JUDGMENT : The matter has been heard through video conferencing with the consent of the learned counsel for the appellants. They have raised no complaint regarding audio and visual quality. I.A. No. 5308 of 2019 2. This Interlocutory Application has been filed for condoning the delay of 92 days, which has occurred in preferring this appeal. 3. Heard learned counsel appearing for the appellants. 4. Having regard to the averments made in this application, we are of the view that the appellants were prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the period of limitation. 5. Accordingly, I.A. No. 5308 of 2019 is allowed and delay of 92 days in preferring the appeal is condoned. I.A. No. 8442 of 2019 6. This application has been filed seeking leave of this Court for filing additional grounds for appeal. 7. It is contended in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the impugned order dated 08.02.2019 having been passed that any part or portion of the pension could not have been withheld by the State authority. A show cause has been issued upon the writ petitioner under Rule 139(b) and 139(c) of the Jharkhand Pension Rules. It is not stated that any final order has been passed in that case which has been initiated as above. It has only been stated that a show-cause notice has been served upon the writ petitioner. 8. In our view, the subsequent development is nothing to do with the scope and ambit of the preliminary proceedings as the writ petition was filed seeking a direction for payment of full pension and gratuity which were not finalized and paid to the writ petitioner despite the fact that the writ petitioner retired on 30.11.2016 i.e., nearly more than 1½ years prior to filing of the writ petition. 9. In the writ petition, a counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the State-respondents, however, as would be clear from the impugned order that a stand was taken that as per the amended Rule 43(c) of the Jharkhand Pension Rules, the State Government is fully competent and authorized to withhold part of the pension. A decision was taken by the learned Single Judge holding that Rule 43(c) having been amended and inducted in the Rules much after the date of superannuation/retirement of the writ petitioner, the same cannot be made applicable in this case. A decision was taken by the learned Single Judge holding that Rule 43(c) having been amended and inducted in the Rules much after the date of superannuation/retirement of the writ petitioner, the same cannot be made applicable in this case. That apart, admittedly there was no proceeding pending under Rule 43(b) or 43(c) at that point of time when the order was being passed by the learned Single Judge and without any proceeding or without passing any order as to under what circumstances the part of pension is being withheld and what would be the quantum of the pension which is being withheld by the State, only the provisional pension was being paid and full pension was not sanctioned and there is no order to withhold any part of the pension which was admissible to the writ petitioner. 10. Though no document has been annexed along with the Interlocutory Application, but from the impugned order itself it is clear that initiation of proceedings under Rules 139 (b) and 139 (c) or show cause issued upon the writ petitioner in that proceeding are subsequent to the passing of the impugned order in which no decision has been taken as yet as would be apparent from the Interlocutory Application. 11. In such a situation and circumstances, we are of the view that the ground upon which the subsequent decision would be taken by the authority, would not be available for the State in the present proceedings as what would happen in the proceeding lies in the womb of morrow. Accordingly, the Interlocutory Application is dismissed. L.P.A. No. 408 of 2019 12. This intra-court appeal is directed against the order/judgment dated 08.02.2019 passed by learned Single Judge in W.P. (S) No. 3004 of 2018, whereby and whereunder the learned Single Judge has directed the competent authority to take necessary steps to disburse all the retiral dues including 10 % pension of the writ petitioner to be paid within 12 weeks from the date of receipt/production of copy of the order. 13. The brief facts of the case, which are required to be referred herein for proper adjudication of the lis, are as under: The writ petitioner joined the services on 26.02.1985 on the post of Range Forest Officer State. After bifurcation of the State, in June, 2004 he was allocated Jharkhand Cadre. 13. The brief facts of the case, which are required to be referred herein for proper adjudication of the lis, are as under: The writ petitioner joined the services on 26.02.1985 on the post of Range Forest Officer State. After bifurcation of the State, in June, 2004 he was allocated Jharkhand Cadre. The writ petitioner was retired from services on attaining the age of superannuation on 30.11.2016 while posted in the office of Conservator of Forest, Working Plan Circle Dumka, Deoghar. A departmental proceeding was initiated against him on 27.08.2014 for conspiring with forest offenders/mafia and being involved in illegal trade of forest produce as well as being involved in corruption by misuse of post and causing harm to forest estate thereby grossly negligent towards his duties. After conclusion of the departmental proceeding, the writ petitioner was inflicted with the punishment by withholding one increment with non-cumulative effect and censure vide order dated 30.09.2016. An F.I.R. was lodged against the writ petitioner on 26.09.2016 being Vigilance P.S. Case No. 65 of 2016 (Vigilance Case No. 69 of 2016) under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code and under Sections 13(1)(d) read with section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. After his retirement on 30.11.2016, the authorities had sanctioned for payment of 90 % pension, the amount of Group Insurance and part of G.P.F but the rest amount of Gratuity, balance 10 % pension, balance leave encashment and G.P.F. have not been paid to the writ petitioner, therefore, he approached to this Court by invoking writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by raising the issue that the respondents-authorities by withholding the aforesaid retiral dues on the pretext of criminal case is not at all justified as because he has already superannuated w.e.f. 30.11.2016 and prior to the date of retirement, he has been punished with the punishment of withholding one increment with non-cumulative effect and censure vide order dated 30.09.2016. But, merely on account of the fact that one criminal case is pending the retiral dues cannot be withheld. Further ground was agitated that the pensionary benefit can only be withheld by resorting to Rule 43 (b) and 139 of the Jharkhand Pension Rules. But, merely on account of the fact that one criminal case is pending the retiral dues cannot be withheld. Further ground was agitated that the pensionary benefit can only be withheld by resorting to Rule 43 (b) and 139 of the Jharkhand Pension Rules. The State has appeared and filed counter affidavit before the writ Court stating that subsequent to the superannuation of the writ petitioner, a provision i.e. Rule 43 (c) has been inserted under Bihar Pension Rules which confers power upon the employer to withheld pension and other retiral benefit where any departmental or judicial proceeding is pending against an employee and as such after making such Rule applicable, rest of the retiral dues has been withheld in course of the pendency of the criminal case. The learned Single Judge has discarded the argument of the State and came to a conclusive finding by holding that the provision of Rule 43(c) of the Jharkhand Pension Rules cannot have retrospective application since amended Rule has come into being vide notification dated 23.07.2018 whereas the writ petitioner had already superannuated on 30.11.2016, as such amended Rule cannot be made applicable for a government servant who has already been separated by virtue of superannuation prior to the enactment of said Rule by way of amendment and has directed to disburse the balance retiral dues in favour of the writ petitioner within a stipulated period. The aforesaid order is subject matter of the present intra-court appeal. 14. Mr. Piyush Chitresh, A.C to learned Advocate General has submitted that the date of sanction of pension would be treated to be a relevant date and, since herein the pension has been sanctioned to be paid in favour of the writ petitioner only after coming into effect of the provision of Rule 43(c) of the Jharkhand Pension Rule by way of amendment in the principal statute, the aforesaid aspect of the matter was required to be considered by the learned Single Judge, which has not been done. Hence, according to him, the impugned order is not sustainable in the eye of law. 15. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants at this Stage and with his consent has proceeded to hear the matter on merit. 16. Hence, according to him, the impugned order is not sustainable in the eye of law. 15. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants at this Stage and with his consent has proceeded to hear the matter on merit. 16. The core issue which has been agitated by learned counsel for the appellants making the provision of Rule 43(c) of the Pension Rule applicable in the case of the writ petitioner is that the amount of pension, since has been sanctioned by the competent authorities on 10.08.2018 and prior to the aforesaid date the provision of Rule 43(c) has been inserted in the principal statute on 07.08.2018, hence the aforesaid Rule is applicable in the case of the writ petitioner and, therefore, as per the said provision of Rule rest of the amount has not been disbursed in favour of the writ petitioner. 17. It is settled position of law that any statute, if not has expressly been referred to be applicable with retrospective effect, cannot be made applicable with retrospective effect. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax (Central)-1, New Delhi Vs. Vatika Township Private Limited reported in (2015) 1 SCC 1 , in particular paragraphs 29, 30 and 31, which are quoted as hereunder: “29. The obvious basis of the principle against retrospectivity is the principle of “fairness”, which must be the basis of every legal rule as was observed in L'Office Cherifien des Phosphates v. Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd. [(1994) 1 AC 486 : (1994) 2 WLR 39 : (1994) 1 All ER 20 (HL)] Thus, legislations which modified accrued rights or which impose obligations or impose new duties or attach a new disability have to be treated as prospective unless the legislative intent is clearly to give the enactment a retrospective effect; unless the legislation is for purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a former legislation or to explain a former legislation. We need not note the cornucopia of case law available on the subject because aforesaid legal position clearly emerges from the various decisions and this legal position was conceded by the counsel for the parties. In any case, we shall refer to few judgments containing this dicta, a little later. 30. We need not note the cornucopia of case law available on the subject because aforesaid legal position clearly emerges from the various decisions and this legal position was conceded by the counsel for the parties. In any case, we shall refer to few judgments containing this dicta, a little later. 30. We would also like to point out, for the sake of completeness, that where a benefit is conferred by a legislation, the rule against a retrospective construction is different. If a legislation confers a benefit on some persons but without inflicting a corresponding detriment on some other person or on the public generally, and where to confer such benefit appears to have been the legislators' object, then the presumption would be that such a legislation, giving it a purposive construction, would warrant it to be given a retrospective effect. This exactly is the justification to treat procedural provisions as retrospective. In Govt. of India v. Indian Tobacco Assn. [ (2005) 7 SCC 396 ], the doctrine of fairness was held to be relevant factor to construe a statute conferring a benefit, in the context of it to be given a retrospective operation. The same doctrine of fairness, to hold that a statute was retrospective in nature, was applied in Vijay v. State of Maharashtra [ (2006) 6 SCC 289 ]. It was held that where a law is enacted for the benefit of community as a whole, even in the absence of a provision the statute may be held to be retrospective in nature. However, we are (sic not) confronted with any such situation here. 31. In such cases, retrospectivity is attached to benefit the persons in contradistinction to the provision imposing some burden or liability where the presumption attaches towards prospectivity. In the instant case, the proviso added to Section 113 of the Act is not beneficial to the assessee. On the contrary, it is a provision which is onerous to the assessee. Therefore, in a case like this, we have to proceed with the normal rule of presumption against retrospective operation. Thus, the rule against retrospective operation is a fundamental rule of law that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication. Thus, the rule against retrospective operation is a fundamental rule of law that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication. Dogmatically framed, the rule is no more than a presumption, and thus could be displaced by outweighing factors.” We have gone across the provisions of amended Rule by which the Rule 43(c) has been inserted under the principal statute and found therefrom that the provision of Rule 43(c) in the Jharkhand Pension Rules, 2000 has been inserted in exercise of power conferred by the Proviso to the Article 309 of the Constitution of India. 18. For ready reference, the Rule 43 (c) of the Jharkhand Pension Rules, 2000 is quoted hereunder as: “43(c) Where any departmental or judicial proceeding is instituted or continued against an officer/employee who has retired on attaining the age of compulsory retirement or otherwise, he shall be sanctioned by the Government which instituted such proceeding, during the period commencing from the date of his retirement to the date on which, upon conclusion of such proceeding final orders are passed, a provisional pension not exceeding the maximum pension which would have been admissible on the basis of his qualifying service upto the date of retirement, or if he was under suspension on the date of retirement, upto the date immediately preceding the date on which he was placed under suspension, but no gratuity or death-cum-retirement gratuity shall be paid to him until the conclusion of such proceedings and the issue of final orders thereon.” It is evident from the aforesaid amendment that there is no stipulation for its retrospective application. As such, the same will have its prospective application. 19. Admittedly, the writ petitioner has retired from service w.e.f. 30.11.2016 and the provision of Rule 43(c) of the Jharkhand Pension Rules, 2000 has been inserted vide notification dated 23.07.2018, therefore, the provision of Rule 43(c) as held above, will not be applicable for the purposes of calculating and disbursing the post retiral benefits. 19. Admittedly, the writ petitioner has retired from service w.e.f. 30.11.2016 and the provision of Rule 43(c) of the Jharkhand Pension Rules, 2000 has been inserted vide notification dated 23.07.2018, therefore, the provision of Rule 43(c) as held above, will not be applicable for the purposes of calculating and disbursing the post retiral benefits. However, another issue has been raised that the material date of consideration for release of pension of the writ petitioner would be the date of sanction of the pension, which is 10.08.2018 and since the provision of Rule 43(c) of the Jharkhand Pension Rules, 2000 came into effect on 07.08.2018, while pension has been sanctioned by the competent authority on 10.08.2018, therefore, the amendment of the inserted Rule 43(c) in the principal statute will be applicable in the case of the writ petitioner. 20. But we, on careful consideration of the aforesaid submission, are of the view that the date of sanction of the pension by the competent authority can never be a determining factor rather the relevant date would be the date of retirement. Even accepting that the relevant documents were not submitted by the writ petitioner, as has been urged by appellant-State, that is not going to make any difference with respect to the cut-off date for making the inserted Rule of 43(c) in the principal statute applicable since the writ petitioner has already retired prior to coming of the aforesaid provision. The date when the government employee retires from service, the relationship of employer and employee ceases to exist. Therefore, whatever claim by way of post retiral benefit is to be paid to the retired employees that will be on the basis of date of retirement. As such the contention as has been agitated by learned counsel for the appellants is not of worth consideration and is accordingly rejected. Since it has been provided under Rule 43(C) for disbursement of provisional pension which will be sanctioned to such employee to be paid pension provisionally during the period from the date of retirement till the date of conclusion of the proceeding, as such the date of retirement is the material date for consideration for disbursement of pension. 21. Since it has been provided under Rule 43(C) for disbursement of provisional pension which will be sanctioned to such employee to be paid pension provisionally during the period from the date of retirement till the date of conclusion of the proceeding, as such the date of retirement is the material date for consideration for disbursement of pension. 21. Further admitted fact is that the writ petitioner was departmentally proceeded in which he was subjected to punishment of withholding one increment with non-cumulative effect and censure vide order dated 30.09.2016 but on the ground of pendency of criminal case, the entire post retiral benefit has not been paid. 22. The learned Single Judge, taking into consideration the provision of Rule 43(b) of the Jharkhand Pension Rules, has come to a finding that the provision of Rule 43(b) will not be applicable since the aforesaid provision confers power upon the State to withheld pension or part of it if there is finding of misconduct either in the judicial or departmental proceeding. Herein, the departmental proceeding has attained its finality prior to superannuation of the writ petitioner but the criminal case is still pending. 23. Now the question arises as to whether on the basis of pendency of a criminal case retiral benefit can be withheld? 24. The aforesaid issue has already been decided by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Deokinandan Prasad Vs. State of Bihar & Ors reported in (1971) 2 SCC 330 wherein the right to receive pension has been held to be the property under Article 31(1) of the Constitution of India and by mere executive order, the State had no power to withheld the same. The issue of withholding the pension in course of pendency of judicial or departmental proceeding fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Jharkhand & Ors Vs. Jitendra Kumar Srivastava & Anr. reported in (2013) 12 SCC 210 , wherein it has been laid down, by taking into consideration the judgment rendered by Constitution Bench in the case of Deokinandan Prasad (supra), that no person shall be deprived of his property save by the authority of law. Jitendra Kumar Srivastava & Anr. reported in (2013) 12 SCC 210 , wherein it has been laid down, by taking into consideration the judgment rendered by Constitution Bench in the case of Deokinandan Prasad (supra), that no person shall be deprived of his property save by the authority of law. Again in the case of State of Rajasthan & Ors vs. Mahendra Nath Sharma reported in (2015) 9 SCC 540 , same view has been reiterated that the pension is not a bounty within a meaning of Article 300 A of the Constitution of India. Likewise in the case of Dr. Hira Lal Vs. State of Bihar & Ors reported in (2020) 4 SCC 346 , the right to receive pension has been held to be right to property and by taking into consideration the judgment rendered in the case of Jitendra Kumar Srivastava (Supra) it has been held that the in course of pendency of judicial or departmental proceeding, the pension cannot be withheld. 25. Admitted fact in the case in hand is that no proceeding under Section 43(b) has been initiated. It is also settled legal position that in course of judicial proceeding or departmental proceeding, pensionary benefit cannot be withheld but ignoring the laws laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, as referred above, the State-respondent has not disbursed the full pension rather disbursed only 90 % pension which according to us cannot be said to be proper rather the State authorities has acted contrary to the settled position of law by sitting over the judgments passed by Hon’ble Apex Court as referred. Subsequently, the provision of Rule 43(c) by way of amendment in exercise of power conferred under Article 309 of the Constitution of India dated 10.07.2018 has been inserted under the principal Act which empowers the State to withheld pension even in course of pendency of judicial or departmental proceeding, therefore, according to the State-appellants the decision of sanction of 90 % provisional pension is just and proper, but the provision of Rule 43(c) will not be applicable in the case of the writ petitioner since the same has been notified w.e.f 14.07.2018 while the writ petitioner has been superannuated w.e.f 30.11.2016 as we have already recorded finding to the effect that provision of Rule 43(c) will have no retrospective application. Further there is no order passed by the State invoking the powers conferred under Rule 43(c) available on record and when this Court has put a query upon the learned counsel for the appellant as to whether any such order has been passed by the State under Rule 43(c) of the Pension Rules, he has fairly submitted that no such decision has been taken by the State. According to us, since the pension has been held to be right to property under Article 300 A of the Constitution of India, that can only be withheld under an authority of law. The authority of law only will come if there is an order to be passed by the State by invoking jurisdiction conferred under the Statutory provision, but in absence thereof, if any decision has been taken withholding pension or part of it, the same will be without any authority of law, which will not be proper. 26. We have travelled across the order passed by the learned Single Judge and found therefrom that the issue of retrospective effect has elaborately been considered by discarding the contention of the State with respect to applicability of the provision of Rule 43(c) of the Jharkhand Pension Rules with retrospective effect and it has been discarded rightly, as has been held by us herein above. The learned Single Judge, further after taking into consideration about non applicability of the provision of Rule 43(c) of the Jharkhand Pension Rules, has rightly come to conclusion that the writ petitioner is entitled to get full pension and to that effect order has been passed, which according to us suffers from no infirmity. 27. Before parting with the judgment, this Court deem it fit and proper to consider the judgment, upon which the learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon in support of his argument, rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Howrah Municipal Corp. & Ors Vs. Ganges Rope Co. Ltd reported in (2004) 1 SCC 663 . We have gone through the aforesaid judgment and found therefrom that the factual aspect of the aforesaid case is quite different from that of the present case. & Ors Vs. Ganges Rope Co. Ltd reported in (2004) 1 SCC 663 . We have gone through the aforesaid judgment and found therefrom that the factual aspect of the aforesaid case is quite different from that of the present case. In the aforesaid judgment the applicability of by laws for sanction of map has been held to be applicable on the date when the map is to be sanctioned but here the fact is about disbursement of pension and as such the date of sanction of pension would not be relevant rather the date of superannuation from service as per the provision of pension rule would be relevant. In the case of Howrah Municipal Corp. (supra) the question of sanction of map is involved, hence on fact this judgment is not applicable. 28. This Court, therefore, is of the considered view that the order impugned suffers from no infirmity. Hence, the appeal stands dismissed. However, it is left open to the State to take appropriate decision in accordance with law, after disposal of criminal case, if occasion so arises. 29. With the aforesaid observations and direction, the instant appeal is dismissed. I.A. No. 5309 of 2019 & I.A. No. 8444 of 2019 30. In view of the dismissal of the Letters Patent Appeal, both these Interlocutory Application stand disposed of.