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2020 DIGILAW 982 (JHR)

Suresh Choudhary, S/o. Late Ganesh Choudhary v. State of Jharkhand

2020-10-08

RATNAKER BHENGRA, SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR

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JUDGMENT : SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR, J. On 28.09.2010 at about noon Suresh Choudhary, the appellant, went on a shooting spree in a police barrack. At that time Srikant Pandey, Harivansh Dubey, Ajay Baitha and Ranjeet Prasad Sharma were taking rest after a duty break. The appellant picked up a loaded rifle and when Ajay Baitha quizzed what he was up to he fired at him and then shot Ranjeet Prasad Sharma. He chased and shot at Harivansh Dubey outside the barrack. Ajay Baitha and Ranjeet Prasad Sharma died almost instantly and Harivansh dubey suffered grievous injury on his right arm. On the basis of the fardbeyan of Harivansh Dubey which was recoded at 16:30 p.m. on 28.09.2010 in I.C.C.U. ward of Sadar Hospital, Hazaribag at bed No. 3, Bishnugarh P.S. Case No. 153 of 2010 was registered against the appellant under Sections 307 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code (in short IPC) and Section 27 of the Arms Act. After the investigation a charge-sheet was submitted against him and he has faced the trial on the charge of committing murder of Ajay Baitha and Ranjeet Prasad Sharma and for attempting to murder Harivansh Dubey. During the trial the prosecution has examined seventeen witnesses and except the doctors and B.D.O. all were present in the police barrack premises on 28.09.2010-Kunwar Singh Pahan, B.D.O. has conducted inquest and Dr. Ajay Kumar Ranjan has conducted post-mortem examination. 2. The learned Sessions Judge has believed the informant who is an injured eye-witness and held that the eye-witness account of the incident as narrated by the informant is supported by three other eye-witnesses who also tendered cogent and convicting evidence and there is sufficient corroboration from PW-3, PW-5, PW-6, PW-8, PW-9 and PW-11 who had reached the place of occurrence on hearing sounds of shooting. The learned Sessions Judge has observed that the appellant has started a murderous assault on the victim from the seized rifle which is established from the reports of Sergeant Major and the State Forensic Science Laboratory that the rifle was in perfect working condition and the seized fired bullets were fired from INSAS rifle. The learned Sessions Judge has finally concluded that the appellant has committed murder of Ajay Baitha and Ranjeet Prasad Sharma and attempted to murder Harivansh Dubey. Accordingly, he was convicted and sentenced to R.I. for 7 years and a fine of Rs. The learned Sessions Judge has finally concluded that the appellant has committed murder of Ajay Baitha and Ranjeet Prasad Sharma and attempted to murder Harivansh Dubey. Accordingly, he was convicted and sentenced to R.I. for 7 years and a fine of Rs. 20,000/- under Section 302, IPC and R.I. for 7 years and a fine of Rs. 5,000/- under Section 307, IPC. Under the default stipulation the appellant shall suffer S.I. for 6 months on each count. 3. The appellant has set up a defence that he was undergoing treatment for mental illness and in support of plea of unsoundness of mind he has examined Dr. Md. Jalil and Dr. Umesh Narayan Choudhary who have come to the Court to depose that the appellant was under their treatment. 4. Mr. Arwind Kumar, the learned counsel for the appellant, submits that there was no enmity between the appellant and the victims. There are three witnesses including the informant who have stated that the appellant and Ajay Baitha were on friendly terms and atleast five witnesses-three prosecution and two defense-have deposed in the Court that the appellant was sick and just before the unfortunate incident he was undergoing treatment. On such evidence, with the help of a judgment in "Devidas Loka Rathod v. State of Maharashtra", (2018) 7 SCC 718 , the learned counsel for the appellant would submit that conviction of the appellant in S.T. No. 197 of 2011 is illegal. 5. In most of the criminal jurisdictions insanity is one of the defences to avoid criminal liability. Historically, insanity was seen as a ground for leniency. In early times the insane were known as "non compos mentis" and "non bon memory". The law in the early days that the offence committed by an insane person which would amount to murder or other felony was not punishable primarily for the reason that an insane person does not carry mens rea and punishing an insane with the punishment off a felony which is so severe would be cruel to him and sometimes it was thought that "a lunatic is punished by his madness alone". The medieval notions that insanity was a visitation from the almighty or that the insane were possessed with demoniacal influences were carried by people of all class and creed. Until the last century people did not recognize that insanity as a disease can treated like any other disease. The medieval notions that insanity was a visitation from the almighty or that the insane were possessed with demoniacal influences were carried by people of all class and creed. Until the last century people did not recognize that insanity as a disease can treated like any other disease. This approach is best seen in the speech of Lord Chancellor Richard Bothell who made a statement in the House of Lords in 1862; "the introduction of medical opinions and medical theories into this subject has proceeded upon the vicious principle of considering insanity as a disease". Homer D. Crotty has written in an article that there was a time when the doctors referred to the Bench and Bar as judicial murderers. Before M’Naghten came in 1843, the judicial approach to a plea of insanity was changing with the times. The treatise by Sir Mathew Hale and William Hawkins would give examples of trial of insane during seventeenth and eighteenth century. Hale writes about a case of 1668 in which a woman temporarily insane at child-birth killed her child. While in prison she recovered sanity and then tried for murder. The Jury found her not guilty. Three cases of that time are considered landmark in their own right. "Arnold", 1724 116 How. St. Tr. 695, was indicated for feloniously shooting and wounding Lord Thomas Onslow in 1724 England. He was known as a madman for years and he suffered from a delusion that Lord Onslow was the author of all tumults, noises and disturbances in the country. A series of witnesses said that they have seen him hooting like owl, laughing without any reason and putting hot coal in his father’s food. The prosecution insisted that though he acted like a wicked man devoid of reason he was a madman. Mr. Justice Tracy instructed the Jury regarding the legal standards of insanity that; "it is not every kind of a frantic humor or something unaccountable in a man’s action that points him out to be such a madman as is to be exempted from punishment it must be a man that is totally deprived of his understanding and memory". Arnold was held guilty. "Hadfield" was indicated for high treason for shooting at King George III. Arnold was held guilty. "Hadfield" was indicated for high treason for shooting at King George III. He was a brave soldier in army and after severely wounded in the eight times with a saber at the Battle of Tourcoing in 1794 was discharged from the army on the ground of insanity. He entertained bizarre delusions that the Second Coming of Jusus Christ would come if he were killed by the Government. So he planned his judicial execution and fired at the King standing in the Royal Box at the Theatre Royal, Drury Lane, during the playing of the national anthem. Hadfield's treason trial took less than six hours and ended with the verdict "not guilty". Lord Chief Justice Lloyd Kenyon at this point halted the trial declaring that the verdict was clearly an acquittal but the prisoner for his own sake and for the sake of society at large must not be discharged. The Parliament then hastily passed the Statute of 39 and 40 (George III c.94 1800) and Hadfield was confined to Bethlem-also called Museum of Minds-for the rest of his life. Another remarkable trial was held in "Oxford", 173 Eng. Rep. 941 (1840). He was indicated for treason in shooting at Queen Victoria. His grand-father and father gave evidence on his insanity. Justice Denman adopted the sensitivity advocated by Sir Mathew Hale towards an insane adult and the Jury acquitted him. 6. In those years every plea of insanity caused public outcry and invited waves of sympathy both in equal measures. Then came the judgment in M'Naghten case which changed the legal perspective to a plea of insanity forever. In the afternoon of 20th January, 1843 M'Naghten shot at Edward Drummond from behind when he was walking from Charring Street to Downing Street under an impression that he was shooting at Robert Peel, the Prime Minister of England. When asked, M'Naghten said he was driven to desperation by persecution. The witnesses were called to give evidence about his odd behavior and the doctors testified that his delusions had deprived him of all restraint over his actions. The prosecution did not produce any medical witness and Sir William Follett, the Solicitor General, concluded with the words "I cannot press for a verdict against the prisoner". The acquittal of M'Naghten gave birth to what is popularly called M'Naghten's Rules on insanity. The prosecution did not produce any medical witness and Sir William Follett, the Solicitor General, concluded with the words "I cannot press for a verdict against the prisoner". The acquittal of M'Naghten gave birth to what is popularly called M'Naghten's Rules on insanity. The House of Lords gave the following exposition of the Rules : "The jurors ought to be told in all cases that every man is to be presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsibility for his crimes, until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction, and that to establish a defence on the ground of insanity it must be clearly proved that at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." 7. The law of crimes in India is largely adopted from the law of England with what Lord Sumner has called in "Barendra Kumar Ghosh", AIR 1925 PC 1 , sundry differences. However, the law of insanity in India as contained in section 84, IPC incorporates the English law with more than sundry differences - but, of course, the tests propounded in M'Naghten are applied without exception. Section 84, IPC provides that : "Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law". The expression "unsoundness of mind" is not defined in the Penal Code and in common parlance it is called insanity. It is however accepted that it is a more comprehensive term compared to insanity and refers to any kind of mental derangement which inflicts a person with incapacity to understand the nature of his act or to differential what is right and wrong or contrary to law. Section 84 embodies the fundamental principle of criminal law that an act does not constitute offence unless done with a guilty intention - actus, non reum facit nisi mens sit rea. Section 84 embodies the fundamental principle of criminal law that an act does not constitute offence unless done with a guilty intention - actus, non reum facit nisi mens sit rea. The provisions of Section 84 are unambiguous and use of the expression "at the time of doing it" makes it abundantly clear that mental disorder of an accused of the kind mentioned therein must be continuing at the time of occurrence. Lord Reading C.J. has held in "Henry Perry", [14 Criminal Appeal Rep. 48] : "it must be shown that the man was suffering from an epileptic seizure at the time when he committed the murder". 8. Ajay Baitha and Ranjeet Prasad Sharma have suffered homicidal death that has been proved by the prosecution through the evidence of PW-12. Dr. Ajay Kumar Rantan, PW-12 has conducted the post-mortem examination over the dead body of Ranjeet Prasad Sharma at about 19:40 p.m. on 28.09.2010. He has found one wound of fire-arm entry on the left lateral side of the back of chest, "1/4 inch x 1/4 inch" in size directed upwards. He has found exit wound on left shoulder and charring around the wound. In his estimation time elapsed since death was 6 to 36 hours from the post-mortem. On the same day he has conducted the post-mortem examination over the dead body of Ajay Baitha and found one wound of entry below the right clavicle of the size "1/2 inch x 1/2 inch", inverted in margin with charring around the wound. A lacerated wound over the right mandible of the size "1 inch x 1/2 inch", muscle deep was found. A wound of exit of the size "4 inches x 4 inches' was found over the back of the right upper part of the shoulder; the margin of wound was inverted and lacerated. The medical evidence corroborates the prosecution story that Ajay Baitha and Ranjeet Prasad Sharma have suffered fire-arm injuries on 28.09.2010, around noon. 9. The informant is an injured witness. In a criminal trial an injured witness is accorded a special status. The evidence of an injured witness is tested on the same principles as that of an eye-witness but an injured witness lends assurance to the Court that he was present at the place of occurrence. 10. PW-16, Dr. Ram Lal Mehta has administered first aid to the informant. In a criminal trial an injured witness is accorded a special status. The evidence of an injured witness is tested on the same principles as that of an eye-witness but an injured witness lends assurance to the Court that he was present at the place of occurrence. 10. PW-16, Dr. Ram Lal Mehta has administered first aid to the informant. He has seen fire-arm injury on him and in his estimation the informant was shot within six hours. He has deposed in the Court that at about 13:45 p.m. he has examined the informant and found on him : "(I) wound of entrance-lacerated wound 3/4 inches x 1/2 inch, skin deep, margin inverted with blackening around medial surface of right arm. (II) wound of exit-lacerated wound 1-1/4 inches x 2-1/3 inches, skin deep, margin inverted on medial surface of right arm, one inch apart from injury no. 1". 11. PW-1, PW-2, PW-7 and PW-10 are the eye-witnesses. They were present in the barrack on 28.09.2010 at the time of the occurrence. PW-1 has deposed in the Court that at about 12:30 p.m. he was taking rest in the barrack. At that time Ranjeet Prasad Sharma, Ajay Baitha, Harivansh Dubey and Suresh Choudhary were also there - Ranjeet Prasad Sharma was sleeping and the appellant was strolling on the ground floor. He picked up a loaded rifle and moved backward. On seeing him logging the rifle Ajay Baitha questioned him whereupon he fired at him. Ranjeet Prasad Sharma on hearing the sound of firing got up from bed but in the meantime the appellant fired at him also. He ran outside and fell near the stairs. PW-2, the informant who was trying to escape was chased by the appellant and he fired at him. Thereafter, near the temple which is within the barrack premises the appellant sat down and took position. The other police-men were shouting and in the meantime Anil Kumar Singh ASI came inside the barrack. But by that time Ajay Baitha and Ranjeet Prasad Sharma had died. PW-2 was posted as Reserve Guard at Bishnugarh PS. On 28.09.2010 he was on sentry duty from 10:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon and he had just returned to the barrack. Ajay Baitha and Ranjeet Prasad Sharma were also in the barrack. But by that time Ajay Baitha and Ranjeet Prasad Sharma had died. PW-2 was posted as Reserve Guard at Bishnugarh PS. On 28.09.2010 he was on sentry duty from 10:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon and he had just returned to the barrack. Ajay Baitha and Ranjeet Prasad Sharma were also in the barrack. PW-2 has stated that the appellant who was moving inside the barrack asked Ajay Baitha tobacco and then came near the bed of Ranjeet Prasad Sharma and picked up INSAS loaded rifle. When he was readying the rifle Ajay Baitha interrupted him and moved towards him. The appellant then fired at him and when Ranjeet Prasad Sharma tried to restrain him he fired at him also. On seeing all this the informant, tried to run away and the appellant fired shots at him which hit him on his right hand. He was taken to Sadar Hospital, Hazaribag for treatment by Anil Kumar Singh and Tulsi Prajapati and on way to hospital they informed him that Ajay Baitha and Ranjeet Prasad Sharma have died. PW-7 and PW-10 were in Bishnugarh P.S. barrack at about 12:30 p.m. on 28.09.2010. In his cross-examination PW-1 has stated that there was no previous enmity and the appellant had good relations with Ajay Baitha and Ranjeet Prasad Sharma. Both have stated that before firing at Ajay Baitha and Ranjeet Prasad Sharma the appellant did not make any preparation and they have admitted in their cross-examination that there was no quarrel between the appellant and others before he started shooting them. PW-7 has stated that when he heard firing he took position in the barrack. From the window he has seen the appellant chasing the informant - the informant was shouting. The appellant has taken shelter near the temple and other police constables who gathered there one by one over-powered him. He has seen fire-arm injuries on Ajay Baitha, Ranjeet Prasad Sharma and the informant. PW-10 was on escort duty with the Inspector General of Police and at about 12:10 p.m. he had come back in his barrack. He heard firing at a distance of about 200 metres and thought that it was an extremists' attack. In his cross-examination PW-7 has stated that he has not seen firing at Ajay Baitha and Ranjeet Prasad Sharma but he has seen the informant shouting and running away and the appellant firing at him. He heard firing at a distance of about 200 metres and thought that it was an extremists' attack. In his cross-examination PW-7 has stated that he has not seen firing at Ajay Baitha and Ranjeet Prasad Sharma but he has seen the informant shouting and running away and the appellant firing at him. PW-10 has denied the suggestion that no seizure was made and the sized articles were not scaled and signed by the witnesses. 12. The scene of crime is a double-storey building within Bishnugarh P.S. barrack. In each room of the barrack about five to seven beds were laid. At the time of occurrence Ajay Baitha, Ranjeet Prasad Sharma, Chandrakant Choudhary, Srikant Pandey and Suresh Choudhary were present in the barrack and the witnesses have stated that after duty break they keep their arms with themselves in loaded condition. The learned Sessions Judge has held that PW-1, PW-2, PW-7 and PW-10 are he reliable witnesses and we do not see any reason to disbelieve their testimony. During their cross-examination these witnesses have remained firm to their grounds and nothing material could be elicited by the defense from them which could have put a shadow on the prosecution case about the appellant firing indiscriminately on his colleagues. Their evidence is cogent, clear and convincing and they are reliable and trustworthy witnesses. The minor inconsistency, contradiction, exaggeration and embellishment in the evidence of a prosecution witness is quite natural and on the ground of minor in consistency or exaggeration his evidence can not be discarded altogether. In State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Kalki and Anr., (1981) 2 SCC 752 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that in the deposition of witnesses there are always normal discrepancies however honest and truthful they may be. 13. The firing took place in a frenzy and everything has happened so quick and fast that many could not have seen the firing. PW-3, PW-5, PW-6, PW-8, PW-9 and PW-11 have not seen the appellant firing at Ajay Baitha and Ranjeet Sharma or the informant. They were inside the barrack premises; had none to the place of occurrence immediately and; had seen other contemporaneous acts. At the time of occurrence most of them were napping in the barrack and they woke up on hearing sounds of firing - PW-5, PW-6, PW-7 have stated that on hearing firing they took position with their arms. They were inside the barrack premises; had none to the place of occurrence immediately and; had seen other contemporaneous acts. At the time of occurrence most of them were napping in the barrack and they woke up on hearing sounds of firing - PW-5, PW-6, PW-7 have stated that on hearing firing they took position with their arms. The presence of PW-3, PW-5, PW-6, PW-8, PW-9 and PW-11 in Bishnugarh PS police barrack on 28.09.2010 at the time of occurrence is not in doubt. The investigating officer has deposed in the Court that he was posted as officer-in-charge of P.S. Bishnugarh. He has recorded fardbeyan of Harivansh Dubey at Sadar Hospital, Hazaribag, prepared inquest and seizure-memo and arrested the appellant. In his cross-examination he has stated that seizure-list was prepared at 14:10 p.m. on 28.09.2010 and the seized materials were sealed and signed by the witnesses and those were sent for forensic examination by the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate. He has however admitted that finger-prints of the seized rifle were not taken by him. The investigating officer has seized empty case of 5.56 mm cartridge, 2 bullet of INSAS rifle from the ground floor of the barrack and sixteen pieces of 5.56 mm empty cartridges. A seizure-list was prepared in presence of PW-1 and Chandrakant Choudhary (not examined). He has seized one INSAS rifle with magazine and one live cartridge in the rifle chamber. PW-13 has tendered a report vide exhibit-8 that INSAS rifle was fully effective and heavy firing was made through the rifle. On test firing of one seized 5.56 mm live cartridge through the rifle he has recorded that the empty cartridges and the live one were of the same series. The FSL report is that the rifle was fired before sending to the laboratory and the firing pin and breech face of the fired cartridges were similar to the test fired shells. It was observed that 5.56 mm caliber fired cartridge marked B-1 to B-16 were fired from the same weapon from which live cartridge was test fired. It was also found that the bullets marked as D-1 to D-2 were fired from the same 5.56 mm caliber INSAS rifle. Apparently, there is good amount of consistency in the prosecution story and the prosecution witnesses have tendered such evidence that can be acted upon by the Court without any hesitation. 14. It was also found that the bullets marked as D-1 to D-2 were fired from the same 5.56 mm caliber INSAS rifle. Apparently, there is good amount of consistency in the prosecution story and the prosecution witnesses have tendered such evidence that can be acted upon by the Court without any hesitation. 14. From the evidence of the prosecution witnesses presence of the appellant at the place of occurrence, at the time of occurrence and shooting by him are firmly established. 15. Section 105 of the Evidence Act provides that the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case of a person accused of any offence within any of the General Exceptions in the Indian Penal Code or within any special exception or proviso contained in any other part of the Penal Code, or in any law defining the offence is upon the accused. It further provides that the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances which may bring his case within any of the category of exceptions provided therein. The statutory illustration (a) which says that the burden of proof that A who is accused of murder by reason of unsoundness of mind did not know the nature of the act is on A, leaves the provisions under section 105 with no exception. The presumption under section 105 is a rebuttable presumption and as held in "Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakker v. State of Gujarat", AIR 1964 SC 1563 , the burden of proof upon an accused is no higher than rests upon a party to civil proceedings. This proposition in law is now quite settled by long line of authoritative decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the one being in the case of "State of U.P v. Ram Swarup", (1974) 4 SCC 764 , wherein it has been held that it is enough for the accused to show, as in a civil case, that the preponderance of probability is in his favor. 16. The appellant has produced medical witnesses to support his plea of unsoundness of mind - two doctors were examined by the defense. DW-1, Dr. Md. Jalil has deposed in the Court that the appellant was referred by Dr. U.N. Choudhary on 16.10.2009 for mental checkup. He has examined the appellant next day and found him suffering from depressive disorder. 16. The appellant has produced medical witnesses to support his plea of unsoundness of mind - two doctors were examined by the defense. DW-1, Dr. Md. Jalil has deposed in the Court that the appellant was referred by Dr. U.N. Choudhary on 16.10.2009 for mental checkup. He has examined the appellant next day and found him suffering from depressive disorder. He has further stated that depressive disorder is a kind of mental disease and a patient may exhibit suicidal tendencies when in depression and when provoked he may become excited and lose his mental balance. In his cross-examination he says that the appellant was brought before him for treatment by his brother on 10.09.2009. DW-2, Dr. Umesh Narayan Choudhary has stated that the appellant was brought to him on 16.09.2009 for his treatment by his brother. At that time he had complained of sleeplessness, sadness and agitation. On 17.09.2009 he has seen his test report prepared by Dr. Md. Jalil and on that basis he has prescribed treatment for him. In his cross-examination he has said that on 23.09.2010 the patient was again brought before him and at that time he was in a better condition. 17. The question of insanity is not a question of law rather it is essentially a question of fact. Sir Mathew Hale has recognized that whether or not a person was an idiot, considered insane, is a question of fact to be tried either by the Jury or by inspection (Pleas of the Crown, 1,p.29). In "State of M.P. v. Ahmadulla", AIR 1961 SC 998 , the accused cut the throat of his mother-in-law and severed her head. The father of the accused deposed about his mental health and the District Civil Surgeon and Superintendent of Mental Hospital also came to depose that the accused had an epileptic type of insanity-lastly he had treated the accused about two years before the occurrence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has found that there was no evidence before the Court to record a finding that at the crucial moment the accused was suffering from such unsoundness of mind that he was incapable of knowing that what he was doing was wrong. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has found that there was no evidence before the Court to record a finding that at the crucial moment the accused was suffering from such unsoundness of mind that he was incapable of knowing that what he was doing was wrong. In "Surendra Mishra v. State of Jharkhand", (2011) 11 SCC 495 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that an accused who seeks exoneration from liability of an act under Section 84 of the Panel Code is to prove legal insanity and not medical insanity. It has been explained that every person who is suffering from mental disease is not ipso facto exempted from criminal liability and the mere fact that the accused was conceited, odd or irascible and his brain was not quite all right, are not sufficient to attract the application of Section 84 of the Penal Code. From evidence of DW-1 and DW-2 what we gather is that mental health of the appellant was not good but beyond this nothing more on illness of the appellant can be inferred. For the present purpose what is more important is that the evidence of these witnesses does not even remotely suggest that there was a possibility of the appellant losing his mental balance at any time of a kind which would have rendered him incapable of understanding the nature of his act or that what he was doing was wrong or contrary to law. The prosecution witnesses have truthfully disclosed in their evidence that the appellant was treated at Primary Health Centre and took sick leave. PW-1 has stated that on 22.09.2010 the appellant became sick, gone to Block Health Centre and took four days’ rest. However, he has refused to suggest anything about the health problem of the appellant and said that the doctor who has treated him only can say something on this. PW-2 has also admitted that the appellant was sick for the last four days but he was also not aware or the reason why the appellant was suffering from mental health problem. PW-1 and PW-2 have denied suggestions by the defence that firing by the appellant at his colleagues was on account of his mental disorder. 18. This has come in the prosecution evidence that the appellant had no ill-will with any of his colleagues and his relation with them was quite good. PW-1 and PW-2 have denied suggestions by the defence that firing by the appellant at his colleagues was on account of his mental disorder. 18. This has come in the prosecution evidence that the appellant had no ill-will with any of his colleagues and his relation with them was quite good. The prosecution witnesses have also stated that before he picked up a loaded rifle they have not seen any preparation by the appellant to launch indiscriminate firing on the colleagues. But then, motive does not play any role when the defense of insanity is taken. In "Sheralli Wali Mohammed v. State of Maharashtra", (1973) 4 SCC 79 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that; "the mere fact that no motive has been proved why the accused murdered his wife and child or the fact that he made no attempt to run away when the door was broke open, would not indicate that he was insane or that he did not have the necessary mens rea for the commission of the offence". Every mental disease or defect of mind does not constitute a legal insanity. The concept of legal insanity is narrower than medical insanity. In "Bapu @ Gujraj Singh v. State of Rajasthan", (2007) 8 SCC 66 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that mere abnormality of mind or partial delusion, irresistible impulse or compulsive behaviour of a psychopath affords no protection under Section 84. The appellant was examined by PW-4 on 28.09.2010 at Primary Health Centre, Bishnugarh - he was posted as Medical Officer there. He has stated that he has examined Suresh Choudhary No. 1317 of Jharkhand Police, Hazaribag District Force, who was deputed at Bishnugarh PS as reserve force. He has stated that he has found him mentally and physically fit. In his cross-examination PW-4 has stated that the appellant was brought at Primary Health Centre by the police and admitted that he has not written identification mark of Suresh Choudhary in the report. But, the identity of the appellant is quite established from his service number and the fact that he was brought to the Primary Health Centre by the police for his medical examination corroborates the prosecution version that he was apprehended immediately after the shooting. 19. But, the identity of the appellant is quite established from his service number and the fact that he was brought to the Primary Health Centre by the police for his medical examination corroborates the prosecution version that he was apprehended immediately after the shooting. 19. The acts of the appellant are definitely abnormal and that he was suffering from some sort of mental disorder has been brought out on record but emotional outburst, abnormal behaviour, temper or excitement at the instigation do not constitute insanity as to bring act(s) of an accused within Section 84, IPC. The circumstances of a case are definitely relevant in a criminal trial as it may be found that the necessary facts constituting an offence are not established and, therefore, the accused is entitled for acquittal and it is also relevant for deciding quantum of punishment wherever a discretion is vested with the Court, but what is required under Section 84, IPC is proven unsoundness of mind which has rendered an accused incapable of knowing the nature of his act or that what, he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law, and that too, at the time of the occurrence. In "Elavarasan v. State", (2011) 7 SCC 110 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that while determining whether the accused is entitled to the benefit of Section 84, IPC the Court has to consider the circumstances that proceeded, attended or followed the crime but such circumstances must be established by credible evidence. The circumstances of this case do not establish that the appellant was not knowing what he was doing and the consequences thereof. After the incident he hid himself behind the temple and did no fire again – he had understood the consequences. There may be several stages of mental illness such as stress, anxiety, depression, panic disorder, hyper-activity disorder, dementia etc. but all are not of the kind referred to in Section 84. The protective umbrella of Section 84, IPC exonerating an accused from liability of doing a criminal act covers three situations viz. (a) the accused was incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or (b) the accused was incapable of knowing that what he is doing is (i) wrong, or (ii) contrary to law. The appellant has acted like a crazy and the provocation if any was self sought. (a) the accused was incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or (b) the accused was incapable of knowing that what he is doing is (i) wrong, or (ii) contrary to law. The appellant has acted like a crazy and the provocation if any was self sought. The materials produced during the trial of S.T. No. 197 of 2011 were sufficient to hold him guilty under Section 302, IPC. The indiscriminate firing by him would impute requisite knowledge to him as provided under Clause Fourthly of Section 300, IPC that his act was so imminently dangerous that in all probability. It would have resulted in death, even assuming for a moment absence of intention as to cover his case under Clause Firstly. He was seen walking inside the barrack and at that time he might have been agitated or under some mental stress but just before the incident there was no provocation or instigation, by the others. There was no sudden quarrel in the midst of which in the heat of passion he has started firing. His acts are therefore definitely not covered under Exception-1 or Exception-4 to Section 300, IPC. 20. In the final analysis, we hold that the charge under Section 302, IPC against the appellant has rightly been found proved by the learned Sessions Judge and, accordingly, Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 2212 of 2017 devoid of any merit is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.