ORDER : 1. This case is taken up through video conferencing. 2. The present writ petition was initially filed for issuance of direction upon Nagar Parishad, Sahibganj-respondent no. 3 to open the petitioner’s tender pertaining to S. No. 2/Group No. 2 of short time e-tender invitation notice being NIT 09/2018-19 duly published in a newspaper dated 10th February, 2019 pursuant to letter no. 391 dated 7th February, 2019 issued by the respondent no. 3 and to finalize the tender issued with regard to the contract work i.e. for construction of PCC Road and Pulia from Jharna Nala beside Shiv Niketan up to Ganga Ghat Road (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the said work’) parallel to said Jharna Nala. It was also prayed inter-alia to hold and declare that the petitioner is entitled for consideration of his tender, as he fulfils all the requisite conditions as mentioned in the tender notice, as contained in letter no. 391 dated 7th February, 2019 as well as being the senior most registered contractor amongst the bidders. 3. A counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the respondent nos. 2 and 3, stating, inter-alia, that the said work was already allotted to Dharam Tanti-respondent no. 4 and the work order no. 650 dated 9th March, 2019 had already been issued to him. Accordingly, the petitioner filed amended writ petition, seeking quashment of work order no. 650 dated 9th March, 2019 issued by the Executive Officer, Nagar Parishad, Saibganj-respondent no. 3, whereby pursuant to agreement no. F2-34/2018-19 dated 9th March, 2019 the respondent no. 4 was directed to commence the said work. 4. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent no. 3 published an advertisement in daily newspaper, namely ‘Dainik Jagran’ dated 10th February, 2019, inviting applications from the registered contractors along with their labour licence etc. for participating in online tender process relating to two works mentioned at S. No. 01/Group no. 01 and S. No. 02/Group No. 2. The petitioner and others submitted their tenders for obtaining the work mentioned at S. No. 02/Group No. 2 along with requisite advance money and tender fee as well as the requisite certificates. As per the advertisement, the tender was to be opened on 21st February, 2019, however, the said tender was not opened till filing of the writ petition. The petitioner and others submitted their tenders for obtaining the work mentioned at S. No. 02/Group No. 2 along with requisite advance money and tender fee as well as the requisite certificates. As per the advertisement, the tender was to be opened on 21st February, 2019, however, the said tender was not opened till filing of the writ petition. It is further submitted that the petitioner came to know that he had quoted the same price to that of other successful tenderers and as such he, being the senior most amongst them, fulfilling all the requirements of tender notice, was entitled to be awarded the said work. However, the respondent no. 3 arbitrarily and illegally awarded the said work to the respondent no. 4, who was the tenderer for both the works. So far as the work relating to S. No. 1/Group No. 1, the petitioner was not awarded the work on the ground that he was not having labour licence and had not completed the earlier work entrusted to him despite the fact that he was placed at serial no. 1 in the list of applicants/contractors relating to the work of S. No. 1/Group No. 1 of the tender notice. The work i.e. S. No. 1/Group No. 1 was awarded to one Santosh Kumar Singh, placed at serial no. 3 for the said work. It is further submitted that so far as the allegation against the petitioner made in the counter affidavit regarding not properly executing the previous work relating to construction of drain in Mohalla-Kamaltola (Providence School Lane) is concerned, the same is not based on record. In fact, the petitioner had successfully completed the construction of RCC drain from Chaiti Durga to St. Xavier’s School and a certificate dated 15th September, 2018 to that effect was issued to the petitioner under the signatures of the Assistant Engineer and the Junior Engineer of Nagar Parishad, Sahibganj. It is also submitted that the petitioner has been made entire payment for the said work after due verification of the quality of the work by the Assistant Engineer and the Junior Engineer. Pursuant to letter no. 1477 dated 26th June, 2018, the petitioner had repaired three manholes, which were also verified by the City Manager and the Assistant Engineer of Nagar Parishad, Sahibganj and duly noted that the said work was successfully completed. Pursuant to letter no. 1477 dated 26th June, 2018, the petitioner had repaired three manholes, which were also verified by the City Manager and the Assistant Engineer of Nagar Parishad, Sahibganj and duly noted that the said work was successfully completed. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner further submits that the respondent no. 4 was not granted the work in connection with S. No. 1/Group No. 1 of tender notice i.e. construction of bridge over Jharna Nala, as he got disqualified for not having completed the earlier work awarded to him. Despite the said fact, the work in question has been allotted to the respondent no. 4, which manifests arbitrariness and unreasonableness on the part of the respondent authorities. The petitioner is a senior contractor having unblemished record as well as has completed the earlier work awarded to him to the satisfaction of the concerned authority, hence the respondent authorities ought to have awarded the said work to him. 5. Mr. Gaurav Abhishek, learned A.C. to A.G. submits that previously the petitioner was awarded the work vide Tender No. NIT-02/2017-18 (Group no. 6) for construction of drain in Mohalla Kamaltola (Providence School Lane), however, several irregularities were found in the said work and despite repeated directions issued to him by the respondent no. 3 to improve the quality of the work, he did not pay any heed to such direction, which led to submission of a confidential report by the respondent no. 3 on 2nd April, 2019 in ‘Parishisht-Gha’ of Jharkhand Nagarpalika Samvedak Nibandhan Niyamawali, 2016. It was reported, inter-alia, that the petitioner did not execute the work as per the terms and conditions of the contract agreement. It is further submitted that a general board meeting of Nagar Parishad, Sahibganj was held on 27th September, 2018, in which vide paragraph no. 6 of the minutes of the meeting it was resolved that those contractors who did not perform their work with good quality as per the contract conditions and did not complete the work in time, must not be given priority for further works. It is further submitted that Clause no. 6 of the minutes of the meeting it was resolved that those contractors who did not perform their work with good quality as per the contract conditions and did not complete the work in time, must not be given priority for further works. It is further submitted that Clause no. 32 of the terms and conditions of the tender in question clearly provides that those contractors whose works are pending shall not be given any new work and those who did not complete their work in time and have complaints against them with regard to inferior quality of the work, shall not be given priority for further works in any condition. As per the tender notice, a comparative statement of S. No. 2/Group No. 2 work was prepared on 28th February, 2019 on the basis of which, it was found that the previous work done by the petitioner-Md. Sahbaj Alam was of inferior quality and he was also given warning by the higher authorities for the same. It was also found that the respondent no. 4 had completed the earlier allotted work as approved by the Assistant Engineer and the Junior Engineer in their enquiry report dated 26th February, 2019. Moreover, as per paragraph no. 6 of the Board’s resolution, no priority could have been given to the petitioner as his earlier work was found to be of inferior quality and, thus, the second senior most bidder, namely, Dharam Tanti-respondent no. 4 was selected as suitable bidder. The respondent no. 3, accordingly, issued letter no. 55 dated 28th February, 2019 to the Chief Engineer, Department of Urban Development and Housing, Government of Jharkhand for approval of the comparative statement of S. No. 2/Group No. 2 work and the same was approved on 4th March, 2019. After obtaining the approval, the said work was allotted to the respondent no. 4 and the work order was issued to him vide letter no. 650 dated 9th March, 2019. It is, thus, evident that the petitioner had not executed the earlier allotted work as per the terms and conditions of the contract, whereas the respondent no. 4 had successfully completed the previous allotted work. It is lastly submitted that while executing the earlier work, the petitioner had also damaged other sewerage works and in spite of the repeated warnings he did not improve the quality of work. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 4 had successfully completed the previous allotted work. It is lastly submitted that while executing the earlier work, the petitioner had also damaged other sewerage works and in spite of the repeated warnings he did not improve the quality of work. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 4 also makes submission in consonance with the submissions made on behalf of the respondent no. 3. Learned counsel thus justifies the award of the work in question by the respondent no. 3 in favour of the respondent no. 4. 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. I have also perused the original record of the work in question, which has been handed over by the learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 to the Court Master of this Court in view of the order dated 9th July, 2019 passed in the present writ petition. 8. The thrust of the argument of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner being the senior most contractor for the work - S. No. 2/Group No. 2 was entitled to be awarded the said work, however, the respondent authorities arbitrarily delayed the opening of tender, which in a clandestine manner was finally allotted to the respondent no. 4, who, in fact, had not completed the earlier work awarded to him. 9. Before appreciating the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, it would be relevant to go through the judgment rendered by this Court in the case of ARETPL-AT (JV) vs. M/s. Central Coalfields Limited, 2018 (3) JLJR 208 . In the said case, after citing various judicial pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the issue, this Court has summarized the guidelines to be followed by a writ Court while entertaining any contractual dispute filed by way of a writ petition, the relevant part of which is quoted as under:- “20. In the case of Verigamto Naveen vs. Govt. of A.P. and Others, (2001) 8 SCC 344 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:- 21. In the case of Verigamto Naveen vs. Govt. of A.P. and Others, (2001) 8 SCC 344 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:- 21. On the question that the relief as sought for and granted by the High Court arises purely in the contractual field and, therefore, the High Court ought not to have exercised its power under Article 226 of the Constitution placed very heavy reliance on the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Y.S. Raja Reddy vs. A.P. Mining Corporation Ltd. and the decisions of this Court in Har Shankar vs. Dy. Excise and Taxation Commr. Radha Krishna Agarwal vs. State of Bihar, Ramlal and Sons vs. State of Rajasthan, Shiv Shankar Dal Mills vs. State of Haryana, Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. International Airport Authority of India and Basheshar Nath vs. CIT. Though there is one set of cases rendered by this Court of the type arising in Radha Krishna Agarwal case much water has flown in the stream of judicial review in contractual field. In cases where the decision-making authority exceeded its statutory power or committed breach of rules or principles of natural justice in exercise of such power or its decision is perverse or passed an irrational order, this Court has interceded even after the contract was entered into between the parties and the Government and its agencies. We may advert to three decisions of this Court in Dwarka Das Marfatia and Sons vs. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, Mahabir Auto Stores vs. Indian Oil Corporation and Shrilekha Vidyarthi vs. State of U.P. Where the breach of contract involves breach of statutory obligation when the order complained of was made in exercise of statutory power by a statutory authority, though cause of action arises out of or pertains to contract, brings it within the sphere of public law because the power exercised is apart from contract. The freedom of the Government to enter into business with anybody it likes is subject to the condition of reasonableness and fair play as well as public interest. After entering into a contract, in cancelling the contract which is subject to terms of the statutory provisions, as in the present case, it cannot be said that the matter falls purely in a contractual field. After entering into a contract, in cancelling the contract which is subject to terms of the statutory provisions, as in the present case, it cannot be said that the matter falls purely in a contractual field. Therefore, we do not think it would be appropriate to suggest that the case on hand is a matter arising purely out of a contract and, therefore, interference under Article 226 of the Constitution is not called for. This contention also stands rejected. 21. In the case of Noble Resources Ltd. vs. State of Orissa, (2006) 10 SCC 236 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:- 18. It may, however, be true that where serious disputed questions of fact are raised requiring appreciation of evidence, and, thus, for determination thereof, examination of witnesses would be necessary; it may not be-convenient to decide the dispute in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 19. On a conspectus of several decisions, a Division Bench of this Court in ABL International Ltd. opined that such a writ petition would be maintainable even if it involves some disputed questions of fact. It was stated that no decision lays down an absolute rule that in all cases involving disputed questions of fact, the party should be relegated to a civil court. 20. In Mahabir Auto Stores vs. Indian Oil Corporation, this Court observed: (SCC p. 761, para-12) “It appears to us that rule of reason and rule against arbitrariness and discrimination, rules of fair play and natural justice are part of the rule of law applicable in situation or action by State instrumentality in dealing with citizens in a situation like the present one. Even though the rights of the citizens are in the nature of contractual rights, the manner, the method and motive of a decision of entering or not entering into a contract, are subject to judicial review on the touchstone of relevance and reasonableness, fair play, natural justice, equality and non-discrimination in the type of the transactions and nature of the dealing as in the present case.” 21. In State of U.P. vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh a Division Bench of this Court held that the Government cannot be denied to exercise its discretionary power provided the same is not arbitrary. 22. Interplay between writ jurisdiction and contractual disputes has given rise to a plethora of decisions by this Court. In State of U.P. vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh a Division Bench of this Court held that the Government cannot be denied to exercise its discretionary power provided the same is not arbitrary. 22. Interplay between writ jurisdiction and contractual disputes has given rise to a plethora of decisions by this Court. See, for example, Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons vs. Board of Trustees, Port of Bombay and Mahabir Auto Stores. 23. In Jamshed Hormusji Wadia vs. Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai this Court stated: (SCC p. 235, paras 16-17) “16. The position of law is settled that the State and its authorities including instrumentalities of States have to be just, fair and reasonable in all their activities including those in the field of contracts. Even while playing the role of a landlord or a tenant, the State and its authorities remain so and cannot be heard or seen causing displeasure or discomfort to Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 17. It is common knowledge that several rent control legislations exist spread around the country, the emergence whereof was witnessed by the post-World War scarcity of accommodation. Often these legislations exempt from their applicability the properties owned by the Government, semi-government or public bodies, government-owned corporations, trusts and other instrumentalities of State.” 24. Non-statutory contracts have, however, been treated differently. (Bareilly Development Authority vs. Ajai Pal Singh) 25. A distinction is also made between performance of a statutory duty and/or dealing of a public matter by a State and its commercial activities. (Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. vs. Amritsar Gas Service and LIC of India vs. Escorts Ltd.) 26. In ABL International Ltd. this Court opined that on a given set of facts, if a State acts in an arbitrary manner even in a matter of contract, a writ petition would be maintainable. It was opined: (SCC p. 570, para-23) “23. It is clear from the above observations of this Court, once the State or an instrumentality of the State is a party to the contract, it has an obligation in law to act fairly, justly and reasonably which is the requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It was opined: (SCC p. 570, para-23) “23. It is clear from the above observations of this Court, once the State or an instrumentality of the State is a party to the contract, it has an obligation in law to act fairly, justly and reasonably which is the requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, if by the impugned repudiation of the claim of the appellants the first respondent as an instrumentality of the State has acted in contravention of the above said requirement of Article 14, then we have no hesitation in holding that a writ court can issue suitable directions to set right the arbitrary actions of the first respondent.” 27. Contractual matters are, thus, not beyond the realm of judicial review. Its application may, however, be limited. 22. In the case of Joshi Technologies International Inc. vs. Union of India and Others, (2015) 7 SCC 728 , it is held as under:- 69. The position thus summarised in the aforesaid principles has to be understood in the context of discussion that preceded which we have pointed out above. As per this, no doubt, there is no absolute bar to the maintainability of the writ petition even in contractual matters or where there are disputed questions of fact or even when monetary claim is raised. At the same time, discretion lies with the High Court which under certain circumstances, it can refuse to exercise. It also follows that under the following circumstances “normally” the Court would not exercise such a discretion: 69.1. The Court may not examine the issue unless the action has some public law character attached to it. 69.2. Whenever a particular mode of settlement of dispute is provided in the contract, the High Court would refuse to exercise its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution and relegate the party to the said mode of settlement, particularly when settlement of disputes is to be resorted to through the means of arbitration. 69.3. If there are very serious disputed questions of fact which are of complex nature and require oral evidence for their determination. 69.4. Money claims per se particularly arising out of contractual obligations are normally not to be entertained except in exceptional circumstances. 70. 69.3. If there are very serious disputed questions of fact which are of complex nature and require oral evidence for their determination. 69.4. Money claims per se particularly arising out of contractual obligations are normally not to be entertained except in exceptional circumstances. 70. Further, the legal position which emerges from various judgments of this Court dealing with different situations/aspects relating to contracts entered into by the State/public authority with private parties, can be summarised as under: 70.1. At the stage of entering into a contract, the State acts purely in its executive capacity and is bound by the obligations of fairness. 70.2. State in its executive capacity, even in the contractual field, is under obligation to act fairly and cannot practise some discrimination. 70.3. Even in cases where question is of choice or consideration of competing claims before entering into the field of contract, facts have to be investigated and found before the question of a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution could arise. If those facts are disputed and require assessment of evidence the correctness of which can only be tested satisfactorily by taking detailed evidence, involving examination and cross-examination of witnesses, the case could not be conveniently or satisfactorily decided in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In such cases the Court can direct the aggrieved party to resort to alternate remedy of civil suit, etc. 70.4. Writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution was not intended to facilitate avoidance of obligation voluntarily incurred. 70.5. Writ petition was not maintainable to avoid contractual obligation. Occurrence of commercial difficulty, inconvenience or hardship in performance of the conditions agreed to in the contract can provide no justification in not complying with the terms of contract which the parties had accepted with open eyes. It cannot ever be that a licensee can work out the licence if he finds it profitable to do so: and he can challenge the conditions under which he agreed to take the licence, if he finds it commercially inexpedient to conduct his business. 70.6. Ordinarily, where a breach of contract is complained of, the party complaining of such breach may sue for specific performance of the contract, if contract is capable of being specifically performed. Otherwise, the party may sue for damages. 70.7. 70.6. Ordinarily, where a breach of contract is complained of, the party complaining of such breach may sue for specific performance of the contract, if contract is capable of being specifically performed. Otherwise, the party may sue for damages. 70.7. Writ can be issued where there is executive action unsupported by law or even in respect of a corporation there is denial of equality before law or equal protection of law or if it can be shown that action of the public authorities was without giving any hearing and violation of principles of natural justice after holding that action could not have been taken without observing principles of natural justice. 70.8. If the contract between private party and the State/instrumentality and/or agency of the State is under the realm of a private law and there is no element of public law, the normal course for the aggrieved party, is to invoke the remedies provided under ordinary civil law rather than approaching the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction. 70.9. The distinction between public law and private law element in the contract with the State is getting blurred. However, it has not been totally obliterated and where the matter falls purely in private field of contract, this Court has maintained the position that writ petition is not maintainable. The dichotomy between public law and private law rights and remedies would depend on the factual matrix of each case and the distinction between the public law remedies and private law field, cannot be demarcated with precision. In fact, each case has to be examined, on its facts whether the contractual relations between the parties bear insignia of public element. Once on the facts of a particular case it is found that nature of the activity or controversy involves public law element, then the matter can be examined by the High Court in writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to see whether action of the State and/or instrumentality or agency of the State is fair, just and equitable or that relevant factors are taken into consideration and irrelevant factors have not gone into the decision-making process or that the decision is not arbitrary. 70.10. 70.10. Mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary and this is how the requirements of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of non-arbitrariness. 70.11. The scope of judicial review in respect of disputes falling within the domain of contractual obligations may be more limited and in doubtful cases the parties may be relegated to adjudication of their rights by resort to remedies provided for adjudication of purely contractual disputes. 71. Keeping in mind the aforesaid principles and after considering the arguments of the respective parties, we are of the view that on the facts of the present case, it is not a fit case where the High Court should have exercised discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. First, the matter is in the realm of pure contract. It is not a case where any statutory contract is awarded. 23. Having gone through the aforesaid judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it may be construed that there is no absolute bar in entertaining a writ petition in a contractual matter where some disputed question of facts are involved. However, if the dispute involved in a matter is so complex which can only be determined after thorough long drawn adjudicatory process by leading evidences, the writ petition should not be entertained. Each and every case is to be dealt with on its own facts. If the materials on record are clearly evincible, the writ court may exercise the power of judicial review. 24. The power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is plenary in nature and is not subjected to any of the other provisions of the Constitution. The High Court has discretion to exercise or not to exercise such discretion having regard to the facts of each case. 24. The power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is plenary in nature and is not subjected to any of the other provisions of the Constitution. The High Court has discretion to exercise or not to exercise such discretion having regard to the facts of each case. However, the High Courts have imposed self-restraints in such exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ will not normally be exercised by the Court to the exclusion of other available remedies unless such action of the State or its instrumentality is arbitrary and unreasonable so as to violate the constitutional mandate of Article 14 or for other valid and legitimate reasons, for which the Court thinks it necessary to exercise the said jurisdiction.” 10. Further in the case of Jagdish Mandal vs. State of Orissa and Others, (2007) 14 SCC 517 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court after considering various earlier judgments has held as under:- “22. Judicial review of administrative action is intended to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and mala-fides. Its purpose is to check whether choice or decision is made “lawfully” and not to check whether choice or decision is “sound.” When the power of judicial review is invoked in matters relating to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind. A contract is a commercial transaction. Evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions. Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance. If the decision relating to award of contract is bona fide and is in public interest, courts will not, in exercise of power of judicial review, interfere even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. The power of judicial review will not be permitted to be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest, or to decide contractual disputes. The tenderer or contractor with a grievance can always seek damages in a civil court. Attempts by unsuccessful tenderers with imaginary grievances, wounded pride and business rivalry, to make mountains out of molehills of some technical/procedural violation or some prejudice to self, and persuade courts to interfere by exercising power of judicial review, should be resisted. The tenderer or contractor with a grievance can always seek damages in a civil court. Attempts by unsuccessful tenderers with imaginary grievances, wounded pride and business rivalry, to make mountains out of molehills of some technical/procedural violation or some prejudice to self, and persuade courts to interfere by exercising power of judicial review, should be resisted. Such interferences, either interim or final, may hold up public works for years, or delay relief and succour to thousands and millions and may increase the project cost manifold. Therefore, a court before interfering in tender or contractual matters in exercise of power of judicial review, should pose to itself the following questions: (i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is mala-fide or intended to favour someone: Whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the court can say the decision is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached. (ii) Whether public interest is affected. If the answers are in the negative, there should be no interference under Article 226. Cases involving blacklisting or imposition of penal consequences on a tenderer/contractor or distribution of State largesse (allotment of sites/shops, grant of licences, dealerships and franchises) stand on a different footing as they may require a higher degree of fairness in action.” 11. Further in the case of Central Coalfields Ltd. vs. SLL-SML (Joint Venture Consortium), 2016 (8) SCC 622 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “32. The core issue in these appeals is not of judicial review of the administrative action of CCL in adhering to the terms of NIT and the GTC prescribed by it while dealing with bids furnished by participants in the bidding process. The core issue is whether CCL acted perversely enough in rejecting the bank guarantee of JVC on the ground that it was not in the prescribed format, thereby calling for judicial review by a constitutional court and interfering with CCL's decision. 37. For JVC to say that its bank guarantee was in terms stricter than the prescribed format is neither here nor there. It is not for the employer or this Court to scrutinise every bank guarantee to determine whether it is stricter than the prescribed format or less rigorous. 37. For JVC to say that its bank guarantee was in terms stricter than the prescribed format is neither here nor there. It is not for the employer or this Court to scrutinise every bank guarantee to determine whether it is stricter than the prescribed format or less rigorous. The fact is that a format was prescribed and there was no reason not to adhere to it. The goalposts cannot be rearranged or asked to be rearranged during the bidding process to affect the right of some or deny a privilege to some. 47. The result of this discussion is that the issue of the acceptance or rejection of a bid or a bidder should be looked at not only from the point of view of the unsuccessful party but also from the point of view of the employer. As held in Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489 , the terms of NIT cannot be ignored as being redundant or superfluous. They must be given a meaning and the necessary significance. As pointed out in Tata Cellular vs. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 , there must be judicial restraint in interfering with administrative action. Ordinarily, the soundness of the decision taken by the employer ought not to be questioned but the decision-making process can certainly be subject to judicial review. The soundness of the decision may be questioned if it is irrational or mala-fide or intended to favour someone or a decision “that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached” as held in Jagdish Mandal vs. State of Orissa, (2007) 14 SCC 517 followed in Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. vs. State of Karnataka, (2012) 8 SCC 216 .” 12. It is a trite law that the High Court in exercise of power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not expected to act as a court of appeal while examining an administrative decision and to record a finding as to whether any different decision could have been taken in the facts and circumstances of the case. A writ court while exercising power of judicial review should ordinarily refrain from examining the details of the terms and conditions of the contract entered with the State/its instrumentalities. The writ Court has its inherent limitation on the scope of such enquiry. A writ court while exercising power of judicial review should ordinarily refrain from examining the details of the terms and conditions of the contract entered with the State/its instrumentalities. The writ Court has its inherent limitation on the scope of such enquiry. However, the writ Court can certainly examine as to whether the decision making process undertaken by the State authorities is unreasonable, irrational, discriminatory, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Once the procedure adopted by an authority in the matter of contract is held to be against the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the writ Court cannot ignore such action on the pretext that the State authorities should have certain latitude or liberty in contractual matters and any interference by the writ Court would amount to encroachment upon the exclusive right of the authority to take such a decision. 13. Thus, the issue before this Court is as to whether there is any arbitrariness, unreasonableness and biasness in the decision making process of the respondent authorities so as to make any interference with the tender in question. 14. Coming back to the facts of the present case, the respondent no. 3 vide short term E-tender Invitation Notice no. NIT 09/2018-19 advertised two works i.e. S. No. 1/Group No. 1 for construction of bridge over Jharna Nala and S. No. 2/Group No. 2 for construction of PCC Road and Pulia parallel to Jharna Nala beside Shiv Niketan up to Ganga Ghat Road. The date of opening of the tender was 21st February, 2019 at 12:00 noon. On perusal of Annexure-4 of the supplementary affidavit dated 17th July, 2019 filed on behalf of the petitioner, which is an information provided by the respondent no. 3 to the petitioner, it would be evident that S. No. 1/Group No. 1 work was not awarded to the respondent no. 4, though he was the senior most in the said group, on the ground that he did not complete earlier work awarded to him, however, S. No. 2/Group No. 2 work was awarded to him on the ground that previous work was completed by him on 4th March, 2019. Though the petitioner was senior most in S. No. 2/Group No. 2 work, he was not awarded the said work. It has been contended on behalf of the respondent no. Though the petitioner was senior most in S. No. 2/Group No. 2 work, he was not awarded the said work. It has been contended on behalf of the respondent no. 3 that several irregularities were found in the earlier work awarded to the petitioner i.e. for construction of drain in Mohalla Kamaltola (Providence School Lane). The Joint Secretary, Urban Development and Housing Department, Government of Jharkhand had made physical verification of the said work being executed by the petitioner and the same was found unsatisfactory. Accordingly, the petitioner was directed to improve the quality of work. A show cause notice to that effect was also issued to the petitioner vide letter no. 658 dated 27th March, 2018, however, despite giving reply to the said show cause notice, he did not improve the quality of work. 15. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner has contended that on receipt of letter no. 1477 dated 26th June, 2018, the petitioner repaired three manholes on 28th June, 2018, which was also certified by the concerned City Manager and Assistant Engineer. Subsequently, the petitioner was also paid the bills raised by him after making inspection of the said work by a team of Assistant Engineer and Junior Engineer. 16. It, however, transpires from the record that even after 28th June, 2018, the petitioner was issued a show cause notice vide letter no. 393 dated 8th February, 2019 seeking explanation as to why he should not be put in the blacklist and a suitable action under Jharkhand Registration Rules, 2016 be not taken against him on the ground that slab of the drain was damaged and was also blocked due to non-opening of shuttering of the said drain. It was also alleged against the petitioner that the manhole of sewerage pipeline was knowingly broken at his instance and that even after issuance of the show cause notice to the petitioner, he did not take interest to cure the said defect, showing irresponsible conduct. It also appears that as per the confidential report submitted with regard to the petitioner, it came to light on 2nd April, 2019 that he was not executing the work as per specification. 17. It also appears that as per the confidential report submitted with regard to the petitioner, it came to light on 2nd April, 2019 that he was not executing the work as per specification. 17. In view of the aforesaid factual position, it appears that before publishing the tender in question on 10th February, 2019, there was an allegation against the petitioner regarding inferior quality of work being executed by him and in terms with Clause 32 of the condition of the tender, no tenderer was to be awarded the work against whom there was a complaint with regard to poor quality of work. Though the petitioner has contended that the work earlier executed by him was as per specification and the allegation levelled against him by the authorities of the respondent no. 3 is false and fabricated, yet such allegation and counter allegation based on factual dispute are not supposed to be interfered and adjudicated by a writ Court in view of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Joshi Technologies (supra). 18. Nonetheless, the fact remains that on the date of issuance of tender in question, there were allegations against the petitioner that the earlier work executed by him was of inferior quality. 19. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the considered view that the petitioner has failed to substantiate before this Court that the action of the respondent authorities in not granting tender in question to him is arbitrary, illegal and unreasonable. 20. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner has put reliance on the judgment rendered by the Calcutta High Court in the case of Rashmi Metaliks Ltd. vs. Kolkata Municipal Corporation, W.P. No. 1281 of 2014. I have perused the said judgment, wherein it has been found by the Calcutta High Court on the given facts that the petitioner of the said case was the lowest bidder and was not awarded the work in question on the ground that it was blacklisted. However, on factual verification, it was found that there was no such order of blacklisting or any cause for blacklisting between 1st December to 10th December, 2014, when the award of contract was under consideration. However, on factual verification, it was found that there was no such order of blacklisting or any cause for blacklisting between 1st December to 10th December, 2014, when the award of contract was under consideration. It was, thus, held by the Calcutta High Court that the said petitioner was deprived of its legitimate expectation of getting the contract and under the said circumstance, it was awarded compensation for losing an opportunity to execute the work. 21. However, in the present case, the allegation against the petitioner is that the earlier work executed by him was of inferior quality and during the tender process relating to the work in question, the said allegation was under consideration before the respondent authorities. Hence, the aforesaid judgment relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner cannot be applied in the present case. 22. Now coming to the action of the respondent authorities in awarding the work in question to the respondent no. 4, it transpires from the record that out of two works as advertised vide NIT No. 09 of 2018-19, the work under S. No. 1/Group No. 1 was not awarded to the respondent no. 4 in spite of the fact that he was the senior most contractor under the said group on the ground that he had not completed his earlier work. So far as the work under S. No. 2/Group No. 2 is concerned, the date of opening of the same was 21st February, 2019 and in view of Clause 27 of the conditions of the tender, a tenderer was compulsorily required to submit the quality test report of the work done by him. However, in view of the application dated 26th February, 2019 submitted by the respondent no. 4- Dharam Tanti before the respondent no. 3 (Annexure-H to the counter affidavit dated 31st July, 2019 filed on behalf of the respondent nos.2 and 3), it would appear that the respondentno. 4 had made a request to close the earlier allotted work on the ground that he had done more works than the work specified in the agreement, who, in turn, directed the Assistant Engineer and Junior Engineer to verify the fact as to whether the earlier work allotted to the respondent no. 4 was completed or not. The Junior Engineer prepared the technical report on the same day, stating, inter-alia, that the work executed by the respondent no. 4 was completed or not. The Junior Engineer prepared the technical report on the same day, stating, inter-alia, that the work executed by the respondent no. 4 was found more in quantity than the work specified in the agreement and there was no need to complete the rest of the work. The Assistant Engineer also reported for closure of the work. On the basis of the said technical report, the respondent no. 3 commented that he inspected the site and found that the earlier work executed by the respondent no. 4 had been completed and as such the earlier work of the respondent no. 4 may be treated as complete by the Tender Committee for awarding the work in question. Thereafter, the respondent no. 3 wrote letter dated 27th February, 2019 to the members of the Tender Committee, informing them that since the sitting of the Committee would be held on 28th February, 2019 at about 4:00 p.m. for the purpose of opening of the tender, the comparative chart of the bidders was prepared on the same day, wherein under column at S. No. 8 - clearance certificate of the petitioner was found responsive. 23. Now the vital question is that if the tender had been opened on the scheduled date i.e. on 21st February, 2019, the said situation would not have arisen and the members of the Tender Committee would not have the occasion to consider the clearance certificate issued in favour of the respondent no. 4 and in that situation, the respondent no. 4 would have certainly been disqualified. Curiously enough, no corrigendum whatsoever was issued by the respondent no3, extending the date of opening of the tender and permitting submission of any further document by the tederers, which might have fallen short on the last day of submission of the tender. Otherwise also, it is beyond the comprehension of any common man that if two works are advertised by a particular NIT and if a tenderer is not awarded the first work despite being senior most on the ground that he had not completed the earlier work, how the second work in the same NIT can be awarded to him ignoring that the conditions of the tender are same for both the works. 24. 24. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the view that the decision making process undertaken by the respondent authorities by awarding the tender in question to the respondent no. 4 was arbitrary, unreasonable and suffers from the vice of favouritism. Even if the allegation levelled against the petitioner by the respondent authorities is treated to be true, the respondent no. 4 was not eligible for being awarded the said work and in the said situation, the respondent authorities should have considered the eligibility of other bidders/tenderers for awarding the work. 25. In the case of Noida Entrepreneurs Assn. vs. Noida and Others, (2011) 6 SCC 508 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “41. Power vested by the State in a public authority should be viewed as a trust coupled with duty to be exercised in larger public and social interest. Power is to be exercised strictly adhering to the statutory provisions and fact situation of a case. “Public authorities cannot play fast and loose with the powers vested in them.” A decision taken in an arbitrary manner contradicts the principle of legitimate expectation. An authority is under a legal obligation to exercise the power reasonably and in good faith to effectuate the purpose for which power stood conferred. In this context, “in good faith” means “for legitimate reasons.” It must be exercised bona fide for the purpose and for none other. Commr. of Police vs. Gordhandas Bhanji, AIR 1952 SC 16 , Sirsi Municipality vs. Cecelia Kom Francis Tellis, (1973) 1 SCC 409 , State of Punjab vs. Gurdial Singh, (1980) 2 SCC 471 , Collector (District Magistrate) vs. Raja Ram Jaiswal, (1985) 3 SCC 1 , Delhi Administration vs. Manohar Lal, (2002) 7 SCC 222 and N.D. Jayal vs. Union of India, (2004) 9 SCC 362 . 42. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that these allegations being of a very serious nature and as alleged, Respondent 4 had passed orders in colourable exercise of power favouring himself and certain contractors, require investigation. Thus, in view of the above, we direct CBI to have preliminary enquiry and in case the allegations are found having some substance warranting further proceeding with criminal prosecution, may proceed in accordance with law. Thus, in view of the above, we direct CBI to have preliminary enquiry and in case the allegations are found having some substance warranting further proceeding with criminal prosecution, may proceed in accordance with law. It may be pertinent to mention that any observation made herein against Respondent 4 would be treated necessary to decide the present controversy. CBI shall investigate the matter without being influenced by any observation made in this judgment. 40. The public trust doctrine is a part of the law of the land. The doctrine has grown from Article 21 of the Constitution. In essence, the action/order of the State or State instrumentality would stand vitiated if it lacks bona fides, as it would only be a case of colourable exercise of power. The rule of law is the foundation of a democratic society. Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal, (1975) 1 SCC 70 , Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489 , Haji T.M. Hassan Rawther vs. Kerala Financial Corporation, (1988) 1 SCC 166 , Shrilekha Vidyarthi vs. State of U.P. (1991) 1 SCC 212 and M.I. Builders (P) Ltd. vs. Radhey Shyam Sahu, (1999) 6 SCC 464 . 39. State actions are required to be non-arbitrary and justified on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. Action of the State or its instrumentality must be in conformity with some principle which meets the test of reason and relevance. Functioning of a “democratic form of Government demands equality and absence of arbitrariness and discrimination.” The rule of law prohibits arbitrary action and commands the authority concerned to act in accordance with law. Every action of the State or its instrumentalities should neither be suggestive of discrimination, nor even apparently give an impression of bias, favouritism and nepotism. If a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule, it is unpredictable and such a decision is antithesis to the decision taken in accordance with the rule of law. 38. The State or the public authority which holds the property for the public or which has been assigned the duty of grant of largesse, etc. acts as a trustee and, therefore, has to act fairly and reasonably. 38. The State or the public authority which holds the property for the public or which has been assigned the duty of grant of largesse, etc. acts as a trustee and, therefore, has to act fairly and reasonably. Every holder of a public office by virtue of which he acts on behalf of the State or public body is ultimately accountable to the people in whom the sovereignty vests. As such, all powers so vested in him are meant to be exercised for public good and promoting the public interest. Every holder of a public office is a trustee.” 26. In the present case also, after appreciating the facts as discussed herein above, this Court is of the considered view that the respondent authorities have committed serious illegality in awarding the work in question to the respondent no. 4. However, on perusal of the statements made in the supplementary counter affidavit dated 17th September, 2020 filed on behalf of the respondent nos.2 and 3 in terms with the order of this Court dated 24th August, 2020, it appears that as per the inspection report annexed as Annexure-S/A, the respondent no. 4 has completed 90% of the work, hence it would not be practical to quash the work order issued to the respondent no. 4. 27. Thus, without quashing the impugned work order no. 650 dated 9th March, 2019, the Principal Secretary, Department of Urban Development and Housing, Government of Jharkhand-respondent no. 1 is directed to get an enquiry conducted with regard to the tender process undertaken by the authorities of the respondent no. 3 awarding the said work to the respondent no. 4 in the light of the observations made hereinabove. If in the said enquiry, it is found that the members of the Tender Committee/concerned authorities of the respondent no. 3 have committed irregularity in awarding the said work in favour of the respondent no. 4, appropriate action shall be taken against them in accordance with law. 28. The writ petition is, accordingly, disposed of with the aforesaid observations and directions. 29. I.A. No. 4635 of 2019 also stands disposed of. 30. The Court Master of this Court is directed to return the original file relating to the tender in question to the learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 Nagar Parishad Sahibganj.