JUDGMENT : (Through: Video Conferencing) In view of outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic, case has been taken up through Video Conferencing. Concerned lawyers have no objection with regard to the proceeding, which has been held through Video Conferencing today at 10:30 A.M. onwards. They have no complaint in respect to the audio and video clarity and quality. 2. Petitioner has approached this Court with a prayer for quashing the Award dated 16.12.2009, passed by learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur in Ref. Case No. 11 of 1998, whereby the learned Labour Court has rejected the case of petitioner with regard to his premature termination from service by the respondent. 3. Shorn of unnecessary details, petitioner joined the respondent-Company in the year 1971. It is the case of the petitioner that though he declared his date of birth as 20.03.1949 as per his school transfer certificate, at the time of registration for employment in TISCO Ltd., Jamshedpur but the same has been wrongly recorded as 05.03.1938 in the records of the company. It is the case of the petitioner that he had no knowledge about the date of birth mentioned by the Management and when he became a permanent employee of respondent-Company in the year 1990 and when gate pass was issued to him, he came to know that a wrong date of birth has been mentioned in the records of the company. Thereafter, on 19.03.1993, petitioner submitted representation before the respondent-Management for correction of his date of birth on the basis of school transfer certificate but the respondent-Management did not pass any order on said representation. Hence, the petitioner approached the concerned Department of State Govt. for referring the matter to the Labour Court for adjudication of the same. Thus, the dispute was referred to Labour Court, Jamshedpur by framing following issue for adjudication: “Whether to mention date of birth 05.03.1938 instead of 20.03.1949 of the petitioner Sri Ajit Singh, ticket No. 121360 personal No. 113545, sheet mill of TISCO LTD., Jamshedpur is justified? If not, what relief he is entitled to?” 4. Upon receipt of the notification, notices were issued by the learned Labour Court to the parties and the parties appeared and contested their respective cases by filing written statements. If not, what relief he is entitled to?” 4. Upon receipt of the notification, notices were issued by the learned Labour Court to the parties and the parties appeared and contested their respective cases by filing written statements. Learned labour Court, after hearing the parties and perusing the evidences and documents brought on record, vide its Award dated 16.12.2009 answered the reference in favour of the Management, holding therein that: “Taking into consideration of facts and circumstances and evidence i.e. oral and documentary as available and discussed above and in the light of principles as laid-down by the Hon’ble Court in the decision cited above, I come to conclusion and hold that the date of birth i.e. 05.03.1938 has been rightly recorded by the company on the basis of the provision of standing order followed by medical examination and it has been correctly recorded in accordance with the provision. And workman has not raised any objection against recording of his date of birth till the year 1989 i.e. Ext. W/4. He will not be allowed to challenge the same at fag end of service career or later on after 16 years of record of date of birth. And as such Issue No. (i) is hereby decided accordingly against the workman and in favour of the management and it is found and hold that date of birth of workman Ajit Singh was rightly recorded in the record of the company.” 5. Aggrieved by Award dated 16.12.2009, whereby learned Labour Court has rejected his claim, the petitioner has knocked the door of this Court. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the impugned Award is illegal, arbitrary and fit to be quashed and set aside. Learned counsel submits that there has been flagrant violation of principle of natural justice since the respondent has not considered the date of birth mentioned in the school transfer certificate and entered an imaginary date of birth in the record of the company. Further, learned Labour Court without considering the documents produced by the petitioner has rejected his claim and as such, the Award passed by learned Labour Court is fit to be quashed and set aside. 7. On the other hand, Mr. G.M. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Management argues that the petitioner has accepted his date of birth as 05.03.1938, as would be evident from Exts. 7. On the other hand, Mr. G.M. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Management argues that the petitioner has accepted his date of birth as 05.03.1938, as would be evident from Exts. M, M/1 and M/2 and on the basis of the same, he attained the age of superannuation i.e. 60 years on 05.03.1998 and after availing one year’s extension, he superannuated on 01.04.1999 and thereafter, he received all his retiral benefits as final settlement. Learned counsel further argues that petitioner did not produce any document in support of his age at the relevant time and as such, subjected himself to undergo medical examination for determination of his age. Further, there is no infirmity in the Award as the learned Labour Court has considered every aspect of the matter and thereafter, came to the conclusion that no case is made out for interference and further, the claim of petitioner is a stale claim. In catena of decisions, the Hon’ble Apex Court has clearly held that no correction in date of birth can be entertained at the fag end of service career. 8. To buttress his arguments, learned counsel for the respondent-Management places heavy reliance on the following judgments: (i) Manik Chand Ghosh Vs. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Ors., [ 2004 (1) JCR 51 (Jhr.)]; & (ii) Paswan Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors., [ 2005 (2) JCR 245 (Jhr.)]; 9. Be that as it may, having heard the parties and upon perusal of the records, it appears that Award is fully justified and no interference is warranted in the instant writ application for the following facts and reasons: (I) The employment registration card was prepared recording the age of the petitioner as 35 years as on 05.03.1973 and in the year 1981, petitioner, for the first time was employed on temporary basis. (II) Even the Medical Board, at the time of preparation of employment card assessed the age of petitioner as 35 years as on 05.03.1973. (III) The petitioner for the first time in the year 1993 i.e. after 20 years, made a request for correction of his date of birth, based on his school transfer certificate of July, 1982, which was never accepted by the respondent-Company. (IV) It was only on 08.07.1998, the alleged dispute was referred to learned Labour Court, Jamshedpur. (III) The petitioner for the first time in the year 1993 i.e. after 20 years, made a request for correction of his date of birth, based on his school transfer certificate of July, 1982, which was never accepted by the respondent-Company. (IV) It was only on 08.07.1998, the alleged dispute was referred to learned Labour Court, Jamshedpur. (V) The petitioner attained the age of superannuation on 30.03.1998 but he was given one year’s extension and finally, superannuated on 30.03.1999. After his superannuation, petitioner received all the retiral benefits without any demur or protest. (VI) Learned Labour Court, after adducing the evidences and hearing the parties, passed the Award in favour of the Management, which is fully justified and no interference is required. (VII) Even the reference was a stale one, as it was after 20 years of his appointment; the petitioner raised a dispute which is not permissible in the eyes of law. In case of Union of India Vs. Harnam Singh [ (1993) 2 SCC 162 ], the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that, “No Court or the Tribunal can come to the aid of those who sleep over their rights”. 10. Further, petitioner was fully aware of the date of birth entered in the service record after medical verification. Petitioner accepted the said date of birth all along her service career and it was only in the year 1993 i.e. after 20 years from the date of medical assessment, he made an application for correction in the date of birth based on his school transfer certificate. The Hon’ble Apex Court as well as this Court in catena of decisions has held that request for change of date of birth in service records at the fag end of service career is not sustainable. 11. In case of State of Tamil Nandu Vs. T.V. Venugopalan, reported (1994) 6 SCC 302 , the Hon’ble Apex Court was clearly of the opinion that the government servant should not be permitted to correct the date of birth at the fag end of his service career. The Court, in very strong terms, observed as under:- ".....The government servant having declared his date of birth as entered in the service register to be correct, would not be permitted at the fag end of his service career to raise a dispute as regards the correctness of the entries in the service register. The Court, in very strong terms, observed as under:- ".....The government servant having declared his date of birth as entered in the service register to be correct, would not be permitted at the fag end of his service career to raise a dispute as regards the correctness of the entries in the service register. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Secretary and Commissioner, Home Department & Ors. Vs. R. Kirubakaran, reported in 1994 Suppl. (1) SCC 155, has held as under: “7. An application for correction of the date of birth [by a public servant cannot be entertained at the fag end of his service]. It need not be pointed out that any such direction for correction of the date of birth of the public servant concerned has a chain reaction, inasmuch as others waiting for years, below him for their respective promotions are affected in this process. Some are likely to suffer irreparable injury, inasmuch as, because of the correction of the date of birth, the officer concerned, continues in office, in some cases for years, within which time many officers who are below him in seniority waiting for their promotion, may lose their promotion forever. …According to us, this is an important aspect, which cannot be lost sight of by the court or the tribunal while examining the grievance of a public servant in respect of correction of his date of birth. As such, unless a clear case on the basis of materials which can be held to be conclusive in nature, is made out by the respondent, the court or the tribunal should not issue a direction, on the basis of materials which make such claim only plausible. Before any such direction is issued, the court or the tribunal must be fully satisfied that there has been real injustice to the person concerned and his claim for correction of date of birth has been made in accordance with the procedure prescribed, and within the time fixed by any rule or order. … the onus is on the applicant to prove the wrong recording of his date of birth, in his service book.” This Hon’ble Court dealing with the similar issue in case of Manik Chand Ghosh Vs. … the onus is on the applicant to prove the wrong recording of his date of birth, in his service book.” This Hon’ble Court dealing with the similar issue in case of Manik Chand Ghosh Vs. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Ors., reported in 2004 (1) JCR 51 (Jhr.), has held that, date of birth once recorded and entered in the service record, counter-signed by the government servant, he should not be permitted to challenge at the fag end of his service. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. Gorakhnath Sitaram Kamble & Ors., reported in (2010) 14 SCC 423 has held that: “16. The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in U.P. Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad Vs. Raj Kumar Agnihotri [ (2005) 11 SCC 465 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 96]. In this case, this Court has considered a number of judgments of this Court and observed that the grievances as to the date of birth in the service record should not be permitted at the fag end of the service career. 17. In another judgment in State of Uttaranchal Vs. Pitamber Dutt Semwal [ (2005) 11 SCC 477 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 106] relief was denied to the government employee on the ground that he sought correction in the service record after nearly 30 years of service. While setting aside the judgment of the High Court, this Court observed that the High Court ought not to have interfered with the decision after almost three decades.” Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court reiterating the same view, in case of State of M.P. v. Premlal Shrivas, reported in (2011) 9 SCC 664 has held as under:- “8. It needs to be emphasised that in matters involving correction of date of birth of a government servant, particularly on the eve of his superannuation or at the fag end of his career, the court or the tribunal has to be circumspect, cautious and careful while issuing direction for correction of date of birth, recorded in the service book at the time of entry into any government service. Unless the court or the tribunal is fully satisfied on the basis of the irrefutable proof relating to his date of birth and that such a claim is made in accordance with the procedure prescribed or as per the consistent procedure adopted by the department concerned, as the case may be, and a real injustice has been caused to the person concerned, the court or the tribunal should be loath to issue a direction for correction of the service book. Time and again this Court has expressed the view that if a government servant makes a request for correction of the recorded date of birth after lapse of a long time of his induction into the service, particularly beyond the time fixed by his employer, he cannot claim, as a matter of right, the correction of his date of birth, even if he has good evidence to establish that the recorded date of birth is clearly erroneous. No court or the tribunal can come to the aid of those who sleep over their rights. 12. Be that as it may, in our opinion, the delay of over two decades in applying for the correction of date of birth is ex facie fatal to the case of the respondent, notwithstanding the fact that there was no specific rule or order, framed or made, prescribing the period within which such application could be filed. It is trite that even in such a situation such an application should be filed which can be held to be reasonable. The application filed by the respondent 25 years after his induction into service, by no standards, can be held to be reasonable, more so when not a feeble attempt was made to explain the said delay. There is also no substance in the plea of the respondent that since Rule 84 of the M.P. Financial Code does not prescribe the time-limit within which an application is to be filed, the appellants were duty-bound to correct the clerical error in recording of his date of birth in the service book.” Similar view has been expressed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Vs. Shyam Kishore Singh, reported in (2020) 2 Supreme Today 189, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that, “request for change of the date of birth in the service records at the fag end of service is not sustainable.” The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Nedungadi Bank Ltd. Vs. K.P. Madhavankutty & Ors., reported in (2000) 2 SCC 455 , dealing with the issue relating to stale claim, has held that, reference of the said dispute at a belated stage is bad in eyes of law both on the grounds of delay as well as on non-existence of an industrial dispute. Time and again it has been held that if government servants sleep over their right and are not vigilant, the Court cannot come to their rescue/ aid and grant relief only because they were ignorant of the Rules. These decisions lead to a different dimension of the case that correction of date of birth at the fag end would be at the cost of large number of employees, therefore, any correction at the fag end must be discouraged by the Court. This Court is in full agreement with the Award passed by the learned Labour Court, Jamshedpur and the same requires no interference. 12. As a sequitur to the aforesaid observations, rules, guidelines, legal propositions and judicial pronouncements, the writ petition is devoid of any merit and the same is hereby dismissed.