JUDGMENT : ASHUTOSH J. SHASTRI, J. 1. Both these petitions are filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India essentially for challenging the impugned order dated 05.11.2020 passed by respondent No.3 - Agriculture Produce Markets Committee, Tarapur. Since the background of facts and the questions involved are almost similar, learned advocates appearing for the respective parties have requested the Court to take up both these matters together along with the Civil Application filed for vacating the adinterim relief granted exparte. 2. The first petition i.e. Special Civil Application No.15021 of 2020 is filed for the purpose of seeking following reliefs : “A. The Hon'ble Court may be pleased to admit and allow the present petition. B. This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue appropriate writ order or direction in the nature of writ of prohibition or writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ order or direction and be pleased to quash and set aside the impugned order dated 05.11.2020 passed by the respondent No.3 at Annexure - K to the present petition. C. This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue appropriate writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ order or direction and be pleased to, declare that initiation of proceedings by the respondent no.3 under rule 59 is bad at law and in without jurisdiction. This court may further be pleased to quash and set aside the proceedings initiated by the respondent vide show cause notice at Annexure - D, E, F and Annexure-H. D. This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to stay the impugned order dated 05.11.2020 passed by the respondent no.3 at AnnexureK to the present petition, pending hearing till final disposal of the petition. E. This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to grant adinterim relief in terms of clause (D) mentioned hereinabove.” F. This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to grant such other and further relief as the nature and circumstances of the present case may require in the interest of justice.” 2.1 Whereas, Special Civil Application No. 15024 of 2020 is also filed almost for the same relief and as such, relief clause of this petition is also quoted hereunder : “A. The Hon'ble Court may be pleased to admit and allow the present petition. B. This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue appropriate writ order or direction in the nature of writ of prohibition or writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ order or direction and be pleased to quash and set aside the impugned order dated 05.11.2020 passed by the respondent No.3 at Annexure - J to the present petition. C. This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue appropriate writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ order or direction and be pleased to, declare that initiation of proceedings by the respondent no.3 under rule 59 is bad at law and in without jurisdiction. This court may further be pleased to quash and set aside the proceedings initiated by the respondent vide show cause notice at Annexure - D and Annexure-G. D. This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to stay the impugned order dated 05.11.2020 passed by the respondent no.3 at Annexure-J to the present petition, pending hearing till final disposal of the petition. E. This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to grant adinterim relief in terms of clause (D) mentioned hereinabove.” F. This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to grant such other and further relief as the nature and circumstances of the present case may require in the interest of justice.” 3. Since the background of facts as stated above is almost identical, this Court has treated Special Civil Application No. 15021 of 2020 as a lead matter since substantial submissions have been made in this petition. 4. It is the case of the lead petition that the petitioner - Rajeshbhai Ghanshyambhai Thakkar is an elected member of respondent No.3 - Agriculture Produce Market Committee, Tarapur, holding general licence issued by it. According to the petitioner, he is holding the licence and abiding the terms & conditions since many years and there is no single default committed by the petitioner and no action is also initiated. However, when the petitioner made an application for renewal of licence and paid the requisite fee on 13.03.2019. It is the case of the petitioner that father of the petitioner came to know about various illegalities committed with respect to malfunctioning and misappropriation of money related to the amount of cess to be paid to the market committee. The father of the petitioner filed a complaint against the persons incharge of the market committee. It is the case of the petitioner that father of the petitioner came to know about various illegalities committed with respect to malfunctioning and misappropriation of money related to the amount of cess to be paid to the market committee. The father of the petitioner filed a complaint against the persons incharge of the market committee. The elections of market committee were held in the year 2017 and as such, the first term of the Chairman and Vice Chairman was to be over and first election of the second term was to take place. On 04.09.2020, a meeting of the election of Chairman was held in which the petitioner exercised his right of vote in favour of a candidate of his choice and by keeping political vendetta in mind, the Chairman abusing his post, initiated malicious prosecution against the petitioner by issuing show-cause notice dated 28.09.2020 in exercise of power under Section 59 of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963 [For short, hereinafter referred to as “the Act”] and demanded various particulars from the petitioner. 5. According to the petitioner, time was sought, but the respondent did not pay any attention to the request of the petitioner and sent another notice on 13.10.2020 in which the petitioner was directed to supply the particulars within three days, failing which, his licence will be cancelled. The third notice came to be issued on 19.10.2020. The fourth notice was also issued on 27.10.2020 and some how, according to the petitioner, though certain documents were produced, no attention was paid to and then, the petitioner received an email, in addition to which, one post came to be received on 07.11.2020 and while opening the said post, it was learned by the petitioner that an order came to be passed on 05.11.2020 for cancellation of his licence and this, according to the petitioner, is absolutely impermissible, beyond jurisdiction and as such, by raising multiple contentions, has approached the Court by way of present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 5.1 It has been stated that one petition was moved during Diwali vacation, but the same could not be circulated. Hence, the present petition is filed. 5.1 It has been stated that one petition was moved during Diwali vacation, but the same could not be circulated. Hence, the present petition is filed. These are the broad few facts, on the basis of which, on 13.11.2020, the coordinate bench was persuaded to issue notice and by way of adinterim relief, execution, implementation and operation of impugned order dated 05.11.2020 came to be stayed. 5.2 Now, on receipt of writ of this Court, it appears that original respondent No.3 - Market Committee has moved an application under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India for vacating the said exparte adinterim relief and the said application was also placed for hearing before the Court. Since the original petitioner having realized that this application for vacating the stay is under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India, he has shown his readiness and willingness to proceed further with the matter to avoid consequences and with this background of facts, both the matters are taken up for hearing upon request of learned advocates. Since the second petition i.e. Special Civil Application No. 15024 of 2020 is having almost similar background, no detailed facts are narrated, but the grievance voiced out is the same. 6. Learned advocate Mr. Chintan Champaneri appearing on behalf of the petitioner has vehemently contended that the order in question is without the authority of law and as such, the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is entertainable. It has been submitted that in view of construction of Rule 59 of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Rules, 1965 [For short, hereinafter referred to as “the Rules”], only two things can be demanded namely the account books and the ledger and beyond that, no further demands are possible to be raised by the authority and that too, only if there is suspicion about the petitioner with respect to his business transactions in response to the licence. It has been submitted that a bare perusal of the show-cause notice is not indicating such thing that any of the transaction is found by the authority as suspicious and therefore, from the stage of issuance of show-cause notice itself till the order is passed, the authority has acted beyond jurisdiction. 6.1 Learned advocate Mr. It has been submitted that a bare perusal of the show-cause notice is not indicating such thing that any of the transaction is found by the authority as suspicious and therefore, from the stage of issuance of show-cause notice itself till the order is passed, the authority has acted beyond jurisdiction. 6.1 Learned advocate Mr. Champaneri referred to pari materia provision Section 33 of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, in which, it has been culled out in a decision reported in 1997 2 GLR 2056 that only those particulars can be sought for inspection and beyond that, no details should be demanded and as such, as submitted, the order in question based upon such exercise by the authority is impermissible in law. By referring to notices which have been issued, a contention is raised that only fourth notice dated 27.10.2020 basically relates to cancellation of licence and against that notice, once particulars have been supplied, may be in part, then, in no circumstance, sub section (3) of Section 59 can be resorted to, since sub section (1) and sub section (2) of Section 59 have been complied with. It has further been contended that this issuance of action against the petitioner is nothing, but politically motivated since the petitioner has given a vote in favour of a candidate of his choice for electing the Chairman. By referring to some of the documents at pages 27, 40 and 41, a contention is raised that though the reply is sought to be presented by the petitioner, it is the Chairman who instructed not to accept the same and then, as reflected, his action as if the petitioner is not complying and as such, this is nothing but a mala fide exercised power, based upon which, the order deserves to be quashed. 6.2 Learned advocate Mr. Champaneri has submitted that Special Civil Application No. 14545 of 2020 came to be affirmed on 29.10.2020, presented on 02.11.2020 and since there was Friday, Saturday and Sunday, in between till 06.11.2020, the matter could not be taken up and after filing of such petition, the Chairman of respondent No.3 was requested not to take any action since the matter is filed in the High Court and sub judice, but some how, a day previous i.e. on 05.11.2020, the order came to be passed. By referring to some of the pages, it has been contended that thus, the order in question is passed in back date since covering letter is showing endorsement of date as 07.11.2020. Even in the agenda of the meeting which has been circulated on 27.10.2020, cancellation of licence of the petitioner was never the subject matter of debate in the meeting dated 04.11.2020 and as such, this is nothing but concoction on part of respondent No.3 to some how cancel the licence of the petitioner. 6.3 Mr. Champaneri, learned advocate has further contended that page 42/A is the notice which can be said to be the first notice for cancellation of licence and only three days were given to meet with the same and as such, this is nothing but violation of principle of fair play in action. Even the opinion of Inspector which has been sought is also in the similar way concoction and entire exercise undertaken is without the authority of law and violative of principles of natural justice and that being so, the petition can be entertained by this Court. 6.4 Mr. Champaneri has contended that since the action is politically motivated, the alternative remedy may not be effective for the petitioner and as such, the petition can be accepted and for such contention, one order passed by this Court in Special Civil Application No. 18888 of 2017 dated 19.10.2017 is relied upon and has requested to grant the relief as prayed for in the petition. 7. As against this, learned advocate Mr. Jignesh Kapadia appearing for original respondent No.3 and applicant in Civil Application has vehemently contended that the petition itself is not entertainable in view of the fact that there is a specific statutory remedy prescribed under the Act where all issues can be examined by appropriate authority and as such, in view of this, the petition may not be entertained. Learned advocate has seriously agitated that a clear attempt of misleading the Court from the initial stage itself is made by the petitioner and as such, no equitable jurisdiction be exercised on account of this conduct. For contending this, page 42 is referred to by learned advocate Mr. Kapadia that a document xerox from the original is notice dated 27.10.2020 in which there is no reference to three days. For contending this, page 42 is referred to by learned advocate Mr. Kapadia that a document xerox from the original is notice dated 27.10.2020 in which there is no reference to three days. It was a clear indication that neither the market committee is paid nor any representation is made and therefore, it was indicated that the steps be taken under Section 59(1) (3) of the Act for cancellation of licence. Now, after referring to this, learned advocate has drawn the attention of this Court to a typed version of this communication and precisely, referred to last paragraph at page 42/B, in which, there is a line incorporated that within three days, written explanation be given and then, a contention is raised that no adequate time is given. Thus, according to Mr. Kapadia, this is a serious attempt to mislead the Court and as such, by referring to page 42, a xerox copy from origin and page 42/A/B a typed version, a justification is made about his submission of misleading the Court. Mr. Kapadia, learned advocate has further contended that it is absolutely incorrect to state on part of Mr. Champaneri that cancellation of licence is the only notice dated 27.10.2020. This is also misleading in view of the fact that in previous notices, a reference specifically is made that the authority will be constrained to take step for cancellation of licence and for that purpose, notices have been referred to dated 13.10.2020 at page 26 of the petition compilation, wherein specific reference is made and yet another notice dated 19.10.2020 reflecting at page 28 and in that also second paragraph, there was a reference about contemplation of cancellation of licence and as such, it is illfounded in the mouth of learned advocate to state that no reasonable opportunity is given and first notice for cancellation is only notice dated 27.10.2020. According to Mr. Kapadia, that is merely an intimation notice where foundation for notice as reflected is from of previous notices in which the petitioner has chosen not to reply. Hence, by submitting this, Mr. Kapadia has contended that this is nothing but a clear attempt on part of the petitioner to mislead the court and this could be the only ground, on which, no equity deserves to be shown. 7.1 Learned advocate Mr. Hence, by submitting this, Mr. Kapadia has contended that this is nothing but a clear attempt on part of the petitioner to mislead the court and this could be the only ground, on which, no equity deserves to be shown. 7.1 Learned advocate Mr. Kapadia has further submitted that against a reference which has been made of pari materia provisions of the Cooperative Societies Act i. e. Section 33, a bare reading of same is ex facie not applicable and cannot be said to be pari materia in view of the fact that the said provision is an enabling provision for inspection of particulars and in any case, Rule 59 deals with fees and levy which is not paid by the petitioner and therefore, action was initiated. Apart from that, learned advocate has further contended that a literal meaning which is to be culled out from Rule 59 is that the account books and ledgers etc. can be called and even other incidental material also can be called for so as to arrive at a justification for taking action since the word ‘etc.’ is reflecting in the provision. In addition thereto, learned advocate has further contended that the conditions of licence which are reflected at page 82, in which, a reference can be made to clause (vii) and (ix) also which clearly indicate that all incidental and relevant materials can be called by the authority for taking action against the petitioner and therefore, it is not absolutely correct on part of learned advocate that only two items can be called for under Rule 59. 7.2 Learned advocate Mr. Kapadia has further submitted that it is a consistent practice that whenever the statutory mechanism is provided to ventilate the grievance, such statutory remedy must be availed of and respected to by a person concerned. Learned advocate has also referred to a decision of this Court dated 23.04.2018 in Special Civil Application No. 6434 of 2018, in which on the ground of alternative remedy, this Court has not entertained the petition and as such, has requested that this is not a petition deserves to be entertained. Otherwise, by just making lame averments, such statutory mechanism provided by the statute will be bypassed and hence, has requested not to entertain the petition. 7.3 Apart from that, learned advocate Mr. Otherwise, by just making lame averments, such statutory mechanism provided by the statute will be bypassed and hence, has requested not to entertain the petition. 7.3 Apart from that, learned advocate Mr. Kapadia has also raised serious issues about merits, but has submitted that since the petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of statutory remedy being available, such expression on merit does not deserve to be expressed at this stage and therefore, by referring to the opinion of Inspector at page 93, by referring to condition of licence at page 82 and by referring to several communications by which the petitioner was called for to provide the details and further has by referring to the resolution, a specific request is made to relegate the petitioner to a statutory forum. 7.4 At this stage, learned advocate Mr. Kapadia has further submitted that it is absolutely incorrect on part of the petitioner to contend that there is a discriminatory treatment meted out, he has referred to several documents and pointed out that it is not only against the petitioner such action is taken, but there are several other licence holders who have been called for and as such, issue relating to discrimination is not helpful to the petitioner and by reiterating the contention about alternative remedy, learned advocate has submitted that since the authority has competence to pass the order, it cannot be said to be without the authority of law or lack of jurisdiction. Hence, by referring to few decisions, one passed by this court, a request is made to dismiss the petition. 8. Having heard learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and having gone through the material on record, the first central issue raised about maintainability of the petition in view of statutory remedy being available, the Court has to examine it and for that purpose, a reference deserves to be made to the relevant rule under which the action is sought to be initiated which has given rise to filing of this petition. 8.1 Section 27 of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963 deals with the licence, their issue, renewal, suspension or cancellation etc. and the appeal against refusal, suspension etc. of licence. 8.1 Section 27 of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963 deals with the licence, their issue, renewal, suspension or cancellation etc. and the appeal against refusal, suspension etc. of licence. Relevant sub section (3) deserves to be quoted as under : “(3) A market committee may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, suspend or cancel a licence, (i) if the licence has been obtained through willful misrepresentation or fraud, or (ii) if the holder thereof or his servant or any person acting on his behalf with his express or implied permission, commits a breach of any of the terms, conditions, or restrictions imposed by the licence, or (iii) if the holder of the licence has been adjudged an insolvent and has not obtained his discharge, or (iv) if the holder of the licence is convicted of any offence under this Act: Provided that no licence shall be suspended or cancelled unless the holder thereof has been given a reasonable opportunity to show cause against such suspension or cancellation. “or” (v) if, the licensee has not carried out the sale and purchase of agricultural produce for which the license has been granted or renewal in conformity with the terms and conditions of the licence for the entire previous financial year. (vi) If, the market fee payable under Sec.28 of this Act remains unpaid” 8.2 Whereas sub section (5) is a specific remedy provided under the Act that any person aggrieved by such action either suspension or cancellation of licence may prefer an appeal within thirty days from the date of the communication of the order to him. Relevant sub section (5) is reproduced hereunder : “(5) Any person aggrieved by an order refusing to grant or renew a licence or suspending or cancelling any licence may, appeal within thirty days from the date of the communication of the order to him (i) to the Director, if such order has been made by a market Committee, and (ii) to the State Government, if such order has been made by the Director. (6) The Director or as the case may be, the State Government after giving the appellant a reasonable opportunity of being heard, shall on such appeal make such order as is deemed just and proper.” 8.3 So, from the aforesaid reading of statutory provisions of a specific statute, a remedy is clearly provided to prefer an appeal and it is the settled position of law that the appellate authority can examine all possible contentions permissible under the law including the issue relating to authority as well as jurisdiction and as such, when a statute has provided a specific remedy to ventilate the grievance against any action, this Court is of the opinion that the same is to be respected to and the High Court cannot ignore the same just to allow a litigant to bypass such specific remedy. While coming to this conclusion, the court is mindful of the view of the decisions delivered by the Apex Court (I) AIR 2013 SC 3518 (para 16) (II) 2015 6 SCC 773 and (III) 2016 2 SCC 653 and in addition, recent decision reported in 2018 1 SCC 626 . These are the decisions which are clearly indicating and propounding that when a specific statute has provided a statutory mechanism by way of an alternative remedy, the court should loath in exercising extraordinary jurisdiction and additionally, learned advocates are also aware about the decision of this Court in which a decision of the Apex Court has been taken note of and the petition came to be dismissed in the year 2018. The said decision is delivered in Special Civil Application No. 6434 of 2018 on 23.04.2018. Whereas, learned advocate for the petitioner who has relied upon one another decision in different background of facts on this issue is of no avail to him. Since the said order is dated 19.10.2017 in Special Civil Application No.18888 of 2017 and the petition is still pending and such interim orders are not always to be treated as precedent and hence, of no assistance to the petitioner. This facts situation are altogether different and hence, a conjoint reading of all these decisions would lead to a situation where time and again, the Apex Court has observed that only in exceptional cases, the court can exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if action taken apparently is impermissible. This facts situation are altogether different and hence, a conjoint reading of all these decisions would lead to a situation where time and again, the Apex Court has observed that only in exceptional cases, the court can exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if action taken apparently is impermissible. But here is a case in which the aforesaid background of fact including the conduct on part of the petitioner as referred to above, this Court is of the opinion that this is not a fit case for exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction. Out of the aforesaid decisions, most relevant decision reported in (2015) (6) SCC 773 in case of Union of India and ors. vs. Major General Shri Kant Sharma and anr. few paragraphs, this court would like to reproduce hereunder: “Basic principle for exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution: 27. "In Babubhai Muljibhai Patel vs. Nandlal Khodidas Barot and others, this Court held as follows: "10.....Exercise of the jurisdiction is no doubt discretionary, but the discretion must be exercised on sound judicial principles. When the petition raises complex questions of fact, which may for their determination require oral evidence to be taken, and on that account the High Court is of the view that the dispute should not appropriately be tried in a writ petition, the High Court may decline to try a petition (See Gunwant Kaur v.Bhatinda Municipality, AIR 1970 SC 802 ). If, however,on consideration of the nature of the controversy, the High Court decides, as in the present case, that it should go into a disputed question of fact and the discretion exercised by the High Court appears to be sound and in conformity with judicial principles, this Court would not interfere in appeal with the order made by the High Court in this respect." 28. In Mafatlal Industries Ltd. and others vs. Union of India and others, (1997) 5 SCC 536 , a nine Judge Bench of this Court while considering the Excise Act and Customs Act held that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and this Court under Article 32 though cannot be circumscribed by the provisions of the said enactments, they will certainly have due regard to the legislative intent evidenced by the provisions of the said Acts and would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the Act. This Court held: "108. This Court held: "108. The discussion in the judgment yields the following propositions. We may forewarn that these propositions are set out merely for the sake of convenient reference and are not supposed to be exhaustive. In case of any doubt or ambiguity in these propositions, reference must be had to the discussion and propositions in the body of the judgment. (i)...........While the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 and of this Court under Article 32 cannot be circumscribed by the provisions of the said enactments, they will certainly have due regard to the legislative intent evidenced by the [pic]provisions of the said Acts and would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the Act. The writ petition will be considered and disposed of in the light of and in accordance with the provisions of Section 11B. This is for the reason that the power under Article 226 has to be exercised to effectuate the rule of law and not for abrogating it. Xxx xxx xxx xxx 29. In Kanaiyalal Lalchand and Sachdev and others vs. State of Maharasthra and others, (2011) 2 SCC 782 , this Court considered the question of maintainability of the writ petition while an alternative remedy is available. This Court upheld the decision of the Bombay High Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellants therein on the ground of existence of an efficacious alternative remedy under Section 17 of SARFASI Act and held: "23. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court rightly dismissed the petition on the ground that an efficacious remedy was available to the appellants under Section 17 of the Act. It is well settled that ordinarily relief under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India is not available if an efficacious alternative remedy is available to any aggrieved person. (See Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and SBI v. Allied Chemical Laboratories.) 24. In City and Industrial Development Corpn. v. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala this Court had observed that: (SCC p. 175, para 30) "30. (See Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and SBI v. Allied Chemical Laboratories.) 24. In City and Industrial Development Corpn. v. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala this Court had observed that: (SCC p. 175, para 30) "30. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 is duty-bound to consider whether: (a) adjudication of the writ petition involves any complex and disputed questions of facts and whether they can be satisfactorily resolved; (b) the petition reveals all material facts; (c) the petitioner has any alternative or effective remedy for the resolution of the dispute; (d) the person invoking the jurisdiction is guilty of unexplained delay and laches; (e) ex facie barred by any laws of limitation; (f) grant of relief is against public policy or barred by any valid law; and host of other factors." 30. In Nivedita Sharma vs. Cellular Operators Association of India and others, (2011)14 SCC 337, this Court noticed that when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. The Court further noticed the previous decisions of this Court wherein the Court adverted to the rule of self-restraint that writ petition will not be entertained if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person as follows: 13. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa this Court observed: (SCC pp. 440-41, para 11) "11. ... It is now well recognised that where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of. This rule was stated with great clarity by Willes, J. in Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford in the following passage: (ER p. 495) '... There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established founded upon a statute. ... But there is a third class viz. where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it. ... The remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class. where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it. ... The remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class. The form given by the statute must be adopted and adhered to.' The rule laid down in this passage was approved by the House of Lords in Neville v. London Express Newspapers Ltd. and has been reaffirmed by the Privy Council in Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant and Co. Ltd. and Secy. of State v. Mask and Co. It has also been held to be equally applicable to enforcement of rights, and has been followed by this Court throughout. The High Court was therefore justified in dismissing the writ petitions in limine." 14. In Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J. (speaking for the majority of the larger Bench) observed: (SCC p. 607, para 77) "77. ... So far as the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 or for that matter, the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 is concerned, it is obvious that the provisions of the Act cannot bar and curtail these remedies. It is, however, equally obvious that while [pic]exercising the power under Article 226/Article 32, the Court would certainly take note of the legislative intent manifested in the provisions of the Act and would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the enactment." 15. In the judgments relied upon by Shri Vaidyanathan, which, by and large, reiterate the proposition laid down in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad, it has been held that an alternative remedy is not a bar to the entertaining of writ petition filed for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights or where there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice or where the order under challenge is wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of the statute is under challenge. 16. It can, thus, be said that this Court has recognised some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy. However, the proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal v. Supt. 16. It can, thus, be said that this Court has recognised some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy. However, the proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal v. Supt. of Taxes and other similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds the field." 31. In Southern Electricity Supply Company of Orissa Limited (SOUTHCO) and another vs. Sri Seetaram Rice Mill, (2012) 2 SCC 108 , a three Judge Bench held: "80. It is a settled canon of law that the High Court would not normally interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India where statutory alternative remedy is available. It is equally settled that this canon of law is not free of exceptions. The courts, including this Court, have taken the view that the statutory remedy, if provided under a specific [pic]law, would impliedly oust the jurisdiction of the civil courts. The High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can entertain writ or appropriate proceedings despite availability of an alternative remedy. This jurisdiction, the High Court would exercise with some circumspection in exceptional cases, particularly, where the cases involve a pure question of law or vires of an Act are challenged. This class of cases we are mentioning by way of illustration and should not be understood to be an exhaustive exposition of law which, in our opinion, is neither practical nor possible to state with precision. The availability of alternative statutory or other remedy by itself may not operate as an absolute bar for exercise of jurisdiction by the courts. It will normally depend upon the facts and circumstances of a given case. The further question that would inevitably come up for consideration before the Court even in such cases would be as to what extent the jurisdiction has to be exercised. 81. Should the courts determine on merits of the case or should they preferably answer the preliminary issue or jurisdictional issue arising in the facts of the case and remit the matter for consideration on merits by the competent authority? 81. Should the courts determine on merits of the case or should they preferably answer the preliminary issue or jurisdictional issue arising in the facts of the case and remit the matter for consideration on merits by the competent authority? Again, it is somewhat difficult to state with absolute clarity any principle governing such exercise of jurisdiction. It always will depend upon the facts of a given case. We are of the considered view that interest of administration of justice shall be better sub-served if the cases of the present kind are heard by the courts only where they involve primary questions of jurisdiction or the matters which go to the very root of jurisdiction and where the authorities have acted beyond the provisions of the Act. However, it should only be for the specialised tribunal or the appellate authorities to examine the merits of assessment or even the factual matrix of the case." 32. In Cicily Kallarackal vs. Vehicle Factory 2012(8) SCC 524 , the Division Bench of this Court held: "4. Despite this, we cannot help but state in absolute terms that it is not appropriate for the High Courts to entertain writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the orders passed by the Commission, as a statutory appeal is provided and lies to this Court under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Once the legislature has provided for a [pic]statutory appeal to a higher court, it cannot be proper exercise of jurisdiction to permit the parties to bypass the statutory appeal to such higher court and entertain petitions in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Even in the present case, the High Court has not exercised its jurisdiction in accordance with law. The case is one of improper exercise of jurisdiction. It is not expected of us to deal with this issue at any greater length as we are dismissing this petition on other grounds. XXX XXX XXX XXX 9. ........, we hereby make it clear that the orders of the Commission are incapable of being questioned under the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, as a statutory appeal in terms of Section 27A(1) (c) lies to this Court. XXX XXX XXX XXX 9. ........, we hereby make it clear that the orders of the Commission are incapable of being questioned under the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, as a statutory appeal in terms of Section 27A(1) (c) lies to this Court. Therefore, we have no hesitation in issuing a direction of caution that it will not be a proper exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts to entertain writ petitions against such orders of the Commission." 33. Another Division Bench of this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax and others vs. Chhabil Dass Agrawal, (2014)1 SCC 603 held: "11. Before discussing the fact proposition, we would notice the principle of law as laid down by this Court. It is settled law that non-entertainment of petitions under writ jurisdiction by the High Court when an efficacious alternative remedy is available is a rule of self-imposed limitation. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Undoubtedly, it is within the discretion of the High Court to grant relief under Article 226 despite the existence of an alternative remedy. However, the High Court must not interfere if there is an adequate efficacious alternative remedy available to the petitioner and he has approached the High Court without availing the same unless he has made out an exceptional case warranting such interference or there exist sufficient grounds to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. (See State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh, Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. and State of H.P. v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. 12. The Constitution Benches of this Court in K.S. Rashid and Son v. Income Tax Investigation Commission, Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Union of India v. T.R. Varma, State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh2 and K.S. Venkataraman and Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Madras have held that though Article 226 confers very wide powers in the matter of issuing writs on the High Court, the remedy of writ is absolutely discretionary in character. If the High Court is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate or suitable relief elsewhere, it can refuse to exercise its jurisdiction. (P) Ltd. v. State of Madras have held that though Article 226 confers very wide powers in the matter of issuing writs on the High Court, the remedy of writ is absolutely discretionary in character. If the High Court is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate or suitable relief elsewhere, it can refuse to exercise its jurisdiction. The Court, in extraordinary circumstances, may exercise the power if it comes to the conclusion that there has been a breach of the principles of natural justice or the procedure required for decision has not been adopted. [See N.T. Veluswami Thevar v. G. Raja Nainar, Municipal [pic]Council, Khurai v. Kamal Kumar, Siliguri Municipality v. Amalendu Das, S.T. Muthusami v. K. Natarajan, Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant, Kerala SEB v. Kurien E. Kalathil, A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan, L.L. Sudhakar Reddy v. State of A.P., Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj) Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha v. State of Maharashtra, Pratap Singh v. State of Haryana and GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v. ITO.] 13. In Nivedita Sharma v. Cellular Operators Assn. of India, this Court has held that where hierarchy of appeals is provided by the statute, the party must exhaust the statutory remedies before resorting to writ jurisdiction for relief and observed as follows: (SCC pp. 343-45, paras 12-14) "12. In Thansingh Nathmal v. Supt. of Taxes this Court adverted to the rule of selfimposed restraint that the writ petition will not be entertained if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and observed: (AIR p. 1423, para 7) '7. ... The High Court does not therefore act as a court of appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by the statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit by entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the machinery created under the statute to be bypassed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up.' 13. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa this Court observed: (SCC pp. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa this Court observed: (SCC pp. 44041, para 11) “11. ... It is now well recognised that where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of. This rule was stated with great clarity by Willes, J. in Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford in the following passage: (ER p. 495) xxx xxx xxx xxx 14. In Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J. (speaking for the majority of the larger Bench) observed: (SCC p. 607, para 77) '77. ... So far as the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226or for that matter, the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32is concerned, it is obvious that the provisions of the Act cannot bar and curtail these remedies. It is, however, equally obvious that while exercising the power under Article 226/Article 32, the Court would certainly take note of the legislative intent manifested in the provisions of the Act and would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the enactment.'" (See G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd., CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd., Ramendra Kishore Biswas v. State of Tripura, Shivgonda Anna Patil v. State of Maharashtra, C.A. Abraham v. ITO, Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath and Sons, Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, [pic]Tin Plate Co. of India Ltd. v. State of Bihar, Sheela Devi v. Jaspal Singh and Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan.) 15. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath and Sons, Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, [pic]Tin Plate Co. of India Ltd. v. State of Bihar, Sheela Devi v. Jaspal Singh and Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan.) 15. Thus, while it can be said that this Court has recognised some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy i.e. where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice, the proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal case, Titaghur Paper Mills case and other similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds the field. Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation." 34. In Union of India vs. Brigadier P.S. Gill, (2012) 4 SCC 463 , this Court while dealing with appeals under Section 30 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act following the procedure prescribed under Section 31 and its maintainability, held as follows: "8. Section 31 of the Act extracted above specifically provides for an appeal to the Supreme Court but stipulates two distinct routes for such an appeal. The first route to this Court is sanctioned by the Tribunal granting leave to file such an appeal. Section 31(1) in no uncertain terms forbids grant of leave to appeal to this Court unless the Tribunal certifies that a point of law of general public importance is involved in the decision. This implies that Section 31 does not create a vested, indefeasible or absolute right of filing an appeal to this Court against a final order or decision of the Tribunal to this Court. Such an appeal must be preceded by the leave of the Tribunal and such leave must in turn be preceded by a certificate by the Tribunal that a point of law of general public importance is involved in the appeal. Such an appeal must be preceded by the leave of the Tribunal and such leave must in turn be preceded by a certificate by the Tribunal that a point of law of general public importance is involved in the appeal. 9. The second and the only other route to access this Court is also found in Section 31(1) itself. The expression "or it appears to the Supreme Court [pic]that the point is one which ought to be considered by that Court" empowers this Court to permit the filing of an appeal against any such final decision or order of the Tribunal. 10. A conjoint reading of Sections 30 and 31 can lead to only one conclusion viz. there is no vested right of appeal against a final order or decision of the Tribunal to this Court other than those falling under Section 30(2) of the Act. The only mode to bring up the matter to this Court in appeal is either by way of certificate obtained from the Tribunal that decided the matter or by obtaining leave of this Court under Section 31 for filing an appeal depending upon whether this Court considers the point involved in the case to be one that ought to be considered by this Court. 11. An incidental question that arises is: Whether an application for permission to file an appeal under Section 31 can be moved directly before the Supreme Court without first approaching the Tribunal for a certificate in terms of the first part of Section 31(1) of the Act? 12. In the ordinary course the aggrieved party could perhaps adopt one of the two routes to bring up the matter to this Court but that does not appear to be the legislative intent evident from Section 31(2) (supra). A careful reading of the section shows that it not only stipulates the period for making an application to the Tribunal for grant of leave to appeal to this Court but also stipulates the period for making an application to this Court for leave of this Court to file an appeal against the said order which is sought to be challenged. 13. It is significant that the period stipulated for filing an application to this Court starts running from the date beginning from the date the application made to the Tribunal for grant of certificate is refused by the Tribunal. 13. It is significant that the period stipulated for filing an application to this Court starts running from the date beginning from the date the application made to the Tribunal for grant of certificate is refused by the Tribunal. This implies that the aggrieved party cannot approach this Court directly for grant of leave to file an appeal under Section 31(1) read with Section 31(2) of the Act. 14. The scheme of Section 31 being that an application for grant of a certificate must first be moved before the Tribunal, before the aggrieved party can approach this Court for the grant of leave to file an appeal. The purpose underlying the provision appears to be that if the Tribunal itself grants a certificate of fitness for filing an appeal, it would be unnecessary for the aggrieved party to approach this Court for a leave to file such an appeal. An appeal by certificate would then be maintainable as a matter of right in view of Section 30 which uses the expression "an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court". That appears to us to be the true legal position on a plain reading of the provisions of Sections 30 and 31." 35. Thus, we find that though under Section 30 no person has a right of appeal against the final order or decision of the Tribunal to this Court other than those falling under Section 30(2) of the Act, but it is statutory appeal which lies to this Court. 36. The aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court can be summarised as follows: The power of judicial review vested in the High Court under Article 226 is one of the basic essential features of the Constitution and any legislation including Armed Forces Act, 2007 cannot override or curtail jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.(Refer: L. Chandra and S.N. Mukherjee). (ii) The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and this Court under Article 32 though cannot be circumscribed by the provisions of any enactment, they will certainly have due regard to the legislative intent evidenced by the provisions of the Acts and would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the Act. (Refer: Mafatlal Industries Ltd.). (iii) When a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. (Refer: Mafatlal Industries Ltd.). (iii) When a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. (Refer: Nivedita Sharma). (iv) The High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance. (Refer: Nivedita Sharma). 37. Article 141 of the Constitution of India reads as follows: "Article 141.Law declared by Supreme Court to be binding on all courts. The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India." 38. In Executive Engineer, Southern Electricity Supply Company of Orissa Limited(SOUTHCO) this Court observed that it should only be for the specialised tribunal or the appellate authorities to examine the merits of assessment or even the factual matrix of the case. 39. In Chhabil Dass Agrawal this Court held that when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. 40. In Cicily Kallarackal this Court issued a direction of caution that it will not be a proper exercise of the jurisdiction by the High Court to entertain a writ petition against such orders against which statutory appeal lies before this Court. 41. In view of Article 141(1) the law as laid down by this Court, as referred above, is binding on all courts of India including the High Courts.” 8.4 Yet in another decision of recent time reported in (2018) 1 SCC 626 in case of Agarwal Tracom Private Limited vs. Punjab National Bank and ors. also, while finding that there is a specific remedy available under the statute, the court has observed in paragraphs 32 and 33 which read as under : “33. In United Bank of India vs. Satyawati Tondon & Ors., (2010) 8 SCC 110 , this Court had the occasion to examine in detail the provisions of the SARFAESI Act and the question regarding invocation of the extraordinary power under Article 226 /227 in challenging the actions taken under the SARFAESI Act. In United Bank of India vs. Satyawati Tondon & Ors., (2010) 8 SCC 110 , this Court had the occasion to examine in detail the provisions of the SARFAESI Act and the question regarding invocation of the extraordinary power under Article 226 /227 in challenging the actions taken under the SARFAESI Act. Their Lordships gave a note of caution while dealing with the writ filed to challenge the actions taken under the SARFAESI Act and made following pertinent observations which, in our view, squarely apply to the case on hand: “42. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If Respondent 1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1). The expression “any person” used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective. 43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. 44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. 45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance.” 33. In the light of foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the Writ Court as also the Appellate Court were justified in dismissing the appellant's writ petition on the ground of availability of alternative statutory remedy of filing an application under Section 17(1) of SARFAESI Act before the concerned Tribunal to challenge the action of the PNB in forfeiting the appellant's deposit under Rule 9(5). We find no ground to interfere with the impugned judgment of the High Court.” 9. We find no ground to interfere with the impugned judgment of the High Court.” 9. From the aforesaid observations of the Apex Court and the consistent approach on the proposition, this Court is of the clear opinion that hear also when a specific statutory remedy is available under the Act to prefer an appeal, the petitioner is required to respect the said statutory provision and must prefer an appeal instead of invoking extraordinary jurisdiction in this background of fact situation. 10. Since this court is of the clear opinion that the petition does not deserve to be entertained, the Court has not expressed any opinion on merit which may prejudice the decision making process eitherway of statutory forum but then the aforesaid contentions which have been raised by learned advocate Mr. Kapadia are the contentions which have weighed with the court for relegating the petitioner to a statutory remedy. Since the said forum can examine all these issues which are raised by the petitioner, such detailed exercise of adjudication deserves to be undertaken by the appellate authority which has got sufficient powers to examine. Normally, this Court would have taken a serious note of some of the submissions of learned advocate Mr. Champaneri which may tantamount to misleading the Court, but since the Court is not examining the issue of cancellation of licence on merits in view of alternative remedy, the court has refrained itself from expressing any opinion but with a word of caution that the submission may be made before the court upon proper scrutiny and only reading of the documents. Be that as it may, in aforesaid background of facts, this Court is not inclined to entertain the petition. 11. In view of this detailed discussion on a lead matter, the connected matter i. e. Special Civil Application No. 15024 of 2020 is also dismissed hereby with the same observations and the same remedy also being available to the petitioner. 12. In view of dismissal of main petition, no separate order is passed in Civil Application and accordingly, the same is also disposed of hereby.