JUDGMENT : A.M. Badar, J. 1. These group of writ petitions have been placed together for final disposal because common order (Ext. P4) dated 26.02.2020 passed by the learned Labour Court, Ernakulam in applications under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the I.D. Act', for short) filed by respondents/workmen/original applicants is impugned herein at the instance of petitioners/management/original opposite parties. In all applications under Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act, joint trial was conducted by the learned Labour Court at the request of respondents/workmen taking the Claim Petition No. 5 of 2018 as the lead case. The workmen adduced evidence of one of them i.e. Balachandran Pillai (petitioner in C.P. No. 5 of 2018) as PW 1 whereas petitioners herein/management had not chosen to adduce oral evidence. Documentary evidence placed on record remain undisputed. By the impugned order, the learned Labour Court was pleased to allow petitions under Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act partly by awarding claim No. II and claim No. III laid by workmen with interest by rejecting claim No. I. 2. As common questions of facts and law so also common order passed by the learned Labour Court are involved in this batch of cases, Writ Petition bearing No. 13679 of 2020 is taken as a lead case for incorporation of facts as well as for passing the judgment in these cases. 3. Facts in brief necessary for deciding instant writ petitions are thus: (a) The 1st petitioner is a Company engaged in production of high carbon of steel wire ropes. Said Company could not perform well and went into liquidation. A Company Petition bearing No. 28 of 2002 came to be registered on reference made by the Board of Industrial Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) in the matter of winding up of the said Company. On 20.12.2005, this Court passed orders winding up the 1st petitioner-Company. During pendency of appeals challenging that order before the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court, a revival scheme came to be proposed under Section 391 of the Companies Act, 1956. Accordingly, winding up proceedings were kept in abeyance and the Company discharged its liability towards secured and unsecured creditors. The 2nd petitioner, by filing an application under Rule 9 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 prayed for recall of the order of winding up so that the Company could be revived and restored. Accordingly, winding up proceedings were kept in abeyance and the Company discharged its liability towards secured and unsecured creditors. The 2nd petitioner, by filing an application under Rule 9 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 prayed for recall of the order of winding up so that the Company could be revived and restored. The workmen also preferred Company Applications under Rule 164 of the said Rules praying for an order for granting their claims mentioned in the annexure to the affidavit. Vide common order dated 29.05.2017 passed in C.A. Nos. 216 and 979 of 2016 and 708 of 2011 in C.P. 28 of 2002, the Company Applications came to be disposed of and the operative portion of the order reads thus: "In the result, these Company Applications are disposed of as follows. a. The winding up order passed on 20.12.2005 in C.P. No. 28/2002 will stand recalled and consequently the Company will stand revived and restored to its original position as on the date of initiation of proceedings, with all its rights and liabilities as a legal entity. b. The petitioners in C.As. 708/2011 and 979/2016 are allowed to agitate their claims for additional benefits by way of gratuity or otherwise before the competent Forum and once, such claim is made, the claim shall be legally adjudicated and decided by the competent Forum. c. The fact that the above petitioners have received some amount towards their claims shall not stand in the way of their right to get more benefits, if they are entitled to get such benefits in law. d. Revival of the company consequent to the above order, will have the legal consequences that the company will be bound by its liabilities under the law as a legal entity, found by any competent Forum. e. The official liquidator is hereby directed to hand over the company and assets including the records to the competent person within three weeks from this date. f. The amount, if any, due to the Official Liquidator shall be paid by the company on claim, without any delay. g. The Official Liquidator is directed to obtain the title deeds of the company from the Debt Recovery Tribunal, subject to other claims, if any, now pending before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. h. The other applications now pending will stand closed, without prejudice to the rights of those petitioners for relief, if any, in law. g. The Official Liquidator is directed to obtain the title deeds of the company from the Debt Recovery Tribunal, subject to other claims, if any, now pending before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. h. The other applications now pending will stand closed, without prejudice to the rights of those petitioners for relief, if any, in law. They are permitted to agitate their legal claims before the proper authority on revival of the company. The reports filed in C.P. 28/2002 are closed accordingly". Thus workmen were allowed to agitate their claims for additional benefit by way of gratuity or otherwise before the competent forum. (b) Being dissatisfied with this order, workmen preferred a Company Appeal bearing No. 7 of 2017 which came to be decided on 25.08.2017 (Ext. R1(e)). The Hon'ble Division Bench did not find any grounds to interfere with the order appealed against but observed that in the event workmen approaching the competent forum for adjudicating their claims, such proceedings shall be given preference and shall be adjudicated expeditiously. (c) It is seen that claims were made by workmen taking recourse to Rule 164 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 on the basis of the settlement arrived at between the management and the workmen on 28.02.2011 (Ext. P1). This Court, while deciding the Company Applications, vide order at Ext. R1(d), has observed that if workmen are entitled to get more benefits by way of gratuity or otherwise, the mere fact that they have received some amount already will not stand in the way of their legal rights and they can agitate their rights before the competent forum. That is how, based on the settlement at Ext. P1 dated 28.02.2011, the workmen approached the learned Labour Court, Ernakulam by filing petition (Ext. P2) under Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act. It is apposite to quote the terms of settlement reflected in the settlement at Ext. P1 which reads thus: "TERMS of AGREEMENT A. All the workmen who are on the rolls of the Company as on 31.12.2010 will be eligible for the VRS Scheme. All workmen who superannuated prior to 31.12.2010 are excluded from the scheme and they will be paid gratuity as per the Payment of Gratuity Act. Any orders from the Court for any additional payment, obtained by the employee, will be paid extra. All workmen who superannuated prior to 31.12.2010 are excluded from the scheme and they will be paid gratuity as per the Payment of Gratuity Act. Any orders from the Court for any additional payment, obtained by the employee, will be paid extra. B. Workmen will be paid 1.25 months salary and DA for every completed year of service till 31.12.2010. C. The DA will be calculated based on the Cost of Living Index during the month of December 2010. D. The workmen eligible for the VRS scheme will also be paid @15 days for each year of remaining service, upto 10 years of such service. Such of those workmen who have remaining service beyond 10 years will be paid @18 days for each year of remaining service. E. The employees eligible for the VRS scheme will also be paid Gratuity as per the Payment of Gratuity Act. F. The above payments under the VRS Scheme and the Gratuity Scheme are in full and final settlement of all dues and the workmen agreed to voluntarily retire from the service. G. Such of those employees who were eligible for salary for the month of May and June 2001 will be paid the unpaid salary along with the VRS and Gratuity Payments. G. All employees who retired before 31.12.2010 will be paid gratuity eligible by them as detailed in Clause A. G. The payment as above will be made by the new promoters on or before 31.05.2011. H. Upon receipt of payment as detailed above every workmen will sign the Form HH, to be submitted to various authorities under the Department of Labour, Govt. of Kerala. I. Payment to the employees as agreed upon in this Memorandum of Settlement will be paid on or before 31.05.2011. In the event of non-payment as above, the agreement will lapse. This agreement has been executed on the date and year first above written. (d) In an application under Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act (Ext. P2), following claims were made by workmen. STATEMENT I. ARREARS OF SALARY FOR THE LAST TWO MONTHS a. Salary amount for two months May and June 2001= Rs.9152/- b. Interest @ 12% from 01.07.2001 to 31.12.2010 = Rs.10,433/- c. Amount Recieved= Rs.9151/- d. Balance to be recieved as on 31.12.2010=[(a+b)-c]= Rs.10,434/- e. Interest @ 12% from 01.01.2011 to 30.11.2017=Rs.8972/- f. Balance amount entitled to get=Rs.19405/- II. STATEMENT I. ARREARS OF SALARY FOR THE LAST TWO MONTHS a. Salary amount for two months May and June 2001= Rs.9152/- b. Interest @ 12% from 01.07.2001 to 31.12.2010 = Rs.10,433/- c. Amount Recieved= Rs.9151/- d. Balance to be recieved as on 31.12.2010=[(a+b)-c]= Rs.10,434/- e. Interest @ 12% from 01.01.2011 to 30.11.2017=Rs.8972/- f. Balance amount entitled to get=Rs.19405/- II. LEAVE SALARY, BONUS AND OTHER CLAIMS a. Leave Salary=21702/- b. Bonus= 4576/- c. Other dues=16015/- d. Amount recieved=Nil e. Balance [(a+b+c)-d] as on July 2001=Rs.42293/- f. Interest @ 12% from July 2001 to 30.11.2017=Rs.83317/- g. Total amount due (e+f)=Rs.125610/- III. COMPENSATION PAYABLE TO THE PETITIONER AS PER AGREEMENT DATED 28.02.2011 a. Completed year of service as per agreement=30 b. Compensation payable as per Clause B of the agreement dated 28.02.2011=4576x1.25x30 = Rs.1,71,600/- [1.25 months salary for every completed year of service] c. Interest @ 12% from 28.02.2011 to 30.11.2017 = Rs.1,38,996/- d. Total= Rs.3,15,096/- e. Received= Nil f. Amount due as on 30.11.2017 = Rs.3,15,096/-Grand Total (I+II+III) =Rs.4,60,111.00/-(Rupees Four Lakhs Sixty Thousand One Hundred and Eleven Only)” (e) Though quantum of amount under each head of the claim is different from workman to workman (original applicants), head of the claim by all workmen is the same and the same is based on settlement at Ext. P1. Petitioners herein (original respondents) opposed the Claim Petitions by filing objections/written statements (Ext. P3). According to petitioners/management, calculations made in the statement are not correct and workmen are not entitled to get any amount as claimed by them. The management further contended that salary for the months of May and June 2001 has already been paid to workmen. The workmen are not entitled to get leave salary and bonus as claimed by them in the Claim Petitions. The workmen have been paid compensation as per the settlement dated 28.02.2011 and as such, no further amount is to be paid to the workmen. The management further contended that workmen are not entitled to any amount other than what is due to different workmen under the terms of the agreement Ext. P1. The workmen are entitled to receive only the amount which they are eligible to receive as per the agreement Ext. P1 and other than that they are not entitled to get any amount. P1. The workmen are entitled to receive only the amount which they are eligible to receive as per the agreement Ext. P1 and other than that they are not entitled to get any amount. (f) The undisputed position emerging from pleadings as well as evidence of parties and as has been stated across the bar is to the effect that all workmen who preferred subject Claim Petitions under Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act were workmen of the 1st petitioner Company and they were already superannuated prior to 31.12.2010. (g) As stated herein before, workmen adduced evidence of one witness and relied on documentary evidence including Ext. P1 settlement dated 28.02.2011. They also placed on record the communication dated 31.05.2011 (Ext. R1(a)) from the management showing payment of gratuity as well as arrears of salary and that communication was bearing receipt passed by the workmen in token of having received the amount in full and final settlement of all dues from the Company. The management had chosen not to adduce any oral evidence. After hearing the parties, the learned Labour Court, Ernakulam, by the impugned order dated 26.02.2020 (Ext. P4) was pleased to reject the first claim regarding salary for May and June 2001 along with interest thereon. However, the second claim regarding leave salary, bonus and other dues so also the third claim regarding compensation payable as per the agreement dated 28.02.2011 came to be allowed with interest at the rate of 9% per annum. 4. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners-management. He argued that the document at Ext. R1(a) forming part of record of the learned Labour Court relied by the respondents herein/workmen makes it clear that the gratuity as per the settlement at Ext. P1 was already paid and accepted by workmen along with salary of two months. Even balance amount of interest on gratuity was also paid to the workmen. Learned counsel for the petitioners strenuously urged that the workmen involved in instant writ petitions were superannuated period to 31.12.2010 and as such they were only entitled for gratuity according to the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 apart from salary for the months of May and June 2001 in terms of settlement Ext. P1. As these dues were already paid, learned Labour Court ought to have rejected petitions under Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act. P1. As these dues were already paid, learned Labour Court ought to have rejected petitions under Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act. Relying on clause 'I' of the settlement, Ext. P1, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that even if, for the sake of argument, it is accepted that apart from gratuity, workmen are entitled for some other dues from the Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) package, then as those dues were not paid by the management on or before 31.05.2011, the agreement stands lapsed and therefore, the remedy, if any, with the workmen was to approach the concerned forum for claiming compensation under Section 25FFF of the I.D. Act. Hence the petition under Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act was not maintainable. It is further argued that as there was no clause for payment of interest in the settlement at Ext. P1, the award of interest by the learned Labour Court is per se illegal. Learned counsel further argued that the learned Labour Court has not answered the question of entitlement of workmen to receive benefits as per the settlement at Ext. P1 and there is no finding to that effect rendered by the learned Labour Court. Therefore, the impugned order needs to be quashed and set aside. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the followings judgments: 1. Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Ganesh Razak & another (1995) 1 SCC 235 2. Central Bank of India Ltd. vs. P.S. Rajagopalan ( AIR 1964 SC 743 ) 3. Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited vs. The Workmen and another (1974) 4 SCC 696 6. As against this, learned counsel for the respondents herein/workmen argued that the functioning of the 1st petitioner stopped after May 2001 for no fault on the part of the workmen. The revival of the Company was permitted by this Court and the settlement at Ext. P1 is a composite settlement for the benefit of retired as well as non retired employees of the 1st petitioner. Learned counsel for respondents further argued that it is not the contention of the petitioners herein that no compensation is payable to the respondents herein/workmen. Clause B of Ext. P1 settlement makes the respondents herein/workmen entitled to compensation. As per the contention of the learned counsel for respondents, the employer had three opportunities to refute the claim of workmen but the employer failed to refute the claim. Clause B of Ext. P1 settlement makes the respondents herein/workmen entitled to compensation. As per the contention of the learned counsel for respondents, the employer had three opportunities to refute the claim of workmen but the employer failed to refute the claim. The claim was made before the Company Court by moving necessary applications. But the employer had stated before the said Court that he is willing to pay whatever is due to workmen. Even before the Appellate Court, the employer failed to refute the claim of workmen. My attention is drawn to documents at Exts. R1(c) and R1(d). It is also urged that even legal notice making claim at the instance of workmen came to be unanswered by the employer. By drawing my attention to paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of the written statement/objection of the management to petitions under Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act, learned counsel for respondents argued that sweeping denial is made by the employer apart from vague statement that compensation as per the settlement Ext. P1 has already been paid to workmen. Learned counsel further argued that the second claim was a statutory claim whereas the third claim was as per the settlement Ext. P1. By drawing my attention to the proof affidavit, Ext. R1(g), learned counsel for respondents/workmen urged that there was disparity between two set of employees as seen from averments in paragraph 22 and therefore, clause 'B' was incorporated in Ext. P1 settlement to mitigate the loss suffered by the workmen who retired prior to 31.12.2010. 7. Learned counsel for respondents relied on the following judgments during the course of his arguments: 1. Jeet Lal Sharma vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court ((2000) ILLJ 1472) 2. Central Bank of India Ltd. vs. P.S. Rajagopalan ( AIR 1964 SC 743 ) 3. Pioneer Embroideries Ltd. vs. Prithvi Singh and 278 others (Letters Patent Appeal No. 89/2008) 4. N. Palaniappan vs. Presiding Officer, Madurai Labour Court & Others (2011-IV-LLJ-621 (Mad.) 5. G 4 S Security Services India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Satheeshkumar ( 2010 (1) KLT 463 ) 6. Anand Oil Industries vs. Labour court, Hyderabad ( AIR 1979 A.P. 182 ) 7. Union of India vs. S.B. Agnihotri & Another (1991-II-LLJ 603) 8. Chacko vs. Vythiri Plantations Ltd. ( 2000 (2) KLT 244 ) 8. I have considered the submissions advanced and also perused the materials placed on record by partied. Anand Oil Industries vs. Labour court, Hyderabad ( AIR 1979 A.P. 182 ) 7. Union of India vs. S.B. Agnihotri & Another (1991-II-LLJ 603) 8. Chacko vs. Vythiri Plantations Ltd. ( 2000 (2) KLT 244 ) 8. I have considered the submissions advanced and also perused the materials placed on record by partied. The common order passed by the learned Labour Court in applications under Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act is under challenge in these writ petitions. The writ jurisdiction of this Court to entertain such petitions is very limited and this Court cannot convert itself into a Court of Appeal while exercising such jurisdiction. The supervisory jurisdiction of this Court extends to keeping subordinate Tribunal within the limits of its authority by seeing that it obey the law. The impugned order can however be interfered with when there is patent error of law committed by the subordinate Tribunal warranting intervention. The finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be upset unless and until it is obviously perverse, causing grave miscarriage of justice. Keeping in mind this limited jurisdiction, let us put on record the reasoning part of the impugned common order which ultimately resulted in awarding claim Nos. 2 and 3 made by respondents/workmen. Though the impugned common order is running in about 44 pages, the reasoning part for awarding the 2nd and 3rd claim raised by workmen can be found only in paragraph 11 thereof. Needless to mention here that the first clam made by workmen titled as 'arrears of salary for the last two months' came to be rejected by the learned Labour Court. Paragraph 11 of impugned common order reads thus: "11. The second claim raised by all the petitioners is under the head of leave salary, bonus and other claims. It is the case of the management that the petitioners are not entitled to get leave salary and bonus as claimed by them in the claim petition. The learned counsel appearing for the counter petitioners submitted that the petitioners have been paid compensation as per Ext. P1 agreement and therefore, the company has got no liability to pay leave salary and bonus. It is submitted by the counsel for the petitioners that they are limiting the claim of minimum bonus to Rs. 2,500/-. The claim of compensation as per clause 'B' in Ext. p1 document is also disputed by the opposite party. P1 agreement and therefore, the company has got no liability to pay leave salary and bonus. It is submitted by the counsel for the petitioners that they are limiting the claim of minimum bonus to Rs. 2,500/-. The claim of compensation as per clause 'B' in Ext. p1 document is also disputed by the opposite party. But, the management failed to produce any scrap of paper to prove the payment of those claims to the workmen pursuant to Ext. P1 memorandum of settlement. The witness from the side of the management did not mount the witness box to prove their contentions. They have not produced documents which are in their possession to controvert the second and third claim in the claim petitions. Here, the remedy sought for by the petitioners is in the light of Ext. P1 settlement. Pw1 gave evidence for himself and on behalf of other petitioners. His evidence is found to be in tune with the entries in the documents furnished from the side of the petitioners. The Hon'ble High Court in Company Appeal 708/2011 directed the petitioners to approach the competent forum for adjudication of the claims on the ground that the claims made by the workers are legitimate and legal." 9. Bare perusal of this paragraph makes it clear that virtually there is no discussion for arriving at the conclusion in awarding 2nd and 3rd claim made in petitions under Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act. The impugned order is bereft of any reason for awarding the 2nd and 3rd claim made in claim petitions by workmen. I have already incorporated 2nd and 3rd claims made by workmen in the foregoing paragraphs of this judgment. Learned Labour Court cryptically observed that the evidence of PW 1 is found to be in tune with the entries in the documents furnished by the side of workmen and the management failed to produce documents to controvert claim Nos. II and III. At this juncture, it is apposite to note that documents furnished by workmen were in the nature of communication dated 31.05.2011 issued by the management informing them that a cheque for two months salary and gratuity with interest is being delivered to them. That communication (Ext. R1(a)) also bears stamped receipt of the concerned workman in token of receipt of the cheque. Apart from this, other document produced by workmen is the settlement dated 28.02.2011 (Ext. P1). That communication (Ext. R1(a)) also bears stamped receipt of the concerned workman in token of receipt of the cheque. Apart from this, other document produced by workmen is the settlement dated 28.02.2011 (Ext. P1). 10. Though the impugned common order is bereft of any reason for awarding the 2nd and 3rd claim made by workmen, considering the fact that the workmen are litigating for their entitlement for pecuniary benefits from management of the factory which became virtually defunct from July 2001, instead of remitting the matter to the learned Labour Court for fresh decision, I feel it appropriate to examine the issue of entitlement of workmen and to decide the same so as to mitigate the hardship which may cause to workmen by remanding the matters. Ultimately the question is only of interpretation of settlement dated 28.02.2011 (Ext. P1). That settlement requires liberation construction to ensure benefit to employees in view of the fact that the factory run by the 1st petitioner Company virtually stopped all its operation from July 2001 and since then all its employees were left to lurch. They were not paid any salary from July 2001 till attaining the age of their superannuation. Even salary for the months of May and June 2001 was not paid to them which was ultimately paid on 31.05.2011 vide communication, Ext. R1(a) along with amount of gratuity and that too with interest at the rate of 6% only, though remaining interest was paid subsequently. 11. Prior to interpreting settlement at Ext. P1, let us put on record the scope of jurisdiction of the learned Labour Court under Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act. Both parties have rightly relied on the judgment in the matter of P.S. Rajagopalan (supra) for demonstrating that in order to make necessary determination under Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act, in appropriate cases, it is open for the learned Labour Court to interpret the award or settlement on which the right claimed by workmen rest. If such right to receive benefit is disputed, then the learned Labour Court has to first decide whether concerned workman has right to receive such benefit. The relevant portion of paragraph 16 of the said judgment can be quoted with advantage and it reads thus: "16. If such right to receive benefit is disputed, then the learned Labour Court has to first decide whether concerned workman has right to receive such benefit. The relevant portion of paragraph 16 of the said judgment can be quoted with advantage and it reads thus: "16. In our opinion, on a fair and reasonable construction of sub-s. (2) it is clear that if a workman's right' to receive the benefit is disputed that may have to be determined by the Labour Court. Before proceeding to compute the benefit in terms of money the Labour Court inevitably has to deal with the question as to whether the workman has a right to receive that benefit. If the said right is not disputed, nothing more needs to be done and the Labour Court can proceed to compute the value of the benefit in terms of money; but if the said right is disputed, the Labour Court must deal with that question and decide whether the workman has the right to receive the benefit as alleged by him and it is only if the Labour Court answers this point in favour of the workman that the next question of making necessary computation can arise." 12. In the matter of Ganesh Razak (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has examined series of judgments and crystalised the scope of jurisdiction of Labour Court under Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act by stating that these proceedings are analogous to execution proceedings and the Labour Court acts like Executing Court in the execution petition under the Code of Civil Procedure. It was further held that the benefit sought to be computed under Section 33C(2) must be an existing one which are already adjudicated upon or provided for. For doing this exercise, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the learned Labour Court can interpret the award or settlement on which the right of the workman rests. The position of law as crystalised by the Hon'ble Supreme Court found in paragraph 12 of the judgment reads thus: "12. The High Court has referred to some of these decisions but missed the true import thereof. The position of law as crystalised by the Hon'ble Supreme Court found in paragraph 12 of the judgment reads thus: "12. The High Court has referred to some of these decisions but missed the true import thereof. The ratio of these decisions clearly indicates that where the very basis of the claim or the entitlement of the workmen to a certain benefit is disputed, there being, no earlier adjudication or recognition (1968) 1 LLJ 589 : 38 Comp Cas 400 (SC) thereof by the employer, the dispute relating to entitlement is not incidental to the benefit claimed and is, therefore, clearly outside the scope of a proceeding under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. The Labour Court has no jurisdiction to first decide the workmen's entitlement and then proceed to compute the benefit so adjudicated on that basis in exercise of its power under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. It is only when the entitlement has been earlier adjudicated or recognised by the employer and thereafter for the purpose of implementation or enforcement thereof some ambiguity requires interpretation that the interpretation is treated as incidental to the Labour Court's power under Section 33-C(2) like that of the Executing Court's power to interpret the decree for the purpose of its execution." 13. Similarly, in the matter of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited (supra), following are the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court which clinches the issue. "11. The only question which arises for determination in this Court is whether the Labour Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate on the issues referred to it under section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Sub-section (2), which is part of section 33C dealing with "the recovery of money due from an employer" reads as follows: "(2) Where any work-man is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government." 12. It is now well-settled that a proceeding under Section 33C(2) is a proceeding, generally, in the nature of an execution proceeding wherein the Labour Court calculates the amount of money due to a workman from his employer, or if the workman is entitled to any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the Labour Court proceeds to compute the benefit in terms of money. This calculation or computation follows upon an existing right to the money or benefit, in view of its being previously adjudged, or, otherwise, duly provided for. In (Thief Mining Engineer, East India Coal Co. Ltd. v. Rameshwar & ors. (1) it was reiterated that proceedings under section 33C(2) are analogous to execution proceedings and the Labour Court called upon to compute in terms of money the benefit claimed by workmen is in such cases in the Position of an executing court. It was also reiterated that the right to the benefit which is sought to be computed must be an existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the course of and in relation to the relationship between an industrial workman and his employer". 14. Similar are the observations of High Courts in the matters of Jeet Lal Sharma (supra), Pioneer Embroideries Ltd. (supra) and N. Palaniappan (supra). So far as statutory benefits are concerned, in the matter of G 4 S Security Services India Pvt. Ltd. (supra), this Court has held that when the right has already been crystalised by operation of the Act, ascertainment of the days and hours of work on evidence is only incidental to powers under Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act. The High Court was dealing with the right of workmen to receive payment of extra wages for overtime work guaranteed by Section 7 of the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act. Similarly, the Hon'ble Andhra High Court in the matter of Anand Oil Industries (supra) has held that minimum bonus under the Payment of Bonus Act and the minimum wages under the Minimum Wages Act are respectively rights vested in an employee under a statute and by entertaining a petition under Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act, the Labour Court has jurisdiction to entertain and determine the amount due towards arrears of minimum wages and bonus. 15. 15. In the matter of S.B. Agnihotri & Another (supra), it is held by the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court that the Labour Court has equitable jurisdiction to award interest for withholding the amount due to the workman while deciding an application under Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act. Similar is the ratio of judgment of this Court in the matter of Chacko (supra). It is thus clear that if the court finds that an amount legally due to workmen was not paid by the employer while deciding such claim, the Labour Court can award interest at suitable rate. 16. Now let us advert to the controversy involved in the instant case regarding entitlement of workmen for pecuniary advantage on the basis of the existing rights as provided for in the settlement dated 28.02.2011 (Ext. P1). This settlement itself reflects the fact that the 1st petitioner Company had stopped working from July 2001 onwards as the management could not manage the Company. The settlement further incorporates the fact that new promoters proposed to undertake to liquidate all existing liabilities of the Company. For giving effect to the revival scheme, as seen from the settlement, new promoters propose a Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) in order to mitigate the financial difficulties of workmen who were suffering during the past 10 years as the Company stopped its all operations from July 2001. Thus the settlement at Ext. P1 is primarily to alleviate and mitigate the financial hardship suffered by workmen for a long period of 10 years because of stoppage of functioning of the factory run by the 1st petitioner. Considering the object of mitigation of financial hardship suffered by workmen, the terms of settlement at Ext. P1 needs to be interpreted by this Court in order to ascertain which benefits were directed to be given to the workmen by this settlement, Ext. P1. Entitlement for pecuniary benefits flowing from settlement at Ext. P1 is required to be done by this Court by interpreting the settlement at Ext. P1. If it is found that workmen are entitled to receive money which is referable to preexisting right flowing from the settlement at Ext. P1, then the management can be directed to make payment of such money which a workman is entitled to receive in terms of settlement at Ext. P1. I have already incorporated all terms of settlement in foregoing paragraphs of this judgment. P1, then the management can be directed to make payment of such money which a workman is entitled to receive in terms of settlement at Ext. P1. I have already incorporated all terms of settlement in foregoing paragraphs of this judgment. In the light of those terms of settlement, one will have to examine whether award of the learned Labour Court in granting claim No. II titled as "leave salary, bonus and other claims" and claim No. III titled as "compensation payable to the petitioner as per agreement dated 28.02.2011" is sustainable or not in the eyes of law. 17. Claim No. II awarded by the learned Labour Court by the impugned order is in respect of 'leave salary, bonus and other dues'. The proof affidavit of the original petitioner in Claim Petition No. 5 of 2018 needs to be looked into in order to determine justification for the claim. This claimant in paragraph 18 has cryptically stated that he was entitled for leave salary of Rs. 15,615/-, minimum bonus of one month salary for the year 2000-01 amounting to Rs. 4566/- and other dues amounting to Rs. 1,968/-. He further stated that details of amount due to other 41 claimants are mentioned in the Annexure to their respective applications. As per his version, all applicants/claimants are already paid gratuity. Except this, there is nothing in his evidence to justify the claim No. II. The impugned order shows that all workmen have restricted claim for bonus to Rs. 2500/- for the year 2000-01. There is no contra evidence on this aspect. The claim for bonus is a statutory claim made as per provision of Section 10 of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 which assures minimum bonus at the rate of 8.33% of the salary or wages earned by the employee during the accounting year or Rs. 100/- whichever is higher. The claim for bonus is of the year 2000-01, i.e. prior to stoppage of working of the factory. Thus this claim has legal sanctity and dues claimed on this count are statutory dues. The management has not produced any evidence to show that bonus for the year 2000-01 was paid to its employees. Hence the learned Labour Court was totally justified in awarding bonus to the workmen amounting to Rs. 2500/- as claimed by them, though no reasons were recorded by the learned Labour Court for awarding this amount. The management has not produced any evidence to show that bonus for the year 2000-01 was paid to its employees. Hence the learned Labour Court was totally justified in awarding bonus to the workmen amounting to Rs. 2500/- as claimed by them, though no reasons were recorded by the learned Labour Court for awarding this amount. Ultimately the order on this aspect is not suffering from any error of law as the right to receive bonus has already crystalised by provisions of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965. 18. The second claim raised by workmen also consists of claim for 'leave salary and other dues'. There is no evidence on record to justify the claim for leave salary and other dues. No evidence has been brought on record by workmen to justify these claims. Workmen have not adduced any evidence as to how much leaves were in credit of their respective leave account nor explained as to how and under which settlement, they were entitled for encashment of leaves to the credit of their leave account. Similarly what were the other dues and how workmen were entitled for those other dues is not explained by them by adducing any evidence in that regard. The award of claim for leave salary and other dues by the learned Labour Court is totally unsupported by evidence and, as such is perverse and unjustified. The settlement at Ext. P1 is not dealing with payment of any leave salary or other dues, nor workmen are claiming amounts under these heads on account of pre-existing right flowing from the settlement at Ext. P1. Statutory liability to pay such amount is also not shown. Hence, the impugned order so far as it awards claim for leave salary and other dues is concerned, is required to be set aside and the same is set aside accordingly. 19. The third claim is for compensation payable to the workmen as per settlement Ext. P1 dated 28.02.2011. The claim on this third count is made in view of clause 'B' of the settlement at Ext. P1 and at the cost of repetition, the same is reproduced herein. "B. The workmen will be paid 1.25 months salary and DA for every completed year of service till 31.12.2010". This claim has been awarded by the learned Labour Court with interest. P1 and at the cost of repetition, the same is reproduced herein. "B. The workmen will be paid 1.25 months salary and DA for every completed year of service till 31.12.2010". This claim has been awarded by the learned Labour Court with interest. The proof affidavit is explaining the number of completed years of service of workmen and as per the entitlement of workmen shown in clause 'B' of the settlement, the learned Labour Court computed entitlement of pecuniary benefit payable to workmen on this count. 20. According to the learned counsel for petitioners-management, these workmen are not entitled for benefits flowing from clause 'B' of the settlement because they were not on roll of the 1st petitioner as on 31.12.2010 and that they were already superannuated prior to 31.12.2010. 21. Let us therefore examine whether workmen are entitled for benefits flowing from clause 'B' of the settlement Ext. P1 though undisputedly they had attained age of superannuation prior to 31.12.2010. A bare perusal of clause 'B' of the settlement makes it clear that it is applicable to all workmen as the words used in that clause are 'the workmen'. This clause is not limiting its applicability to workmen who were on the roll of the Company as on 31.12.2010. Clause 'B' of the settlement is a general clause applicable to all workmen of the 1st petitioner-Company. No limited interpretation can be given to clause 'B' to restrict its operation to workmen who were on roll of the Company as on 31.12.2010 as language of clause 'B' is clear, comprehensive and unambiguous so as to include all workmen of the 1st petitioner-Company. Bare reading of clause 'B' with other clauses of settlement at Ext. P1 makes the position further clear and demonstrates that clause 'B' is applicable to all workmen irrespective of their date of attaining age of superannuation. In clause 'A' of the settlement, two classes of workmen are carved out. One class of workmen as per clause 'A' is those who were on the rolls of the Company as on 31.12.2010. These workmen are made eligible for benefits of VRS Scheme. Another class of workmen in Clause 'A' is workmen who attained the age of superannuation prior to 31.12.2010 and they were excluded from the purview of benefit of VRS Scheme. Clause 'D' of the settlement deals with VRS package. These workmen are made eligible for benefits of VRS Scheme. Another class of workmen in Clause 'A' is workmen who attained the age of superannuation prior to 31.12.2010 and they were excluded from the purview of benefit of VRS Scheme. Clause 'D' of the settlement deals with VRS package. The wordings used in clause 'D' for awarding VRS package describe those workmen as 'the workmen eligible for the VRS scheme'. Thus, clause 'D' is specifically made applicable to workmen who are eligible for benefit of VRS scheme. Similar is the language employed in clause 'E' of the settlement. It states that the 'employees eligible for VRS scheme' will also be paid gratuity. Clause 'G' and clause 'H' of the settlement are of general application wherein workmen are described as 'all employees' and 'every workmen'. It is thus clear that whenever the question of granting benefit of VRS scheme was there, terms of agreement specifically employ words as 'workmen eligible for the VRS scheme'. For awarding benefits of VRS scheme to specified workmen, the language employed in the terms of settlement is to the effect that 'workmen eligible for the VRS scheme'. Whenever the benefit of the settlement was to be granted to all and sundry workmen, the language employed in the settlement is 'the workmen' or 'the employees'. Looking from this angle, if clause 'B' is read in its true perspective, then it becomes clear that benefits flowing from clause 'B' of the settlement is applicable to each and every workmen employed by the 1st petitioner, though he might have attained age of superannuation either before or after 31.12.2010. This can only be a true and literal construction of clause 'B' of the settlement in view of plain and unambiguous language used while drafting it. 22. The matter can be viewed from another angle also. The object of the settlement, Ext. P1 is to mitigate financial hardship suffered by workmen because of actual closure of operations of the Company from July 2001. Workmen on the roll of the 1st petitioner could not get salary from July 2001 onwards for all these years. For the first time, they were paid salary of May and June 2001 on 31.05.2011 under document at Ext. R1(a) along with gratuity @ 6% interest. Thus, there was prolonged delay in payment of salary even of two months, so also the gratuity. For the first time, they were paid salary of May and June 2001 on 31.05.2011 under document at Ext. R1(a) along with gratuity @ 6% interest. Thus, there was prolonged delay in payment of salary even of two months, so also the gratuity. Salary for the period from July 2001 till attaining age of superannuation by workmen prior to 31.12.2010 was not paid to them, though workmen were on roll and they were neither retrenched by paying appropriate retrenchment compensation or closure compensation as per provisions of the I.D. Act. In this view of the matter, the terms of settlement dated 28.02.2011 and more particularly clause 'B' thereof is making such workmen entitled to 1.25 months salary and DA for every completed year of service till 31.12.2010. Thus, it is seen that some solace came to be offered by the employer to such workmen who were virtually deserted by the earlier management on stoppage of functioning of the factory from July 2001. In this view of the matter, it needs to be held that workmen who had attained the age of superannuation even prior to 31.12.2010 were also eligible and entitled to receive financial benefits flowing from clause 'B' of the settlement at Ext. P1. Therefore, no fault can be found with the impugned common order of the learned Labour Court in awarding claim No. III regarding compensation as per clause 'B' of the agreement dated 28.02.2011, Ext. P1, along with interest thereon. Award of interest by the learned Labour Court is because of unjustified withholding of the amount due to the workmen by following principles of equity. 23. Learned counsel for petitioners vehemently argued that as payment was not made to concerned workmen in terms of clause 'B' of the settlement on or before 31.05.2011, the settlement lapses and the only remedy available with workmen is to raise industrial dispute for receiving closure compensation. This argument is devoid of merit because though the agreement may lapse, entitlement to receive money flowing from clause 'B' of the agreement subsists and it can be executed through the Executing Court by taking recourse to provisions of Section 33(C)(2) of the I.D. Act. Hence it cannot be said that the applications under Section 33(C)(2) of the I.D. Act as framed and filed by workmen were not maintainable. Hence it cannot be said that the applications under Section 33(C)(2) of the I.D. Act as framed and filed by workmen were not maintainable. In the light of the foregoing discussions, all writ petitions are partly allowed by modifying the award of Claim No. II by restricting it to the extent of grant of bonus at Rs. 2500/- with interest thereon as awarded by the learned Labour Court by rejecting other claims of workmen on account of leave salary and other dues under claim No. II. Rest of the impugned order including award of claim No. III towards compensation payable as per agreement dated 28.02.2011 (Ext. P1) with interest thereon is maintained.