JUDGMENT : A.C. RAO, J. 1. By way of present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the show-cause notice dated 09.10.2020 issued by the respondent no. 2- Regional Commissioner of Municipality, Vadodara, wherein the petitioner was called upon to explain as to why action under Section 70 of the Gujarat Municipality Act (for short “the Act”) should not be taken against him. 2. The short facts leading to the present petition are that, the petitioner was the President of Lunawada Mahanagarpalika and during his tenure, the Municipal Corporation has decided to construct a town hall. Initially, the Corporation has decided to construct the town hall on the land owned by the Corporation bearing revenue survey No. 171 but, thereafter, the Municipality has revised the plan and it is alleged that the petitioner has not made any estimation and revised a technical approval and approval for the change of the place and the petitioner has sanctioned the running bill of Rs. 46,55,627/-. It is also stated in the notice that he has not made a provision for the third party inspection and agency and he had paid more amount then it was sanctioned in the tender bill. He had issued work order after one year and 9 months from the sanction of the tender, which is against the validity of the tender period. 3. According to the respondent No. 2, the petitioner has caused economic loss to the Municipality. He has not followed the ruled and thereby, he has caused economic loss to the Municipality and therefore, the respondent No. 2 has issued show-cause notice as to why the action against the petitioner under Section 70 of the Act should not be initiated. 4. The learned advocate Mr. Deepak Sanchela appearing for the petitioner, has contended that as per Government Resolution dated 04.07.2015, the check is to be signed by the Chief Officer and Accountant and it is the responsibility of the Chief Officer and Accountant to see that all the rules are followed and it is the duty of the Chief Officer to carry out internal audit and all technical verifications before the payment is made. He has also relied upon the letter dated 28.11.2016 addressed by the District Urban Development Agency, wherein the technical sanction was granted by the District Development Authority. He has also relied upon the letter dated 28.11.2016 addressed by the District Urban Development Agency, wherein the technical sanction was granted by the District Development Authority. He has further relied on the advertisement which is signed by the Chief Officer and the President of the Municipality. He has relied on the General Body Resolution dated 29.01.2019, wherein the President of the Municipality was given the authority to take all the necessary action for the construction of the town hall. Relying on all these materials, the learned advocate for the petitioner has contended that the petitioner was elected as a President of Municipality for the period from 26.02.2013 to 26.08.2015 and thereafter, from 26.02.2018 to 26.08.2020. It is contended that the technical sanction came to be approved in the year 2016, the advertisement was given in March, 2017, the price bid was opened in the May, 2017 and work order was given in February, 2019. Therefore, at the relevant time, the petitioner was not the President of the Municipality but, only work order was given by the petitioner in February, 2019. So the notice is a colourable exercise of powers in order to harass the petitioner by the rival political parties and he has prayed that the writ may be issued to the respondent No. 2 and the impugned notice dated 09.10.2020 may be quashed and set aside. 5. The learned advocate for the petitioner has relied on the judgment of the Apex court rendered in the case of Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai, 1998 (8) SCC 1 , wherein it is observed as under: “The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. The High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. The High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by the Supreme Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. (Paras 14 and 15) Therefore, the jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, in spite of the alternative statutory remedies, is not affected, specially in a case where the authority against whom the writ is filed is shown to have had no jurisdiction or had purported to usurp jurisdiction without any legal foundation. (Para 20) Hence, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the writ petition at the initial stage without examining the contention that the show-cause notice issued to the appellant was wholly without jurisdiction and that the Registrar, in the circumstances of the case, was not justified in acting as the “Tribunal.” (Para 21) 6. Per contra, Mr. Trupesh Kathiriya, the learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondent authorities has opposed this petition and contended that at the stage of show-cause notice, the writ petition is not maintainable. In support of his submission, he has relied upon the judgment of this Court rendered in the Special Civil Application No. 5804 of 2010 decided on 11.05.2010. It is contended that in the said reportable case, there was allegation of colourable exercise of powers but, the court has held that the writ petition against the show-cause notice is not maintainable as there was no violation of principles of natural justice. It was observed that the petitioner is at liberty to produce material in support of his case before the concerned authority. 7. It was observed that the petitioner is at liberty to produce material in support of his case before the concerned authority. 7. I have considered the rival submissions and considered the fact that though the technical sanction was approved during the tenure of other President namely, Shri Jayshreeben V. Joshi, the place of the town hall was changed during the tenure of the present petitioner. The resolution was passed to proceed with the work of town-hall and full authority was given to the petitioner. The petitioner was also a party to the said resolution. The petitioner does not disclose this facts. Further I find substance in the submissions made by the learned AGP and the judgment relied upon by him would be applicable to the facts of the present case. In para-12 of the said judgment it is held as under: “12. At this juncture, it would be helpful to examine the legal position regarding maintainability of a petition challenging a Show Cause notice under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In Union of India and Another vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, (2006) 12 SCC 28 , the Apex Court has lucidly summed up the legal position as under: “14. The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should not be entertained against a mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet is that at that stage the writ petition may be held to be premature. A mere charge-sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. It is well settled that a writ petition lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of anyone. It is only when a fined order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance. 15. Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence such discretion under Article 226 should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show-cause notice or charge-sheet. 16. It is only when a fined order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance. 15. Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence such discretion under Article 226 should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show-cause notice or charge-sheet. 16. No doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a charge-sheet or show-cause notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal. However, ordinarily the High Court should not interfere in such a matter.” 7.1 Applying the said ratio to the facts of the present case, I am of the view that the present petitioner is not able to show that the respondent no. 2 has no jurisdiction to issue such show-cause notice. Secondly, by the issuance of show-cause notice, no legal or fundamental right of the petitioner is infringed. Thirdly, it cannot be said that the principles of natural justice have been violated, as petitioner has been called upon to furnish the reply to the show-cause notice. The case of the petitioner, therefore, does not fall within the extraordinary and exceptional circumstances as contemplated in the case of Whirlpool Corporation (Supra) and the question raised by the learned advocate for the petitioner as to whether at the relevant time he was president or not and whether he had not taken active participation in awarding the contract and signing the bill is a question of fact. The petition at notice stage is pre-mature. Merely a show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or after holding an inquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the further proceedings are not required. It is well settled that a writ petition lies when some right of any party in infringed. A mere show-cause notice does not infringe right of anyone. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise, adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance. It is well settled that a writ petition lies when some right of any party in infringed. A mere show-cause notice does not infringe right of anyone. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise, adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance. No doubt, in very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a show-cause notice, if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal. Such is not the case in the present petition. 8. Under the circumstances, I am not inclined to entertain this writ petition. Hence, the present petition deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed.