JUDGMENT : In view of outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic, case has been taken up through Video Conferencing. Concerned lawyers have no objection with regard to the proceeding, which has been held through Video Conferencing today at 10:30 a.m. onward. They have no complaint in respect to the audio and video clarity and quality. 2. The petitioner has approached this Court for quashing of the order dated 09.12.2011, passed by learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur in Ref. Case No. 8 of 2004, by which the preliminary issue i.e. “whether the domestic enquiry conducted by the Management against the Workman is fair, proper and in accordance with the principles of natural justice?”, was decided against the petitioner. Petitioner has further prayed for quashing the Award dated 17.07.2012, passed by learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur in Ref. Case No. 8 of 2004, by which the learned Presiding Officer answered the Award against the Workman-Petitioner and held that dismissal of petitioner from service of M/s. TISCO Ltd. is justified and petitioner is not entitled to get any relief. Petitioner has also prayed for direction upon the respondent to reinstate the petitioner in service with all consequential benefits after setting aside the order dated 09.12.2011 and award dated 17.07.2012. 3. The facts of the case in short is that while the petitioner was posted as L.W.A. at Tube Division of M/s. TISCO Ltd., vide letter dated 03.12.1991 he was charge-sheeted by the respondent-Management alleging therein that on 28.11.1991 when the locker of the petitioner was checked one slap of lucas of 8.5 kg and four pairs of gloves were found in the said locker, which was neither in use by the Department of petitioner nor it was issued to him. As such, said act of the petitioner amounts to attempt of theft and dishonesty towards the property of the respondent-Management. Thereafter, the respondent-Management initiated domestic enquiry regarding the said charges but without giving any intimation to the petitioner to produce his defence and further, the entire proceeding was conducted in English. Another enquiry was also conducted against the charge-sheet dated 10.01.1992. The enquiry officer, after conducting both the enquiries, submitted two separate enquiry reports, both dated 23.10.1992, holding the petitioner guilty of the charges levelled against him. Another enquiry was also conducted against the charge-sheet dated 10.01.1992. The enquiry officer, after conducting both the enquiries, submitted two separate enquiry reports, both dated 23.10.1992, holding the petitioner guilty of the charges levelled against him. After receipt of the enquiry reports, the punishment of discharge was imposed upon the petitioner by order dated 24.10.1992, issued by the signature of one Sri Harsh, who was not the appointing authority of the petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner orally raised objection against the order dated 24.10.1992 on several occasions but when nothing was done on behalf of the respondent-Management, petitioner submitted representation dated 31.01.2001, to the General Manager, C.R. Mill of TISCO Ltd., requesting therein to reinstate the petitioner with full back wages. 4. However, when no order was passed on the representation of the petitioner, he approached the Department of Labour, Employment and Training, Govt. of Jharkhand, to get his matter referred to Ld. Labour Court. Accordingly, the Department of Labour, Employment and Training, Govt. of Jharkhand referred an industrial dispute for adjudication vide notification dated 21.02.2003 to the Labour Court, Jamshedpur, after framing the following issue: “Whether the dismissal of Johnson Lakra, the workman of M/s. TISCO Ltd., Jamshedpur from the date of 24.10.1992 by the Management is justified? If not, what relief he is entitled to?” 5. After receiving the reference, notices were issued to both the parties by the Ld. Labour Court, Jamshedpur and after that, both parties appeared and filed their respective written statement. 6. Before passing the Award, a preliminary issue was raised i.e. “whether the domestic enquiry conducted by the Management against the Workman is fair, proper and in accordance with the principles of natural justice?”, and the learned Labour Court vide its order dated 09.12.2011, decided the said issue against the petitioner, holding therein that, “………………the domestic enquiry conducted against the petitioner is fair and proper. The legality and propriety of the concerned authority shall be considered at the time of final hearing of the case u/s. 11-A of the I.D. Act.” Thereafter, the learned Court below after hearing the parties at length and after perusing the documents and evidences brought on record, vide its Award dated 17.07.2012, came to the conclusion that, “……… the workman has raised his dispute after a lapse of more than 8 years and during evidence, workman has stated that he was working with other company for some months after the termination made by the management. Thus, the present reference, in my opinion, is stale one and the present dispute has lost its significance. In the result, the present reference is, hereby, answered in favour of the management and against the concerned workman.” Aggrieved by order dated 09.12.2011 and award dated 17.07.2012, passed by the learned Labour Court, Jamshedpur, rejecting the claim of the petitioner for his reinstatement in service, the petitioner has knocked the door of this Court. 7. Assailing the impugned orders, Mr. Kishore Kr. Singh, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner vociferously argues that the order dated 09.12.2011 and award dated 17.07.2012, passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur is illegal and liable to be quashed and set aside and the petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service with all consequential benefits. Learned counsel further argues that the dismissal order imposed upon the petitioner by the respondent is illegal, disproportionate and not in accordance with law, since it cannot be said that the domestic enquiry was conducted fairly, as at no point of time, the enquiry officer intimated the petitioner and asked him to lead his witnesses in support of his case. Learned counsel further argues that petitioner was not given opportunity of cross-examining the management’s witness and further, the copy of the documents submitted by the respondent-management before the enquiry officer, was also not given to the petitioner-workman. Thus, the enquiry officer failed to conduct the enquiry fairly and as such findings recorded in the enquiry report are also not sustainable in the eyes of law. Thus, the enquiry officer failed to conduct the enquiry fairly and as such findings recorded in the enquiry report are also not sustainable in the eyes of law. Learned counsel further argues that learned Presiding Officer has not given due consideration to the points raised and material brought on record by the petitioner and came to an erroneous finding vide his order dated 09.12.2011 and award dated 17.07.2012 and as such, the same are liable to be quashed and set aside. 8. To buttress his arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner places heavy reliance on the following judgments: (I) Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd. Vs. Mahesh Dahiya [ (2017) 1 SCC 768 ]; (II) Prabhu Dayal Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors. [ 2020 (1) JLJR 180 ] 9. Per contra, counter-affidavit has been filed by respondent-Management. Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. Manish Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-management vehemently opposes the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner and argues that the petitioner was issued charge-sheet dated 03.12.1991 for attempted theft and dishonesty in connection with company’s business and on 06.12.1991, the petitioner submitted his reply. However, on 10.01.1992 another charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner for attempted theft of company’s property. The enquiry officer after enquiring into the charge-sheet dated 03.12.1991, found the petitioner guilty of the said charges. Thereafter, on 24.10.1992, the petitioner was discharged from the services of the respondent for the misconduct committed by him vide aforesaid two charge-sheets. Thereafter, on 31.03.1993, the petitioner made a representation to the Chief Personnel Executive admitting his guilty leveled vide charge-sheets dated 03.12.1991 and 10.01.1995, however, he has stated that he was in drunken state and had no feeling as to what he was doing. Further, he requested to consider his case sympathetically. Thereafter, on 06.07.1995, a meeting was held between V.P. (HRM) and Union representative, in which case of the petitioner was discussed in detail and it was unanimously decided that petitioner has no case. Aggrieved by the said decision, the petitioner approached the concerned government department and hence, the dispute was referred for adjudication to the Labour Court and the learned Labour Court, after hearing the parties, decided the Award against the petitioner and in favour of the management. 10. Aggrieved by the said decision, the petitioner approached the concerned government department and hence, the dispute was referred for adjudication to the Labour Court and the learned Labour Court, after hearing the parties, decided the Award against the petitioner and in favour of the management. 10. Denying the submission of the petitioner that the enquiry was not conducted in accordance with law, learned senior counsel for the respondent-management submits that the domestic enquiry was found to be fair and proper by the learned Labour Court vide order dated 09.12.2011. Learned senior counsel submits that the law is firmly settled by the Apex Court that, “when a proper enquiry has been held by an employer and the finding of misconduct is plausible conclusion flowing from the evidence adduced at the said enquiry, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to sit in judgment over the decision of the employer as an appellate authority”. Learned senior counsel further argues that the Labour Court has carefully analyzed the evidences, documents and records and has come to a logical finding that the dispute is stale, the charges are proved and the punishment is not harsh and thus came to the finding that the workman is not entitled for any relief. Learned senior counsel accordingly submits that for the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition is not maintainable and is fit to be dismissed. 11. To buttress his arguments, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents places heavy reliance on the following judgments: (I) Nedungadi Bank Ltd. Vs. K.P. Madhavankutty & Ors. [ (2000) 2 SCC 455 ]; (II) Prabhakar Vs. Joint Director, Sericulture Department & Anr. [ (2015) 1 SCC 1 ]; (III) Om Prakash Mann Vs. Director of Education (Basic) & Ors. [ (2006) 7 SCC 558 ]; (IV) Haryana Financial Corp. & Anr. Vs. Kailash Chandra Ahuja [ (2008) 9 SCC 31 ]; (V) Divisional Controller, N.E.K.R.T.C. Vs. H. Amaresh [ (2006) 6 SCC 187 ]; 12. Be that as it may, after hearing counsel for the parties at length and from perusal of the documents brought on record and the judgments relied upon by the respective parties, this Court is of the opinion that admittedly, there has been unexplained delay and laches on the part of the petitioner. Be that as it may, after hearing counsel for the parties at length and from perusal of the documents brought on record and the judgments relied upon by the respective parties, this Court is of the opinion that admittedly, there has been unexplained delay and laches on the part of the petitioner. The reference has been made by the appropriate authority after lapse of more than eight years and further, during the evidence, the workman had stated that he was working with other company for some months after the termination made by the respondent-management. Hence, it can comfortably be said that the present reference is stale one and the present dispute has lost its significance and as on date, no dispute is in existence. Even the domestic enquiry conducted against the petitioner was held to be fair and proper. 13. The issue fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Nedungadi Bank Ltd. Vs. K.P. Madhavankutty & Ors., reported in (2000) 2 SCC 455 , wherein the Hon’ble Court has held as under: “6. Law does not prescribe any time limit for the appropriate government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central Government has exercised powers in this case after lapse of about seven years of order dismissing the respondent from service. At the time reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact it could be said that there was no dispute pending at the time When the reference in question was made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. In fact it could be said that there was no dispute pending at the time When the reference in question was made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under what circumstances they were dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for raising industrial dispute was ex facie bad and incompetent. 7. In the present appeal it is not the case of the respondent that the disciplinary proceedings, which resulted in his dismissal, were in any way illegal or there was even any irregularity. He availed his remedy of appeal under the rules governing his conditions of service. It could not be said that in the circumstances industrial dispute did arise or was even apprehended after lapse of about seven years of the dismissal of the respondent. Whenever a workman raises some dispute it does not become industrial dispute and appropriate government cannot in a mechanical fashion make the reference of the alleged dispute terming as industrial dispute. Central Government lacked power to make reference both on the ground of delay in invoking the power under section 10 of the Act and there being no industrial dispute existing or even apprehended. The pur-pose of reference is to keep industrial peace in an establishment. The present reference is destructive to the industrial peace and defeats the very object and purpose of the Act. Bank was justified in thus moving the High Court seeking an order to quash the reference in question.” Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Prabhakar Vs. Joint Director, Sericulture Department & Anr., reported in (2015) 15 SCC 1 , has held as under: “8. From the facts narrated above, it becomes clear that for a period of fourteen years no grievance was made by the petitioner qua his alleged termination. Though it was averred that the petitioner had approached the Management time and again and was given assurance that he would be taken back in service, there is nothing on record to substantiate this. No notice was served upon the Management. There is no assurance given in writing by the Management at any point of time. Such assertions are clearly self-serving. No notice was served upon the Management. There is no assurance given in writing by the Management at any point of time. Such assertions are clearly self-serving. Pertinently, even the Labour Court has not accepted the aforesaid explanation anywhere and has gone by the fact that the dispute was raised after a delay of fourteen years. Therefore, keeping in mind the aforesaid facts, we would decide the issue which has arisen, namely, whether reference of such a belated claim was appropriate. ……. ……. 21. On the reading of these judgments, which are discussed hereinafter, it can be discerned that in some decisions where the reference was made after a lapse of considerable period, the Court did not set aside the reference but moulded the relief by either granting reinstatement but denying back wages, fully or partially, or else granted compensation, denying reinstatement. On the other hand, in some of the decisions, the Court held that even when there was no time prescribed to exercise power under Section 10 of the Act, such a power could not be exercised at any point of time to revive matters which had since been settled or had to become stale. We would like to refer to these judgments at this juncture. 22. As early as in 1959, this Court in the case of Shalimar Works Ltd. v. Their Workmen ( (1960) 1 SCR 150 ) pointed out that there is no limitation prescribed in making a reference of disputes to Industrial Tribunal under Section 10(1) of the Act. At the same time, the Court also remarked that the dispute should be referred as soon as possible after they have arisen and after conciliation proceedings have failed. In that case, reference was made after four year of dispute having arisen. In these circumstances, this Court held that relief of reinstatement should not be given to the discharged workmen in such a belated and vague reference. 23. Again, in Western India Match Company Ltd.-6, though upholding the reference of dispute made nearly six years after the previous refusal to make the reference, the Court observed that in exercising its discretion to make reference, the Government will take into consideration the time which had lapsed between its earlier decision and the date when it decides to reconsider it in the interest of justice and industrial peace. Following observations from this judgment need to be noticed for the purposes of the present case: '8. From the words used in Section 4(k) of the Act there can be no doubt that the Legislature has left the question of making or refusing to make a reference for adjudication to the discretion of the Government. But the discretion is neither unfettered nor arbitrary for the section clearly provides that there must exist an industrial dispute as defined by the Act or such a dispute must be apprehended when the Government decides to refer it for adjudication. No reference thus can be made unless at the time when the Government decides to make it an industrial dispute between the employer and his employees either exists or is apprehended. Therefore, the expression 'at any time', though seemingly without any limits, is governed by the context in which it appears. Ordinarily, the question of making a reference would arise after conciliation proceedings have been gone through and the conciliation officer has made a failure report. But the Government need not wait until such a procedure has been completed. In an urgent case, it can 'at any time', i.e., even when such proceedings have not begun or are still pending, decide to refer the dispute for adjudication. The expression 'at any time' thus takes in such cases as where the Government decides to make a reference without waiting for conciliation proceedings to begin or to be completed. As already stated, the expression 'at any time' in the context in which it is used postulates that a reference can only be made if an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. No reference is contemplated by the section when the dispute is not an industrial dispute, or even if it is so, it no longer exists or is not apprehended, for instance, where it is already adjudicated or in respect of which there is an agreement or a settlement between the parties or where the industry in question is no longer in existence. xx xx xx 13. It is true that where a Government reconsiders its previous decision and decides to make the reference, such a decision might cause inconvenience to the employer because the employer in the meantime might have acted on the belief that there would be no proceedings by way of adjudication of the dispute between him and his workmen. xx xx xx 13. It is true that where a Government reconsiders its previous decision and decides to make the reference, such a decision might cause inconvenience to the employer because the employer in the meantime might have acted on the belief that there would be no proceedings by way of adjudication of the dispute between him and his workmen. Such a consideration would, we should think, be taken into account by the Government whenever, in exercise of its discretion, it decides to reopen its previous decision as also the time which has lapsed between its earlier decision and the date when it decides to reconsider it. These are matters which the Government would have to take into account while deciding whether it should reopen its former decision in the interest of justice and industrial peace but have nothing to do with its jurisdiction under Section 4(k) of the Act. Whether the intervening period may be short or long would necessarily depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and therefore, in construing the expression 'at any time' in Section 4(k) it would be impossible to lay down any limits to it.” The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Shalimar Works Ltd. Vs. Workmen [ AIR 1959 SC 1217 ], pointed-out that there is no limitation prescribed in making a reference of disputes to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10(1) of the Act. At the same time, the Court also remarked that the dispute should be referred as soon as possible after they have arisen and after conciliation proceedings have failed. In that case, reference was made after four years of dispute having arisen. 14. The other submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner regarding non-supply of copy of the enquiry report, it would be apposite to mention here that merely because there is a right to receive the copy of enquiry report and if the same has not been supplied, the entire proceeding cannot be said to be vitiated. In this regard reference can be had to the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Om Prakash Mann Vs. Director of Education (Basic) & Ors., reported in (2006) 7 SCC 558 . The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment is quoted herein below: “8. In this regard reference can be had to the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Om Prakash Mann Vs. Director of Education (Basic) & Ors., reported in (2006) 7 SCC 558 . The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment is quoted herein below: “8. The second ground that no copy of the enquiry report had been furnished to the appellant thereby violated the principle of natural justice has also no substance. On this ground the learned Judge recorded a finding that the appellant was unable to show as to how he has been prejudiced for non-furnishing of the copy of the report. We agree with the finding of the learned Judge of the High Court. 9. By now it is well settled principle of law that doctrines of principle of natural justice are not embodied Rule. They cannot be applied in a straightjacket formula. To sustain the complaint of violation of the principle of natural justice one must establish that he has been prejudiced by non-observance of principle of natural justice. As held by the High Court the appellant has not been able to show as to how he has been prejudiced by non-furnishing of the copy of the enquiry report. The appellant has filed a detail appeal before Appellate Authority which was dismissed as noticed above. It is not his case that he has been deprived of making effective appeal for non-furnishing of copy of enquiry report. He has participated in the enquiry proceedings without any demur. It is undisputed that the appellant has been afforded enough opportunity and he has participated throughout the enquiry proceedings, he has been heard and allowed to make submission before the enquiry Committee.” Further, in case of Haryana Financial Corporation & Anr. Vs. Kailas Chandra Ahuja, reported in (2008) 9 SCC 31 , the Hon’ble Court has held as under: 18. So far as the supply of report of the Inquiry Officer is concerned, it was held by the Constitution Bench that the delinquent employee had a right to receive the Inquiry Officer's report and a denial thereof would constitute breach of natural justice. Speaking for the majority, Sawant J. stated: [ECIL V. B. Karunakar (1993) 4 SCC 727 ] "29. So far as the supply of report of the Inquiry Officer is concerned, it was held by the Constitution Bench that the delinquent employee had a right to receive the Inquiry Officer's report and a denial thereof would constitute breach of natural justice. Speaking for the majority, Sawant J. stated: [ECIL V. B. Karunakar (1993) 4 SCC 727 ] "29. Hence it has to be held that when the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy of the enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the charges levelled against him. That right is a part of the employee's right to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. A denial of the enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges, is a denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural justice". (emphasis supplied) 19. The Court then considered the effect of non-supply of Inquiry Officer's report on the delinquent. The majority stated: [B.Karunakar case (supra)] "30. (v) The next question to be answered is what is the effect on the order of punishment when the report of the enquiry officer is not furnished to the employee and what relief should be granted to him in such cases. The answer to this question has to be relative to the punishment awarded. When the employee is dismissed or removed from service and the inquiry is set aside because the report is not furnished to him, in some cases the non-furnishing of the report may have prejudiced him gravely while in other cases it may have made no difference to the ultimate punishment awarded to him. Hence to direct reinstatement of the employee with back-wages in all cases is to reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical ritual. The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequence would have followed, it would be a perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an `unnatural expansion of natural justice' which in itself is antithetical to justice". (emphasis supplied) 20. Holding that it was incumbent on the delinquent employee to show prejudice, the majority held that non-supply of report of the Inquiry Officer to the delinquent employee would not by itself make the order of punishment null and void or non est. The majority concluded: [B. Karunakar’s case (supra)] “31. Hence, in all cases where the enquiry officer's report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the Courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the Court/Tribunal and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, the Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short cuts. The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short cuts. Since it is the Courts/Tribunals which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment, (and not any internal appellate or revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment". (emphasis supplied) 21. From the ratio laid down in B. Karunakar’s case (supra), it is explicitly clear that the doctrine of natural justice requires supply of a copy of the Inquiry Officer's report to the delinquent if such Inquiry Officer is other than the Disciplinary Authority. It is also clear that non-supply of report of Inquiry Officer is in the breach of natural justice. But it is equally clear that failure to supply a report of Inquiry Officer to the delinquent employee would not ipso facto result in proceedings being declared null and void and order of punishment non est and ineffective. It is for the delinquent-employee to plead and prove that non-supply of such report had caused prejudice and resulted in miscarriage of justice. If he is unable to satisfy the Court on that point, the order of punishment cannot automatically be set aside. …… ……. 24. In our considered view, the High Court was wrong in making the above observation and virtually in ignoring the ratio of B. Karunakar that prejudice should be shown by the delinquent. To repeat, in B. Karunakar, this Court stated; “30 (v) ……Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case". …… ……. 36. The recent trend, however, is of `prejudice'. Even in those cases where procedural requirements have not been complied with, the action has not been held ipso facto illegal, unlawful or void unless it is shown that non-observance had prejudicially affected the applicant. ……. ……. 39. …… ……. 36. The recent trend, however, is of `prejudice'. Even in those cases where procedural requirements have not been complied with, the action has not been held ipso facto illegal, unlawful or void unless it is shown that non-observance had prejudicially affected the applicant. ……. ……. 39. In B. Karunakar’s case (supra), this Court considered several cases and held that it was only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report "would have made a difference" to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment. The law laid down in B. Karunakar was reiterated and followed in subsequent cases also [vide State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364 ; M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1999) 6 SCC 237 ]. ……. …… 44. From the aforesaid decisions, it is clear that though supply of report of Inquiry Officer is part and parcel of natural justice and must be furnished to the delinquent-employee, failure to do so would not automatically result in quashing or setting aside of the order or the order being declared null and void. For that, the delinquent employee has to show `prejudice'. Unless he is able to show that non-supply of report of the Inquiry Officer has resulted in prejudice or miscarriage of justice, an order of punishment cannot be held to be vitiated. And whether prejudice had been caused to the delinquent-employee depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down. 15. From going through the records of the case, it has also been noticed that petitioner was caught thrice while committing theft and it is settled laws that misappropriation amounts to loss of confidence and dismissal is the proper punishment in such cases. The petitioner had no legal right to continue in service any further. This Court is in full agreement with the observations made by learned Labour Court, Jamshedpur. 16. The judgments referred by Mr. Kishore Kr. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner does not come to his rescue as nothing has been brought on record to show that how the petitioner was prejudiced by non-supply of copy of the enquiry report and when the dispute was not in existence, how the unexplained stale claim could have been ignored by the learned Labour Court. 17. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner does not come to his rescue as nothing has been brought on record to show that how the petitioner was prejudiced by non-supply of copy of the enquiry report and when the dispute was not in existence, how the unexplained stale claim could have been ignored by the learned Labour Court. 17. As a sequitur to the aforesaid observations, rules, guidelines, legal propositions and judicial pronouncements, no interference is warranted in the instant writ application and the same is hereby dismissed.