JUDGMENT : CHANDRA DHARI SINGH, J. 1. The instant appeal has been filed for correctness of order judgment and order dated 06.12.2018 passed by learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.2844 (SS) of 2004 (S.B. Singh vs. State Bank of India and Ors.). 2. Brief facts of the case are as follows: (i) Show-cause notice dated 22.05.2001 was issued by the appellant/Bank to the respondent/writ petitioner seeking explanation of fraudulent withdrawal aggregated of Rs.54,100/-on various dates from the saving bank accounts of Shri V.K. Jaiswal and Shri Udham Singh during his posting as Passing Officer at Phulpur, Azamgarh Branch of the Bank from 22.08.1996 to 15.06.2000. The respondent/writ petitioner submitted his reply on 22.05.2001. (ii) The Bank initiated departmental proceedings by issuing charge-sheet to the respondent/writ petitioner by charging him for making fraudulent withdrawal amounting to Rs.54,100/-from saving bank accounts of Shri V.K. Jaiswal and Shri Udham Singh thereby exposing the Bank to substantial loss. The respondent/writ petitioner did not submit any written statement in defence. Shri R.K. Srivastava was appointed as enquiry officer by the appointing authority to inquire the charges levelled against the respondent/writ petitioner. The Bank also lodged an FIR against the respondent/writ petitioner bearing Crime No.23 of 2002 for committing offence under Sections 419, 420, 467 & 468 IPC on 22.02.2002 at P.S. Phulpur, District Azamgarh. (iii) On 23.04.2003 the enquiry officer submitted his report holding the allegation no.1 partly proved. However, Deputy General Manager (Disciplinary Authority) disagreed and tentatively found the charge to be fully proved. The disciplinary authority sought representation of the respondent/writ petitioner on findings of the enquiry officer. On 06.06.2003, the respondent/ writ petitioner submitted a representation. The disciplinary authority imposed the punishment of dismissal from service on 17.11.2003. Against punishment order dated 17.11.2003, the respondent/writ petitioner submitted departmental appeal to the Chief General Manager (Appellate Authority) on 06.01.2004. Vide order dated 05.04.2004, the appellate authority dismissed the departmental appeal and found the penalty commensurate with the lapses held proved against the respondent/writ petitioner. The respondent/writ petitioner preferred a petition bearing Writ Petition No.2844 (SS) of 2004, impugning the order of punishment dated 17.11.2003 and order of dismissal of departmental appeal dated 05.04.2004. (iv) Vide order dated 07.06.2008, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Azamgarh convicted the respondent/writ petitioner for offence punishable under Sections 419, 420, 467 & 468 IPC in Criminal Case No.3995 of 2006 (State of U.P. vs. S.B. Singh). (iv) Vide order dated 07.06.2008, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Azamgarh convicted the respondent/writ petitioner for offence punishable under Sections 419, 420, 467 & 468 IPC in Criminal Case No.3995 of 2006 (State of U.P. vs. S.B. Singh). Against the said order, the respondent/writ petitioner preferred a criminal appeal bearing No.27 of 2008 before Additional Sessions Judge, Azamgarh. The said criminal appeal was allowed by the appellate Court vide order dated 24.05.2010 and the respondent/writ petitioner was acquitted by granting benefit of doubt. (v) After the order of the criminal appeal, the respondent/writ petitioner amended Writ Petition No.2844 (SS) of 2004 by bringing subsequent development on record. Vide impugned order dated 06.12.2018, learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and quashed order of punishment dated 17.11.2003 and order of appellate authority dated 05.04.2004 with direction to the appellant/Bank to treat the respondent/writ petitioner in service w.e.f the date of dismissal order dated 17.11.2003 till the date of his superannuation i.e. 31.07.2016 and to provide him all consequential service benefits and the post retiral benefits. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that judgment and order dated 06.12.2018 (supra) passed by learned Single Judge is erroneous in law as well as on facts. The learned Single Judge erroneously presumed and proceeded in the entire judgment on the premise that the respondent/writ petitioner was ‘honourably’ acquitted in the criminal proceedings, although he was acquitted on benefit of doubt. 4. The learned counsel has further submitted that it is settled law that the departmental enquiry is independent of criminal proceedings. So, acquittal in a criminal court is of no help and even if, a person stands acquitted by a criminal court, departmental enquiry can be held, since standard of proof required in a departmental enquiry and in a criminal case are different; In criminal case, standard of proof is required beyond reasonable doubt while in departmental enquiry, it is proof on preponderance of probabilities. Judgment of acquittal passed in favour of an employee by giving benefit of doubt per se would not be binding upon the employer. Judgment of acquittal passed in favour of an employee by giving benefit of doubt per se would not be binding upon the employer. To support his contention learned counsel for the appellant has relied on [General Manager (Operations), State Bank of India vs. R Periyasamy, reported in 2015 (3) SCC 101 : Deputy Inspector General of Police Vs S.Samuthiram, reported in 2013 (1) SCC 598 : Manager, Reserve Bank of India Vs S. Mani, reported in 2005 (5) SCC 100 ]. 5. It is further submitted that learned Single Judge has erroneously held that the respondent/writ petitioner had not been afforded ample opportunity of hearing in the departmental enquiry on the premise that the account holders Shri Udham Singh and Shri V.K. Jaiswal had not been produced as witnesses in the departmental enquiry. The learned Single Judge has also failed to consider and appreciate that reasonable opportunity of defence was provided to the respondent/writ petitioner in the departmental enquiry but the respondent/writ petitioner neither filed reply to the charge-sheet nor adduced oral evidence by producing Shri Udham Singh and Shri V.K. Jaiswal (account holders) as defence witnesses and did not cross examine the management witnesses Shri Ram Aadhar Tiwari and Shri Shyam Murari Mishra and also not engaged any defence representative nor submitted defence brief to the enquiry Officer. 6. It is argued that the learned Single Judge has failed to consider and appreciate that sufficiency of evidence is not a ground for judicial review in departmental proceedings; only total absence of evidence and non-compliance of principles of natural justice causing some real prejudice to the delinquent officer are the grounds for judicial review. 7. It is also submitted that the learned Single Judge also failed to consider and appreciate that an employee of Bank is required to take all possible steps to protect interest of the Bank and discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty devotion and diligence and do nothing unbecoming of an officer of a Bank. The respondent/writ petitioner acted in breach of Bank’s rules and had lost confidence with the Bank and it was a futile exercise of judicial review to embark upon the decision of disciplinary authority imposing punishment, preceded by an enquiry. 8. The respondent/writ petitioner acted in breach of Bank’s rules and had lost confidence with the Bank and it was a futile exercise of judicial review to embark upon the decision of disciplinary authority imposing punishment, preceded by an enquiry. 8. It is further submitted that the learned Single Judge had erroneously held that the appellate authority has rejected the appeal without considering factual legal matrix of the issue in question and the appellate order did not reflect application of mind. It is submitted that in view of the above, the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge being erroneous in law as well as on facts and is liable to be set aside. 9. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/writ petitioner has vehemently opposed the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the appellant/respondent by submitting that there is no infirmity in the impugned order/judgment passed by learned Single Judge. He has submitted that with respect to alleged misconduct during the period from 04.01.1997 to 21.07.1997, charges were issued by the Deputy General Manager, State Bank of India, Zonal Office, Region – II, Gorakhpur i.e. Disciplinary Authority through charge-sheet dated 08.11.2001 after more than four years without explaining the delay in issuing the said charge-sheet. It is submitted that the enquiry officer conducted preliminary hearing on 25.01.2002 and regular hearing on 20.08.2002 meaning thereby only two days. On 20.08.2002, two management witnesses namely Shri Ram Adhar Tiwar and Shri Shyam Murari Misra deposed before the enquiry officer and gave statement contrary to Rule 24 of Master Circular (Saving Bank Account). The enquiry officer submitted an enquiry report dated 23.04.2003 vide which Charge No.1 was found partly proved. The disciplinary authority recorded disagreement note dated 20.05.2003 on the finding of the enquiry officer without disclosing any reasons. 10. The learned counsel has further submitted that the respondent/writ petitioner requested to reopen the enquiry for giving a proper opportunity to the respondent/writ petitioner but the same was not considered by the concerned authority. It is submitted that it is the appointing authority and not the disciplinary authority who gave note dated 20.05.2003 on the basis of which the respondent/writ petitioner was dismissed from service vide order dated 17.11.2003. 11. It is submitted that it is the appointing authority and not the disciplinary authority who gave note dated 20.05.2003 on the basis of which the respondent/writ petitioner was dismissed from service vide order dated 17.11.2003. 11. The learned counsel for the respondent/writ petitioner has submitted that bare perusal of enquiry report dated 23.04.2003, disciplinary note dated 20.05.2003 and dismissal order dated 17.11.2003 would reveal that the same suffer from improper appreciation of fact and non-application of mind to the facts and circumstances of the case as the materials on record do not establish/prove the allegations against the respondent/writ petitioner. 12. It is further submitted that the departmental appeal which was preferred by the respondent/writ petitioner was rejected by the appellate authority vide order dated 05.04.2004 without appreciation of facts and without applying mind to the issues and point raised by the respondent/writ petitioner, therefore, the said order passed in the departmental appeal is bad in law and liable to be set aside. 13. The learned counsel has submitted that in the statement made before the criminal Court during the criminal proceedings, Shri Udham Singh, account holder, accepted his signatures on withdrawal form and acknowledged the receipt of the payment. It is further submitted that Shri Udham Singh was produced as prosecution witness and he categorically stated that no fraud was made in his account and no amount was withdrawn by anyone. It is submitted that since criminal proceedings and departmental proceedings were on the same set of facts, therefore, when the respondent/writ petitioner has been acquitted in criminal proceedings ‘honourably’, then he cannot be held guilty in the departmental enquiry. 14. The learned counsel vehemently argued that the judgment of the criminal Court acquitting the respondent/writ petitioner has to be construed as an ‘honourable’ acquittal and that the respondent/writ petitioner cannot be proceeded with on the same set of facts on which he was acquitted by a criminal Court. 15. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. We may first deal with the departmental proceedings initiated against the respondent/writ petitioner. Departmental Proceedings:- 16. We may indicate that the following were the charges levelled against the respondent/writ petitioner in the departmental proceedings on the basis of which charge-sheet dated 08.11.2001 was served on the respondent/writ petitioner: “1. We may first deal with the departmental proceedings initiated against the respondent/writ petitioner. Departmental Proceedings:- 16. We may indicate that the following were the charges levelled against the respondent/writ petitioner in the departmental proceedings on the basis of which charge-sheet dated 08.11.2001 was served on the respondent/writ petitioner: “1. You fraudulently obtained payments through withdrawal forms Rs.49,000/-on various occasions from Savings Bank Account of Shri Vinod Kumar Jiswal (S.B. A/c No.15508) and Rs.5,100/-on two occasions from Savings Bank Account of Sri Udham Singh (S.B. A/c No.3135). All the said withdrawals were posted and passed by you. The payment of withdrawals were received by you. The payment of withdrawals were received from the teller counter/paying cashier.” 17. The disciplinary authority vide letter dated 08.11.2001 had required the respondent/writ petitioner to submit statement of defence in response to the charge-sheet, in terms of service rules, within 10 days of receipt of the said letter. Similarly, vide letter dated 11.10.2002, the disciplinary authority required the respondent/writ petitioner to submit defence brief by 27.10.2002 but the respondent/writ petitioner did not submit the same. The respondent/writ petitioner had also chosen not to cross-examine the witnesses in the departmental proceedings, inspite of being afforded the said opportunity. The respondent/writ petitioner himself expressed his desire to engage defence representative and sought permission to advise his name but he did not do so. The respondent/writ petitioner wrote a letter dated 28.11.2002 and sought permission for defence representative and also sought for reopening of the departmental enquiry. After giving ample opportunity to the respondent/writ petitioner, the disciplinary authority passed order dated 17.11.2003 by imposing penalty of dismissal from service. 18. As per the documentary evidence, the respondent/writ petitioner had withdrawn money from one Shri Udham Singh’s Account. The account holder, Shri Udham Singh, wrote letter dated 20.08.1997 to the Bank authorities wherein he denied having withdrawn money from his account. He clearly stated in the said letter that neither does the withdrawal form bear his signatures nor was withdrawn money on the concerned dates. The charge relating to withdrawals of money by the respondent/writ petitioner from the account of Shri V.K. Jaiswal was also duly proved during the enquiry proceedings. The signatures borne on the withdrawal forms do not tally with the signature on the account opening form. Hence, it is evident that the said account holders did not withdraw money from their account. 19. The signatures borne on the withdrawal forms do not tally with the signature on the account opening form. Hence, it is evident that the said account holders did not withdraw money from their account. 19. It would be pertinent to sum up the reasons why the Presenting Officer (Shri V.K. Srivastava) in his brief concluded that the withdrawals by respondent/writ petitioner from accounts of the two account holders stood proved. The reasons are as follows:- “(i) Perusal of Cash Payment Register of relevant dates shows name of the respondent/writ petitioner as being the person who received payments from the said account holders; (ii) Deposition during the course of enquiry by the payment cashiers who worked at Cash Counter during the relevant time, namely Ram Adhar Tiwari and Shyam Murari Verma who examined themselves as PW1 and PW2 respectively. (iii) The fact that the respondent/writ petitioner did not cross examine the payment cashiers PW1 and PW 2. (iv) The account holders Shri Vinod Kumar Jaiswal vide letters dated 14.06.2000 and 24.11.2000 and Shri Udham Singh vide letter dated 26.08.2007, denied having received payments or withdrawn money form their accounts on the alleged dates. (v) Amount had been debited to the account stood confirmed from Relative Day Book, Day Book Summary and Saving Bank Account, General Ledger Head. (vi) Petitioner produced letter dated 03.06.2000 which has no relation with charge leveled against him. 20. On 23.04.2003, the enquiry officer submitted enquiry report partly proving the sole charge except the allegation that the respondent/writ petitioner has posted 14 withdrawals. Vide order dated 20.05.2003, Deputy General Manager (Disciplinary Authority) disagreed with the enquiry report dated 23.04.2003 and fully proved the sole charge. Deputy General Manager (Disciplinary Authority) sent a letter dated 20.05.2003 to the respondent/writ petitioner alongwith enquiry report dated 23.04.2003 and disagreement note dated 20.05.2003 for representation. The respondent/writ petitioner submitted reply dated 06.06.2003 and requested for reopening the enquiry as was earlier requested through letter dated 28.11.2002. Vide order dated 17.11.2003 passed by General Manager (Appointing Authority), the respondent/writ petitioner was dismissed from service as the charges levelled against the respondent/writ petitioner was duly proved. 21. A departmental appeal was filed against order dated 17.11.2003 passed by the appellate authority i.e. General Manager on 06.01.2004. The said appeal was also rejected by the appellate authority on 05.04.2004. 22. 21. A departmental appeal was filed against order dated 17.11.2003 passed by the appellate authority i.e. General Manager on 06.01.2004. The said appeal was also rejected by the appellate authority on 05.04.2004. 22. In view of the facts as discussed above, it is evident that the respondent/writ petitioner did not participate in the departmental enquiry and he also did not submit his reply/written submission to the enquiring officer. There is no violation of principle of natural justice in this case. The records of the disciplinary proceedings show that the respondent had avoided filing of the written explanation for the charges of misconduct levelled against him and also had for no valid reason refused to co-operate in the disciplinary proceedings. A bank employee who had refused to avail of the opportunities provided to him in a disciplinary proceeding of defending himself against the charges of misconduct involving his integrity and dishonesty, cannot be permitted to complain later that he had been denied a reasonable opportunity of defending himself of the charges levelled against him and the disciplinary proceeding conducted against him had resulted in violation of principles of natural justice. Criminal Proceedings:- 23. We have indicated in the above-mentioned paragraphs that a criminal case was also registered against the respondent/writ petitioner being Crime No.23 of 2002, under Sections 419, 420, 467 & 468 IPC at Police Station Pulpur, District Azamgarh by one Shri Manoj Kumar Das, the then Manager, State Bank of India, Branch Pulpur, District Azamgarh against unknown persons with respect to same 14 withdrawal forms amounting to Rs.54,100/-. 24. After completion of investigation, the investigating agency filed a charge-sheet before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Azamgarh. After filing the charge-sheet the case was registered as Criminal Case No.3995 of 2006 (State of U.P. vs. S.B. Singh). The respondent/writ petitioner was convicted for offence punishable under Section 419, 420, 467 & 468 IPC vide order dated 07.06.2008 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Azamgarh. 25. Against order dated 07.06.2008 (supra), the respondent/writ petitioner filed a criminal appeal bearing no.27 of 2008 before Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.1, Azamgarh. Vide order dated 24.05.2010, the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.1, Azamgarh acquitted the respondent/writ petitioner from all the charges levelled against him on the ground that the prosecution has failed to prove his case beyond reasonable doubt. Against order dated 07.06.2008 (supra), the respondent/writ petitioner filed a criminal appeal bearing no.27 of 2008 before Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.1, Azamgarh. Vide order dated 24.05.2010, the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.1, Azamgarh acquitted the respondent/writ petitioner from all the charges levelled against him on the ground that the prosecution has failed to prove his case beyond reasonable doubt. Benefit of doubt was given to the respondent/writ petitioner by the Additional Sessions Judge while acquitting him. Therefore, it is crystal clear that he was convicted by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Azamgarh vide order dated 07.06.2008 (supra), however, was acquitted subsequently by giving benefit of doubt vide order dated 24.05.2020 (supra). In such circumstances, acquittal of the respondent/writ petitioner cannot be said as ‘honourable acquittal’. 26. We may indicate that before order of acquittal dated 24.05.2010 (supra), the departmental enquiry was concluded and the respondent/ writ petitioner was dismissed from service on 17.11.2003. Now the question is when the departmental enquiry has been concluded resulting in dismissal of the delinquent from service, whether the subsequent finding recorded by the criminal court acquitting the respondent/delinquent will have any effect on the departmental proceedings? Honourably acquittal:- 27. The meaning of the expression “honourable acquittal” came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal - (1994) 1 SCC 541 . In that case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions “honourable acquittal”, “acquitted of blame”, “fully exonerated” are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression “honourably acquitted”. When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted. 28. In R.P. Kapur v. Union of India - AIR 1964 SC 787 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that even in the case of acquittal, departmental proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other than honourable. 28. In R.P. Kapur v. Union of India - AIR 1964 SC 787 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that even in the case of acquittal, departmental proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other than honourable. In State of Assam v. Raghava Rajgopalachari -1972 SLR 44 (SC), the Hon’ble Supreme Court quoted with approval the views expressed by Lord Williams, J. in Robert Stuart Wauchope v. Emperor [ILR (1934) 61 Cal 168] which is as follows: (Raghava case [1972 SLR 44 (SC)] , SLR p. 47, para 8) “8. … ‘The expression “honourably acquitted” is one which is unknown to courts of justice. Apparently it is a form of order used in courts martial and other extrajudicial tribunals. We said in our judgment that we accepted the explanation given by the appellant, believed it to be true and considered that it ought to have been accepted by the government authorities and by the Magistrate. Further, we decided that the appellant had not misappropriated the monies referred to in the charge. It is thus clear that the effect of our judgment was that the appellant was acquitted as fully and completely as it was possible for him to be acquitted. Presumably, this is equivalent to what government authorities term “honourably acquitted”.’” (Robert Stuart case [ILR (1934) 61 Cal 168], ILR pp. 188-89) Effect of judgment of acquittal:- 29. Contention of the respondent/writ petitioner is that since the criminal proceedings and departmental proceedings were on the same set of facts and when the respondent/writ petitioner was acquitted in criminal proceedings honourably, then he should be reinstated in service. 30. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Southern Railway Officers Assn. v. Union of India – (2009) 9 SCC 24 has held that acquittal in a criminal case by itself cannot be a ground for interfering with an order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. The Court reiterated that the order of dismissal can be passed even if the delinquent officer had been acquitted of the criminal charge. 31. v. Union of India – (2009) 9 SCC 24 has held that acquittal in a criminal case by itself cannot be a ground for interfering with an order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. The Court reiterated that the order of dismissal can be passed even if the delinquent officer had been acquitted of the criminal charge. 31. In State Bank of Hyderabad v. P. Kata Rao - (2008) 15 SCC 657 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the jurisdiction of the superior Courts in interfering with the finding of fact arrived at by the enquiring officer is limited and that the High Court would also ordinarily not interfere with the quantum of punishment and there cannot be any doubt or dispute that only because the delinquent employee who was also facing a criminal charge stands acquitted, the same, by itself, would not debar the disciplinary authority in initiating a fresh departmental proceeding and/or where the departmental proceedings had already been initiated, to continue therewith. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further held as follows in Para – 20: “20. The legal principle enunciated to the effect that on the same set of facts the delinquent shall not be proceeded in a departmental proceedings and in a criminal case simultaneously, has, however, been deviated from. The dicta of this Court in M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. - (1999) 3 SCC 679 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 810 however, remains unshaken although the applicability thereof had been found to be dependent on the fact situation obtaining in each case.” 32. In the case of Karnataka SRTC v. M.G. Vittal Rao – (2012) 1 SCC 442 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court after a detailed survey of various judgments on the issue with regard to the effect of criminal proceedings on the departmental enquiry, held that the disciplinary authority imposing the punishment of dismissal from service cannot be held to be disproportionate or non-commensurate to the delinquency. 33. The scope of departmental inquiry and criminal cases have been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in number of cases. The said issue is no longer res integra. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India - (1995) 6 SCC 749 , the Supreme Court has held as under: “12. 33. The scope of departmental inquiry and criminal cases have been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in number of cases. The said issue is no longer res integra. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India - (1995) 6 SCC 749 , the Supreme Court has held as under: “12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the Court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/ Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence criminal appeal. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.” 34. In Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayan - (1999) 5 SCC 762 , it is held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as under: “11. Strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry proceedings. In Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayan - (1999) 5 SCC 762 , it is held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as under: “11. Strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry proceedings. The only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent officer must be established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravamen of the charge against the delinquent officer. Mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in departmental enquiry proceedings. The Court exercising the jurisdiction of judicial review would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings excepting in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at that finding. The Court cannot embark upon reappreciating the evidence or weighing the same like an appellate authority. So long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel, the Constitution Bench has held: The High Court can and must enquire whether there is am evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true does the conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved asainst the respondent? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence legally the impugned conclusion follows or not.” 35. In Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur - (1972) 4 SCC 618 , the Supreme Court has held as under: “15. A finding cannot be characterized as perverse or unsupported by any relevant materials if it is a reasonable inference from proved facts. Now what are the proved facts : Nand Kumar as representative of Ram Sarup Mam Chand and Mam Chand and Company of Calcutta filed five applications for licences to set-up steel re-rolling mills on 14th June, 1956. A finding cannot be characterized as perverse or unsupported by any relevant materials if it is a reasonable inference from proved facts. Now what are the proved facts : Nand Kumar as representative of Ram Sarup Mam Chand and Mam Chand and Company of Calcutta filed five applications for licences to set-up steel re-rolling mills on 14th June, 1956. On 25th June, 1956, a cheque drawn in favour of P.S. Sundaram was given to the respondent by Nand Kumar for Rs 2500; the cheque was endorsed and the amount credited in the account of the respondent. When the respondent borrowed the amount in question from Nand Kumar, he was not working in the Industries Act section. Nand Kumar knew that the respondent was working in the Steel & Cement section of the Ministry and the applications for the grant of licences for setting up the steel plant re-rolling mills would go to that section. Even if the applications were to be dealt with at the initial stage by the Industries Act section the respondent at least was expected to know that in due course the section in which he was working had to deal with the same. This is borne out by the fact that in July, 1956 copies of the applications were actually sent to the Steel & Cement section where the respondent was working. If he, therefore, borrowed money from Nand Kumar a few days earlier it seems rather clear that he placed himself under pecuniary obligation to a person who was likely to have official dealings with him. The words likely to have official dealings take within their ambit the possibility of future dealings between the officer concerned and the person from whom he borrowed money. A disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial. The standard proof required is that of preponderance of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the inference that Nand Kumar was a person likely to have official dealings with the respondent was one which a reasonable person would draw from the proved facts of the case, the High Court cannot sit as a Court of appeal over a decision based on it. If the inference that Nand Kumar was a person likely to have official dealings with the respondent was one which a reasonable person would draw from the proved facts of the case, the High Court cannot sit as a Court of appeal over a decision based on it. Where there are some relevant materials which the authority has accepted and which materials may reasonably support the conclusion that the officer is guilty, it is not the function of the High Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 to review the materials and to arrive at an independent finding on the materials. If the enquiry has been properly held the question of adequacy or reliability of the evidence cannot be canvaased before the High Court (See: State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 ) No doubt there was no separate finding on the question whether Nand Kumar was a person likely to have official dealings with the respondent by the Inquiring Officer or the President. But we think that such a finding was implied when they said that Charge No. 3 has been proved. The only question was whether the proved facts of the case would warrant such an inference. Tested in the light of the standard of proof necessary to enter a finding of this nature, we are satisfied that on the material facts proved the inference and the implied finding that Nand Kumar was a person likely to have official dealings with the respondent were reasonable.” 36. In Deport Manager, A.P. SRTC v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya - (1997) 2 SCC 699 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has expressed its view as under: “8. We are in respectful agreement with the above view. The purpose of departmental enquiry and of prosecution are two different and distinct aspects. The criminal prosecution is launched for an offence for violation of a duty, the offender owes to the society or for breach of which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public. So crime is an act of commission in violation of law or of omission of public duty. The departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of public service. It would, therefore, be expedient that the disciplinary proceedings are conducted and completed as expeditiously as possible. So crime is an act of commission in violation of law or of omission of public duty. The departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of public service. It would, therefore, be expedient that the disciplinary proceedings are conducted and completed as expeditiously as possible. It is not, therefore, desirable to lay down any guidelines as inflexible rules in which the departmental proceedings may or may not be stayed pending trial in criminal case against the delinquent officer. Each case requires to be considered in the backdrop of its own facts and circumstances. There would be no bar to proceed simultaneously with departmental enquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the charge in the criminal trial is of grave nature involving complicated questions of fact and law. Offence generally implies infringement of public (sic duty), as distinguished from mere private rights punishable under criminal law. When trial for criminal offence is conducted it should be in accordance with proof of the offence as per the evidence defined under the provisions of the Evidence Act. Converse is the case of departmental enquiry. The enquiry in a departmental proceedings relates to conduct or breach of duty of the delinquent officer to punish him for his misconduct defined under the relevant statutory rules or law. That the strict standard of proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands excluded is a settled legal position. The enquiry in the departmental proceedings relates to the conduct of the delinquent officer and proof in that behalf is not as high as in an offence in criminal charge. It is seen that invariably the departmental enquiry has to be conducted expeditiously so as to effectuate efficiency in public administration and the criminal trial will take its own course. The nature of evidence in criminal trial is entirely different from the departmental proceedings. In the former, prosecution is to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt on the touchstone of human conduct. The standard of proof in the departmental proceedings is not the same as of the criminal trial. The evidence also is different from the standard point of the Evidence Act. The evidence required in the departmental enquiry is not regulated by the Evidence Act.” 37. In the case of Suresh Pathrella v. Oriental Bank of Commerce - (2006) 10 SCC 572 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “11. The evidence also is different from the standard point of the Evidence Act. The evidence required in the departmental enquiry is not regulated by the Evidence Act.” 37. In the case of Suresh Pathrella v. Oriental Bank of Commerce - (2006) 10 SCC 572 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “11. In our view, the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge are fallacious. This Court has taken the view consistently that acquittal in a criminal case would be no bar for drawing up a disciplinary proceeding against the delinquent officer. It is well-settled principle of law that the yardstick and standard of proof in a criminal case is different from the disciplinary proceeding. While the standard of proof in a criminal case is a proof beyond all reasonable doubt, the proof in a departmental proceeding is preponderance of probabilities.” 38. In Samar Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P. - (2011) 9 SCC 94 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court categorically held: “7. Acquittal in the criminal case shall have no bearing or relevance to the facts of the departmental proceedings as the standard of proof in both the cases are totally different. In a criminal case, the prosecution has to prove the criminal case beyond all reasonable doubt whereas in a departmental proceedings, the department has to prove only preponderance of probabilities. In the present case, we find that the department has been able to prove the case on the standard of preponderance of probabilities. Therefore, the submissions of the counsel appearing for the appellant are found to be without any merit”. 39. In SBI v. Narendra Kumar Pandey -2013 MPLJ Online (S.C.) 24 : (2013) 2 SCC 740 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “23. The inquiring authority has examined each and every charge levelled against the charged officer and the documents produced by the presenting officer and came to the conclusion that most of the charges were proved. In a departmental enquiry, the disciplinary authority is expected to prove the charges on preponderance of probability and not on proof beyond reasonable doubt. Reference may be made to the judgments of this Court in Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur and R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab. The documents produced by the Bank, which were not controverted by the charged officer, support all the allegations and charges levelled against the charged officer. Reference may be made to the judgments of this Court in Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur and R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab. The documents produced by the Bank, which were not controverted by the charged officer, support all the allegations and charges levelled against the charged officer. In a case, where the charged officer had failed to inspect the documents in respect of the allegations raised by the Bank and not controverted, it is always open to the inquiring authority to accept the same”. 40. We are of the view that the mere acquittal of an employee by a criminal Court has no impact on the disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Department. The respondent/writ petitioner, it may be noted, is an employee of a Bank and he was convicted by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Azamgarh in Criminal Case No.3995 of 2006 (supra). However, subsequently he was acquitted by the appellate Court by giving benefit of doubt. That being the factual situation, we are of the view that the respondent/writ petitioner was not honourably acquitted by the criminal Court in the criminal appeal but only by giving benefit of doubt. 41. As we have already indicated, in the absence of any provision in the service rules for reinstatement, if an employee is not honourably acquitted by a criminal court, no right is conferred on the employee to claim any benefit including reinstatement. Reason is that the standard of proof required for holding a person guilty by a criminal Court and the enquiry conducted by way of disciplinary proceedings is entirely different. In a criminal case, the onus of establishing the guilt of the accused is on the prosecution and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is assumed to be innocent. It is settled law that the strict burden of proof required to establish guilt in a criminal Court is not required in a disciplinary proceedings and preponderance of probabilities is sufficient. There may be cases where a person is acquitted for technical reasons or the prosecution giving up other witnesses since few of the other witnesses turned hostile, etc. In the case on hand, the prosecution did not take steps to examine many of the crucial witnesses. The Court, therefore, acquitted the accused giving the benefit of doubt. There may be cases where a person is acquitted for technical reasons or the prosecution giving up other witnesses since few of the other witnesses turned hostile, etc. In the case on hand, the prosecution did not take steps to examine many of the crucial witnesses. The Court, therefore, acquitted the accused giving the benefit of doubt. We are not prepared to say after considering the entirety of the matter and the facts involved in the instant case that the respondent/writ petitioner was honourably acquitted by the criminal Court in Criminal Appeal No.27 of 2008 (supra). 42. It is also noticed by this Court that the respondent/writ petitioner was convicted by the trial Court but acquitted by the appellate Court by giving benefit of doubt. Without taking into notice the fact that on the initial occasion in the trial, the respondent/writ petitioner was convicted, learned Single Judge reached at the conclusion that the respondent/writ petitioner was honourably acquitted. 43. A Bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with money of the depositors and the customers. Every officer/employee of the Bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the Bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a Bank officer. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the Bank. The very discipline of an organization more particularly a Bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. In the instant case, the charges against the respondent/writ petitioner are not casual in nature and are serious. These aspects do not appear to have been kept in view by the learned Single Judge. 44. For the afore-mentioned reasons, the impugned judgment dated 06.12.2018 passed by learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.2844 (SS) of 2004 (S.B. Singh vs. State Bank of India) cannot be sustained and the same is hereby set aside. Accordingly, the instant special appeal is allowed. No order as to costs. The judgment and order has been pronounced under Chapter VII Rule 1(2) of Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952.