JUDGMENT : I.A. No. 4863 of 2019: 1. The matter has been heard through video conferencing with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties. They have no complaint about any audio and visual connectivity. 2. The instant interlocutory application is under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay of 97 days in preferring the instant appeal. 3. This Court, after taking into consideration the reason assigned in the instant application as also considering the fact that instead of dismissing the appeal on the ground of limitation it would be appropriate in the ends of justice to decide the appeal on its merit, accordingly, the delay of 97 days in filing the appeal, is condoned. 4. In the result, the instant interlocutory application is disposed of. L.P.A. No. 366 of 2019: 5. This is an appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent directed against the order/judgment dated 07.01.2019 passed the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. (S) No. 779 of 2016 whereby and whereunder the writ Court has been pleased to interfere with the order of punishment dated 14.09.1996 passed by the Superintendent of Police, Bokaro by which the writ petitioner had been dismissed from service as also the order dated 04.01.1997 passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Coal Range, Bokaro, the appellate authority, and the order dated 21.10.1998 passed by the Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police, Bihar, Patna by which the memorial was also dismissed. 6. The brief facts of the case which requires to be enumerated reads as under: The writ petitioner joined his services as Police Constable under the State of Bihar in the year 1981 in the District of Bhagalpur and on creation of State of Jharkhand his services was allocated to the State of Jharkhand. The writ-petitioner, while working in the district of Bokaro, Jharkhand (the then undivided State of Bihar) received a charge-sheet dated 14.02.1996 issued by the Superintendent of Police, Bokaro whereby and whreunder he was charged with allegation that on 09.12.1995 in Chas-Purulia Road under Pindra Jora P.S. region, he unauthorizedly and illegally stopped the vehicles and harassed the drivers and thereafter when he was enquired about the incidence by the Officer in-charge, he misrepresented and gave the name and police number of other constable. The competent authority of the respondent-State of Jharkhand (the then undivided State of Bihar) on the basis of the aforesaid charge, initiated a departmental proceeding bearing Bokaro District D.P. No. 10/96 by appointing an enquiry officer directing the writ petitioner to appear before the enquiry officer to put forth his defence. Finally, the enquiry has been concluded coming to a finding of proving of charges against the writ petitioner and having been accepted by the disciplinary authority, Superintendent of Police, Bokar, punishment of dismissal from service was inflicted upon him vide order dated 14.09.1996. The writ petitioner preferred an appeal before the appellate authority, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Coal Range, Bokaro which was rejected vide order dated 04.01.1997 against which memorial was preferred before the Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police, Bihar, Patna which was also rejected vide order dated 21.10.1998. The writ petitioner, thereafter, approached to this Court by filing a writ petition invoking the jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by assailing the original order of dismissal from service as also the appellate order as well as the memorial. The writ Court has declined to interfere with the aforesaid order against which the instant intra-court appeal has been preferred. 7. Mr. Diwakar Upadhyay, learned counsel for the writ petitioner/appellant has submitted that the order of dismissal is per se illegal because the same is in violation of principles of natural justice since the writ petitioner had not been provided with an opportunity of hearing at the stage of enquiry. Further ground has been agitated that the order of dismissal is in violation of the principle of parity in imposing punishment since according to the learned counsel for the writ petitioner/appellant the other co-employees against whom similar charge has been levelled, have been exonerated by the appellate authority but according to him, this aspect of the matter has not been appreciated by the learned Single Judge and therefore, according to him, the instant intra-court appeal is fit to be allowed by setting aside the impugned orders on the aforesaid grounds. 8. Per contra, Mr. 8. Per contra, Mr. Ashok Kumar, learned counsel for the State of Jharkhand has vehemently opposed the submissions and grounds agitated by the learned counsel for the writ petitioner/appellant by making a submission that the impugned order of dismissal suffers from no infirmity since there are serious charges levelled against the writ petitioner/appellant which touches the integrity and moral turpitude of the writ petitioner since the writ petitioner/appellant has been found to be involved in harassing the drivers of the vehicles by intercepting them at highway for the purpose of collecting money and when the same had been enquired into, the writ petitioner misrepresented the said fact and disclosed the name of other police personnel and as such the authority after taking into consideration this serious nature of allegation, had initiated a departmental proceeding in which the writ petitioner was provided with an opportunity by issuing notice for his participation in the enquiry but the writ petitioner chosen not to appear and thereafter the enquiry officer had no option but to proceed with the enquiry and finally found the charges proved against the writ petitioner. The enquiry officer forwarded the said enquiry report before the disciplinary authority who had accepted the finding recorded by the enquiry officer and thereafter imposed the punishment of dismissal from service which has been confirmed by the appellate authority as well as in the memorial as also by the writ Court, therefore, according to the learned counsel for the respondent, there are four concurrent findings against the writ petitioner, hence, this Court may not interfere with the impugned order. He further submits that the learned Single Judge, while exercising the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in the matter of departmental proceeding, since the charges have conclusively been proved by the enquiry officer, has rightly not interfered with the impugned orders otherwise the writ Court will substitute itself to be a Court of appeal. 9. 9. Learned counsel for the respondents, in response to the ground agitated about the parity in punishment submits that the said ground is not available to the learned counsel for the writ petitioner because the charges against the other co-delinquents, who have been exonerated at the appellate stage, are quite different to that of the writ petitioner and it is settled that the principle of parity in punishment is to be considered only when the charges in between the two delinquent employees are same. 10. This Court, having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on the basis of the facts enumerated hereinabove, deem it fit and proper first to discuss about the power of judicial review which is to be exercised by the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is settled position of law that the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has got limited scope in showing interference in the decision taken by the authorities. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in Union of India vs. P. Gunasekaran, AIR 2015 SC 545 , in particular to paragraph 13, laying down following guidelines which are self explanatory: “13. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge No. 1 was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority. (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf. (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings. (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case. (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations. (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings. (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case. (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations. (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion. (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence. (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding. (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence. (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law. (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence. (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence. (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be. (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” The Hon’ble Apex Court in Management of State Bank of India vs. Smita Sharad Deshmukh and Another, (2017) 4 SCC 75 , has laid down that it is equally settled position of law that the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can certainly interfere with the quantum of punishment, if it is found disproportionate to the gravity of offence. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Central Industrial Security Force and Others vs. Abrar Ali, AIR 2017 SC 200 , has laid down following guidelines at paragraph 8 for interference by the High Court in the matter of punishment imposed on conclusion of the departmental proceeding, which is quoted herein below: “8. Contrary to findings of the Disciplinary Authority, the High Court accepted the version of the Respondent that he fell ill and was being treated by a local doctor without assigning any reasons. It was held by the Disciplinary Authority that the Unit had better medical facilities which could have been availed by the Respondent if he was really suffering from illness. It was further held that the delinquent did not produce any evidence of treatment by a local doctor. It was held by the Disciplinary Authority that the Unit had better medical facilities which could have been availed by the Respondent if he was really suffering from illness. It was further held that the delinquent did not produce any evidence of treatment by a local doctor. The High Court should not have entered into the arena of facts which tantamounts to re-appreciation of evidence. It is settled law that re-appreciation of evidence is not permissible in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur vs. Nemi Chand Nalwaiya, (2011) 4 SCC 584 : AIR 2011 SC 1931 (Para 6), this Court held as follows: “7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic inquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the inquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala-fide or based on extraneous considerations. In Union of India and Others vs. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 this Court held as follows: “12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the inquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the inquiry is held by a competent authority. (b) the inquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf. (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings. (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case. (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations. (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion. (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence. (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding. (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence. (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the inquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law. (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence. (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence. (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be. (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” It is equally settled that in the departmental proceeding, the opportunity of hearing is required to be provided to the delinquent employee and if no such opportunity has been provided, certainly, the order of punishment will stand vitiated. 11. In the light of the aforesaid settled position of law, this Court has proceeded to examine as to whether in exercise of power of judicial review any interference can be made in the decision of the authority imposing punishment of dismissal from service in the case in hand? 12. 11. In the light of the aforesaid settled position of law, this Court has proceeded to examine as to whether in exercise of power of judicial review any interference can be made in the decision of the authority imposing punishment of dismissal from service in the case in hand? 12. We have travelled across the memo of charge wherefrom it is evident that the writ petitioner, while working as constable under Pindra Jora Police Station, was found to be involved in intercepting the vehicle illegally on 09.12.1995 for the purpose of harassing the vehicle drivers and for his own personal gain but when the same was enquired from him, he disclosed the name of other police constable in his place for which an FIR was instituted on the basis of which the memorandum of charge was issued. 13. The writ petitioner had sufficiently been noticed to put his appearance before the enquiry officer as would be evident from the materials available on record, i.e. the order of dismissal passed by the original authority, that in spite of receipt of notice the writ petitioner did not appear but made a correspondence on 10.05.1995 that due to his deputation in the election he was not in a position to appear, save and except the said communication he has not made any subsequent communication for his appearance rather he has chosen not to appear. Thus, he chose not to put forth his defence. 14. The enquiry officer had given a final opportunity to submit his reply in defence by 31.05.1996 but he did not submit any reply. Thereafter, the enquiry officer proceeded with the enquiry and recorded the evidence of the witnesses who have supported the allegation levelled against the writ petitioner basis upon which the enquiry officer had found the charges to be proved. The disciplinary authority, on perusal of the enquiry report, had accepted the same and taking into consideration the nature of allegation, passed an order of dismissal from service which had been confirmed by the appellate authority as well as in the memorial. 15. The disciplinary authority, on perusal of the enquiry report, had accepted the same and taking into consideration the nature of allegation, passed an order of dismissal from service which had been confirmed by the appellate authority as well as in the memorial. 15. The writ petitioner, although has agitated the issue about non-observance of principles of natural justice before the enquiry officer but as would be evident from the final order, since the writ petitioner did not annexe the copy of the enquiry report either before the writ Court or before this Court, the Court had gone across the order passed by the original authority wherefrom it is evident that the writ petitioner, even though had been provided with ample opportunity to put forth his defence, he had chosen not to do so. Although, it is reflected from the record that the writ petitioner had made certain correspondences showing his inability to appear due to his engagement in election duty but thereafter, no such correspondence has been made with the enquiry officer, therefore, the enquiry officer, having no option, had proceeded with the enquiry by recording the evidence of the witnesses who have supported the allegation levelled against the writ petitioner on the basis of which the charges were found to be proved. Thus, it is evident that the writ petitioner, although had been provided with opportunity to appear before the enquiry officer to put forth his defence, he had chosen not to appear, therefore, it is not available for the writ petitioner to agitate the issue of non-observance of principles of natural justice at the subsequent stage. It is settled position of law that if the opportunity to put forth the defence was given but not availed, it would not be available for the delinquent employee to raise such issue at a subsequent state. It is settled position of law that if the opportunity to put forth the defence was given but not availed, it would not be available for the delinquent employee to raise such issue at a subsequent state. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bank of India vs. Apurba Kumar Saha, (1994) 2 SCC 615 wherein it has been held that an employee who had refused to avail the opportunities provided to him in a disciplinary proceeding to defend himself against the charges of misconduct involving his integrity and dishonesty, cannot be permitted to complain later that he had been denied a reasonable opportunity of defending himself of the charges levelled against him after the disciplinary proceeding conducted against him by the Bank-employer had resulted in punishment. In State Bank of India and Others vs. Narendra Kumar Pandey, (2013) 2 SCC 740 the Hon'ble Apex Court, by placing reliance upon the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Bank of India vs. Apurba Kumar Saha (supra) has reiterated the same view. In the case in hand also the writ petitioner, though had been provided with an opportunity to put forth his defence, had chosen not to appear for the reasons best known to him. Thus, it has to be understood that he had not cooperated with the enquiry as a result of which the enquiry officer proceeded in his absence. Now he cannot be allowed to agitate the plea of not providing opportunity of hearing to put forth his defence. 16. The second issue that has been agitated is that the other delinquent employees have been exonerated from the charges, therefore, there is violation of principle of observance of parity in punishment. 17. We, before proceeding to scrutinize this aspect of the matter as to whether the principle of parity in punishment has been followed or not, deem it fit and proper to go across the pleading of the writ petitioner as to whether such point has been agitated before the writ Court because from bare perusal of the impugned order it does not appear that there is any finding with respect to the this issue. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner has stated in paragraph-14 to the writ petition that apart from the writ petitioner, other three persons, namely, Hawaldar Gajendra Singh, Hawaldar Makeshwar Singh and Constable Arvind Kumar Jha were charge-sheeted and against them also departmental proceeding was initiated but the aforesaid three persons have been reinstated in service after exonerating them from the charges and a different decision has been taken against the writ petitioner by passing the order of dismissal. 18. The said paragraph has duly been replied by the State-respondent in their counter affidavit under paragraph 13 taking a stand that although the departmental proceeding against the three persons namely, Hawaldar Gajendra Singh, Hawaldar Makeshwar Singh and Constable Arvind Kumar Jha was initiated but if the charges would be compared as has been levelled against the writ petitioner, it would be evident that the allegation of collecting illegal gratification was framed only against the writ petitioner while no such charge has been framed against the aforesaid three persons, therefore, the question of following the principle of parity is not available in the facts and circumstances of the case. 19. It requires to refer herein that although the writ petitioner has taken the point of parity in punishment by referring the names of three persons as under paragraph-14 to the writ petition but the charges levelled against those three persons have not been brought on record either before the writ Court or before this Court so that a comparison with the charges levelled against the writ petitioner vis-à-vis other three persons, namely, Hawaldar Gajendra Singh, Hawaldar Makeshwar Singh and Constable Arvind Kumar Jha, could be made by this Court. 20. It is further evident that no such plea about principle of parity in punishment has been taken even before the appellate or before the authority which has dealt with the memorial preferred by the writ petitioner. Therefore, in absence of the charges levelled against those three persons having not been brought on record, it is quite difficult for this Court to deal with this issue. Therefore, in absence of the charges levelled against those three persons having not been brought on record, it is quite difficult for this Court to deal with this issue. However, taking into consideration the averment made at paragraph-14 to the writ petitioner which has duly been replied at paragraph-13 to the counter affidavit denying the assertion about similarity in the charges levelled against the writ petitioner vis-à-vis the other three delinquent employees, this Court, is of the view that no rejoinder affidavit having been filed by the writ petitioner to the statement made in para-13 of the counter affidavit, no positive finding can be recorded in his favour. 21. The writ petitioner, however, has placed reliance upon a judgment rendered in Rajendra Yadav vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others, (2013) 3 SCC 73 wherein the principle has been laid down to follow the principle of parity with co-delinquents. It is evident from the aforesaid judgment that on the basis of the same charges and the same finding one Lakhan Tiwary was demoted for three years from the post of ASI to Head Constable but the appellant and Jagdish Prasad Tiwari were dismissed from service. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant preferred an appeal before the Inspector General of Police, the appellate authority, who dismissed the appeal vide order dated 09.12.2004, thereafter, the appellant, namely, Rajendra Yadav filed a writ petitioner being Writ Petition No. 10696 of 2007 before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur Bench, which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 03.05.2007 against which an appeal was preferred being Writ Appeal No. 11 of 2007 but the same was also dismissed vide judgment dated 06.09.2011 which was assailed before the Hon'ble Apex Court. The Hon'ble Apex Court, after taking into consideration the enquiry report with respect to the appellant as well as the Constable Arjun Pathak which revealed that the role of Arjun Pathak having demanded and received money, though the tacit approval of the appellant was proved in the inquiry, found that the charge levelled against Arjun Pathak was more serious than the one charged against the appellant. After having been found that Arjun Pathak had a more serious role and, in fact, it was he who had demanded and received money but was inflicted comparatively a lighter punishment, whereas the appellant, who had played a passive role, was inflicted with a more serious punishment of dismissal from service, the same was held not sustainable on the doctrine of equality which applied to all who are equally placed, even among others who are found guilty. The persons who have been found guilty can also claim equality of treatment, if they can establish discrimination while imposing punishment when all of them are involved in the same incident. Parity among co-delinquents has also to be maintained when punishment is being imposed. Punishment should not be disproportionate while comparing the involvement of co-delinquents who are parties to the same transaction or incident. The disciplinary authority cannot impose punishment which is disproportionate i.e. lesser punishment for serious offences and stringent punishment for lesser offences. 22. We have tested the fact of this case and found from the statement made at paragraph-14 to the writ petition disclosing names of three persons against whom the writ petitioner has claimed that they have similarly been charged but the same has been disputed at paragraph-13 to the counter affidavit. However, the writ petitioner has not brought on record the memorandum of charges levelled against those three persons. The statement made at paragraph-14 to the writ petition has been disputed by stating in the counter affidavit that the charges levelled against those persons were quite different from the writ petitioner against whom the charge of interception of the vehicle for personal interest has been found and further he had purposely covered his name by naming other constable. 23. In view of the aforesaid admitted facts, the ratio which has been laid down in the judgment rendered in Rajendra Yadav vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others (supra) with respect to following the doctrine of equality in imposing the punishment is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case. 24. 23. In view of the aforesaid admitted facts, the ratio which has been laid down in the judgment rendered in Rajendra Yadav vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others (supra) with respect to following the doctrine of equality in imposing the punishment is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case. 24. We have already referred the ratio laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court with respect to power of judicial review which is to be exercised by the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India wherein the scope is very limited and the same can only be exercised as per the guideline stipulated in the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Union of India Vs. P. Gunasekaran (supra) and Central Industrial Security Force and Others vs. Abrar Ali (supra). According to our considered view, none of the grounds is available warranting interference by this Court in the exercise of power of judicial review as conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 25. The learned Single Judge, taking into consideration the fact that there is no violation of principles of natural justice and further that there is concurrent finding of the three administrative authorities as also taking into consideration the nature of allegation levelled against the writ petitioner, who was a member of a disciplined force against whom the misuse of his official power for personal gain has been levelled, has rightly not interfered with the impugned order. 26. Accordingly, we are of the view that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge requires no interference, hence, the instant appeal fails and stands dismissed. 27. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, also stand dismissed.