Don Paul S/o Paul Paul v. State of Kerala Rep. by the Public Prosecutor, High Court of Kerala
2020-11-18
ALEXANDER THOMAS
body2020
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : 1. The prayers in the above Criminal Miscellaneous Case filed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. are as follows: “(i) Quash Anx. IX order dated 10-12-2018 in Crl. M.P. No. 14115/2018 in C.C. No. 250/2016 on the files of the JFCM Court-I, Vaikom. (ii) Issue a direction to the JFCM Court-I, Vaikom to dispose of the C.C. No. 250/2016 within a time frame to be fixed by this Honourable Court. (iii) Pass such other appropriate order as deem just and fit to this Honourable court in the interest of justice. (iv) Allow this Crl. M.C. with costs.” 2. Heard Sri. G. Krishna Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners (A1 and A2), Sri. B. Jayasurya, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for R1 State of Kerala and Smt. M. Santhy, learned counsel appearing for contesting respondent No. 2 (lady defacto complainant). 3. The petitioners herein have been arrayed as accused Nos. 1 and 2 in Anx. I, FIR in crime No. 54/2015 of Kadathuruthy Police Station, Kottayam District, for offences punishable under Sections 498A and 34 of the IPC, on the basis of the First Information Statement given by the 2nd respondent lady victim on 15-01-2015 at about 6.45 p.m. in respect of the alleged incidents, which had happened for the period from 14-04-2012 to 01-01-2015, etc. 4. The Police, after investigation has filed Anx-II final report/charge-sheet in the said Anx. I FIR in crime No. 54/2015 of Kadathuruthy Police Station, which has now led to the pendency of Calendar Case, C.C. No. 250/2016 on the file of Judicial First Class Magistrate (JFCM) Court-I, Vaikom, Kottayam District, in which the 1st petitioner herein has been arrayed as accused No. 1 and the 2nd petitioner herein (1st petitioner's mother) has been arrayed as accused No. 2 therein, among the two accused therein, for offences punishable under Sections 498A and 34 of the IPC. 5. After filing of the Final report, the learned Magistrate has framed charges in this case as against the accused persons only for the offence as per Secs.498A and 34 of the IPC. It appears that the 2nd respondent (CW-1/PW-1) has consistently taken the stand that the matters in relation to Anx. I FIR and FIS and the materials collected in the course of the investigation are formed part of Anx.
It appears that the 2nd respondent (CW-1/PW-1) has consistently taken the stand that the matters in relation to Anx. I FIR and FIS and the materials collected in the course of the investigation are formed part of Anx. II Final report /charge sheet, etc would disclose not only the offence as per Section 498A of the IPC, but also the offence as per Section 323 of the IPC. Since the cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate only for substantive offence as per Section 498A of the IPC, the 2nd respondent (CW-1/PW-1) lady victim had subsequently filed Crl. M.P. No. 1673/2018 in C.C. No. 250/2016 before the learned Magistrate, praying that in view of the indisputable materials, which formed part of the case records, an additional charge for the offence as per Section 323 of the IPC may also be incorporated by resort to the discretionary powers conferred on this Court under Section 216 of the Cr.P.C. 6. The learned Magistrate, after hearing both sides has passed order dated 25-04-2018 on Crl. M.P. No. 1673/2018 in the said C.C. No. 250/2016, ordering that, in view of the availability of the materials, additional charge for the offence as per Section 323 of the IPC could be added to the charges already framed. Being aggrieved by the said order dated 25-04-2018 rendered by the trial court, the petitioners herein (accused persons) had preferred Criminal Revision Petition No. 11/2018 before the Sessions Court, Kottayam, challenging the abovesaid order dated 25-04-2018 of the trial court altering the additional charge. The allegations and materials, which were the basis for the addition of the charge as per Section 323 of the IPC, are that, it has been alleged on 01-01-2015 at night in the bedroom, where the spouses were residing, A1 had caught hold of R2 herein by her neck and assaulted her in connivance with A2, etc. An objection was raised by the petitioners herein in the said Revision Petition that the said order dated 25-04-2018 is highly improper inasmuch as the said order has been passed on a non-sitting day of the court and that therefore, the petitioners have been deprived all their valuable right to be heard in the matter, etc. 7. The revisional sessions court after hearing the parties has passed Anx. IV order dated 11-07-2018 in the said Crl.
7. The revisional sessions court after hearing the parties has passed Anx. IV order dated 11-07-2018 in the said Crl. R.P. No. 11/2018, whereby the said impugned order dated 25-04-2018 passed by the trial court in the matter of additional charge was set aside and however, it has held that, the trial court will be at liberty to frame additional charges or alter charges on appreciating the entire evidence on record at the fag end of the trial and that at that stage the passing of the impugned order is liable for interdiction, etc. Thus by the passing of Anx. IV revisional order dated 11-07-2018 by the Sessions Court concerned, the additional charge made at the instance of the trial court for the offence as per Section 323 of the IPC, was thus interdicted. Thereafter the evidence has reached almost at fag end, except the examination of the investigating officer. The 2nd respondent (CW-1/PW-1) has given her chief examination and has also been subjected to intense cross examination at the hands of the defence counsel, as can be seen from Anx. IV series of depositions. So also, the father of the 2nd respondent, CW-2 has also been examined as PW-2 and his evidence was over, as can be seen from Anx. VI deposition of that witness. The Doctor, who has issued the wound certificate, has also given evidence as PW-7, as can be seen from Anx. VII. What now remains is only the evidence to be given by the Investigating Officer. At that stage, the State represented by the prosecution agency, has filed Crl. M.P. No. 14115/2018 in the said C.C. No. 250/2016 before the learned Magistrate, pointing out that the evidence has reached at the fag end and that the materials before the said court including the depositions of the prosecution witnesses (like Anxs. V to VII, etc.) would show that, apart from the various incidents of cruelty and harassment, a glaring incident has also taken place on 01-01-2015 at 2.15 a.m. in the morning regarding serious assaults suffered by the 2nd respondent at the hands of the 1st petitioner, which, according to the prosecution, is with the connivance of the 2nd petitioner (A2). 8. The learned Prosecutor would also contend that the truth of the said matter is also spoken eloquently by the wound certificate issued by the Doctor (PW-7), whose deposition is Anx. VII.
8. The learned Prosecutor would also contend that the truth of the said matter is also spoken eloquently by the wound certificate issued by the Doctor (PW-7), whose deposition is Anx. VII. Hence it is contended that the trial court can exercise its discretion specifically conferred under Section 216 of the IPC to alter the charge, to incorporate the offence as per Section 323 of the IPC apart from the original offence as per Section 498A of the IPC and that nothing could stand in the way of the court from considering this aspect in its exercise of discretion conferred under Section 216 of the IPC, as the evidence has almost reached at the fag end, as what remains is only the evidence of the Investigating Officer concerned. The trial court, after hearing both sides, has been impressed with the said submission made by the prosecution agency and has decided to exercise its discretion under Section 216 of the Cr.P.C. and has ordered that the offence as per Section 323 of the IPC will also be separately added to the charges framed by the said Court by addition of charges as envisaged in Section 216 of the Cr.P.C. etc. The said decision of the trial court is reflected in Anx. IX, proceedings dated 10-12-2018. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioners would make serious critique into the legality and propriety of the trial court issuing a proceedings in the nature of Anx. IX regarding the addition of the charge. The learned counsel for the petitioners would place serious reliance on the decision of the Two Judge Bench of the Apex Court in the case in Kartikalakshmi P. vs. Sri.
IX regarding the addition of the charge. The learned counsel for the petitioners would place serious reliance on the decision of the Two Judge Bench of the Apex Court in the case in Kartikalakshmi P. vs. Sri. Ganesh and Another, (2017) 3 SCC 347 , thereof, wherein it has been held that the matter relating to addition of charge by the trial court would fall within its exclusive domain and province as per the discretion conferred under Section 216 of the Cr.P.C. and that no party, neither the defacto complainant nor the State prosecution agency, has any statutory vested right to seek any addition or alteration of charge, because it is not provided under Section 216 of Cr.P.C. and that if it is held that vested right is conferred on any such party, then it will amount to permitting the parties to seek such pleas, which will lead to an impossible situation for the criminal court to conclude proceedings and the concept of speedy trial will be jeopardised, etc. It will be profitable to refer to paras 6 to 8 of the decision of the Two Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Kartikalakshmi P. vs. Sri. Ganesh and Another, (2017) 3 SCC 347 , which read as follows: “6. Having heard the learned counsel for the respective parties, we find force in the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent No. 1. Section 216 Cr.P.C. empowers the Court to alter or add any charge at any time before the judgment is pronounced. It is now well settled that the power vested in the Court is exclusive to the Court and there is no right in any party to seek for such addition or alteration by filing any application as a matter of right. It may be that if there was an omission in the framing of the charge and if it comes to the knowledge of the Court trying the offence, the power is always vested in the Court, as provided under Section 216 Cr.P.C. to either alter or add the charge and that such power is available with the Court at any time before the judgment is pronounced. It is an enabling provision for the Court to exercise its power under certain contingencies which comes to its notice or brought to its notice.
It is an enabling provision for the Court to exercise its power under certain contingencies which comes to its notice or brought to its notice. In such a situation, if it comes to the knowledge of the Court that a necessity has arisen for the charge to be altered or added, it may do so on its own and no order need to be passed for that purpose. After such alteration or addition when the final decision is rendered, it will be open for the parties to work out their remedies in accordance with law. 7. We were taken through Sections 221 and 222 Cr.P.C. in this context. In the light of the facts involved in this case, we are only concerned with Section 216 Cr.P.C. We, therefore, do not propose to examine the implications of the other provisions to the case on hand. We wish to confine ourselves to the invocation of Section 216 and rest with that. In the light of our conclusion that the power of invocation of Section 216 Cr.P.C. is exclusively confined with the Court as an enabling provision for the purpose of alteration or addition of any charge at any time before pronouncement of the judgment, we make it clear that no party, neither de facto complainant nor the accused or for that matter the prosecution has any vested right to seek any addition or alteration of charge, because it is not provided under Section 216 Cr.P.C. If such a course to be adopted by the parties is allowed, then it will be well-nigh impossible for the criminal court to conclude its proceedings and the concept of speedy trial will get jeopardised. 8. In such circumstances, when the application preferred by the appellant itself before the trial court was not maintainable, it was not incumbent upon the trial court to pass an order under Section 216 Cr.P.C. Therefore, there was no question of the said order being revisable under Section 397 Cr.P.C. The whole proceeding, initiated at the instance of the appellant, was not maintainable.
Inasmuch as the legal issue had to be necessarily set right, we are obliged to clarify the law as is available under Section 216 Cr.P.C. To that extent, having clarified the legal position, we make it clear that the whole proceedings initiated at the instance of the appellant was thoroughly misconceived and vitiated in law and ought not to have been entertained by the trial court. As rightly pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 1, such a course adopted by the appellant and entertained by the court below has unnecessarily provided scope for protraction of the proceedings which ought not to have been allowed by the court below.” 10. Per contra, Sri. B. Jayasurya, the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the 1st respondent State would place strong reliance on recent decision of a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in the case in Nallapareddy Sridhar Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2020) 1 KLT 1035 (SC), wherein it has been held that the resort to the provision of Section 216 of the Cr.P.C. is a discretion cast on the trial court and that prime important thing is that, whether the evidence relied on for the proposed addition of charge is of good and sufficient probative value and that court need not then at that stage, concern itself as to whether such evidentiary aspects could be duly proved in the trial. Further it has been held therein that all care and caution should be taken by the trail court while exercising of such discretion that the said action shall not cause any serious prejudice to the accused or shall not place any serious hurdles in the conduct of the prosecution as well. 11. Both sides have been heard in extenso. 12. The Apex Court in the decision in Onkar Nath Mishra vs. The State, (2008) 2 SCC 561 , has held as follows in Para No. 11 thereof: “11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record.
At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence.” 13. Further the Apex Court has held in Anant Prakash Sinha vs. State of Haryana, (2016) 6 SCC 105 , in Paras 18 and 19 thereof as follows: “18. From the aforesaid, it is graphic that the court can change or alter the charge if there is defect or something is left out. The test is, it must be founded on the material available on record. It can be on the basis of the complaint or the FIR or accompanying documents or the material brought on record during the course of trial. It can also be done at any time before pronouncement of judgment. It is not necessary to advert to each and every circumstance. Suffice it to say, if the court has not framed a charge despite the material on record, it has the jurisdiction to add a charge. Similarly, it has the authority to alter the charge. The principle that has to be kept in mind is that the charge so framed by the Magistrate is in accord with the materials produced before him or if subsequent evidence comes on record. It is not to be understood that unless evidence has been let in, charges already framed cannot be altered, for that is not the purport of Section 216 Cr.P.C. 19. In addition to what we have stated hereinabove, another aspect also has to be kept in mind. It is obligatory on the part of the court to see that no prejudice is caused to the accused and he is allowed to have a fair trial. There are in built safeguards in Section 216 Cr.P.C. It is the duty of the trial court to bear in mind that no prejudice is caused to the accused as that has the potentiality to affect a fair trial.
There are in built safeguards in Section 216 Cr.P.C. It is the duty of the trial court to bear in mind that no prejudice is caused to the accused as that has the potentiality to affect a fair trial. It has been held in Amar Singh vs. State of Haryana, that the accused must always be made aware of the case against them so as to enable him to understand the defence that he can lead. An accused can be convicted for an offence which is minor than the one he has been charged with, unless the accused satisfies the court that there has been a failure of justice by the non-framing of a charge under a particular penal provision and some prejudice has been caused to the accused. While so stating, we may reproduce the following two passages from Bhimanna vs. State of Karnataka:- “25. Further, the defect must be so serious that it cannot be covered under Sections 464/465 Cr.P.C. which provide that, an order of sentence or conviction shall not be deemed to be invalid only on the ground that no charge was framed, or that there was some irregularity or omission or misjoinder of charges, unless the court comes to the conclusion that there was also, as a consequence, a failure of justice. In determining whether any error, omission or irregularity in framing the charges has led to a failure of justice, this Court must have regard to whether an objection could have been raised at an earlier stage during the proceedings or not. While judging the question of prejudice or guilt, the court must bear in mind that every accused has a right to a fair trial, where he is aware of what he is being tried for and where the facts sought to be established against him, are explained to him fairly and clearly and further, where he is given a full and fair chance to defend himself against the said charges. 26. This Court in Sanichar Sahni vs. State of Bihar, while considering the issue placed reliance upon various judgments of this Court particularly on Topandas vs. State of Bombay, Willie (William) Slaney vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, Fakhruddin vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, State of A.P. vs. Thakkidiram Reddy, Ramji Singh vs. State of Bihar and Gurpreet Singh vs. State of Punjab and came to the following conclusion: “27.
Therefore.....unless the convict is able to establish that defect in framing the charges has caused real prejudice to him and that he was not informed as to what was the real case against him and that he could not defend himself properly, no interference is required on mere technicalities. Conviction order in fact is to be tested on the touchstone of prejudice theory.” A similar view has been reiterated in Abdul Sayeed vs. State of M.P.” 14. In the case in CBI vs. Karimulla Osan Khan, (2014) 11 SCC 538 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held in Paras 17 to 20 thereof, as follows: “17. Section 216 Cr.P.C. gives considerable powers to the Trial Court, that is, even after the completion of evidence, arguments heard and the judgment reserved, it can alter and add any charge, subject to the conditions mentioned therein. The expressions “at any time” and before the “judgment is pronounced” would indicate that the power is very wide and can be exercised, in appropriate cases, in the interest of justice, but at the same time, the Courts should also see that its orders would not cause any prejudice to the accused. 18. Section 216 Cr.P.C. confers jurisdiction on all Courts, including the designated Courts, to alter or add to any charge framed earlier, at any time before the judgment is pronounced and Sub-Sections (2) to (5) prescribe the procedure which has to be followed after that addition or alteration. Needless to say, the Courts can exercise the power of addition or modification of charges under 216 Cr.P.C. only when there exists some material before the Court, which has some connection or link with the charges sought to be amended, added or modified. In other words, alteration or addition of a charge must be for an offence made out by the evidence recorded during the course of trial before the Court (Harihar Chakravarty vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1954 SC 266 ). Merely because the charges are altered after conclusion of the trial, that itself will not lead to the conclusion that it has resulted in prejudice to the accused because sufficient safeguards have been built in Section 216 Cr.P.C. and other related provisions. 19.
Merely because the charges are altered after conclusion of the trial, that itself will not lead to the conclusion that it has resulted in prejudice to the accused because sufficient safeguards have been built in Section 216 Cr.P.C. and other related provisions. 19. We may point out, so far as the present case is concerned, with regard to the incident occurred on 12.3.1993 (Bombay blast), trial in respect of 123 accused persons had been concluded, out of which 100 persons were convicted by the Designated Court and this Court vide its judgment recorded on 21.3.2013 confirmed the conviction of 98 accused persons in the following cases: (i) Essa vs. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 13 SCC 1 at p. 456 (ii) Ibrahim Musa Chauhan vs. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 13 SCC 1 at p. 689 (iii) Ahmed Shah Khan Durrani vs. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 13 SCC 1 at p. 757 (iv) State of Maharashtra vs. Fazal Rehman Abdul, (2013) 13 SCC 1 at p. 898 (v) Sanjay Dutt vs. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 13 SCC 1 at p. 964.” 20. Taking note of all those aspects and the fact that the respondent was declared as a proclaimed offender and was absconding for more than 15 years and sufficient materials are already on record and all elements of the crime are interconnected and interrelated, the Court cannot simply discard the confession made by him on 27.8.2008 during investigation, which was recorded under Section 15 of TADA Act, wherein he had admitted his role in the criminal conspiracy, of course, that has to be dealt with in accordance with law. Following that, the supplementary charge-sheet was filed against the respondent accused for offence of criminal conspiracy as well as for offences punishable under Section 3(3) of TADA Act and a list of additional witnesses and documents was enclosed with that. The Designated Court framed charge of criminal conspiracy against the respondent under Section 120-B IPC read with Section 3(3) of TADA Act but, inadvertently, the original charge of criminal conspiracy under Section 3(2) of TADA Act read with Section 120-B and other offences, was not mentioned.” 15. Section 216 of Cr.P.C. provides as follows: “Section 216. Court may alter charge:- (1) Any Court may alter or add to any charge at any time before judgment is pronounced. (2) Every such alteration or addition shall be read and explained to the accused.
Section 216 of Cr.P.C. provides as follows: “Section 216. Court may alter charge:- (1) Any Court may alter or add to any charge at any time before judgment is pronounced. (2) Every such alteration or addition shall be read and explained to the accused. (3) If the alteration or addition to a charge is such that proceeding immediately with the trial is not likely, in the opinion of the Court, to prejudice the accused in his defence or the prosecutor in the conduct of the case, the Court may, in its discretion, after such alteration or addition has been made, proceed with the trial as if the altered or added charge had been the original charge. (4) If the alteration or addition is such that proceeding immediately with the trial is likely, in the opinion of the Court, to prejudice the accused or the prosecutor as aforesaid, the Court may either direct a new trial or adjourn the trial for such period as may be necessary. (5) If the offence stated in the altered or added charge is one for the prosecution of which previous sanction is necessary, the case shall not be proceeded with until such sanction is obtained, unless sanction has been already obtained for a prosecution on the same facts as those on which the altered or added charge is founded.” 16. After hearing both sides and a reading of the abovesaid decisions would clearly establish that the resort to the provisions in Section 216 of the Cr.P.C. is matter of discretion conferred exclusively on the trial court concerned in the matter of addition or alteration of charge as envisaged in Section 216 of the Cr.P.C. 17. It is by now well settled that no party has a vested statutory right to demand that the trial court should necessarily resort to its discretion in the matter of addition or alteration of charge. Therefore, consequently, that is a matter, which would fall exclusively within domain and province of the discretion cast on the trial court concerned. However, while exercising such discretion, it has to be ensured that no serious prejudice is caused to the accused and also that no avoidable hurdles are placed in the smooth conduct of the prosecution. 18.
Therefore, consequently, that is a matter, which would fall exclusively within domain and province of the discretion cast on the trial court concerned. However, while exercising such discretion, it has to be ensured that no serious prejudice is caused to the accused and also that no avoidable hurdles are placed in the smooth conduct of the prosecution. 18. From a reading of the abovesaid Three-Judge Bench decision of the Apex Court in the recent judgment in Nallapareddy Sridhar Reddy’s case (supra), the most important parameter regarding the exercise of the discretion is that, there should exist some substantial material before the court, to justify the addition or alteration of charge in terms of Section 216 of the Cr.P.C. and the said material should have probative value. However, at that stage, it is not the look out of trail court to get into the unnecessary issue as to whether the said aspects based on the said material could be proved in the trial, that could be the matter that should await determination in the trial through adducing of evidence. Once it is found that there exist proper material before the court and the said material has rather good probative value and the trial court finds that it is necessary in the interest of justice to exercise the discretion under Section 216 of the Cr.P.C. then appropriate decision could be taken in the matter of addition or alteration of charges strictly with the realm of Section 216 of the Cr.P.C. 19. In the instant case, resort to the said provision on an earlier occasion by the trial court has been interfered with by the Sessions Court, as can be seen from Anx. IV order, that is at a stage when the evidence had not even commenced. A serious objection was raised by the petitioners before the Sessions Court that the said order dated 25-04-2018 rendered by the trial court for addition of charge at that stage was rendered on the non-sitting day and thus violating the cardinal principles of natural justice. 20.
IV order, that is at a stage when the evidence had not even commenced. A serious objection was raised by the petitioners before the Sessions Court that the said order dated 25-04-2018 rendered by the trial court for addition of charge at that stage was rendered on the non-sitting day and thus violating the cardinal principles of natural justice. 20. Taking into account the totality of the facts and circumstances of this case, the revisional Sessions Court has interdicted with the said order, but has given full liberty to the trial court to exercise its discretion, if so necessary, by resort to Section 216 of the Cr.P.C. for addition or alteration of charge at the appropriate stage after the case has reached the fag end. There cannot be any doubt that the case has almost reached the fag end in view of the fact that almost the entire evidence of the prosecution is almost over, except the evidence of the Investigating Officer concerned and this can be seen from Anxs. V, VI and VII series of depositions of the crucial witnesses like PW-1 (victim), PW-2 (victim’s father) and PW-7 (Doctor, who has issued wound certificate). Therefore, the limited issue that is to be determined by this Court is as to whether there existed necessary materials before the court to justify the addition of charge as ordered in the impugned order and whether the said aspect is backed by good probative value. So also, it has to be ascertained as to whether the accused persons would suffer any serious prejudice by the addition of charges. 21. After going through the materials made available before this Court, it can be seen that the allegation regarding the incident which happened on 01-01-2015 has been narrated by the 2nd respondent in the FIS as well as in her statements given in the course of the investigation, which forms part of Anx. II Final report. So also, she has narrated those incidents, which are said to have happened on 01-01-2015 at about 2.15 a.m. in the morning regarding the alleged assault suffered by her, as can be seen from her elaborate deposition at Anx. V, which would also disclose that she has been subjected to very intense cross examination.
II Final report. So also, she has narrated those incidents, which are said to have happened on 01-01-2015 at about 2.15 a.m. in the morning regarding the alleged assault suffered by her, as can be seen from her elaborate deposition at Anx. V, which would also disclose that she has been subjected to very intense cross examination. At this stage, it is not right and proper for this Court to examine more details emanating from the evidence of the witnesses, as the case is pending trial. However, after hearing all the parties concerned and going through the materials including Anxs. V to VII, and the other materials, it can be seen that the 2nd respondent has consistently raised this allegation of separate incidents of assault said to have been suffered by her on 01-01-2015 at about 2.15 in the morning, etc, and the Doctor, who has examined her has also given evidence, as can be seen from the deposition of PW-7, who has issued the wound certificate as per Anx. VIII. Therefore, evaluating from this perspective, this Court is constrained to hold that the view taken by the trial court that there exist materials and the said materials have good probative value cannot be faulted by this Court in any manner. No illegality or impropriety has been committed by the trial court in taking that view in the impugned order. Moreover, the allegations regarding the separate incidents which are said to have taken place on 01-01-2015 have been narrated by the 2nd respondent all throughout right from the commencement of the First Information Statement upto the final report as well as the course of the investigation, which ended in final report as well as the depositions before the court. 22. Going by the nature of the allegations and taking into account these materials, this Court cannot take the view that the impugned decision of the trial court in the addition of charge in respect of Section 323 of the IPC, apart from the original offence as per Section 498A of the IPC, will result in any serious prejudice to the accused. Therefore, going by the parameters laid down by the Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Nallapareddy Sridhar Reddy’s case (supra), this Court is constrained to take the view that the trial court cannot be faulted in any manner for having rendered decision in the nature of Anx.
Therefore, going by the parameters laid down by the Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Nallapareddy Sridhar Reddy’s case (supra), this Court is constrained to take the view that the trial court cannot be faulted in any manner for having rendered decision in the nature of Anx. IX order dated 10-12-2018 in the matter of addition of charge. 23. The last plea taken up by Sri. G. Krishna Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners is that the entire decision making process, which led to the impugned order, is vitiated on the ground that the decision has been rendered by the learned Magistrate on an application filed by the prosecution agency, which is frowned upon by the Apex Court in the decision in P. Kartikalakshmi’s case (2017) 3 SCC 347 . 24. After hearing both sides and after anxious consideration of the said issue and from a perusal of the said decision of the Two Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Kartikalakshmi case (2017) 3 SCC 347 that the legal position laid down therein in para No. 6 of the SCC report, is the one, which has been reiterated by the subsequent Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Nallapareddy Sridhar Reddy’s case (supra). True that in Para No. 7 of P. Kartikalakshmi’s case (supra), the Apex Court has categorically held that no one has the statutory vested right to seek for addition or alteration of charges in terms of Section 216 of the Cr.P.C. which would fall within the exclusive domain of the trail court discretion. 25. A reading of Para No. 8 of the said decision in P. Kartikalakshmi’s case (supra) would show that the Apex Court has even clearly held that once a decision is rendered by the trial court, it may not be proper for the Revisional Sessions Court to interdict in the matter. On this basis, Smt. M. Santhy, learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent would point out that, in view of the said legal position, even the interdiction made by the revisional sessions court on the previous occasion at Anx. IV is thus illegal and improper. This Court need not get into that issue as Anx. IV order has not been challenged by the respondents. 26.
IV is thus illegal and improper. This Court need not get into that issue as Anx. IV order has not been challenged by the respondents. 26. Further one of the main grounds urged by the petitioners before the Revisional Sessions Court at that time was that, the trial court had rendered the impugned decision on a non-sitting day, which amounted to flagrant violation of principles of natural justice, etc. True that there is an observation in the last portion of Para No. 8 of the decision in P. Kartikalakshmi’s case (supra), that in view of the said position, the whole impugned proceedings therein initiated at the instance of the appellant-defacto complainant therein was thoroughly misconceived and vitiated in law and ought not to have been entertained by the by the trial court, etc. 27. A combined reading of the abovesaid decision of the Two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in P. Kartikalakshmi’s case (supra), along with the aforecited other decisions, more particularly, the recent Three-Judge Bench decision of the Apex Court in Nallapareddy Sridhar Reddy’s case (supra) would show that once the primary requirements of good probative value for the materials relied on by the trial court and the aspect of no prejudice caused to the accused etc, are fulfilled, then it would be a matter which would fall within the domain of the discretion of the trial court concerned in the matter of addition or alteration of charges. If the interest of justice so demands, then there cannot be any issue that the trial court can exercise its discretion in appropriate, fair and just manner. Merely because of the instant case the application has been filed at the instance of the state prosecution agency, it cannot be held that the entire decision making process rendered by the trial court is thoroughly illegal, improper or without jurisdiction. It has to be borne in mind that in the instant case, the application has been filed by the state prosecution agency and that too, in a police charge sheeted case.
It has to be borne in mind that in the instant case, the application has been filed by the state prosecution agency and that too, in a police charge sheeted case. Where the necessary parameters are fulfilled, the discretion could be appropriately exercised by the trial court and for the purpose of considering as to whether the discretion is to be exercised or not, by the trial court, it cannot be said that the State prosecution agency does not even have the locus to place the matter before the trial court for triggering its consideration as to whether the discretion is to be exercised or not. 28. Therefore, merely because the decision has been rendered by the trial court on a formal application filed by the State prosecution agency, will not lead to scenario that the order is thoroughly illegal or devoid of jurisdiction. The application in this case filed by the State prosecution agency need be examined only in the light of scenario that the same could be mechanism only for triggering the consideration of the trial court for the deciding the vital issue as to whether or not, exercise of its statutory discretion is required in terms of Section 216 of the Cr.P.C. in the matter of addition or alteration of charges. If the abovesaid extreme contention advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners is accepted, it is a matter of common knowledge that the trial criminal courts are overburdened and overloaded with work and as can be seen from the crucial factual aspect narrated in the Three-Judge Bench Decision in Nallapareddy Sridhar Reddy’s case (supra), where the trial court in that case had even missed to see the additional final report/ additional charge sheet relating to the additional offences as it formed part of a separate bundle of the case records and even though cognizance for the said additional offence was taken based on the additional final report, charges were not framed at the stage of framing of the charges, the said additional offences were omitted to be included in the charges framed by the court, as the additional charge sheet was happened to be placed in a separate bundle of the case records.
The courts are after all not infallible and could also be subject to certain frailties, which happened in the natural course of human existence and for any reason some omissions occur, then certainly it is not as if the system is totally helpless and certainly in a police charge sheeted case, the prosecution in the interest of administration of justice can at least place the matter for the consideration of the trial court, so as to trigger its consideration on the issue as to whether or not discretion could be exercised in the matter of Section 216 of the Cr.P.C. Therefore, the abovesaid plea made by the petitioners would also stand overruled and rejected by this Court. However, in a matter like this, the trial court could have avoided such a objection easily by passing proceedings independent of the application and making it clear that, it is exercising its own discretion. After having considered the matter based on the information triggered by the prosecution agency by the filing of the application in question, the trial court could have ideally closed that petition and could have separately passed an independent proceedings de hors the said application showing the reasons for exercising its discretion so that a hyper technical contention of this nature could have been avoided. That aspect of the matter is a nuanced and subtle aspect and trial court cannot be faulted in any serious manner for having overlooked the nuances and subtleties in that matter in the light of the observations made in Para No. 8 of the decision of the Two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in P. Kartikalakshmi’s case (supra). 29. This Court is now having the hindsight wisdom and that too, sitting in jurisdiction of supervision and superintendence and after examining various aspects of the matter in a detached objective manner. The said luxury may not always be available to a trial court, which is already overloaded with work and the mere fact that the trial court has rendered its decision by passing orders on the application filed by the prosecution agency, by itself cannot be the basis to interdict the said decision as the said decision has passed the relevant parameters to be taken into consideration in exercise of discretion. 30.
30. This Court has made the abovesaid observations and that too, with hindsight wisdom, only to ensure that hyper technical contentions of this nature could be avoided in future, if the trial court would take into account the observations made by this Court hereinabove about closing of the formal application that is to be filed by the party concerned, so that the decision is rendered in a separate proceedings, as mentioned hereinabove. 31. The upshot of the discussion is that the prayers in the above petition are liable to be rejected by this Court and it is so ordered. 32. With these observations and directions, the above Criminal Miscellaneous Case will stand dismissed.