JUDGMENT : DEEPAK ROSHAN, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties through V.C. 2. The instant writ application has been preferred by the petitioner for quashing the order dated 10.06.2009 (Annexure-11) passed by the Disciplinary Authority, whereby penalty of removal from service has been imposed against the petitioner and also prayed for quashing of the order dated 14.05.2010 (Annexure-10), whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner has been rejected. The petitioner has further prayed for quashing the order dated 30.03.2011 whereby the Reviewing Authority has rejected the petition preferred by the petitioner against the order of punishment and penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority and upheld the order of the Appellate Authority. During pendency of this writ application, the petitioner has attained the age of retirement. 3. The facts of the case as narrated in the instant writ application is that the petitioner while working as Chief Manager, Main Branch in Allahabad Bank, Jamshedpur is said to have committed some misconduct and for which a memorandum/charge-sheet was issued vide charge-sheet dated 10.03.2008 (Annexure-3) along with statement of article of charges. There are altogether 14 articles under which the charges have been framed against the petitioner. Thereafter, the inquiry officer has submitted its report (Annexure-7) in which the inquiry officer has proved the Charge Nos. 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13 and has partly proved Article Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 10 and only Article No. 14 was not proved. The disciplinary authority on 10.06.2009 has passed the order of removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment. 4. The case of the petitioner is that the accounts shown to have become non-performing assets (NPA) relates to the petitioner’s posting at Dhanbad, but at Dhanbad no such charges have been previously issued against the petitioner, since the loan sanctioned in Dhanbad is perfectly in terms of the guidelines of the bank and therefore, no charge is constituted against the petitioner for the loan which he has advanced to the customers at Dhanbad, but the aforesaid issue has purposely been added in the present charge-sheet in order to make the charges more grievous, since the petitioner’s working at Jamshedpur does not constitute any misconduct so serious that it invites punishment of removal. 5. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that while going through the entire inquiry report, it transpires that there are certain small irregularities which, even if, has been committed by the petitioner in terms of the inquiry report, the said irregularities have not incurred any loss to the bank. There is nothing in the inquiry report to show that those minor irregularities committed by the petitioner are for any vested interest and/or there is no allegation of forgery embezzlement, misappropriation etc. He further contended that the findings given by the inquiry officer in its report is based on absolutely no evidence against most of the charges which can be seen while going through the inquiry report. The principle of preponderance of probability applies in the departmental proceeding; therefore, there has to be some evidence to show that the petitioner has exceeded limit or ignored the guidelines while sanctioning the cash credit limit or even the loan facilities to the consumer so therefore, in absence of substantial corroboration of the charges, the inquiry report cannot be said to be in accordance with the law and such inquiry report should not have been accepted by the disciplinary authority imposing punishment upon the petitioner. He further contended that the petitioner has given detailed reply to the inquiry report and he has taken all such grounds. He lastly contended that the charges leveled against the petitioner are of minor nature and the petitioner has ability to rectify those irregularities, if the petitioner would have been given a chance from the bank but no such chance was given to the petitioner whereas the other officers of the bank who does minor irregularities, they are being given chance to rectify. Although, the petitioner did not get any chance from the bank to rectify the mistakes/irregularities, but the bank was not put to the loss and hence, the punishment awarded to the petitioner is excessive and it can be converted into any minor punishment. 6. In order to buttress his argument, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the following judgments: (a) 1990 (Supp) SCC 738 Para 6 (b) (2007) 9 SCC 582 Para 11 (c) (2015) 2 SCC 410 Para 11 and 14 (d) (2014) 10 SCC 301 Para 31 (e) (2015) 8 SCC 272 Para 28 to 30 (f) (2008) 8 SCC 648 Para 4 to 8 7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent opposed the prayer of the petitioner mainly on two grounds that is with respect to maintainability of the writ application and the power of the judicial review in case of departmental proceeding. Learned counsel further contended that there is an inordinate delay in filing the present writ application inasmuch as the last impugned order is dated 30.03.2011 whereas the writ petition has been filed on 12.03.2014 and there is no pleading in the entire writ application with regard to delay. In order to support his argument on this issue, he relied upon the judgment passed in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others vs. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that a writ Court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. Learned counsel further contended that the power of the judicial review is very limited and the finding of fact cannot be gone into. He submits that there is concurrent finding as against the petitioner by the disciplinary authority, appellate authority and reviewing authority which ought not to be interfered within writ petition. Further, there is no averment in the writ application that there were any procedural lapses in the entire departmental proceeding. In support of his argument on the question of judicial review, he relied upon the judgment passed in the case of State of Karnataka and Others vs. N. Gangaraj, (2020) 3 SCC 423 at Para 7, 8, 9, 12 and 13. 8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after going through the materials available on record it appears that the petitioner has mainly been proceeded for the charges relating to grant of clean overdrawing in number of cases grossly exceeding his authority, sanctioned several loans which were not reported by the petitioner in “Managers Discretionary Authority Statement” which remained unauthorized, made fictitious entry to show growth in business, acted in the manner putting Bank’s Fund to jeopardy and difficult to recovery and also other grounds which can be seen in the charge-sheet including few accounts became NPA while he was posted at Dhanbad few years ago. Thus it can be seen that the entire charge-sheet does not relate to any misconduct committed by the petitioner with any ulterior motive or with any vested interest. Thus it can be seen that the entire charge-sheet does not relate to any misconduct committed by the petitioner with any ulterior motive or with any vested interest. The charge-sheet does not disclose that the bank has suffered any loss. Therefore, whatever charges framed in the charge-sheet, all relates to technicalities which the petitioner has either ignored or violated and thus made the Bank at risk. The charge-sheet does not say that the decision taken by the petitioner ignoring the guidelines of the bank, has affected the interest of the bank adversely. The bank does not say that it has incurred any loss. There is absolutely no allegation that the petitioner has done the same with any vested interest inasmuch as there is nothing in the inquiry report to show that those irregularities committed by the petitioner is for any vested interest and/or there is any allegation of forgery embezzlement, misappropriation etc. and in that view of the matter the punishment imposed against the petitioner for removal from the service under the bank is excessive in nature and is highly disproportionate. The petitioner has worked for more than twenty three years in the bank and during the entire period of his service he has not been given any show-cause save and except the present charge-sheet. Therefore, keeping into consideration the past service record of the petitioner, the punishment imposed for removal from the service is disproportionate. 9. It is true that no perversity can be found recorded by the inquiry officer as the same are based on evidence on record and the enquiry has been conducted in compliance with the principal of natural justice. Learned counsel for the petitioner has mostly argued on the ground of proportionality and submits that the entire allegation is with respect to not following the procedure and allowing frequent and huge clean overdrawing in number of current accounts, grossly exceeding his authority and even without obtaining any sanction from the superior officers nor he was ever informed them. He thus violated the prescribed guidelines including Maker and Checker concept. In this regard the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of S.R. Tewari vs. Union of India and Another, (2013) 6 SCC 602 has laid down the law in paragraph 25 to 29 as under:- “25. He thus violated the prescribed guidelines including Maker and Checker concept. In this regard the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of S.R. Tewari vs. Union of India and Another, (2013) 6 SCC 602 has laid down the law in paragraph 25 to 29 as under:- “25. In B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India, this Court after examining its various earlier decisions observed that in exercise of the power of judicial review, the court cannot “normally” substitute its own conclusion or penalty. However, if the penalty imposed by an authority “shocks the conscience” of the court, it would appropriately mould the relief either directing the authority to reconsider the penalty imposed and in exceptional and rare cases, in order to shorten the litigation, itself impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. While examining the issue of proportionality, the court can also consider the circumstances under which the misconduct was committed. In a given case, the prevailing circumstances might have forced the accused to act in a certain manner though he had not intended to do so. The court may further examine the effect, if the order is set aside or substituted by some other penalty. However, it is only in very rare cases that the court might, to shorten the litigation, think of substituting its own view as to the quantum of punishment in place of punishment awarded by the competent authority. 26. In V. Ramana vs. A.P. SRTC, this Court considered the scope of judicial review as to the quantum of punishment is permissible only if it is found that it is not commensurate with the gravity of the charges and if the Court comes to the conclusion that the scope of judicial review as to the quantum of punishment is permissible only if it is found to be “shocking to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards.” In a normal course, if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate, it would be appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority to reconsider the penalty imposed. However, in order to shorten the litigation, in exceptional and rare cases, the court itself can impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. 27. However, in order to shorten the litigation, in exceptional and rare cases, the court itself can impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. 27. In State of Meghalaya vs. Mecken Singh N. Marak this Court observed that: (SCC p. 584, Para 13-14) “13.........A court or a tribunal while dealing with the quantum of punishment has to record reasons as to why it felt that the punishment is not commensurate with the proved charges. 14. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope for interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases.......The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review.” 28. The role of the court in the matter of departmental proceedings is very limited and the court cannot substitute its own views or findings by replacing the findings arrived at by the authority on detailed appreciation of the evidence on record. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope for interference by the court is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review. The court has to record reasons as to why the punishment is disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. The mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice. (Vide Union of India vs. Bodupalli Gopalaswami and Sanjay Kumar Singh vs. Union of India) 29. In Union of India vs. R.K. Sharma, this Court explained the observations made in Ranjit Thakur observing that if the charge was ridiculous, the punishment was harsh or strikingly disproportionate it would warrant interference. However, the said observations in Ranjit Thakur are not to be taken to mean that a court can, while exercising the power of judicial review, interfere with the punishment merely because it considers the punishment to be disproportionate. It was held that only in extreme cases, which on their face, show perversity or irrationality, there could be judicial review and courts should not interfere merely on compassionate grounds.” 10. It was held that only in extreme cases, which on their face, show perversity or irrationality, there could be judicial review and courts should not interfere merely on compassionate grounds.” 10. The scope is therefore, of judicial review as to the quantum of punishment is permissible only if it is found to be shocking to the conscience of the Court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. Proportionality is a general principle in law which covers several special (although related) concepts. The concept of proportionality is used as a criterion of fairness and justice in statutory interpretation processes, especially in constitutional law, as a logical method intended to assist in discerning the correct balance between the restriction imposed by a corrective measure and the severity of the nature of the prohibited act. Within criminal law, it is used to convey the idea that the punishment of an offender should fit the crime. Under International Humanitarian Law governing the legal use of force in an armed conflict, proportionality and distinction are important factors in assessing military necessity. It is well settled that the punishment or penalty to be imposed must be commensurate with the gravity of misconduct. The authority while inflicting punishment must adhere to the doctrine of proportionality and cannot exercise the power in an arbitrary manner. In all fairness and propriety demands that when major disciplinary punishment is sought to be inflicted, which would tantamount to dismissal from service, there should be absolute fair play in action, without even a tinge of mala-fide motive. Sadly, this aspect of the matter is missing from the action taken by the authorities and the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is disproportionate to the charge alleged. In case in hand the punishment is of removal of service. There won’t be any exaggeration in saying that punishment of removal from service is a capital punishment in service jurisprudence. From record it appears that the petitioner has worked altogether 23 years and this is the first charge-sheet in his entire career. It goes without saying that there should be a difference in the quantum of punishment in case of charge arising out of an act of fraud & misappropriation vis-a-vis charges which are technical in nature. From record it appears that the petitioner has worked altogether 23 years and this is the first charge-sheet in his entire career. It goes without saying that there should be a difference in the quantum of punishment in case of charge arising out of an act of fraud & misappropriation vis-a-vis charges which are technical in nature. The inquiry officer as well as the disciplinary authority found the petitioner acted recklessly exercising his discerning power in the manner has made the bank to serious financial risk. It is true that in the case of Suresh Pathrella vs. Oriental Bank of Commerce, (2006) 10 SCC 572 the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that a bank officers acting beyond his authority constituted misconduct and no further proof of loss is necessary. If the charged employee holds a post of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. However, in another judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kailash Nath Gupta vs. Enquiry Officer, (R.K. Rai) Allahabad Bank and Others, (2003) 9 SCC 480 , on the question of proportionality has held as under:- “11. In the background of what has been stated above, one thing is clear that the power of interference with the quantum of punishment is extremely limited. But when relevant factors are not taken note of, which have some bearing on the quantum of punishment; certainly the Court can direct re-reconsideration or in an appropriate case to shorten litigation, indicate the punishment to be awarded. It is stated that there was no occasion in the long past service indicating either irregularity or misconduct of the appellant except the charges which were the subject-matter of his removal from service. The stand of the appellant as indicated above is that though small advances may have become irrecoverable, there is nothing to indicate that the appellant had misappropriated any money or had committed any act of fraud. If, any loss has been caused to the Bank (which he quantifies at about Rs. 46,000) that can be recovered from the appellant. As the reading of the various articles of charges goes to show, at the most there is some procedural irregularity which cannot be termed to be negligence to warrant the extreme punishment of dismissal from service.” 11. If, any loss has been caused to the Bank (which he quantifies at about Rs. 46,000) that can be recovered from the appellant. As the reading of the various articles of charges goes to show, at the most there is some procedural irregularity which cannot be termed to be negligence to warrant the extreme punishment of dismissal from service.” 11. Further, in the case of Chaman Lal vs. SBI, 2003 SCC Online Delhi 768 Para-7 as held as under: “7. In view of the law laid down in Ranjit Thakur vs. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 1, normally this Court would not substitute a punishment awarded by the Disciplinary Authority. However, in this case from the perusal of the order of Appellate Authority while coming to a conclusion that no loss has been caused to the bank still Appellate Authority has not stated that why dismissal be not substituted. 30 years of services rendered by the petitioner from 1955 to 1985 when show cause notice was issued has been washed away. Said order shows complete non application of mind whereby denying the terminal benefits to the petitioner. This writ petition is pending in this Court since last 14 years. Petitioner, I have been told is quite old. No useful purpose will be served if case is remanded back to Disciplinary Authority. Even otherwise during the course of hearing on the last date of hearing, I had directed the respondent to take instructions as to whether the respondent was prepared to take a fresh decision in view of what has been stated above. Mr. Arora has informed that he has received instructions that the decision cannot be reviewed and in this regard has placed a letter dated 21.8.2003 on record. Therefore, no useful purpose will be served to remit the case again to the respondent. The penalty of dismissal is disproportionate to the charges proved against the petitioner. The order dated 17.9.1986 passed by Disciplinary Authority order dated 8.9.1987 passed by Appellate Authority and order dated 4.2.1989 passed by Reviewing Authority are hereby quashed.” 12. Therefore, no useful purpose will be served to remit the case again to the respondent. The penalty of dismissal is disproportionate to the charges proved against the petitioner. The order dated 17.9.1986 passed by Disciplinary Authority order dated 8.9.1987 passed by Appellate Authority and order dated 4.2.1989 passed by Reviewing Authority are hereby quashed.” 12. In view of the aforesaid discussions and also keeping into consideration the past service record of the petitioner inasmuch as in his entire career of 23 years; this was the first charge sheet, the punishment imposed for removal from the service is disproportionate and is excessive and it can be converted into any minor punishment. Before concluding, I wish to address the contention of the respondent that there is an inordinate delay in filing the present writ application inasmuch as the last impugned order is dated 30.03.2011 whereas the writ petition has been filed on 12.03.2014 as such, the same should be dismissed in limine. I am not in agreement with this argument of the respondent Bank for the sole reason that this is a case of punishment of removal from service of an employee which is the highest punishment and as aforesaid it is like is a capital punishment in service jurisprudence as such, dismissing the case on the ground of delay; that too of only 3 years, is against the interest of justice. 13. As a result, the instant writ application is allowed. The impugned order dated 10.06.2009 (Annexure-11) passed by the Disciplinary Authority, whereby penalty of removal from service has been imposed against the petitioner and order dated 30.03.2011 (Annexure-13), whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner has been rejected, and also the order dated 30.03.2011 whereby the Reviewing Authority has rejected the petition preferred by the petitioner, are hereby quashed and set aside. The matter is remitted back to the appellate authority to pass a fresh order after discussing the contentions raised by the petitioner and the findings given herein above. It is made clear that the entire exercise shall be completed within a period of four months from the date of receipt/production of copy of this Order.