JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. Rahul Kumar, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. Salona Mittal, the learned A.C to G.A.-I appearing on behalf of the respondent State. 2. This writ petition has been heard through Video Conferencing in view of the guidelines of the High Court taking into account the situation arising due to COVID-19 pandemic. None of the parties have complained about any technical snag of audio-video and with their consent this matter has been heard. 3. The petitioner has preferred this writ petition for quashing the order dated 23.06.2020 whereby the service of the petitioner has been terminated. The Jharkhand State Aarogya Society for the implementation of the project namely, “Aayushman Bharat-Pradhanmantri Jan Aarogya Yojana” under the Medical, Health Education & Family Welfare Department, Government of Jharkhand issued an advertisement via Press-release for appointment of its employees on contractual basis for different posts i.e., General Manager, Senior Consultant and other professional and the said selection shall be made by way of walk-in-interview. The said press-release stated that after verification of the qualifications and experience certificate of the candidates, the selection committee shall recommend the names of the candidates for appointment according to their eligibility for the recommended posts. The said appointment shall be a contractual appointment for a period of three years with the rider that on completion of three years, review would be done of the work of the appointed persons and upon their being found to be satisfactory, their services shall be extended for the next year. The petitioner had applied for the post of Senior Consultant (Finance) and was called for interview by the committee/board of experts, by way of Annexure-2. In view of the check-list which was prepared by the verifying officers of the selection committee, marks were allotted to the petitioner for his percentage obtained in MBA and MCA and also for his years of experience and interview. The petitioner got a total of 45 marks in the said check-list, by way of Annexure-3. The said selection committee on 27.09.2019 presided by the Secretary, Medical, Health Education and Family Welfare Department prepared a post-wise selection-cum-merit list of appointment for different posts in Jharkhand State Aarogya Society. The petitioner got a total of 45 marks in the said check-list, by way of Annexure-3. The said selection committee on 27.09.2019 presided by the Secretary, Medical, Health Education and Family Welfare Department prepared a post-wise selection-cum-merit list of appointment for different posts in Jharkhand State Aarogya Society. A total of 14 persons had applied for the post in which the petitioner had applied and after evaluating his qualifications and other criteria, which was required as per the advertisement, was found to be highest, he was selected for the post of Senior Consultant (Finance), by way of Annexure-4. The petitioner received the appointment letter dated 15.10.2019. In view of clause-6, it has been specifically provided that if the work of the employee/petitioner is found unsatisfactory, then after giving one month's notice his service shall be terminated. The petitioner's service was terminated vide letter dated 23.06.2020 even without completing one year. 4. Mr. Rahul Kumar, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner assailed the impugned order on the ground that the order is non-speaking. The termination order is illegal. The termination order was issued in absence of any show-cause. It was issued in violation of principles of natural justice and was also issued without following clause-6 of the appointment letter which provides one month's notice before terminating the service of the employee. To substantiate his argument, he relied in the judgment rendered in the case of “Sirsi Municipality v. Cecelia Kom Francis Tellis,” reported in (1973) 1 SCC 409 . Paragraph nos. 24 and 27 of the said judgment are quoted here-in-below : “24. This Court in S.R. Tewari v. District Board Agra; Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Sunil Kumar Mukherjee; Calcutta Dock Labour Board v. Jaffar Imam and Naraindas Barot v. Divisional Controller S.T.C. dealt with power of statutory authorities and bodies to dismiss servants. These decisions establish that the dismissal of a servant by statutory including local authorities or bodies in breach of the provisions of the statutes or orders or schemes made under the statute which regulate the exercise of their power is invalid or ultra vires and the principle of pure master and servant contractual relationship has no application to such cases. 27. 27. This Court has held in the decisions referred to that the dismissal or termination of the services of employees without complying with the provisions of statute or scheme or order is invalid. This Court has quashed the orders of dismissal and granted appropriate declarations.” 5. Per contra, Mr. Salona Mittal, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent State submitted that for implementing the scheme of Aayushman Bharat-Pradhan Mantri Jan Aarogya Yojna for which walk-in-interview was conducted on 27.09.2019. The petitioner along with other candidates participated in the interview. The petitioner was appointed by letter dated 15.10.2019 issued by the Deputy Secretary cum Additional Executive Director, Jharkhand State Aarogya Society, wherein it has been categorically mentioned that the appointments are being made for a period of three years subject to review of their performance every year and if the same is not found satisfactory, their services can be terminated. Due to the negligence of the petitioner, the office of the respondents was levied with penalty by the Income-tax Department for not filing TDS within time. A show-cause notice was also issued to the petitioner vide letter no.111 dated 22.01.2020 by the Deputy Secretary-cum-Additional Executive Director, Jharkhand State Aarogya Society, Jharkhand and only after due consideration, the order of termination dated 23.06.2020 was passed. The learned counsel supported the termination order and submitted that it was issued after following the due process of law. The petitioner is having the alternative remedy as the petitioner was appointed on contractual basis. To buttress his argument, he relied in the judgment rendered in the case of “Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. T. Mohammed Raisuli Hassan” reported in (1993) 1 SCC 553 . Paragraph nos.4 and 5 of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow: “4.Admittedly, there was no statutory rule requiring one month’s notice for termination by the appellant of the service of the respondent. It is only the term of appointment order, which stipulated for one month’s notice or one month’s salary in lieu thereof by either side to bring an end to the service of the respondent, which is made the basis for claiming invalidation of termination. That term contained in clause 10 of the appointment order reads: “10. This appointment is liable to be terminated at any time by giving one month’s notice, in writing, on either side, or a month’s salary in lieu of notice, without assigning any reason. That term contained in clause 10 of the appointment order reads: “10. This appointment is liable to be terminated at any time by giving one month’s notice, in writing, on either side, or a month’s salary in lieu of notice, without assigning any reason. Breach of this condition, will entitle the company to recover from you one month’s salary in lieu of notice.” 5. When the above term in the clause relating to the condition of service of the respondent with the appellant is seen as a whole, there is nothing to indicate or suggest, even remotely, that non-service of one month’s notice as a condition precedent for termination of the respondent’s service would result in vitiation or invalidation of termination, if effected. On the contrary, the second part of the term contained in the clause, “breach of this condition, will entitle the company to recover from you one month’s salary in lieu of notice” makes it obvious that the same would be the consequence if there was a breach of condition on the part of the company in the matter of service of one month’s notice before termination of the respondent’s service. Hence, we are constrained to hold that the non-service of one month’s notice in writing by the appellant to the respondent before terminating the latter’s service did not invalidate or vitiate such termination. From this, it follows that courts below had misread the said clause, by which either party was required to serve notice for putting an end to service of the respondent and consequently committed an apparent error in taking the view that non-service of one month’s prior notice to the respondent had vitiated the termination of his service.” 6. The learned counsel for the respondent State further relied in the judgment rendered in the case of “State of M.P. v. Sandhya Tomar” reported in (2013) 11 SCC 357 . Paragraph no.9 of the said judgment is quoted here-in-below: “9. There can be no dispute with respect to the settled legal proposition that in the event that a person is not appointed on a regular basis, and if his service is not governed by any statutory rules, he shall be bound by the terms and conditions that have been incorporated in his appointment letter. There can be no dispute with respect to the settled legal proposition that in the event that a person is not appointed on a regular basis, and if his service is not governed by any statutory rules, he shall be bound by the terms and conditions that have been incorporated in his appointment letter. (Vide State of Punjab v. Surinder Kumar.) In such an eventuality, there can be no reason with respect to why the terms and conditions incorporated in the appointment letter should not be enforced against such an employee. In the instant case, Respondent 1 was temporarily appointed in a project and thus, she had at no point of time, been appointed on a regular basis, owing to which, she cannot claim any lien with respect to the said post.” 7. With regard to termination order as punitive or simplisitor, the learned counsel for the respondent State further relied in the judgment rendered in the case of “Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences” reported in (2002) 1 SCC 520 . Paragraph nos.3, 4, 31 and 34 of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow : “3. The appellant was temporarily appointed on 10-4-1996 to the post of Joint Director (Materials Management) of Respondent 1. Clauses 3 and 4 of the letter of appointment provided: “3. This appointment is temporary and can be terminated on one month’s notice from either side or in lieu of this notice on payment of a sum equivalent to one month’s salary. 4. You will be on probation for a period of one year from the date of appointment and the probation period may at the discretion of the competent authority be curtailed or extended by such period as deemed necessary.” 4. The period of probation was extended on 23-6-1997 for a period of six months w.e.f. 30-4-1997. This was subsequently further extended for a period of three months w.e.f. 30-10-1997. On 6-2-1998, the impugned order of termination was issued. The language used in the order reads: “… during the period of our work (sic) and conduct was found satisfactory and therefore, your probation was extended for a period months (sic) w.e.f. the forenoon of 30-4-1997 vide Office Order No. PG/DIR/DC/479/97 dated 23-6-1997. Again vide Office Order No. 811 PG/DIR/DC dated 27-10-1997 your probation period was further extended for three months w.e.f. the forenoon of 30-10-1997. Again vide Office Order No. 811 PG/DIR/DC dated 27-10-1997 your probation period was further extended for three months w.e.f. the forenoon of 30-10-1997. Even during thus (sic) extended period of probation your work and conduct has not been found to be satisfactory. Therefore, under terms and conditions 3 and 4 of the above-referred appointment letter, dated (sic) services are hereby terminated with immediate effect and for the period Cheque No. VR/00/5856 dated 5-2-1998 for Rs 11,070 (Rupees eleven thousand seventy only) in lieu of on (sic) month’s notice is enclosed.” 31. Returning now to the facts of the case before us. The language used in the order of termination is that the appellant’s “work and conduct has not been found to be satisfactory”. These words are almost exactly those which have been quoted in Dipti Prakash Banerjee caseas clearly falling within the class of non-stigmatic orders of termination. It is, therefore safe to conclude that the impugned order is not ex facie stigmatic. 34. That an affidavit cannot be relied on to improve or supplement an order has been held by a Constitution Bench in Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr., New Delhi: (SCC p. 417, para 8) “When a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise.” 8. The learned counsel also relied in the case of “Sri Lal Sah & Others v. Gulabchand Sah (Dead) By Lrs. & Others” reported in (1993) 1 SCC 557 . Paragraph no.11 of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow: “11. We now come to the last question whether the appellant was entitled to the protection of Article 311(2) of the Constitution, even though he was a temporary government servant. It is well settled that temporary servants are also entitled to the protection of Article 311(2) in the same manner as permanent government servants, if the government takes action against them by mating out one of the three punishments i.e. dismissal, removal or reduction in rank : (see Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India). But this protection is only available where discharge removal or reduction in rank is sought to be inflicted by way of punishment and not otherwise. But this protection is only available where discharge removal or reduction in rank is sought to be inflicted by way of punishment and not otherwise. It is also not disputed that the mere use of expressions like “termination” or “discharge” is not conclusive and in spite of the use of such innocuous, expressions the court has to apply the two tests mentioned in Parshotam Lal Dhingra case namely-(1) whether the servant had a right to the post or the rank or (2) whether he has been visited with evil consequences; and if either of the tests is satisfied, it must be held that the servant had been punished. Further even though misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to take action under the terms of the contract of employment or the specific service rule, nevertheless, if a right exists, under the contract or the rules, to terminate the service the motive operating on the mind of the Government is wholly irrelevant. It is on these principles which have been laid down in Parshotam Lal Dhingra case that we have to decide whether the appellant was entitled to the protection of Article 311(2) in this case.” 9. In the light of the above arguments of the learned counsels appearing for the parties, the only point needs to be decided by this Court is, whether the termination order can sustain in the eye of law or not, and as to whether the contractual employee has got a right to continue in service? The Court has perused the appointment letter contained in Annexure-5. In clause-3 it has been stated that the appointment shall be made for three years and every year the contract of service shall be extended after considering the work of the petitioner. It is further provided in that clause that in future claim for regular service shall not be entertained. Clause-6 of the appointment letter stipulates that if the service is not found to be satisfactory, after providing a month's notice, the contract of service can be terminated. It is well-settled provision of law that for a contractual employee, on termination of his service, claiming right to continue in service and temporary status covered by the Industrial Disputes Act, the remedy lies before the Tribunal or before the Labour Court, and not before the High Court. It is well-settled provision of law that for a contractual employee, on termination of his service, claiming right to continue in service and temporary status covered by the Industrial Disputes Act, the remedy lies before the Tribunal or before the Labour Court, and not before the High Court. He was not holding any civil post and in view of the termination of service, master-servant relationship ceased rendering the provision of the Act. In this regard a reference may be made to the case of “Union of India v. Deep Chand Pandey” reported in (1992) 4 SCC 432 , in which the Supreme Court has held as under : “6. The present respondents are claiming the right to continue in the employment of the Union of India as before, with additional claim of temporary status and it is, therefore, idle to suggest that such a claim is not covered by the Act. The necessary conclusion, therefore, is, that the remedy of the respondents was before the Tribunal and not the High Court. We, accordingly, hold that the High Court did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the claim of the respondents. Consequently the impugned judgment is set aside, the writ petition before the High Court is dismissed and these appeals are allowed, but without costs.” 10. A further reference may be made to the case of “Yogesh Mahajan v. AIIMS” reported in (2018) 3 SCC 218 , in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under : “6. It is settled law that no contract employee has a right to have his or her contract renewed from time to time. That being so, we are in agreement with the Central Administrative Tribunal and the High Court that the petitioner was unable to show any statutory or other right to have his contract extended beyond 30-6-2010. At best, the petitioner could claim that the authorities concerned should consider extending his contract. We find that in fact due consideration was given to this and in spite of a favourable recommendation having been made, the All India Institute of Medical Sciences did not find it appropriate or necessary to continue with his services on a contractual basis. We do not find any arbitrariness in the view taken by the authorities concerned and therefore reject this contention of the petitioner. 7. We do not find any arbitrariness in the view taken by the authorities concerned and therefore reject this contention of the petitioner. 7. We are also in agreement with the view expressed by the Central Administrative Tribunal and the High Court that the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of the decision of this Court in Umadevi. There is nothing on record to indicate that the appointment of the petitioner on a contractual basis or on an ad hoc basis was made in accordance with any regular procedure or by following the necessary rules. That being so, no right accrues in favour of the petitioner for regularisation of his services. The decision in Umadevi does not advance the case of the petitioner.” 11. A show-cause has already been issued to the petitioner which the petitioner has admitted in the writ petition. Admittedly, there was no statutory rule requiring one month's notice for termination by the respondents of the service of the petitioner. It was only the term of appointment order which stipulated for one month's notice. The term contained in clause-6 of the appointment letter reads as under: “On unsatisfactory contract of service termination can be made after providing a month's notice.” 12. In view of the said clause, there is nothing to indicate or suggest that non-service of one month's notice as a condition precedent for termination of petitioner's service would result in vitiation or invalidation of termination of service, if effected. In view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of “Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. T. Mohammed Raisuli Hassan” (supra), the non-service of one month's notice in writing by the respondents to the petitioner before terminating the service of the petitioner did not invalidate or vitiate such termination. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the principles of natural justice have not been followed is also not sustainable in view of the fact that the show-cause has been issued. The service of the petitioner was not being governed by any statutory rule and in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the judgment relied by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in case of “Sirsi Municipality v. Cecelia Kom Francis Tellis,” (supra) is also not rescuing the petitioner. 13. The service of the petitioner was not being governed by any statutory rule and in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the judgment relied by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in case of “Sirsi Municipality v. Cecelia Kom Francis Tellis,” (supra) is also not rescuing the petitioner. 13. In view of the cumulative effect of the above discussions, there is no merit in the writ petition, and accordingly, the instant writ petition [W.P.(S) No. 1832 of 2020] is dismissed. 14. I.A. No. 4153 of 2020 stands disposed of.