JUDGMENT : R.B. Deo, J. 1. This appeal is preferred under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ("Act" for short) taking exception to the judgment and order dated 26-11-2014 rendered by the learned Joint Civil Judge (Senior Division), Nagpur in Land Acquisition Reference 2 of 1996 enhancing the compensation awarded by the Special Land Acquisition Officer from Rs. 27,000/- per hectare to Rs. 2,00,000/- per hectare. 2. Before adverting to the submissions of the learned Counsel Smt. U.A. Patil appearing for the appellant-Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation ('VIDC' for short) and the learned Counsel Shri S.P. Kshirsagar appearing for respondent 1, it would be necessary to note the factual background. 3. Notification dated 07-2-1991 was issued in exercise of power under Section 4 of the Act declaring the intention to acquire land Survey 285, admeasuring 1.05 hectares and land Survey 299, admeasuring 1.99 hectares of Mouza-Kolar, Tahsil and District Nagpur, for the Wadgaon Dam Project. 4. The notice under Section 12 of the Act was issued on 17-1-1995 and the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer vide award dated 01-11-1994 was Rs. 27,000/- per hectare. 5. Respondent 1 instituted Land Acquisition Reference 2 of 1996 claiming enhanced compensation at the rate of Rs. 60,000/- per acre i.e. at the rate of Rs. 1,50,000/- per hectare. Respondent 1 additionally claimed compensation for the trees and well. 6. The reference Court decided Land Reference Application 2 of 1996 vide judgment and order dated 02-5-2002 whereby the compensation was enhanced to Rs. 80,000/- per acre. 7. The judgment and order of the reference Court was challenged in First Appeal 688 of 2002. 8. This Court decided First Appeal 688 of 2002 vide judgment dated 30-3-2009 (Coram: B.P. Dharmadhikari, J. as his Lordship was then). The appeal was partly allowed and the reference Court was directed to decide the reference afresh. 9. The question framed by this Court was "Whether the action of the reference Court in granting enhancement by placing reliance upon sale-deed dated 06-11-1990 can be said to be justified in present circumstances?" 10. This Court, while remanding the matter, held that the reliance upon one single sale instance of dry crop land by the reference Court for enhancement cannot be sustained. This Court, while remanding the matter, held that the reliance upon one single sale instance of dry crop land by the reference Court for enhancement cannot be sustained. This Court further noted that the Land Acquisition Officer did adduce evidence before the reference Court, but then, all the sale-deeds were not produced and the reference Court did not have the opportunity to analyze the entire material. This Court directed the reference Court to decide the reference afresh after giving the parties further opportunity to lead evidence. 11. The reference Court decided the reference application afresh vide judgment and order dated 31-12-2009 and granted enhanced compensation at the rate of Rs. 60,000/- per acre i.e. at the rate of Rs. 1,50,000/- per hectare. 12. Respondent 1 herein-the claimant challenged the judgment and order of the reference Court in First Appeal 660 of 2010 which was decided by this Court vide judgment dated 02-4-2014. This Court noted that the claimant produced on record sale-deeds dated 13-12-1992 and 06-11-1990, which were the basis of the enhancement. This Court further noted that the learned Counsel for the appellant-respondent 1 herein requested this Court to look into a third sale-deed dated 07-9-1989, which sale-deed was not admissible in evidence since it was not produced and proved before the reference Court. Observing thus, this Court allowed the appeal and remanded the matter to the reference Court directing that fresh evidence, if any, be recorded. 13. The claimant produced on record of the reference Court sale-deed dated 07-9-1989 and examined Shri Devrao Vithobaji Doifode to prove the sale-deed. The said witness is the purchaser of land admeasuring 2.56 hectares of Mouza-Butibori and the sale consideration was Rs. 80,000/- per acre approximately. 14. The reference Court decided the reference afresh and vide judgment and order dated 26-11-2014 granted enhanced compensation at the rate of Rs. 80,000/- per acre i.e. Rs. 2,00,000/- per hectare. 15. It is this judgment and order dated 26-11-2014 of the reference Court, which is under challenge. 16. The substratum of the submissions of the learned Counsel for the appellant Smt. U.A. Patil is twofold. The first limb of the submission is that the reference Court committed serious error in relying on the sale-deed dated 07-9-1989 (Exhibit 43) and the evidence of Shri Devrao Vithobaji Doifode and the other limb of the submission is that although the reference application claimed compensation of Rs. The first limb of the submission is that the reference Court committed serious error in relying on the sale-deed dated 07-9-1989 (Exhibit 43) and the evidence of Shri Devrao Vithobaji Doifode and the other limb of the submission is that although the reference application claimed compensation of Rs. 60,000/- per acre, and the application was not amended to claim further enhancement, the reference Court erroneously granted enhanced compensation of Rs. 80,000/- per acre. 17. In support of the second submission Smt. U.A. Patil placed heavy reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran v. Tarachand and another, AIR 1996 SC 2772. 18. In response, the learned Counsel Shri S.P. Kshirsagar for respondent 1 contends that the credibility of the testimony of the witness Shri Devrao Vithobaji Doifode is not shaken and the cross-examination is restricted to peripheral aspects leaving the core of the testimony untouched. Shri S.P. Kshirsagar, learned Counsel contends that the acquiring body did not adduce cogent evidence in rebuttal and the reference Court was well justified in relying on the sale-deed dated 07-9-1989, which is proved by examining the purchaser Shri Devrao Vithobaji Doifode. Countering the submission that the reference Court could not have awarded enhanced compensation exceeding the compensation claimed, Shri S.P. Kshirsagar, learned Counsel contended that the issue is not res integra and the decision of the Apex Court in Narendra and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (2017) 9 SCC 426 is a complete answer. 19. Considering the second submission canvassed by the learned Counsel Smt. U.A. Patil for the appellant, the learned Counsel is not unjustified in relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran v. Tarachand and another in support of the contention that the Court cannot grant compensation higher than claimed by the claimant. The issue is considered in the said decision thus: "7. It is true that under Section 22(2) of the Act prior to the Amendment, the Court was prohibited to enhance the compensation in excess of the amount claimed pursuant to notices issued under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act. Since subsection (2) of Section 22 was deleted by Amendment Act 68 of 1984, the limitation on the exercise of the power of the Court was taken away. Since subsection (2) of Section 22 was deleted by Amendment Act 68 of 1984, the limitation on the exercise of the power of the Court was taken away. Nonetheless, it would always be open to a party to claim a particular amount and having claimed at the rate, the question arises: whether the Court could grant compensation higher than that claimed by the party? It would be obvious that when a party claims compensation at a particular rate, he assesses the market value of the land at that particular rate and seeks compensation on that basis. Having assessed the compensation at that particular rate, the question emerges: whether the Court could grant higher compensation than was assessed by the party? We find the answer in the negative. This principle squarely applies to the facts in these cases. The party having limited the compensation to Rs. 20,000/- per bigha in the memorandum of appeal filed in the High Court, it would be obvious that the respondents claimed that they were entitled to the maximum of the compensation @ Rs. 20,000/- per bigha. Thereby the Court was precluded to award compensation beyond the amount claimed by the party and award in excess thereof would be obviously illegal. The power of the Court would be confined to the difference of the amount awarded by the reference Court and the amount claimed in the memorandum of the appeal but not in excess thereof." 20. In Narendra and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, the Apex Court referred to its earlier decision in Ashok Kumar and another v. State of Haryana (2016) 4 SCC 544 . It would be apposite to note the said consideration. "After hearing the counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the issue has already been settled by this Court in Ashok Kumar vs. State of Haryana wherein it is held that it is the duty of the Court to award just and fair compensation taking into consideration true market value and other relevant factors, irrespective of claim made by the land owner and there is no cap on the maximum rate of compensation that can be awarded by the court and the courts are not restricted to awarding only that amount that has been claimed by the land owners/applicants in their application before it. The relevant paras of this judgment are quoted as under: "6. The relevant paras of this judgment are quoted as under: "6. Prior to amendment Act 68 of 1984, the amount of compensation that could be awarded by the Court was limited to the amount claimed by the applicant. Section 25. Rules as to amount of compensation-(1) When the applicant has made a claim to compensation, pursuant to any notice given under Section 9, the amount awarded to him by the court shall not exceed the amount so claimed or be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11. (2) When the applicant has refused to make such claim or has omitted without sufficient reason (to be allowed by the Judge) to make such claim, the amount awarded by the court shall in no case exceed the amount awarded by the Collector. (3) When the applicant has omitted for a sufficient reason (to be allowed by the Judge) to make such claim, the amount awarded to him by the court shall not be less than, and may exceed, the amount awarded by the Collector. The amended Section 25 reads as under: "Section 25. Amount of compensation awarded by Court not to be lower than the amount awarded by the Collector-The amount of compensation awarded by the Court shall not be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11. The amendment has come into effect on 24.09.1984. 7. The pre-amended provision put a cap on the maximum; the compensation by court should not be beyond the amount claimed. The amendment in 1984, on the contrary, put a cap on the minimum; compensation cannot be less what was awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector. The cap on maximum having been expressly omitted, and the cap that is put is only on minimum, it is clear that the amount of compensation that a court can award is no longer restricted to the amount claimed by the applicant. It is the duty of the Court to award just and fair compensation taking into consideration the true market value and other relevant factors, irrespective of the claim made by the owner. * 9. In Bhag Singh v. UT of Chandigarh, this Court held that there may be situations where the amount higher than claimed may be awarded to the claimant. The Court observed: (SCC p. 741, para 3) "3. ... * 9. In Bhag Singh v. UT of Chandigarh, this Court held that there may be situations where the amount higher than claimed may be awarded to the claimant. The Court observed: (SCC p. 741, para 3) "3. ... It must be remembered that this was not a dispute between two private citizens where it would be quite just and legitimate to confine the claimant to the claim made by him and not to award him any higher amount than that claimed though even in such a case there may be situations where an amount higher than that claimed can be awarded to the claimant as for instance where an amount is claimed as due at the foot of an account. Here was a claim made by the appellants against the State Government for compensation for acquisition of their land and under the law, the State was bound to pay to the appellants compensation on the basis of the market value of the land acquired and if according to the judgments of the learned single Judge and the Division Bench, the market value of the land acquired was higher than that awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector or the Additional District Judge, there is no reason why the appellants should have been denied the benefit of payment of the market value so determined. To deny this benefit to the appellants would tantamount to permitting the State Government to acquire the land of the appellants on payment of less than the true market value. There may be cases where, as for instance, under agrarian reform legislation, the holder of land may, legitimately, as a matter of social justice with a view to eliminating concentration of land in the hands of a few and bringing about its equitable distribution, be deprived of land which is not being personally cultivated by him or which is in excess of the ceiling area with payment of little compensation or no compensation at all, but where land is acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it would not be fair and just to deprive the holder of his land without payment of the true market value when the law, in so many terms, declares that he shall be paid such market value....' 10. In Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Kanhaiya Lal, this Court held that under the amended provisions of Section 25 of the Act, the Court can grant a higher compensation than claimed by the applicant in his pleadings--- 11. Further, in Bhimasha v. LAO, a three-Judge Bench reiterated the principle in Bhag Singh and rejected the contention that a higher compensation than claimed by the owner in his pleadings cannot be awarded by the Court...." 21. In Ashok Kumar and another v. State of Haryana, the Apex Court held that it is the duty of the Court to award just and fair compensation taking into consideration the true market value and other relevant factors, irrespective of the claim made by the owner (emphasis supplied). The Apex Court noted that while the pre-amendment provision put a cap on the maximum and the reference Court could not have granted compensation beyond the amount claimed, the amendment removes the cap on the maximum and au contraire puts a cap on the minimum i.e. the compensation cannot be less than what was awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector. In Ashok Kumar and another v. State of Haryana, it is categorically articulated that the amount of compensation that a Court can award is no longer restricted to the amount claimed by the applicant. 22. In Narendra and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, the Apex Court approved and followed the dictum of Ashok Kumar and another v. State of Haryana and additionally referred to the letter and spirit of Section 28-A of the Act. 23. The two Judges Bench decision in Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran v. Tarachand and another was not brought to the notice of the two Judges Bench in Ashok Kumar and another v. State of Haryana and Narendra and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others. 24. It is difficult to reconcile the articulation in Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran v. Tarachand and another, which is that once the claimant himself assessed the fair compensation, the Court is precluded from granting higher compensation, with the dictum of Ashok Kumar and another v. State of Haryana and Narendra and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, which is that in view of the legislative change, the fetters on the power of the Court to award compensation higher than that claimed by the owner are obliterated. 25. 25. Indubitably, there is a sharp cleavage in the articulation of law in Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran v. Tarachand and another, which holds that the Court is powerless from awarding compensation higher than that claimed and the later decisions of the Apex Court in Ashok Kumar and another v. State of Haryana and Narendra and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, which propound that the constraints of cap on the maximum having been removed by the legislative intervention, the power of the Court to award compensation higher than that claimed, is unfettered. Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran v. Tarachand and another and later two decisions are co-ordinate decisions of the Apex Court and the seminal issue is whether the High Court is bound to follow the earlier or the later view or the High Court is free to invoke the freedom of choice principle and follow that decision, which in the considered view of the High Court, is a stronger authority on law. 26. The freedom of choice principle is invoked in several decisions of the Courts in England. In Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Company Limited 1944(2), Lord Greene M.R. speaking for the Court of appeal, considered the issue, albeit in the context of following the coordinate Bench decisions of the Court of Appeal, and observed that the Court is unquestionably entitled to choose between the two conflicting decisions. 27. In Atma Ram v. State of Punjab and others, AIR 1959 SC 519 , His Lordship B.P. Sinha, who spoke for the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, implicitly acknowledged the permissibility of the subordinate Courts invoking the freedom of choice principle while observing thus: "12.-------Perhaps, the better course would have been to constitute a larger Bench, when it was found that a Full Bench of three Judges was inclined to take a view contrary to that of another Full Bench of equal strength. Such a course become necessary in view of the fact that otherwise the subordinate courts are placed under the embarrassment of preferring one view to another, both equally binding upon them….." 28. The course to be adopted by the subordinate Courts when confronted with a direct conflict between two decisions of co-ordinate Benches of the Apex Court was considered by the Full Bench by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in M/s. Indo Swiss Time Limited, Dundahera v. Umrao and others, AIR 1981 Punjab and Haryana 213. The course to be adopted by the subordinate Courts when confronted with a direct conflict between two decisions of co-ordinate Benches of the Apex Court was considered by the Full Bench by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in M/s. Indo Swiss Time Limited, Dundahera v. Umrao and others, AIR 1981 Punjab and Haryana 213. Chief Justice S.S. Sandhawaliya considered the issue thus: "23 Now the contention that the latest judgment of a coordinate Bench is to be mechanically followed and must have pre-eminence irrespective of any other consideration does not commend itself to me. When judgments of the superior court are of co-equal Benches and therefore of matching authority then their weight inevitably must be considered by the rationale and the logic thereof and not by the mere fortuitous circumstances of the time and date on which they were rendered. It is manifest that when two directly conflicting judgments of the superior Court and of equal authority are extant than both of them cannot be binding on the courts below. Inevitably a choice though a difficult one has to be made in such a situation. On principle it appears to me that the high Court must follow the judgment which appears to it to lay down the law more elaborately and accurately. The mere incidence of time whether the judgments of co-equal Benches of the Superior Court are earlier or later is a consideration which appears to me as hardly relevant." 29. Chief Justice S.S. Sandhawaliya held that on principle the High Court must follow the judgment which appears to it to lay down the law more elaborately and accurately unfettered and uninfluenced by mere incidences of time, drawing support from the dictum in Hampton v. Holman Miles (1877) 5 Ch D 183, Miles v. Jarvis (1883) 24 Ch D 633 and Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. (1944) KB 718. 30. While the decision of the Full Bench was split and Chief Justice S.S. Sandhawaliya was in minority, the majority agreed with the articulation of the Chief Justice on the freedom of choice principle as is perceptible from the following passages in the majority judgment: "38. Ltd. (1944) KB 718. 30. While the decision of the Full Bench was split and Chief Justice S.S. Sandhawaliya was in minority, the majority agreed with the articulation of the Chief Justice on the freedom of choice principle as is perceptible from the following passages in the majority judgment: "38. On a careful consideration of the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, in the light of various decisions cited by them, it transpires that the view taken in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Himalaya Tiles and Marbles (P.) Ltd. ( AIR 1980 SC 1118 )(supra), on which reliance has been placed by Mr. Sarin, is in conflict with the view taken in the earlier judgment in Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad's case (1970) 1 SCWR 183 (supra). As observed by my Lord the Chief justice, a perusal of the two judgments plainly indicates that there is a direct conflict on the point which needs our decision. Both the judgments have been rendered by a Bench consisting of two Hon'ble Judges and cannot possibly be reconciled. In this situation a some-what interesting though tricky question arise for determination i.e., when there is a direct conflict between the two decisions of the Supreme Court rendered by co-equal Benches, which of them should be followed by the High Courts and the Courts below. 39. On this question, my Lord the Chief Justice in his elaborate judgment has held that the Courts may follow the judgment which appears to them to state the law accurately and that mere incidence of time whether the judgment of the co-equal Benches of the superior Court are earlier or later is a consideration which appears to be hardly relevant. I have also given my thoughtful consideration to the entire matter and find myself in respectful agreement with the aforesaid observation of my Lord the Chief Justice." 31. In Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel v. Union of India and others, 1994 Mh. L.J. 1669, the Full Bench of this Court was confronted with contrary decisions of the Apex Court emanating from Benches of co-equal strength. In Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel v. Union of India and others, 1994 Mh. L.J. 1669, the Full Bench of this Court was confronted with contrary decisions of the Apex Court emanating from Benches of co-equal strength. Chief Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee, speaking for the Full Bench, articulated that the only reasonable solution and the only way-out when confronted with contrary decisions of the Apex Court emanating from co-equal Benches is to undertake the unpleasant task of choosing that one which appears to have better authority of reasons. 32. The Full Bench expressed unqualified concurrence with the view of the Special Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Bholanath v. Madanmohan, AIR 1988 Calcutta 1 at p. 5-7, which invoked the freedom of choice principle. It would be apposite to note the following passage in the Full Bench decision in Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel v. Union of India and others. "14. It has been pointed out by one of us, while speaking for a Special Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Bholanath v. Madanmohan, AIR 1988 Calcutta 1 at p. 5-7 on the question as to the course to be followed by the High Court when confronted with contrary decisions of the Supreme Court emanating from Benches of co-equal strength, as hereunder:- " ..... When contrary decisions of the Supreme Court emanate from Benches of equal strength, the course to be adopted by the High Court is, firstly, to try to reconcile and to explain those contrary decisions by assuming, as far as possible, that they applied to different sets of circumstances. This in fact is a course which was recommended by our ancient Jurists-"Srutirdwaidhe Smritirdwaidhe Sthalaveda Prakalap-ate"-in case there are two contrary precepts of the Sruties or the Smritis, different cases are to be assumed for their application. As Jurist Jaimini said, contradictions or inconsistencies are not to be readily assumed as they very often be not real but only apparent resulting from the application of the very same principle to different sets of facts-"Prayoge Hi Vi-rodha Syat". As Jurist Jaimini said, contradictions or inconsistencies are not to be readily assumed as they very often be not real but only apparent resulting from the application of the very same principle to different sets of facts-"Prayoge Hi Vi-rodha Syat". But when such contrary decisions of co-ordinate Benches cannot be reconciled or explained in the manner as aforesaid, the question would arise as to which one the High Court is obliged to follow." "One view is that in such a case the High Court has no option in the matter and it is not for the High Court to decide which one it would follow but it must follow the later one. According to this view, as in the case of two contrary orders issued by the same authority, the later would supersede the former and would bind the subordinate and as in the case of two contrary legislations by the same Legislature, the later would be the governing one, so also in the case of two contrary decisions of the Supreme Court rendered by Benches of equal strength, the later would rule and shall be deemed to have overruled the former. P. B. Mukharji, J. (as his Lordship then was) in his separate, though concurring, judgment in the Special Bench decision of this Court in Pramatha Nath v. Chief Justice, AIR 1961 Cal. 545 at p. 551 para 26, took a similar view, S. P. Mitra, J. (as his Lordship then was) also took such a view in the Division Bench decision of this Court in Sovachand Mulchand v. Collector, Central Excise, AIR 168 Cal 174 at p. 186, para 56. To the same effect is the decision of a Division Bench of the Mysore High Court in New Krishna Bhavan v. Commercial-tax Officer, AIR 1961 Mys 3 at p. 7 and the decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Vasant v. Dikkaya 1980 Mh. L.J. 229 : AIR 1980 Bom. 341 at p. 345. A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in U.P. State Road Transport Corpn. v. Trade Transport Tribunal, AIR 1977 All 1 at p. 5 has also ruled to that effect. L.J. 229 : AIR 1980 Bom. 341 at p. 345. A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in U.P. State Road Transport Corpn. v. Trade Transport Tribunal, AIR 1977 All 1 at p. 5 has also ruled to that effect. The view appears to be that in case of conflicting decisions by Benches of matching authority, the law is the latest pronouncement made by the latest Bench and the old law shall change yielding place to new." "The other view is that in such a case the High Court is not necessarily bound to follow the one which is later in point of time, but may follow the one which, in its view, is better in point of law. Sandhawalia, C.J. in the Full Bench decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Indo-Swiss Time Ltd. v. Umarao, AIR 1981 Pun. and Har. 213 at pp. 219-220 took this view with the concurrence of the other two learned Judges, though as to the actual decision, the other learned Judges differed from the learned Chief Justice. In the Karnataka Full Bench decision in Govinda Naik v. West Patent Press Co., AIR 1980 Kant. 92, the minority consisting of two of the learned Judges speaking through Jagannatha Shetty, J. also took the same view (supra, at p. 95) and in fact the same has been referred to with approval by Sandhawalia, C.J. in the Full Bench decision in Indo-Swiss Time (supra)." "This later view appears to us to be in perfect consonance with what our ancient Jurist Narada declared-Dharmashastra Virodhe Tu Yuktiyukta Vidhe Smrita-that is, when the Dharmashastras or Law Codes of equal authority conflict with one another, the one appearing to be reasonable, or more reasonable is to be preferred and followed. A modern Jurist, Seervai, has also advocated a similar view in his Constitutional Law of India, which has also been quoted with approval by Sandhwalia, C.J. in Indo-Swiss Time (supra, at p. 220) and the learned Jurist has observed that "judgments of the Supreme Court, which cannot stand together, present a serious problem to the High Courts and Subordinate Courts" and that "in such circumstances the correct thing is to follow that judgment which appears to the Court to state the law accurately or more accurately than the other conflicting judgment." "It appears that the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in R. Rama Subbnarayalu v. Rengammal, AIR 1962 Mad. 450 , would also support this view where it has been observed (at p. 452) that "where the conflict is between two decisions pronounced by a Bench consisting of the same number of Judges, and the subordinate Court after a careful examination of the decisions came to the conclusion that both of them directly apply to the case before it, it will then be at liberty to follow that decision which seems to it more correct, whether such decision be the later or the earlier one". According to the Nagpur High Court also, as would appear from its Full Bench decision in D. D. Bilimoria v. Central Bank of India, AIR 1943 Nag. 340 at p. 343, in such case of conflicting authorities, "the result is not that the later authority is substituted for the earlier, but that the two stand side by side conflicting with each other", thereby indicating that the subordinate Courts would have to prefer one to the other and, therefore, would be at liberty to follow the one or the other." "Needless to say that it would be highly embarrassing for the High Court to declare one out of the two or more decisions of the Supreme Court to be more reasonable implying thereby that the other or others is or are less reasonable. But if such a task falls upon the High Court because of irreconcilable contrary decisions of the Supreme Court emanating from Benches of co-ordinate jurisdiction, the task, however uncomfortable, has got to be performed." "We are inclined to think that a five-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Atma Ram v. State of Punjab, AIR 1959 SC 519 has also indicated (at p. 527) that such a task may fall on and may have to be performed by the High Court. After pointing out that when a Full Bench of three Judges was inclined to take a view contrary to another Full Bench of equal strength, perhaps the better course would have been to constitute a larger Bench, it has, however, been observed that for otherwise the subordinate Courts are placed under the embarrassment of preferring one view to another, both equally binding on them. According to the Supreme Court, therefore, when confronted with two contrary decisions of equal authority, the subordinate Court is not necessarily obliged to follow the later, but would have to perform the embarrassing task "of preferring one view to another". ".... We are, however, inclined to think that no blanket proposition can be laid down either in favour of the earlier or the later decision and, as indicated hereinbefore, and as has also been indicated by the Supreme Court in Atma Ram (supra), the subordinate Court would have to prefer one to the other and not necessarily obliged, as a matter, of course, to follow either the former or the later in point of time, but must follow that one, which according to it, is better in point of law. As old may not always be the gold, the new is also not necessarily golden and ringing out the old and bringing in the new cannot always be an invariable straight-jacket formula in determining the binding nature of precedents of coordinate jurisdiction." The law as enunciated in that Special Bench decision, as quoted hereinabove, has our unqualified concurrence." 33. A learned Single Judge of this Court (Coram: B.R. Gavai, J. as his Lordship was then) noted the Full Bench decision in Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel v. Union of India and others and followed the view of the Apex Court, which according to his Lordship was in accordance with law. 34. A learned Single Judge of this Court (Coram: B.R. Gavai, J. as his Lordship was then) noted the Full Bench decision in Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel v. Union of India and others and followed the view of the Apex Court, which according to his Lordship was in accordance with law. 34. Unpleasant as the task is, I have no option but to follow the decision which is a better authority on law since the conflicting decisions are of co-equal Benches of the Apex Court and are equally binding on the High Court. 35. Right to property, while no longer a fundamental right, is a valuable right enshrined in Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. 36. The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is not an agrarian reform legislation or a legislation akin thereto. Deprivation of land with payment of compensation, which may not have any nexus with the market value of the land and indeed which could be nominal, is envisaged by social welfare legislations whose laudable object is agrarian reform and promoting social justice by obliterating concentration of land in the hands of a few and the equitable distribution thereto. However, the scheme of the Act mandates that the compensation shall be fair and just and based on the market value and other relevant considerations statutorily prescribed. It would be a travesty of justice, if the Courts, despite concluding that the true market value of the land is more than that claimed by the land owner, are precluded from awarding compensation higher than that claimed on the premise that the claimant himself assessed the market value of the land. Such a view, in my humble opinion, would not accord either with the Constitutional philosophy underlying Article 300-A of the Constitution of India nor with the statutory scheme of the Act. 37. The legislative change brought about by Amendment Act 68 of 1984 is of immense significance. While prior to the amendment, the Court was precluded from awarding compensation exceeding the amount claimed by the land owner pursuant to any notice given under Section 9, the amended Section 25 obliterates the constraint and removes the cap on the maximum. The only cap retained in the provision is the cap on the minimum amount of compensation which shall not be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11. The only cap retained in the provision is the cap on the minimum amount of compensation which shall not be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11. The legislative change is consistent with the statutory scheme, which recognizes the duty of the Court to award just and fair compensation based on the market value and other statutorily prescribed considerations. 38. The assessment of the claimant of the true market value of the land could be flawed. The ground reality that the majority of the land owners, hail from the lower socio economic strata and are severely handicapped by poverty, ignorance and, more often than not, by inadequate access to the relevant data and legal expertise cannot be ignored. To tell a land owner that although the true market value of his land is more than what is claimed, he would not be paid the true market value since he has claimed a lesser amount, would be rubbing salt to the wound. 39. In a catena of decisions dealing with the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Courts have leaned in favour of the view that since the duty is to award just compensation and there is no cap on the maximum, the compensation awarded could be more than that claimed. A useful reference may be made to the following passage in Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh (2003) 2 SCC 274 . "7. Firstly, under the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, (hereinafter referred to as "the MV Act") there is no restriction that compensation could be awarded only up to the amount claimed by the claimant. In an appropriate case, where from the evidence brought on record if Tribunal/court considers that claimant is entitled to get more compensation than claimed, the Tribunal may pass such award. The only embargo is-it should be 'Just' compensation, that is to say, it should be neither arbitrary, fanciful nor unjustifiable from the evidence. This would be clear by reference to the relevant provisions of the M.V. Act. The only embargo is-it should be 'Just' compensation, that is to say, it should be neither arbitrary, fanciful nor unjustifiable from the evidence. This would be clear by reference to the relevant provisions of the M.V. Act. Section 166 provides that an application for compensation arising out of an accident involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both, could be made (a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or (b) by the owner of the property; or (c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or (d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be. Under the proviso to sub-section (1), all the legal representatives of the deceased who have not joined as the claimants are to be impleaded as respondents to the application for compensation. The other important part of the said Section is sub-section (4) which provides that "the Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under sub-section (6) of Section 158 as an application for compensation under this Act." Hence, the Claims Tribunal in an appropriate case can treat the report forwarded to it as an application for compensation even though no such claim is made or no specified amount is claimed." 40. In a relatively recent decision Ramla and others v. National Insurance Company Limited and others, (2019) 2 SCC 192 , the Apex Court has held that there is no restriction that the Court cannot award compensation exceeding the claim amount, since the function of the Tribunal or Court under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is to award "just compensation". The relevant observations read thus: "6. Though the claimant had claimed a total compensation of Rs. 25,00,000/- in their claim petition filed before the Tribunal, we feel that the compensation which the claimants are entitled to is higher than the same as mentioned supra. There is no restriction that the Court cannot award compensation exceeding the claimed amount, since the function of the Tribunal or Court under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is to award "just compensation". There is no restriction that the Court cannot award compensation exceeding the claimed amount, since the function of the Tribunal or Court under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is to award "just compensation". The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial and welfare legislation. A "just compensation" is one which is reasonable on the basis of evidence produced on record. It cannot be said to have become time barred. Further, there is no need for a new cause of action to claim an enhanced amount. The Courts are duty bound to award just compensation. (See the judgments of this Court in (a) Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh, (b) Magma General Insurance v. Nanu Ram, (c) Ibrahim v. Raju)." 41. The duty of the Court determining the compensation under the Act is to determine just and fair compensation and to award compensation less than just and fair compensation on the premise that the Court is powerless to grant compensation exceeding the amount claimed would be doing disservice to the statutory duty. The decisions of the Apex Court rendered in the context of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act support such view. 42. In view of the discussion supra, I am not inclined to accept the submission of the learned Counsel Smt. U.A. Patil that the reference Court erred in awarding compensation higher than that claimed. 43. Adverting to the first submission, that the appreciation of evidence is flawed, I have perused the evidence of Shri Devrao Vithobaji Doifode, who was examined post second remand. The said witness is a signatory to the sale-deed dated 07-9-1989, which is duly proved. The cross-examination of the said witness focuses on the authority of witness to act for and on behalf of the society. Refuting the suggestion that the land covered by the sale-deed is located at a distance of 4 to 5 km. from the land of the applicant-respondent 1 herein, the witness asserts that the distance is hardly 1 to 1 ½ km. In rebuttal, the acquiring body examined one Shri Chandrakant Borkar, the Sub-Divisional Officer, Mouda, who deposed on the basis of record. In the cross-examination, Shri Chandrakant Borkar expressed ignorance as regards the valuation of the land which is the subject matter of sale-deed Exhibit 43. In rebuttal, the acquiring body examined one Shri Chandrakant Borkar, the Sub-Divisional Officer, Mouda, who deposed on the basis of record. In the cross-examination, Shri Chandrakant Borkar expressed ignorance as regards the valuation of the land which is the subject matter of sale-deed Exhibit 43. The said witness has deposed that the land acquired is situated far-off from the subject matter of sale-deed Exhibit 43 and that the quality and fertility of the two lands are different. However, this statement does not appear to be on the basis of either personal knowledge or knowledge gathered from record and Shri Chandrakant Borkar assumes that such are the admissions given by Shri Devrao Vithobaji Doifode, who proved Exhibit 43. I have not come across any admission given by Shri Devrao Vithobaji Doifode to the effect that the quality and fertility of the two lands are different. 44. The evidence is to the effect that the land acquired is perennially irrigated. The sale instance dated 06-11-1990, and the subject matter is dry crop land, discloses the sale consideration to be Rs. 40,000/- per acre. While there cannot be any straight-jacket formula that the valuation of perennially irrigated land shall be twice the valuation of dry crop land, considering the evidence holistically and the sale instance Exhibit 43, I do not find any serious error in the enhancement. 45. No other submission was canvassed. 46. The appeal is dismissed.