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2020 DIGILAW 93 (CAL)

Kakuli Mitra (widow) v. Prabir Kumar Nag And Anr

2020-01-22

BIBEK CHAUDHURI

body2020
JUDGMENT Bibek Chaudhuri, J. - Defendant in a suit for eviction under West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act is the appellant before this Court. 2. One Prabir Kumar Nag and his wife Smt. Mousumi Nag, respondents herein instituted Ejectment Suit No.1284 of 2000 before the learned Judge, 4th Bench, Small Causes Court, Calcutta praying for eviction of the appellants on the ground of default, reasonable requirement and violation of Clauses (m), (o) and (p) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. The appellants contested the suit by filing written statement and additional written statement. 3. After contested hearing the trial court by his judgment and decree dismissed the suit on the ground that the notice under Section 13(6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 (hereinafter described as the Said Act) was defective in view of the fact that by virtue of the said notice entire tenancy of the defendants was not determined. The learned trial judge, however, held that the respondents were able to prove the ground of reasonable requirement envisaged under Section 13(1)ff of the Said Act. 4. The judgment and decree of dismissal of the said suit led the respondents to file an appeal before the learned Chief Judge, City Civil Court, which was registered as Title Appeal No.85 of 2006. By impugned judgment and decree passed on 20th January, 2007 the learned Judge, 6th Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta decreed the suit on the ground of reasonable requirement holding, inter alia, that the notice under Section 13(6) of the Said Act was legal, valid and sufficient. 5. In this Court the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate court is challenged by the defendants of said suit. 6. It is found from the record that vide order dated 29th June, 2007 the instant appeal was admitted for hearing formulating the following substantial questions of law:- a) Whether the learned first Appellate Court committed substantial error in law in reversing the judgment and order passed by the learned trial judge? b) Whether the learned first Appellate Court committed substantial error in law in holding that the notice to the tenants was legal, valid and sufficient although the same was in respect of the portion of the tenancy? b) Whether the learned first Appellate Court committed substantial error in law in holding that the notice to the tenants was legal, valid and sufficient although the same was in respect of the portion of the tenancy? c) Whether the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court committed substantial error in law in not considering the question of partial eviction in terms of Section 13 of subsection (6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956? d) Whether the findings of the learned first Appellate Court is otherwise perverse? 7. Mr. Ayan Banerjee, learned Advocate for the appellants at the outset draws my attention to paragraph 2 of the plaint where the plaintiffs stated the extent of tenancy in the following words:- "That the defendants were the monthly tenants under the plaintiffs in respect of a flat on the ground floor consisting of three bedrooms, kitchen, bath, privy and water tap of premises No.27B, Beadon Row, P.S Burtala, Calcutta-6, at a monthly rental of Rs.75/- per month payable according to English Calendar........" 8. Mr. Banerjee also has pointed out paragraph 3 of the original plaint where the plaintiffs stated that the defendants in or about 1990 by force illegally occupied a space on the ground floor near the entrance gate and also by force walled up the northern side and converted the said space to a room without the consent and permission of the plaintiffs". 9. Next Mr. Banerjee draws my attention to the amended plaint filed by the plaintiffs in the trial court on 25th March, 2004. In the amended plaint it was stated by the plaintiff in paragraph 3 that the space near the entrance gate of the suit flat which was allegedly occupied by the defendants forcibly and illegally and was converted to a room without the consent and permission of the plaintiffs was not included in the extent of tenancy of the defendants. With this averment, the plaintiffs withdrew prayer (b) of the plaint that contained and decree for declaration that the defendant has/had no legal right to retain the legal possession of the said room as described in schedule 'B' of the plaint and recovery of possession thereof. 10. Mr. Banerjee next refers to the written statement filed by the defendants in the suit. 10. Mr. Banerjee next refers to the written statement filed by the defendants in the suit. It is the specific case of the defendants that one Hrishikesh Mitra, since deceased the husband of defendant No.2 was inducted as a tenant in respect of the entire ground floor consisting of three bedrooms, one kitchen, one Thakurghar, bath, privy, courtyard excepting a room on the said ground floor by the side of the main entrance under one Kabita Ditta. Sabita Ghosh, Bimala Rani Mitter at a monthly rental of Rs.60/- payable according to English Calendar. Sometimes in 1955, the room situated near to the main entrance gate of the defendant's flat was also let out to P.K. Engineering Works, proprietorship firm owned by one P.K Mitter, since deceased, the husband of defendant No.1 at a monthly rental of Rs.15/- per month payable according to the English Calendar. After the death of Hrishikesh Mitra in the year 1960 the above mentioned two tenancies were clubbed and/or consolidated into a single tenancy in respect of entire ground floor at a rental of Rs.75/- in favour of P.K Engineering. The rent bill was accordingly issued in respect of entire ground floor in the name of P.K Engineering till the death of the said P.K. Mitter, who died sometime in the month of July, 1966. After the death of the said P.K. Mitter, tenancy was attorned to the defendants who were the widows of Hrishikesh Mitra and P.K Mitter, both deceased under same rate of rent. It is also the case of the defendants that on the request of the plaintiffs the original defendants vacated one room situated on the western side of the ground floor for possession of the Darwan of the plaintiffs. After the death of the original Darwan of the plaintiffs, his two sons are still residing the western side room of the suit premises. The present plaintiffs purchased the suit property from the original owners and they became landlord in respect of the suit premises. Thus the defendants claimed that the description of the tenanted premises was wrongly stated in the plaint as well as the eviction notice under Section 13(6) of the Said Act. According to Mr. Banerjee as the tenancy was not determined to its foulest extent, no decree in the suit for eviction could be passed. 11. Thus the defendants claimed that the description of the tenanted premises was wrongly stated in the plaint as well as the eviction notice under Section 13(6) of the Said Act. According to Mr. Banerjee as the tenancy was not determined to its foulest extent, no decree in the suit for eviction could be passed. 11. Learned Advocate for the appellant submits that according to the case of the plaintiffs, the defendants are tenants in respect of one ground floor flat consisting of three bedrooms, one kitchen, one store room, bath, privy and water tap and a courtyard. The learned Judge in the lower appellate court wrongly held that even assuming that a new tenancy was given in respect of one room near the entrance gate of the ground floor flat under occupation of the defendants, the extent of tenancy of the defendants would be four rooms apart from kitchen, Thakurghar or storeroom and one courtyard. The defendants themselves admitted that they had surrendered one western side room under their possession for occupation of Darwan of the plaintiffs. Thus from defendants' possession of four rooms besides kitchen, Thakurghar or storeroom, bath and privy etc, one room was reduced when they surrendered the same in favour of plaintiffs for the possession of the Darwan of the plaintiffs. Thus according to the learned lower appellate court the extent of tenancy in respect of three rooms, one kitchen, Thakurghar or storeroom, bath, privy and courtyard remained under the possession of defendants when the suit was filed by the plaintiffs. Thus the learned Judge in First Appellate Court found that there is no dispute between the parties regarding extend of tenancy of the defendants in the suit premises. The Commissioner's Report can also be reconciled with the plaintiffs of the parties. Under such circumstances, the learned Judge in First Appellate Court held the extent of tenancy was correctly stated in the notice under Section 13(6) of the Said Act. 12. According to Mr. Banerjee the above finding is absolutely perverse and contrary to the evidence on record and this Court has every authority to look into the evidence on record in view of substantial questions of law formulated in ground (d) by the Division Bench of this Court. 13. 12. According to Mr. Banerjee the above finding is absolutely perverse and contrary to the evidence on record and this Court has every authority to look into the evidence on record in view of substantial questions of law formulated in ground (d) by the Division Bench of this Court. 13. I have carefully perused the Commissioner's report as well as the evidence adduced by the witnesses on behalf of the plaintiffs and the defendants to independently ascertain the extent of tenancy in respect of the suit premises. 14. It is found from the evidence on record as well as the Commissioner's report that the defendants are in occupation of entire ground floor of premises No.27B, Beadon Row. The extent of tenancy consists of one room on the eastern side of the suit flat, two rooms on the southern side of the said suit flat, one small room, named as Thakurghar or storeroom in between two southern side rooms. There is a room on the western side of the courtyard which was surrendered by the defendants for the occupation of the Darwan of the plaintiffs. On the extreme north by the side of staircase there is a room which, according to the plaintiffs was forcibly occupied by the defendants. On the contrary, it is the case of the defendants that said room was given at rent sometimes in 1955 in the name of P.K Engineering, a proprietorship firm of one P.K Mitter. After the death of the said P.K Mitter, both the tenancy were clubbed together and rate of rent was fixed at Rs.75/-. 15. According to Mr. Banerjee the defendants/appellants are tenants in respect of four rooms, one Thakurghar or storeroom, one kitchen, bath and privy, courtyard etc leaving aside the room which was surrendered by the tenants at the request of the original plaintiffs to accommodate Darwan of the plaintiffs. The ejectment notice under Section 13(6) of the said Act clearly shows that tenancy was determined in respect of three rooms, one kitchen, one thakurghar or storeroom, bath and privy etc. since the description of tenancy was wrong and entire tenancy was not determined, the notice to quit was illegal, inoperative and insufficient. The learned Judge in First Appellate Court failed to appreciate the extent of tenancy of the defendants and wrongly held that the notice to quit was legal, valid and sufficient. 16. Mr. since the description of tenancy was wrong and entire tenancy was not determined, the notice to quit was illegal, inoperative and insufficient. The learned Judge in First Appellate Court failed to appreciate the extent of tenancy of the defendants and wrongly held that the notice to quit was legal, valid and sufficient. 16. Mr. Sauradipta Banerjee, learned Advocate on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, submits that if the statements in plaint and written statement are reconciled, it would be found that there is no ambiguity in describing the tenancy in question in the notice to quit. It is stated by the learned Advocate for the respondents that the specific case of the defendants/appellants is that the husband of defendant No.2 Late Hrishikesh Mitra was inducted as tenant sometimes in 1950 in respect of the entire ground floor consisting of three bed rooms, one kitchen, one thakurghar, bath and privy and a courtyard excepting a room on the said ground floor by the side of main entrance under one Kabita Dutta, Sabita Ghosh, Bimala Rani Mitter at the rental of Rs.60/- per month payable according to English Calendar. Sometimes in the year 1955 one P.K Engineering, a proprietorship firm owned by one P.K Mitter, since deceased, took tenancy in respect of the said one room situated by the side of main entrance in the ground floor at a monthly rental of Rs.15/-. After the death of Hrishikesh Mitra in 1960, the aforesaid two tenancies were consolidated and one single tenancy in respect of entire ground floor at a monthly rental of Rs.75/- was created. According to the learned Advocate for the respondent the said fact has not been proved by the defendants during trial of the suit. It is urged by the learned Advocate for the respondent that extent of tenancy being a concurrent finding of fact cannot be agitated in the second appeal. 17. He also refers to the case of the plaintiff depicted in the original plaint where it is specifically pleaded that the defendants illegally trespassed into the said room situated by the side of the entrance of the ground floor flat. 17. He also refers to the case of the plaintiff depicted in the original plaint where it is specifically pleaded that the defendants illegally trespassed into the said room situated by the side of the entrance of the ground floor flat. Initially, the suit was filed for eviction of tenants as well as for eviction of the defendants from the said one room situated by the side of the entrance of the ground floor flat under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, but the relief in the form of decree under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act was omitted by way of amendment of plaint as the Small Causes Court had no jurisdiction to try a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act based on title. Therefore, after amendment of plaint, suit was confined to extent of tenancy and eviction of the defendants from the tenanted premises situated in the ground floor of the premises in suit. 18. It is further argued by Mr. Banerjee, learned Advocate for the respondents that when the defendants claimed that their tenancy was extended also to one room situated by the side of the entrance of the ground floor apart from the rooms mentioned in schedule 'A' of the plaint, it was the duty of the respondents to prove that one P.K Engineering was inducted as a tenant in respect of the said room and the original landlords issued rent receipts in respect of the said room in the name of P.K Engineering. 19. Learned Advocate for the respondents submits that the respondents became the landlord in respect of the suit premises by purchase of premises No.27B, Beadon Row. After their purchase, the respondents, namely, Prabir Kumar Nag and Mousumi Nag sent two separate letters stating, inter alia, that they purchased undivided half share each of premises No. 27B, Beadon Row from the owners/landlords and requested the defendants/appellants to attorn tenancy in favour of them and pay rent to them along with all arrears. The said two letters of attornment were marked Exhibit-E and Exhibit-G during trial of the suit at the instance of the appellants. Similarly, the erstwhile landlords, namely, Kabita Dutta, Sabita Ghosh and Bimala Rani Mitter informed the appellants stating, inter alia, that they had sold out their undivided share in favour of the respondents and the appellants should attorn their tenancy in favour of the respondents. Similarly, the erstwhile landlords, namely, Kabita Dutta, Sabita Ghosh and Bimala Rani Mitter informed the appellants stating, inter alia, that they had sold out their undivided share in favour of the respondents and the appellants should attorn their tenancy in favour of the respondents. The said letters of attornment were marked as Exhibit-F, Exhibit-H, Exhibit-I and Exhibit-J respectively by the defendants. In the above mentioned letters of attornment tenancy of the appellants were described as in respect of the ground floor of the premises No. 27B, Beadon Row at a monthly rental of Rs.75/- payable according to English Calendar month. On careful perusal of the evidence on record which I am constrained to consider independently in order to come to a finding as to whether the impugned judgment suffers from perversity for non consideration of material evidence on record, I find that the learned Advocate for the respondents is wrong in his submission that no rent receipt was ever issued in favour of P.K Engineering. The defendants/appellants filed some old rent receipts wherefrom it is found that rent was collected in respect of one room from M/s P.K Engineering Works on behalf of Smt. Kabita Dutta, Smt. Bina Dey and Smt. Bimala Rani Mitter according to their share in the property. Therefore, the rent receipts (Exhibit-A series) prove that M/s P.K Engineering Works was the tenant in respect of one room in the suit premises and the predecessor-ininterest of the appellants, namely Hrishikesh Mitra, since deceased was inducted as a tenant in respect of the remaining portion of the ground floor of the premises in suit. The said two tenancies were subsequently consolidated to one tenancy after the death of Hrishikesh Mitra. 20. Be that as it may, when the respondents purchased the property the defendants were tenants in respect of entire ground floor except one Darwan's room of premises No. 27B, Beadon Row at a monthly rental of Rs.75/- payable according to English Calendar. 21. The notice to quit (Exhibit-2) states that the defendants were tenants in respect of entire ground floor. The dispute between the parties relating to the illegality of the notice is as to whether entire ground floor comprises of three rooms, one Thakurghar or storeroom, one kitchen, bath and privy, courtyard etc or four rooms, one Thakurghar or storeroom, one kitchen, bath and privy and courtyard etc. 22. The dispute between the parties relating to the illegality of the notice is as to whether entire ground floor comprises of three rooms, one Thakurghar or storeroom, one kitchen, bath and privy, courtyard etc or four rooms, one Thakurghar or storeroom, one kitchen, bath and privy and courtyard etc. 22. Even assuming that extent of tenancy was not properly described eviction notice under Section 13(6) of the Premises Tenancy Act, it is not in dispute that in the notice, it is clearly stated that the defendants/appellants were tenants in respect of the entire ground floor. The Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Gita Devi Shah & Ors vs. Smt. Chandra Moni Karnani & Ors., (1993) AIR Calcutta 280 held in paragraph 45 of the report as hereunder:- "45. A notice under Section 13(6) is a must for instituting a suit against the defendant. The relevant portion of the said section in its categorical terms states that no suit, proceedings can be instituted without seving a notice under Section 13(6). It is a procedure led and not substantive law and although Indian legal system is not so stringent as an English Law, with regard to the procedural part, yet care must be taken to see that unjustified liberalisation with regard to pro-cedural part does not create anomalous position resulting in mis-carriage of justice. The notice is a warning to the tenant having a threat to sue in case the tenant fails to comply with the requisition. The language must be clear, the tenancy should be described as specifically as is expected from a normal and reasonable man. This however, is an established principle of law and no notice under Section 13(6) of the said Act of 1956 would be declared bad, only because the tenancy has: not been exactly defined. The reason being that the tenant knows his own tenancy and the test is whether he had understood the purport of the notice or not. It is also necessary that| the grounds stated in the notice can only be; taken in the plaint. But, however, it is also: established principle of law that the plaint must be absolutely clear in describing the, tenancy as the court will pass decree of eviction from the premises as stated in the plaint." 23. Mr. It is also necessary that| the grounds stated in the notice can only be; taken in the plaint. But, however, it is also: established principle of law that the plaint must be absolutely clear in describing the, tenancy as the court will pass decree of eviction from the premises as stated in the plaint." 23. Mr. Ayan Banerjee, learned Advocate for the appellants on the other hand relies upon a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Ghasi Ram & Ors vs. Jagat Narain & Ors, (1976) AIR Allahabad 221 it is held in the aforesaid report that when in the notice to quit, the landlord has stated that the tenant is in possession of a certain portion qua-tenant and other portion as a trespasser, the said notice is invalid. Because, notice must extend to whole of the demise premises and not in part only; otherwise, the notice will be bad. In the instant case it is stated by the plaintiffs that the defendants were tenants in respect of entire ground floor. Admitted case of both the parties is that one room of the ground floor was subsequently surrendered for the Darwan of the plaintiffs. Except the said Darwan's room, the defendants are in possession of entire ground floor. Tenancy of the defendants were determined by notice to quit (Exhibit-2) in respect of entire ground floor. Under such circumstances, relying on the decision of Gita Devi Saha (supra), I can safely hold that the notice to quit under Section 13(6) of the said Act cannot be held to be illegal, invalid or insufficient on the ground of misdescription of the extent of tenancy. If the suit is decreed, the decree is well executable because in such case, defendants would be liable to be evicted from entire ground floor. 24. In view of the above discussion, I hold that the notice under Section 13(6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act was legal, valid and sufficient and there is no reason to interfere with judgment passed by the learned First Appellate Court on the ground of legality, validity and sufficiency of the ejectment notice in connection with Title Suit No.1284 of 2000 Substantial questions of law in ground Nos. (b) and (d) are therefore answered in negative. 25. (b) and (d) are therefore answered in negative. 25. On the issue of reasonable requirement of the plaintiffs/respondents for their own use and occupation, both the Courts below concurrently found that the respondents reasonably required the suit premises for their own use and occupation. 26. At the time of admission of the appeal, the Division Bench formulated a question of law as to whether the learned Judge in lower appellate court substantially erred in law in failing to consider the question of partial eviction to satisfy the need of the plaintiffs. It is stated by the plaintiffs in the plaint that the family of the plaintiffs consists of both the plaintiffs who are husband and wife, one daughter who was aged about 13 years at the time of institution of the suit, widow mother of the plaintiff No.1, one whole time maid servant and one Darwan. It is further stated by the plaintiff they are in possession of two bed rooms on the second floor and one asbestos shed small room as kitchen and one staircase room as Thakurghar on the same floor. The plaintiffs claimed that they reasonably required one room for themselves, one room for their daughter, one room for the mother of plaintiff No.1, one study room for the daughter of the plaintiffs, one room to be used as Thakurghar, one drawing room cum guest room, one room for their made servant, one storeroom and one kitchen apart from bath and privy. During trial of the suit the plaintiff's accommodation on the second floor of premises No.27B, Beadon Row was inspected by the Advocate Commissioner and he submitted his report. It is found from his report that the second floor of the said premises consists of five rooms, one covered passage and one bath and privy. Out of them the learned Advocate Commissioner described a room on the north-west corner of the second floor of the said premises as a bed room. Room No.2 is a 'L' shaped room measuring about 21 ft. x 10 ft. 6 inches and the said room is used as a bedroom. There is a small room adjacent to the said second room which is used as Thakurghar of the said premises. Measurement of room No.4 is 16 ft. x 8 ft. and the said room is used as kitchen of the plaintiffs. x 10 ft. 6 inches and the said room is used as a bedroom. There is a small room adjacent to the said second room which is used as Thakurghar of the said premises. Measurement of room No.4 is 16 ft. x 8 ft. and the said room is used as kitchen of the plaintiffs. Room No.5 is practically a passage measuring about 11 ft. x 6 ft over which building materials and unused articles were stuck. The roof of the said room is made of asbestos. There is a covered space measuring about 21 ft. x 3 ft. which is used as ingress and egress to and from the other rooms under occupation of the plaintiffs/respondents. 27. During pendency of the appeal both the parties have filed series of applications. All those applications were directed to be disposed of along with the appeal. 28. Since the applications filed by the parties relate to the cause of requirement of the plaintiffs, let me describe the averment in applications hereinbelow: The appellants filed CAN 8462 of 2011 for taking note of subsequent event in as much as the marriage of the daughter of the plaintiffs/respondents was performed on 2nd March, 2019 and after marriage she has been residing at her matrimonial home. Therefore it is pleaded by the appellants the requirement for the daughter of the plaintiffs was no longer thereafter her marriage. By filing an affidavit in opposition against the said application, it is pleaded by the respondents that her married daughter often comes to her paternal home with her husband and the plaintiff's require one room for accommodating her daughter and son-in-law during their occasional visit. Practically the son-in-law of the plaintiffs carries on business of publication and distribution of various text books in College Street area and comes to the suit premises everyday and occasionally resides there. 29. Can 8463 of 2011 is another application filed by the appellants praying for amendment of written statement by incorporating the fact of marriage of the daughter of the plaintiffs. 30. Can 8464 of 2011 is another application filed by the appellants along with the wedding card of the daughter of the plaintiffs with a prayer to bring the said wedding card on record as evidence. 30. Can 8464 of 2011 is another application filed by the appellants along with the wedding card of the daughter of the plaintiffs with a prayer to bring the said wedding card on record as evidence. The respondents have filed an affidavit-in-opposition stating, inter alia, that they have admitted the marriage of their daughter and therefore wedding card may not be proved by the appellants by adducing evidence. 31. Can 8883 of 2011 is an application filed by the respondents praying for amendment of plaint stating, inter alia, that after institution of the suit in 1996 the plaintiff No.2 gave birth to a mail child on 18th July, 1997. The said son of the plaintiffs is now aged about 22 years and plaintiffs require a separate room for his accommodation. The appellants have filed an affidavit-in-opposition stating, inter alia, that during trial of the suit as well as in first appeal, the plaintiffs did not come forward with an application for amendment of plaint at this stage the plaintiffs could not claim additional accommodation for their son. The act and conduct of the plaintiffs reasonably proves that they have abandoned the claim of requirement for their son. 32. Can 10596 of 2013 is an application filed by the respondent for taking note of subsequent events stating, inter alia, that the son of the plaintiffs, namely Samsubhra Nag was aged about 16 years on the date of filing of the application. DW1 admitted during her cross examination that the plaintiffs have a son and as such the said son has requirement of accommodation in the house of the plaintiffs. In the said application the respondents have prayed for leave of the court permitting them not to press an application for amendment of plaint, i.e., CAN 8883 of 2011. The defendants/appellants, however did not file any written objection against the said application. 33. The case of reasonable requirement of the plaintiffs are to be decided taking into consideration of the above mentioned applications. It is an established proposition of law that the Court is duty bound to take into account subsequent events in a suit for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement. Law is also trite that evidence cannot be looked into without pleading. It is an established proposition of law that the Court is duty bound to take into account subsequent events in a suit for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement. Law is also trite that evidence cannot be looked into without pleading. In a suit for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement for own use and occupation of the plaintiffs and his family members, requirement goes on changing during passage of time. However subsequent event is required to be pleaded by the parties. 34. In the instant case the appellants have stated in CAN 8462 of 2011 that the daughter of the plaintiffs got married on 2nd March, 2010 and she has been residing at her matrimonial home. Therefore requirement pleaded by the plaintiffs for their daughter does not exist as after her marriage. In their affidavit-in-opposition, the plaintiffs/respondents, on the other hand pleaded that her married daughter and son-in-law very often come to their house practically the son-in-law of the plaintiffs carries on business of publication and distribution of test books in College Street areas and regularly visits the suit house and often stays there. CAN 8463 of 2011 is another application filed by the appellants praying for amendment of written statement incorporating the said fact of marriage between the parties. 35. Both the applications and affidavit-in-oppositions were filed on affidavit. These are the statements of the parties on certain factual changes on the point of reasonable requirement on solemn affirmation. 36. This Court while answering to the substantial question as to whether partial eviction of the defendants would satisfy the need of the plaintiffs or not, anxiously ponders over the matter as to whether the applications for taking note to subsequent event filed by the appellants and the affidavit-in-opposition thereto can be considered as part of the pleading of the parties. 37. The issue relating to particulars in pleading visa-vise cognizance of subsequent event came up for consideration before Hon'ble Supreme Court in K. Srinivas vs. K. Sunita, (2014) 16 SCC 34 on the question that the fact filing a false case complaint having been not pleaded, whether the Court can take cognizance of it. In this context the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed:- "Another argument which has been articulated on behalf of the learned counsel for the Respondent is that the filing of the criminal complaint has not been pleaded in the petition itself. In this context the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed:- "Another argument which has been articulated on behalf of the learned counsel for the Respondent is that the filing of the criminal complaint has not been pleaded in the petition itself. As we see it, the criminal complaint was filed by the wife after filing of the husband's divorce petition, and being subsequent events could have been looked into by the Court. In any event, both the parties were fully aware of this facet of cruelty which was allegedly suffered by the husband. When evidence was lead, as also when arguments were addressed, objection had not been raised on behalf of the Respondent-Wife that this aspect of cruelty was beyond the pleadings. We are, therefore, not impressed by this argument raised on her behalf." 38. Borrowing this principle in the instant case, it is found from the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent that they have admitted the fact of marriage of their daughter in the year 2010. They also admitted the wedding card of the said marriage of their daughter. In view of such circumstances, in my considered view this fact can be taken into consideration as a subsequent event without even amendment of pleading or taking into consideration the application and affidavit-in-opposition as part of the pleadings of the parties. This Court holds the similar view in respect of the respondent's application for taking note of subsequent events regarding the requirement of the son of the plaintiffs who was born after institution of the suit especially when the witness on behalf of the defendant (DW1) admitted in his cross examination that the plaintiffs have one son and he has requirement for his accommodation in the suit house. 39. Therefore, taking together the applications, affidavits-in-opposition as mentioned above and the original pleadings in the form of plaint and written statement, this Court finds that the family of the plaintiffs consists of themselves, their son who is now aged about 22 years, widow mother of plaintiff No.1 and a whole time made servant. It is always expected that the married daughter and her husband will visit the plaintiffs and for their accommodation the plaintiffs reasonably require one room. 40. It is always expected that the married daughter and her husband will visit the plaintiffs and for their accommodation the plaintiffs reasonably require one room. 40. From the evidence on record as well as the report of the Local Inspection Commissioner it is ascertained that the plaintiffs are now in occupation of two bedrooms, one small room used as Thakurghar and one asbestos shed kitchen. 41. Considering the status of the plaintiffs, I am of the view that the plaintiffs reasonably require one bedroom for themselves, one bedroom for the mother of plaintiff No.1, one bedroom for their son, one drawing roomcum-dining room, one guest room to accommodate the married daughter and son in law and other guests of the plaintiffs, one study room for the son of the plaintiffs and one room for the whole time maid servant apart from bath and privy. 42. Thus the respondents reasonably require six rooms. 43. Present accommodation of the plaintiffs is absolutely insufficient and plaintiffs' requirement cannot fulfill by way of partial eviction. 44. In view of the above discussion I do not find any substantial question of law involved in the instant appeal. The appeal therefore stands dismissed on contest, however without cost. 45. The judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court is affirmed. 46. The appellants had directed to vacate and deliver peaceful possession of the suit premises within 60 days from the date of this order, failing which the respondents are at liberty to execute the decree passed by the First Appellate Court. 47. Let a copy of this judgment be sent down to the lower court below.