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2020 DIGILAW 931 (KER)

Sudha P. v. Anitha T. Balan

2020-11-05

ANIL K.NARENDRAN

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JUDGMENT : ANIL K. NARENDRAN, J. 1. The petitioner has filed this Contempt Case, under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, alleging wilfull disobedience of Annexure A1 judgment of this court dated 10.08.2018 in W.P. (C) No. 19899 of 2018. This Contempt Case fifed on 29.01.2020 is not numbered by the Registry, pointing out certain defects under the provisions contained in Section 20 of the said Act, which provides that no Court shall initiate any proceedings of contempt either on its own motion or otherwise after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. 2. Heard the petitioner, who appeared in person, on the defect noted by the Registry. 3. The petitioner, who secured an award dated 06.03.2018 (Ext.P1) from the Co-operative Arbitration Court (Northern), Kozhikode in ARC No. 106 of 2011, had approached this court in W.P. (C) No. 19899 of 2018, invoking the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to implement Ext.P1 award dated 06.03.2018 and an order dated 09.04.2019 (Ext.P2) of the 1st respondent Joint Registrar and to reinstate her in service in the post of Peon with immediate effect from the date of receipt of a copy of the order and disburse salary and other emoluments, within a stipulated time as may be directed by this Court. The petitioner has also sought for a declaration that she is entitled to get implemented Ext.P1 award and Ext.P2 order and reinstatement in service as Peon under the 2nd respondent with effect from the date of receipt of a copy of Ext.P1 award and for disbursement of salary and other emoluments. 4. In that writ petition, the 2nd respondent filed counter affidavit in which it was pointed out that Ext.P1 award passed by the Arbitration Court is under challenge in R.P. No. 57 of 2018 filed before the Co-operative Tribunal. The writ petitioner has also filed Appeal No. 24 of 2018 challenging the said award and the same is also pending consideration before the co-operative Tribunal. 5. The writ petitioner has also filed Appeal No. 24 of 2018 challenging the said award and the same is also pending consideration before the co-operative Tribunal. 5. By Annexure A1 judgment dated 10.08.2018 this Court disposed of W.P. (C) No. 19899 of 2018, taking note of the pendency of R.P. No. 57 of 2018 filed by respondents 2 and 3 and Appeal No. 24 of 2018 filed by the writ petitioner, before the Co-operative Tribunal, against Ext.P1 award passed by the Arbitration Court. As stated in Para-5 of Annexure A1 judgment, the sole issue before this Court was as to whether the writ petitioner is entitled for an order to implement Ext.P1 award of the Arbitration Court or to enforce Ext.P2 order of the 1st respondent Joint Registrar, by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In Annexure A1 judgment, this Court held that, for executing Ext.P1 award of the Arbitration Court, the statutory remedy open to the writ petitioner is to invoke the relevant provisions of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules before the appropriate forum. Therefore, the writ petitioner cannot invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to execute Ext.P1 award. Paras-6 and 7 of Annexure A1 judgment read thus: “6. Ext.P1 award is one issued by the Arbitration Court, in exercise of its powers under sub-section (3) of Section 70 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act. Section 76 of the Act deals with execution of orders, etc. Going by clause (a) of Section 76, an award made under Section 70, if not carried out, on a certificate signed by the Registrar or any person authorised by him in this behalf, be deemed to be a decree of a Civil Court and shall be executed in the same manner as a decree of such court or where the order is for the recovery of money, be executed according to the law and under the rules for the time being in force for the recovery of public revenue due on land. 7. Rule 72 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules deals with issue of certificate under Section 76 of the Act. 7. Rule 72 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules deals with issue of certificate under Section 76 of the Act. As per sub-rule (1) of Rule 72, the holder of any decision, award or order referred to in Section 76 of the Act shall, if the said decision, award or order is not carried out, apply to the Registrar for execution thereof under clause (c) of Section 76 or for a certificate to be issued under clause (a) or (b) of the said Section. Rule 73 deals with execution proceeding under Revenue Recovery Act and Rule 74 deals with procedure for execution of decision, award or order. Therefore, for executing Ext.P1 award of the Arbitration Court, the statutory remedy open to the petitioner is to invoke the aforesaid provisions of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules before the appropriate forum. At any rate, the petitioner cannot invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to execute Ext.P1 award.” 6. As far as Ext.P2 order dated 09.04.2018 of the 1st respondent is concerned, this Court noticed that, by the said order, which is one issued based on an application made by the writ petitioner dated 25.03.2018, the 1st Respondent Joint Registrar directed respondents 2 and 3 to implement Ext.P1 award of the Arbitration Court. The fact that Ext.P2 order passed by the 1st respondent Joint Registrar was not under challenge in any proceedings at the instance of respondents 2 and 3, is not in dispute. However, it is not discernible from Ext.P2 order as to whether it is one issued by the 1st respondent in accordance with the provisions under Chapter XI of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, which deals with execution of decisions, awards and order. Moreover, during the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the writ petitioner has no specific case that the writ petitioner has invoked any provisions under Rules 72 to 74 for executing Ext.P1 award. 7. During the course of arguments, the learned counsel for respondents 2 and 3 submitted that R.P. No. 57 of 2018 filed by respondents 2 and 3 and Appeal No. 24 of 2018 filed by the writ petitioner challenging Ext.P1 award were finally heard by the Co-operative Tribunal and reserved for orders to 20.08.2018. 7. During the course of arguments, the learned counsel for respondents 2 and 3 submitted that R.P. No. 57 of 2018 filed by respondents 2 and 3 and Appeal No. 24 of 2018 filed by the writ petitioner challenging Ext.P1 award were finally heard by the Co-operative Tribunal and reserved for orders to 20.08.2018. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the writ petitioner submitted that, though the said cases are listed to 20.08.2018, it is only a formal posting and not for orders. 8. After considering the rival submissions this Court disposed of W.P. (C) No. 19899 of 2018 by Annexure A1 judgment dated 10.08.2018, taking note of the pendency of R.P. No. 57 of 2018 filed by respondents 2 and 3 and in Appeal No. 24 of 2018 filed by the petitioner, before the Co-operative Tribunal, challenging Ext.P1 award passed by the Arbitration Court. This Court ordered that, if Ext.P2 order passed by the 1st respondent Joint Registrar is one issued, based on an application made by the writ petitioner for execution of Ext.P1 award, invoking the provisions under Chapter XI of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules and if the said order is one issued in accordance with the provisions under Chapter XI, with notice to respondents 2 and 3, it is for the 1st respondent Joint Registrar to proceed further with Ext.P2, strictly in accordance with law, subject to any interim or final orders to be passed by the Co-operative Tribunal in R.P. No. 57 of 2018 and Appeal No. 24 of 2018. The 1st respondent was directed to take necessary steps in this regard, as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a certified copy of that judgment. Going by the averments in para-13 of this Contempt Case, the writ petitioner submitted a certified copy of Annexure A1 judgment before the 1st respondent Joint Registrar, on 23.08.2018. 9. After the disposal of W.P.(C) No.19899 of 2018 by Annexure A1 judgment, the Co-operative Tribunal by the order dated 30.08.2018, partly allowed R.P. No. 57 of 2018 filed by the respondents 2 and 3, whereby the directions of the Co-operative Arbitration Court to reinstate the writ petitioner in service stands upheld. The Tribunal set aside the enquiry report by Advocate Shri Jayan and Advocate Shri K. Sujith Kumar and also the order of dismissal. The Tribunal set aside the enquiry report by Advocate Shri Jayan and Advocate Shri K. Sujith Kumar and also the order of dismissal. It was ordered that respondents 2 and 3 shall grant all service and monetary benefits to the writ petitioner forthwith from the date of suspension till the date of reinstatement. The Tribunal has made it clear that, in case respondents 2 and 3 are advised to conduct a fresh enquiry on the second memo of charges issued to the writ petitioner, they are at liberty to do so by complying all the principles of natural justice and strictly as per the provisions of law. By another order dated 30.08.2018, Appeal No. 24 of 2018 filed by the writ petitioner was disposed of in tune with the order in R.P. No. 57 of 2018. 10. Challenging the award passed by the Co-operative Arbitration Court, Kozhikode in ARC No. 106 of 2011 and the order of the Co-operative Tribunal in R.P. No. 57 of 2018, the Ambalapara Service Co-operative Bank approached this Court in W.P. (C) No. 30582 of 2018, seeking a writ of certiorari to quash that award and order and for a declaration that the Co-operative Arbitration Court has no jurisdiction to direct reinstatement of the writ petitioner in service, in view of the law laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in Ambika vs. The Kottappady Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. 2018 (3) KLT 779 , wherein this Court held that the Co-operative Arbitration Court constituted under the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, has no power to direct reinstatement of a delinquent employee in service. The Bank has also filed W.P. (C) No. 30598 of 2018 challenging the order dated 30.08.2018 of the Co-operative Tribunal in ARC No. 106 of 2011. 11. In W.P. (C) No. 30582 of 2018, this Court passed an interim order dated 18.09.2018, whereby it was ordered that any coercive steps pursuant to the award dated 06.03.2018 of the Co-operative Arbitration Court, Kozhikode and the order dated 30.08.2018 of the Kerala Co-operative Tribunal in R.P. No. 57 of 2018 shall be deferred for the period specified in that interim order, which was extended from time to time. The writ petitioner filed I.A. No. 2 of 2018 in W.P. (C) No. 30582 of 2018 seeking an order to vacate that interim order. The writ petitioner filed I.A. No. 2 of 2018 in W.P. (C) No. 30582 of 2018 seeking an order to vacate that interim order. By order dated 05.11.2018, this court dismissed I.A. No. 2 of 2018 in W.P. (C) No. 30582 of 2018 and the interim order granted on 18.09.2018 was extended for a further period of two months. The said order was under challenge in W.A. No. 8 of 2019, which ended in dismissal by the judgment of the Division Bench dated 08.02.2019. That judgment was under challenge before the Apex court in S.L.P. (C) No. 13617 of 2019. The Apex court by the order dated 22.11.2019 declined to entertain the petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India and that S.L.P. was disposed of with a request to this court to consider the listing of W.P. (C) No. 30582 of 2018 at an early date, preferably within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the order in order to facilitate a finality being brought to the dispute under consideration. 12. Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act deals with limitation for actions for contempt. As per Section 20, no court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. 13. In Firm Ganpat Ram Rajkumar vs. Kalu Ram, (1989) Supp. 2 SCC 418, a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court was dealing with a case where an order of that Court ordering delivery of premises had not been complied with. Therefore, an application was filed for initiation of contempt proceedings. A contention was raised on behalf of the alleged contemner based on Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. Dealing with that contention, the Apex Court observed that, Section 20 of the Act states that no court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. In this case, the present application was filed on or about 03.11.1988, as it appear from the affidavit filed in support of the application. In this case, the present application was filed on or about 03.11.1988, as it appear from the affidavit filed in support of the application. The contempt consisted, inter-alia, the act of not giving the possession by force of the order of the learned Senior Sub Judge, Narnaul dated 12.02.1988. Therefore, the application was well within the period of one year. Failure to give possession, if it amounts to a contempt in a situation of this nature, is a continuing wrong and there was no scope for application of Section 20 of the Act. 14. In Pallav Sheth vs. Custodian, (2001) 7 SCC 549 , a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court, noticed that the aforesaid observations in Firm Ganpat Ram Rajkumar indicate that the contention based on Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act was not accepted for two reasons, firstly that the application for initiating action for contempt was filed within one year of the date when the contempt was alleged to have been committed and secondly failure to give possession amounted to continuing wrong and, therefore, there was no scope for application of Section 20 of the Act. This case is important for the reason that Court regarded the filling of the application for initiating contempt proceedings as relevant dated from the point of view of limitation. 15. In Om Prakash Jaiswal vs. D.K. Mittal, (2000) 3 SCC 171 , the Apex Court was called upon to interpret Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, which deals with limitation for actions for contempt. In that case an undertaking had been given before the High Court on 19.12.1986 that the Municipal Corporation would not demolish or disturb the construction till disposal of the writ petition. Despite that undertaking, demolition took place on 11.01.1987. Soon thereafter, the appellant filed an application before the High Court, under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, seeking initiation of contempt proceedings. On 15.01.1987 the High Court issued a show-cause notice to the opposite party as to why contempt proceedings should not be initiated against him for defiance of the order dated 19.12.1986. On 06.01.1988, on a concession being made by the Advocate General the High Court ordered that notices be issued to show-cause why the opposite party be not punished for disobeying the order dated 19.12.1986. On 06.01.1988, on a concession being made by the Advocate General the High Court ordered that notices be issued to show-cause why the opposite party be not punished for disobeying the order dated 19.12.1986. Subsequently, on 23.11.1989 the High Court came to the conclusion that issuing of a show-cause notice did not amount to initiation of proceedings and, therefore, the bar enacted by section 20 of the Act was attracted and the application was liable to be rejected. The issue raised before the Apex Court was as to whether the order of 06.01.1988 amounted to initiation of proceedings for contempt. 16. In Om Prakash Jaiswal, dealing with the question of initiation of proceedings, the Apex Court observed that, in order to appreciate the exact connotation of the expression 'initiate any proceedings for contempt' several situations or stages which may arise before the court dealing with contempt proceedings, which are as follows: (i)(a) a private party may file or present an application or petition for initiating any proceedings for civil contempt. (b) the court may receive a motion or reference from the Advocate General or with his consent in writing from any other person or a specified law officer or a court subordinate to the High Court. (ii)(a) the court may in routine issue notice to the person sought to be proceeded against. (b) the court may issue notice to the respondent calling upon him to show cause why the proceedings for contempt be not initiated. (iii) the court may issue notice to the person sought to be proceed against calling upon him to show cause why he be not punished for contempt. In the cases contemplated by (i) or (ii) above, it cannot be said that any proceedings for contempt have been initiated. Filing of an application or petition for initiating proceedings for contempt or a mere receipt of such reference by the court does not amount to initiation of the proceedings by court. On receiving any such document, it is usual with the courts to commence some proceedings by employing an expression such as 'admit', 'rule', 'issue notice' or 'issue notice to show cause why proceedings for contempt be not initiated'. On receiving any such document, it is usual with the courts to commence some proceedings by employing an expression such as 'admit', 'rule', 'issue notice' or 'issue notice to show cause why proceedings for contempt be not initiated'. In all such cases the notice is issued either in routine or because the court has not yet felt satisfied that a case for initiating any proceedings for contempt has been made out and therefore, the court calls upon the opposite party to admit or deny the allegations made or to collect more facts so as to satisfy itself if a case for initiating proceedings for contempt was made out. Such a notice is certainly anterior to initiation. The tenor of the notice is itself suggestive of the fact that in spite of having applied its mind to the allegations and the material placed before it the court was not satisfied of the need for initiating proceedings for contempt; it was still desirous of ascertaining facts or collecting further material whereon to formulate such opinion. It is only when the court has formed an opinion that a prima facie case for initiating proceedings for contempt is made out and that the respondents or the alleged contemners should be called upon to show cause why they should not be punished; then the court can be said to have initiated proceedings for contempt. It is the result of a conscious application of the mind of the court to the facts and the material before it must take placed within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed, failing which the jurisdiction to initiate any proceedings for contempt is lost. The heading of section 20 is 'limitation for actions for contempt'. Strictly speaking, this section does not provide limitation in the sense in which the term is understood in the Limitation Act. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not, therefore, apply. Section 20 strikes at the jurisdiction of the court to initiate any proceeding for contempt. 17. In Pallav Sheth vs. Custodian, (2001) 7 SCC 549 , the question that came up for consideration before a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex court was as follows; “what is the meaning to be given to the expression 'no court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt', occurring in section 20 of the contempt of courts Act”. 17. In Pallav Sheth vs. Custodian, (2001) 7 SCC 549 , the question that came up for consideration before a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex court was as follows; “what is the meaning to be given to the expression 'no court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt', occurring in section 20 of the contempt of courts Act”. The Apex court noticed that, section 20 deals not only with criminal contempt but also with civil contempt. It applies not only to the contempt committed in the face of the High Court or the Supreme Court, but would also be applicable in the case of contempt of the subordinate court. The procedure which is to be followed in each of these cases is different. There can be little doubt that Section 20, as framed, is not happily worded. The heading of the section, however indicates what it was to provide for 'limitation for actions for contempt'. The wording of the section are negative but it is clear that terminus ad quem is the initiation of proceedings for contempt. The question that arise as to how or when are the proceedings for contempt initiated. Under section 23 of the Act power has been given to the supreme Court and to the High Courts to make rules not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act providing for any matter relating to its procedure. The Rules framed under section 23 by the supreme court as well as by the High courts in India, inter alia require, other than suo motu action is taken, petition or application being filed in Court it is then taken up for consideration. The Rules so framed by all the courts in India do show that proceedings are initiated, inter alia, with the filing of an application or a petition in that behalf. If, however, proceedings are not initiated by filing of an application within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed then the court shall not have jurisdiction to punish for contempt. If, on the other hand, proceedings are properly initiated by the filing of an application, in the case of civil contempt, within the period of limitation, then the provisions of Section 20 will not stand in the way of the court exercising its jurisdiction. 18. If, on the other hand, proceedings are properly initiated by the filing of an application, in the case of civil contempt, within the period of limitation, then the provisions of Section 20 will not stand in the way of the court exercising its jurisdiction. 18. In Pallav sheth the Apex court noticed that, one of the principles underlying the law of limitation is that a litigant must act diligently and not sleep over its rights. In this background such an interpretation should be placed on section 20 of the Act which does not lead to an anomalous result causing hardship to the party who may have acted with utmost diligence and because of the inaction on the part of the court a contemner cannot be made to suffer. Interpreting the section in the manner canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant would mean that the court would be rendered powerless to punish even though it may be fully convinced of the blatant nature of a contempt having been committed and the same having been brought to the notice of the court soon after the committal of the contempt and within the period of one year of the same. Section 20, therefore, has to be construed in a manner which would avoid such an anomaly and hardship both as regards the litigant as also by placing a pointless fetter on the part of the court to punish for its contempt. An interpretation of Section 20, like the one canvassed by the appellant, which would render the constitutional power of the courts nugatory in taking action for contempt even in case of gross contempt, successfully hidden for would render Section 20 as liable to be regarded as being in conflict with Article 129 and/or Article 215 of the Constitution of India. Such a rigid interpretation must therefore be avoided. 19. Such a rigid interpretation must therefore be avoided. 19. In Pallav Sheth the Apex Court held that, the decision in Om Prakash Jaiswal, to the effect that initiation of proceedings under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act can only be said to have occurred when the court formed the prima facie opinion that contempt has been committed and issued notice to the contemner to show-cause why it should not be punished, is taking too narrow a view of section 20, which does not seem to be warranted and is not only going to cause hardship but would perpetrate injustice. A provision like Section 20 has to be interpreted having regard to the realities of the situation. For instance, in a case where a contempt of a subordinate court is committed, a report is prepared whether on an application to court or otherwise, and reference made by the subordinate court to the High Court. It is only thereafter that a High court can take further action under Section 15. In the process, more often than not, a period of one year elapses. If the interpretation of Section 20 put in Om Prakash Jaiswal is correct, it would mean that notwithstanding both the subordinate court and the High Court being prima facie satisfied that contempt has been committed, the High court would become powerless to take any action. On the other hand, if the filing of an application before the subordinate court or the High Court making of a reference by a subordinate court on its own motion or the filing an application before an Advocate General for permission to initiate contempt proceedings is regarded as initiation by the Court for the purposes of Section 20, then such an interpretation would not impinge on or stultify the power of the High court to punish for contempt which power dehors the contempt of courts Act is enshrined in Article 215 of the constitution. Such an interpretation of Section 20 would harmonise that section with the powers of the courts to punish for contempt which is recognised by the Constitution. Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the court and that instituted otherwise than on the court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the court and that instituted otherwise than on the court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. Therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. 20. In Pallav Sheth, before the Apex court, it was submitted on behalf of the appellant that even if the provisions of section 20 do not bar the High court from taking action if proceedings are initiated by the filing of an application within a period of one year of the contempt having been committed, in the present case the period of limitation must be regarded as having expired long before the filing of the application by the Custodian and, therefore, no action on such an application could be taken by the court. The Apex Court noticed that, as disclosed from the records, Custodian received information of the appellant having committed contempt by taking over benami concerns, transferring funds to these concerns and operating their accounts clandestinely only from a letter dated 05.05.1998 from the Income Tax Authorities. It is soon thereafter that on 18.06.1998 a petition was filed for indicating action in contempt and notice issued by Special Court on 09.04.1999. Sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. Section 17 of the Limitation Act, inter alia, provides that where, in the case of any suit or application for which a period of limitation is prescribed by the Act, the knowledge of the right or title on which a suit or application is founded is concealed by the fraud of the defendant or his agent [Section 17(1(b)] or where any document necessary to establish the right of the plaintiff or applicant has been fraudulently concealed from him [Section 17(1)(d)], the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff or applicant has discovered the fraud or the mistake or could, with reasonable diligence, have discovered it; or in the case of a concealed document, until the plaintiff or the applicant first had the means of producing the concealed document or compelling its production. These provisions embody fundamental principles of justice and equity, viz, that a party should not be penalised for failing to adopt legal proceedings when the facts or material necessary for him to do so have been wilfully concealed from him and also that a party who has acted fraudulently should not gain the benefit of limitation running in his favour by virtue of such fraud. Therefore, the Apex court held that, the provisions of section 17 of the Limitation Act are applicable in the present case. The fraud perpetuated by the appellant was unearthed only on the custodian receiving information from the Income Tax Department, vide their letter of 05.05.1998. On becoming aware of the fraud application for initiating contempt proceedings was filed on 18.06.1998, well within the period of limitation prescribed by Section 20. It is on this application that the Special Court by its order of 09.04.1999 directed the application to be treated as a show cause notice to the appellant to punish him for contempt. In view of the abovestated facts and in the light of the discussion regarding the correct interpretation of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act it follows that the action taken by the Special Court to punish the Appellant for contempt was valid. The Special Court has only faulted in being unduly lenient in awarding the sentence. It is necessary under the circumstances to examine the finding of the special court that this was a continuing wrong or contempt and, therefore, action for contempt was not barred by Section 20. 21. The Special Court has only faulted in being unduly lenient in awarding the sentence. It is necessary under the circumstances to examine the finding of the special court that this was a continuing wrong or contempt and, therefore, action for contempt was not barred by Section 20. 21. The law laid down in Pallav Sheth has been reiterated by the Apex Court in Prakash Kakubhai Rangwala vs. Nyayalay Karmachari Anne N.H.S. and Another, (2011) 14 SCC 762 and in Maheshwar Peri vs. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, (2016) 14 SCC 251 . 22. In Dinesh Kumar G.P. vs. Biswas Metha I.A.S. and Others, ILR 2019 Ker 780, a Division Bench of this court was dealing with a case in which contempt petition has been filed after 12 years, for enforcement of an order in W.P.(C) No.6694 of 2007 dated 15.03.2007. On the question as to whether contempt petition filed after one year is barred by limitation, the Division Bench noticed that the limitation provided by Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act is different as the limitation is understood under the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963. Even Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application in the case and the court loses its jurisdiction after expiry of the limitation, rather jurisdiction evaporates automatically after expiry of the period provided under section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. In T. Deendayal vs. High Court of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1997 SC 3451 the Apex Court observed that proceedings may be initiated within one year and it is not necessary that it should be concluded within that stipulated period. In Om Prakash Jaiswal vs. D.K. Mittal, (2000) 3 SCC 171 , the Apex Court has elaborately dealt with this issue and placed reliance upon its earlier judgment in Baradakanta Mishra vs. Justice Gatikrushna Misra, Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court, AIR 1974 SC 2255 , wherein the Apex court held that it is only when the court decides to take action and initiates proceedings for contempt that it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of proceedings for contempt. That is why, the terminus a qua for a period of limitation provided under Section 20 of the Act is the date when a proceeding for contempt is initiated by the court. 23. Exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of proceedings for contempt. That is why, the terminus a qua for a period of limitation provided under Section 20 of the Act is the date when a proceeding for contempt is initiated by the court. 23. In Dinesh Kumar G.P. the Division Bench held that the High courts cannot invoke the powers under Article 215 of the Constitution of India, in all the cases by entertaining the contempt application beyond the period of one year, so as to dilute or eradicate the law prescribed under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. All contempt applications ought to be filed within the period of limitation prescribed under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The High court on exceptional circumstances, on arriving at a conclusion that a gross injustice to the society or the case is of public importance, then the inherent powers provided under Article 215 of the Constitution of India, can be exercised without reference to section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. A litigant may come out with interpretation that an injustice is caused to all the orders or judgments passed by the High Courts. Such a general proposition, as advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner deserves no merit consideration. No doubt, the litigants approach the Court to get justice, that does not mean that all the contempt applications have to be entertained after a period of one year prescribed under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. Generalisation in this regard can never be encouraged. What exactly the circumstances warranting interference under Article 215 of the Constitution of India has to be decided judiciously and applying the peculiar facts and circumstances prevailing in each and every case. General application in this regard is certainly impermissible and courts have to interpret these provisions in a pragmatic way than in a general manner. In other words, the principles of constructive interpretation is to be adopted while interpreting the period of limitation under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act as well as Article 215 of the Constitution of India. 24. In other words, the principles of constructive interpretation is to be adopted while interpreting the period of limitation under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act as well as Article 215 of the Constitution of India. 24. Relying on the judgment of a Division Bench of High Court of Bombay in Harshawadan Bandivadekar vs. Taramati Harishchandra Ghanekar, [2009 (1) Bom CR 170 : MANU-MH/1339/2008] the petitioner, who appeared in person, would contend that a petition filed under Section 20 of the contempt of Courts Act, after the expiry of the time limit specified in Section 20, can be entertained by the court after condoning the delay. 25. In Harshawadan Bandivadekar, the Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay was considering the challenge made against the judgment and order of a learned Single Judge dated 20.04.2007, whereby Notice of Motion No. 186 of 2007 was entertained after condoning the delay of 2 years and 5 months in filing the contempt petition and issued a show cause notice to the appellant before the Division Bench, as to why contempt action should not be taken against him. The Division Bench, after taking note of the law laid down by the Apex court in Pallav Sheth held that in that decision the Apex court has decided, after referring to a catena of cases, that Section 5 of the limitation Act would be applicable in cases arising out of Contempt of Courts Act 1971. On the facts of the case, the Division Bench noticed that as per the directions issued by the learned single Judge, the appellant filed an undertaking before the Court on 09.03.2007 to complete the additional construction and rehabilitate the remaining tenants. He has also given an undertaking to furnish Bank Guarantee of Rs. 1 crore to carry out the said work. Having regard to all the aforesaid circumstances the learned Single Judge, by the impugned judgment dated 20.4.2007, condoned the delay of 2 years and 5 months. He has also given an undertaking to furnish Bank Guarantee of Rs. 1 crore to carry out the said work. Having regard to all the aforesaid circumstances the learned Single Judge, by the impugned judgment dated 20.4.2007, condoned the delay of 2 years and 5 months. The Division Bench found that the facts and circumstances set out in the judgment makes it abundantly clearly that there is a continuing wrong, in the sense, that the appellant's non-compliance of the undertaking and the appellant himself took out a Notice of Motion on 7th December, 2006 for extension of time to comply with the earlier undertaking and given a further undertaking to the High Court on 09.03.2007 to fulfil the earlier undertaking and also furnishing a Bank Guarantee of Rs.1 crore to comply with the same, clearly indicates that there is no need to condone the delay as the appellant himself accepted it as a continuing wrong in the facts and circumstances set out in that judgment. 26. As already noticed hereinbefore, the law raid down by the Apex court in Pallav Sheth is that, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. In that case, the fraud perpetuated by the appellant was unearthed only on the custodian receiving information from the Income Tax Department, vide their letter of 05.05.1998. Therefore, the Apex court held that, the provisions of Section 17 of the Limitation Act are applicable in the present case. On becoming aware of the fraud application for initiating contempt proceedings was filed on 18.06.1998, well within the period of limitation prescribed by section 20. In Pallav Sheth the Apex court followed the law laid down in Om Prakash Jaiswal that, Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application and that, Section 20 strikes at the jurisdiction of the court to initiate any proceedings for contempt. 27. In Pallav Sheth the Apex court followed the law laid down in Om Prakash Jaiswal that, Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application and that, Section 20 strikes at the jurisdiction of the court to initiate any proceedings for contempt. 27. In the instant case, the question that has to be considered on the defect noted by the Registry is as to whether this contempt petition is one filed after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. 28. As already noticed hereinbefore, Annexure A1 judgment of this Court in W.P.(C) No. 19899 of 2018 is one dated 10.08.2018, whereby the 1st respondent Joint Registrar was directed to proceed further with Ext.P2, in case it is an order passed by the 1st respondent based on an application made by the writ petitioner for execution of Ext.P1 award, invoking the provisions under Chapter XI of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, and if the said order is one issued in accordance with the provisions under Chapter XI, with notice to respondents 2 and 3 strictly in accordance with law, subject to any interim orders or final orders to be passed by the co-operative Tribunal in R.P.No.57 of 2018 and Appeal No.24 of 2019, within one month from the date of receipt of a certified copy of that judgment. 29. Going by the averments in para 13 of this Contempt Case, the writ petitioner submitted a certified copy of Annexure A1 judgment before the 1st respondent, on 23.08.2018. Therefore, the time limit stipulated in Annexure A1 judgment expired only on 23.09.2018. On 30.08.2018, the Co-operative Tribunal partly allowed R.P.No.57 of 2018 filed by respondents 2 and 3 and Appeal No.24 of 2018 filed by the writ petitioner was also disposed of in tune with the order in R.P.No.57 of 2018. Therefore, the time limit stipulated in Annexure A1 judgment expired only on 23.09.2018. On 30.08.2018, the Co-operative Tribunal partly allowed R.P.No.57 of 2018 filed by respondents 2 and 3 and Appeal No.24 of 2018 filed by the writ petitioner was also disposed of in tune with the order in R.P.No.57 of 2018. The award passed by the Co-operative Arbitration Court, Kozhikode in A.R.C.No.106 of 2011 and the order of the Co-operative Tribunal in R.P.No.57 of 2018 are under challenge before this court in W.P. C) No.30582 of 2018 filed by Ambalapara Service Co-operative Bank in which this Court passed an interim order on 18.09.2018, whereby it was ordered that any coercive steps pursuant to the award dated 06.03.2018 of the Co-operative Arbitration Court and the order dated 30.08.2018 of the Kerala Co-operative Tribunal shall be deferred for the period specified in that interim order. The said interim order, which was extended from time to time, is still in force. 30. Therefore, the question that has to be considered is as to whether the petitioner has a cause of action for filing this Contempt Petition, invoking Section 12 of the contempt of Courts Act, alleging non-compliance of the direction contained in Annexure A1 judgment. At any rate, this contempt case cannot be said to be one filed beyond the time limit specified in Section 20 of the said Act. In such circumstances, the defect noted by the Registry cannot be sustained. 31. The Registry is directed to number this contempt of court Case and list it for admission.