Research › Search › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

2020 DIGILAW 929 (ALL)

Anoop Rana @ Sattan v. State of U. P.

2020-06-05

RAVI NATH TILHARI

body2020
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Shri Saksham Srivastava, Advocate holding brief of Shri Akhilesh Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Ajay Kumar Tiwari, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. The petitioner has challenged the order dated 02.09.2004 suspending the petitioner’s fire arm license, the order dated 15.07.2005 cancelling his fire arm license and the appellate order dated 20.02.2006 dismissing the petitioner’s appeal. 3. The facts of the case are that the petitioner was granted fire arm License No. 198 for DBBL Gun No. 73393 and License No. 36 for Pistol No. 59539 which were renewed from time to time. 4. In view of the police report dated 04.08.2004 of Police Station-Banne Devi the arm license of the petitioner were suspended and a show cause notice dated 02.09.2004 was issued to the petitioner for cancellation of the arm licenses on the ground that on 14.07.2004, the petitioner and others opened fire from their fire arms, in the premises of Tehsil Kaul, in which Shahabudeen and Dinesh Kumar Sharma were seriously injured by bullet in Case Crime Nos. 289 of 2004 and 290 of 2004 under Sections 147, 148, 149 and 307 I.P.C. Police Station-Banne Devi, District-Aligarh were registered against the petitioner. The petitioner misused his fire arms resulting into breach of peace, law and order. Besides, previously, many criminal cases were also registered against the petitioner. 5. The petitioner filed reply to the effect that he was not named in the FIR of the incident dated 14.07.2004 lodged against unknown persons and in the two case crime nos. 289 of 2004 and 290 of 2004 the petitioner was falsely implicated. The petitioner had not misused the fire arms. The petitioner also submitted that previously a show cause notice dated 03.08.2003 for cancellation of the petitioner’s fire arm licenses was issued but the same was withdrawn by order dated 28.10.2003 after considering the petitioner’s reply. As such, the petitioner submitted that the notice dated 02.09.2004 deserved to be withdrawn. 6. The Licensing Authority/District Magistrate Aligarh after considering the petitioner’s reply and the police report but not being satisfied with the reply passed the order of cancellation on 15.07.2005. The petitioner filed appeal no. 2 under Section 18 of the Indian Arms Act (Anoop Rana @ Sattan versus State of U.P.) which was dismissed by the Commissioner Agra Division, Agra by order dated 20.02.2006. 7. The petitioner filed appeal no. 2 under Section 18 of the Indian Arms Act (Anoop Rana @ Sattan versus State of U.P.) which was dismissed by the Commissioner Agra Division, Agra by order dated 20.02.2006. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that in the FIR the petitioner was not named and in Case Crime No. 289 of 2004 and 290 of 2004, the petitioner was falsely implicated. He has also submitted that as the previous show cause notice dated 03.08.2003 was withdrawn by order dated 28.10.2003, the present proceedings for cancellation of the petitioner’s fire arm licenses could not be initiated and his license could not be cancelled. by the order under challenge. 8. Learned Standing Counsel has submitted that the petitioner has long criminal history. There were several cases registered against him. He was creating nuisance in the society showing power and barrels. The order of cancellation had rightly been passed by the licensing authority in the interest of public security and public safety. The petitioner had misused the fire arm in the incident dated 14.07.2004. Even if the petitioner’s name was not in the FIR, his name came to light during investigation and consequently the case crime nos. 289 of 2004 and 290 of 2004 were registered against the petitioner. 9. Learned Standing Counsel has next submitted that the present proceedings were initiated in view of the petitioner’s involvement and misuse of fire arm in the incident on 14.07.2004 and with respect to the same two criminal cases were pending against the petitioner. This has nothing to do with the previous show cause notice dated 03.08.2003 and the order dated 28.10.2003. The same would not come in the way of initiation of the present proceedings and in passing of the order of cancellation under challenge. 10. I have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material on record. 11. It is necessary to reproduce the provisions of Section 17 of the Arms Act, 1959 as following. “17. Variation, suspension and revocation of licences. (1) The ?(1) The licensing authority may vary the conditions subject to which a licence has been granted except such of them as have been prescribed and may for that purpose require the licence-holder by notice in writing to deliver-up the licence to it within such time as may specified in the notice. “17. Variation, suspension and revocation of licences. (1) The ?(1) The licensing authority may vary the conditions subject to which a licence has been granted except such of them as have been prescribed and may for that purpose require the licence-holder by notice in writing to deliver-up the licence to it within such time as may specified in the notice. (2) The licensing authority may, on the application of the holder of a licence, also vary the conditions of the licence except such of them as have been prescribed. (3) The licensing authority may by order in writing suspend a licence for such period as it thinks fit or revoke a licence,?(1) The (a) if the licensing authority is satisfied that the holder of the licence is prohibited by this Act or by any other law for the time being in force, from acquiring, having in his possession or carrying any arms or ammunition, or is of unsound mind, or is for any reason unfit for a licence under this Act; or (b) if the licensing authority deems it necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety to suspend or revoke the licence; or (c) if the licence was obtained by the suppression of material information or on the basis of wrong information provided by the holder of the licence or any other person on his behalf at the time of applying for it; or (d) if any of the conditions of the licence has been contravened; or (e) if the holder of the licence has failed to comply with a notice under sub-section (1) requiring him to deliver-up the licence. (4) The licensing authority may also revoke a licence on the application of the holder thereof. (5) Where the licensing authority makes an order varying a licence under sub-section (1) or an order suspending or revoking a licence under sub-section (3), it shall record in writing the reasons there for and furnish to the holder of the licence on demand a brief statement of the same unless in any case the licensing authority is of the opinion that it will not be in the public interest to furnish such statement. (6) The authority to whom the licensing authority is subordinate may by order in writing suspend or revoke a licence on any ground on which it may be suspended or revoked by the licensing authority; and the foregoing provisions of this section shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to the suspension or revocation of a licence by such authority. (7) A court convicting the holder of a licence of any offence under this Act or the rules made there under may also suspend or revoke the licence: Provided that if the conviction is set aside on appeal or otherwise, the suspension or revocation shall become void. (8) An order of suspension or revocation under sub-section (7) may also be made by an appellate court or by the High Court when exercising its powers of revision. (9) The Central Government may, by order in the Official Gazette, suspend or revoke or direct any licensing authority to suspend or revoke all or any licences granted under this Act throughout India or any part thereof. (10) On the suspension or revocation of a licence under this section the holder thereof shall without delay surrender the licence to the authority by whom it has been suspended or revoked or to such other authority as may be specified in this behalf in the order of suspension or revocation.” 12. A bare reading of Section 17(3) of the Arms Act, 1959 makes it clear that licensing authority may by order in writing suspend a license for such period as he thinks fit and revoke the license (b) if the Licensing Authority deems it necessary for the security of public peace or for public safety suspend or revoke a license. 13. It is settled in law that the licensing authority has to satisfy itself that it is necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety to revoke or cancel the license. 14. The satisfaction of the licensing authority must be based on the material on record. The order of cancellation or revocation must be passed after affording opportunity of hearing to the licensee in consonance with the principle of natural justice. 15. 14. The satisfaction of the licensing authority must be based on the material on record. The order of cancellation or revocation must be passed after affording opportunity of hearing to the licensee in consonance with the principle of natural justice. 15. In the present case, the petitioner’s license has been cancelled by the licensing authority on its satisfaction that it was necessary for the security of the public peace and public safety that the fire arm license should not continue with the petitioner. 16. In this respect the licensing authority has considered the police report and the reply of the petitioner to the show cause notice and on such consideration the licensing authority found that the petitioner has long criminal history and he misused the fire arm in the incident dated 14.07.2004. Thus, the licensing authority has recorded its satisfaction on the pre requisite under Section 17(3) of the Arms Act for cancellation of the fire arm licenses which is based on material on record. This finding has been affirmed by the appellate authority. The finding thus, is a concurrent finding of fact, the petitioner’s counsel has not been able to demonstrate as to how the finding suffers from any illegality or perversity. 17. In the case of Mahendra Singh Dhantwal versus Hindustan Motors Ltd. 1976 4 SCC 606 the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph no. 32 has held as under:- “It is true that on the face of the order of termination the company invoked clause (1) of the agreement and even so it was open to the tribunal to pierce the veil of the order and have a close look at all the circumstances and come to a decision whether the order was passed on account of certain misconduct. This is a finding of fact which could not be interfered with under Article 226 of the Constitution unless the conclusion is perverse, that is to say, based on no evidence whatsoever. We are, however, unable to say so having regard to the facts and circumstances described by the tribunal in its order.” 18. In the case of Ashok Kumar versus Sita Ram 2001 4 SCC 478 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under in paragraph nos. 10 and 17 which are being reproduced as under. “10. We are, however, unable to say so having regard to the facts and circumstances described by the tribunal in its order.” 18. In the case of Ashok Kumar versus Sita Ram 2001 4 SCC 478 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under in paragraph nos. 10 and 17 which are being reproduced as under. “10. The position is too well settled to admit of any controversy that the finding of fact recorded by the final Court of fact should not ordinarily be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction, unless the Court is satisfied that the finding is vitiated by manifest error of law or is patently perverse. The High Court should not interfere with a finding of fact simply because it feels persuaded to take a different view on the material on record. 17. The question that remains to be considered is whether the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction was justified in setting aside the order of the Appellate Authority. The order passed by the Appellate Authority did not suffer from any serious illegality, nor can it be said to have taken a view of the matter which no reasonable person was likely to take. In that view of the matter there was no justification for the High Court to interfere with the order in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. In a matter like the present case where orders passed by the Statutory Authority vested with power to act quasi-judicially is challenged before the High Court, the role of the Court is supervisory and corrective. In exercise of such jurisdiction the High Court is not expected to interfere with the final order passed by the Statutory Authority unless the order suffers from manifest error and if it is allowed to stand it would amount to perpetuation of grave injustice. The Court should bear in mind that it is not acting as yet another Appellate Court in the matter. We are constrained to observe that in the present case the High Court has failed to keep the salutary principles in mind while deciding the case.” 19. The Court should bear in mind that it is not acting as yet another Appellate Court in the matter. We are constrained to observe that in the present case the High Court has failed to keep the salutary principles in mind while deciding the case.” 19. Thus, in exercise of writ jurisdiction a finding of fact recorded by the final court of fact or the statutory authority should not ordinarily be interfered with by the High Court unless the court is satisfied that the finding is vitiated by manifest error of law or is patently perverse. The role of the Court is supervisory and corrective. The High Court is not expected to interfere with the final order passed by the statutory authority unless the order suffers from manifest error of law and if it is allowed to stand it would amount to perpetuation of grave injustice. It should also not interfere with the finding of fact simply because on the material on record a different view is also possible. This Court would not act as yet another court of appeal in the matter. 20. The finding recorded by the statutory authority in the present case being based on material on record and also having been recorded after affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner in consonance with the principle of natural justice, this Court does not find any reason to interfere with the concurrent finding of fact that the continued existence of fire arm license with the petitioner would endanger security of public peace and public safety. Once there is material to support the finding, this Court will also not enter into the aspect of sufficiency of the material for the satisfaction of the licensing authority. 21. The petitioner might not have been named in the FIR and the FIR might have been against unknown persons but it is not denied by the petitioner that the case crime nos. 289 of 2004 and 290 of 2004 under Sections 147, 148, 149 and 307 I.P.C. were registered against the petitioner. The petitioner’s name must have appeared and come to light during investigation. For that reason the criminal cases were registered against him. 289 of 2004 and 290 of 2004 under Sections 147, 148, 149 and 307 I.P.C. were registered against the petitioner. The petitioner’s name must have appeared and come to light during investigation. For that reason the criminal cases were registered against him. For the purposes of the satisfaction of the licensing authority in terms of Section 17(3) of the Arms Act, 1959 it hardly matters if the licensee is named in the FIR or his name comes to knowledge during investigation, particularly, when after investigation, the criminal cases have been registered finding the involvement of the licensee. 22. The next submission of the petitioner’s counsel is that in view of the previous order dated 28.10.2003, by which the earlier show cause notice dated 03.08.2003 was withdrawn and as such the present proceedings for cancellation of the fire arm license could not be initiated by issue of notice dated 29.04.2004 and the impugned order could not be passed, does not appeal to the court and deserves to be rejected. 23. A perusal of the order dated 28.10.2003 shows that the subject matter of the earlier notice dated 03.08.2003 was entirely different than the subject matter of present notice dated 02.09.2004. The proceedings by notice dated 02.09.2004 were initiated against the petitioner in view of many criminal cases against him as mentioned in the said notice, which was withdrawn by order dated 28.10.2003. In so far as the initiation for proceedings of cancellation by notice dated 02.09.2004 is concerned, the same were initiated on the ground that in the incident dated 14.07.2004, the petitioner misused his fire arm and opened fire in the premises of Tehsil Kaul in which Shahbudeen and Dinesh Kumar Sharma were seriously injured, resulting into breach of peace, law and order and consequently case crime nos. 289 of 2004 and 290 of 2004 were registered against the petitioner. These are the criminal cases registered after the order dated 28.10.2003 and can very well form the basis of initiation of fresh proceedings for cancellation of fire arm license, even if the earlier notice dated 03.08.2003 was withdrawn by order dated 28.10.2003. 24. Mere mention of the earlier criminal cases in the present notice dated 02.09.2004 is not sufficient to quash the impugned order dated 15.07.2005 in as much as the court finds that the same was mentioned only to show the petitioner’s criminal history. 24. Mere mention of the earlier criminal cases in the present notice dated 02.09.2004 is not sufficient to quash the impugned order dated 15.07.2005 in as much as the court finds that the same was mentioned only to show the petitioner’s criminal history. These cases are not the basis of the initiation of the proceedings nor the impugned order has been passed on the basis of those criminal cases. The present proceedings, the court finds that, are independent of the earlier proceedings. The subject matter of both the notices is different and as such the order dated 28.10.2003 does not come in the way of the authorities in giving notice dated 02.09.2004 and passing the order dated 15.07.2005 under Section 17(3) of the Arms Act, 1959. 25. Thus, considered, I do not find any illegality in the order of cancellation dated 15.07.2005 passed by the licensing authority. 26. The appellate order has also been rightly passed by the appellate authority, affirming the order of the licensing authority. 27. The writ petition lacks merits and is dismissed. No orders as to cos.