ORDER : 1. The present writ petitions are taken up today through Video conferencing. Both these writ petitions have been preferred against the action of the St. Xavier’s School, Ranchi-Patna Road, D.V.C. Colony, Hazaribagh, whereby the petitioners have neither been allowed to take admission in the next higher classes nor have been permitted to attend their online classes. 2. Mr. Ajit Kumar, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, submits that the petitioners are the students of the respondent-school and they had successfully completed the academic year 2019-20. They had also participated in the last examination and in view of the school’s guidelines, they are entitled to be promoted to the respective higher classes. However, to the utter surprise of the petitioners, they have not been allowed to take admission in the next higher classes by the respondent-school and they have also been denied to attend the online classes being conducted by the respondent-school in the wake of Corona-Virus (Covid-19) pandemic. It is further submitted that the petitioners represented before the principal of the respondent-school through their parents several times requesting inter-alia to promote them to the next higher classes and not to force the parents to withdraw their name from the said school, however, the said request fell on the deaf ears of the principal. Thereafter, the parents of the petitioners approached the District Superintendent of Education-cum-Nodal Officer, R.T.E-cum-Secretary, District Elementary Education Committee (Private School), Hazaribagh under the provisions of the Right to Education Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act, 2005”). The D.S.E. vide memo no. 1413 dated 24.06.2020 asked the principal of the respondent-school to promote all the students including the petitioners to the next higher classes. The principal, however, vide his letter dated 27.06.2020 replied to the D.S.E. Hazaribagh that he had already met and heard the parents of the aggrieved students and would be assessing all the matters on case to case basis and the decision would be communicated as soon as it is taken. However, no such decision was thereafter communicated to the D.S.E. Hazaribagh by the respondent-school due to which the D.S.E. Hazaribagh called upon the parents of the aggrieved students as well as the principal of the respondent-school for personal hearing on the matter. Subsequently, the D.S.E. Hazaribagh passed an order after a detailed hearing as contained in memo no. However, no such decision was thereafter communicated to the D.S.E. Hazaribagh by the respondent-school due to which the D.S.E. Hazaribagh called upon the parents of the aggrieved students as well as the principal of the respondent-school for personal hearing on the matter. Subsequently, the D.S.E. Hazaribagh passed an order after a detailed hearing as contained in memo no. 1473 dated 04.07.2020 directing the respondent-school that it would not issue transfer certificate/school leaving certificate to any student by way of punishment for the academic session 2020-21 against the wish of the students or their parents and would promote all the students to the next higher classes. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners also submits that the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE), in the meantime, also issued a press release on 01.04.2020 specifying inter-alia that in view of the prevailing extraordinary circumstances throughout the world in the wake of Corona-Virus (Covid-19) pandemic as well as the countrywide lockdown and also keeping in view the different queries made by the stakeholders regarding the academic future of the students, all the schools affiliated to the C.B.S.E. were advised/informed that all students studying between Class 1 to 8 should be promoted to the next higher classes/grade as a one-time measure. The said advisory was issued by the C.B.S.E. in consultation with the NCERT. It is further submitted that the respondent-school has adopted whimsical and arbitrary approach in the matter of admission and it has always been trying to carve out some vacant seats in different classes so as to accommodate few students of its choice. As per the prevailing practice, the respondent-school has been promoting the students who achieve the pass marks in overall assessment of both the terminal examinations, but in some cases, its approach uses to be different based on its own whims and fancies. The action of the respondent-school in compelling the petitioners to withdraw their names on disciplinary ground without issuing any show cause notice is highly arbitrary and whimsical. The respondent-school has not afforded any opportunity of hearing to the petitioners before taking decision of their expulsion from the school, which is in violation of the principles of natural justice. The petitioners have the right to take education in the respondent-school itself in view of the mandate of Article 21A of the Constitution of India as well as the provisions of the Act, 2005. The petitioners have the right to take education in the respondent-school itself in view of the mandate of Article 21A of the Constitution of India as well as the provisions of the Act, 2005. Since the C.B.S.E. has issued a clear press release informing the schools throughout the country that all the students between Class 1 to 8 should be promoted in the next higher classes during the pandemic period, the action of the respondent-school in taking decision of expulsion of the petitioners from the school is also violative of such guidelines issued by the C.B.S.E. 3. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-school, at the outset, submits that the present writ petition is not maintainable as the petitioners have speedy, statutory and efficacious remedy available with them by preferring appropriate applications before the Jharkhand Education Tribunal constituted under the Jharkhand Education Tribunal Act, 2005. It is further submitted that the Jharkhand Education Tribunal has been constituted under the said statute enacted in compliance of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation and Others vs. State of Karnataka and Others, (2002) 8 SCC 481 and the direction of the Division Bench of this Court passed in W.P. (PIL) No. 2744 of 2003. The jurisdiction, power and authority of the said Tribunal has been provided under Section 8 of the Act, 2005 according to which apart from other powers, all the grievances of the guardians and parents of the students against the management of the educational institutions regarding teaching standards, fee structure, infrastructural facilities, development works and allied matter related thereto have been subjected to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Since the present dispute is between the parents/students and the management of the school relating to disciplinary action being taken against them, it comes under the purview of “allied matters” and as such, the same is required to be raised before the Tribunal. It is also submitted that the High Courts throughout the country have consistently refused to entertain the writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the ground of availability of alternative/statutory remedy to the petitioners barring exceptional circumstances. In the present case, the petitioners have failed to show that their grievances come under the category of exceptional cases so as to justify bypassing of the efficacious/ statutory remedy available to them. In the present case, the petitioners have failed to show that their grievances come under the category of exceptional cases so as to justify bypassing of the efficacious/ statutory remedy available to them. The disciplinary action taken against the petitioners does not violate their fundamental rights as the respondent-school is a private minority un-aided educational institution which enjoys autonomy with respect to functioning and managing its affairs in view of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 26 and 30 of the Constitution of India and the same cannot be waived in any circumstance. The learned counsel for the respondent-school further submits that the fundamental right guaranteed to the citizens of India under the Constitution cannot be stretched to the extent that the management of the school cannot take required action against mischievous students. The respondent-school is otherwise within its jurisdiction to take disciplinary action against its students in order to ensure discipline and imparting quality education. It is also submitted that during the admission process, the students and their parents are required to give undertaking that the school would be entitled to take any disciplinary action towards misconduct of the students. The parents of the students also give an undertaking that they would abide by the decision of the school management in all the matters during which the students take education in the school. The management of the school having no alternative has taken a decision to take disciplinary action against 26 students who did not show any improvement in their conduct even after issuing several warnings and show cause notices. The impugned decision has been taken by the respondent-school after providing several opportunities to the parents of the said students and issuing caution and warnings. In course of interaction between the school and the guardians, they even undertook to withdraw their respective ward from the school, if they failed to show any improvement. So far as the petitioner no. 2 is concerned, he has voluntarily taken transfer certificate from the school and as such, he is barred by the principle of estoppel from challenging the decision of the school before any forum. It is further submitted that the parents of the petitioners also approached the D.S.E. Hazaribagh making false and frivolous allegations, whereupon the said authority issued order as contained in memo no. It is further submitted that the parents of the petitioners also approached the D.S.E. Hazaribagh making false and frivolous allegations, whereupon the said authority issued order as contained in memo no. 1473 dated 04.07.2020 purportedly setting-aside the decision of the school in taking disciplinary action against the petitioners which is without jurisdiction and authority. The respondent-school is a minority educational institution and is not covered under the provisions of the Act, 2005 and hence, the proceeding before the D.S.E. Hazaribagh was not only without jurisdiction, but also improper. It is also submitted that the respondent-school has also filed a writ petition challenging the order passed by the D.S.E. Hazaribagh being W.P. (C) No. 2142 of 2020, which is also pending adjudication before this Court. So far as the press release issued by the C.B.S.E. is concerned, the same has been issued after the disciplinary action was already taken by the respondent-school against the petitioners. Otherwise also, the same is merely advisory in nature, non-compliance of which, cannot be a subject matter to be adjudicated by this Court under extraordinary writ jurisdiction. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. The petitioners, who are the students of the respondent-school, have preferred the present writ petitions seeking intervention of this Court against the disciplinary action taken against them by the respondent-school which is admittedly a private unaided minority educational institution (school). Mr. Indrajit Sinha, the learned counsel for the respondent-school, at the outset, has raised question with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the petitioners have speedy, statutory and efficacious remedy to prefer suitable applications before the Jharkhand Education Tribunal constituted under the Jharkhand Education Tribunal Act, 2005. I have also heard the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners on the issue of maintainability of the writ petition. I have also heard the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners on the issue of maintainability of the writ petition. It would be thus pertinent to go through the relevant provisions of the Jharkhand Education Tribunal Act, 2005, the objects and reasons of which is quoted as under: “An Act to make suitable provisions for constitution of a statutory forum, to be known as Appellate Tribunal for looking into the grievances of teachers of aided, affiliated and Private Educational institutions and that of the parents/ guardians of the students studying therein and to comply with the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of TMA Pai vs. Karnataka State and the ruling dated the 5th August, 2003 passed by the Division Bench of the Honourable Jharkhand High Court in the matter of W.P. (PIL) No. 2744 of 2003.” 5. Section 8 of the Act, 2005 is also reproduced as under for ready reference: 8. Jurisdiction, power and authority of the Jharkhand Education Tribunal - (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Jharkhand Education Tribunal shall exercise on and from the appointed day, all the jurisdiction, power and authority exercisable immediately before that day by all Courts (Except the Jharkhand High Court and Supreme Court of India) regarding: (a) Matters concerning recruitment to any post in connection with the affairs of the educational institution. (b) All matters concerning the service conditions of employees of the educational institutions. (c) Grievances of the employees against the management of the educational institutions. (d) Grievances of the guardians and parents of students against the management of the educational institutions regarding teaching standards, fee structure, infrastructural facilities development works and allied matters related thereto. (e) Such matters relating to educational institutions as may be referred to the tribunal by the State Government notification from time to time. 6. Mr. Ajit Kumar, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners on the issue of maintainability of the writ petitions has tried to convince this Court that the prayer made in the writ petitions does not come under the jurisdiction of the Jharkhand Education Tribunal. 6. Mr. Ajit Kumar, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners on the issue of maintainability of the writ petitions has tried to convince this Court that the prayer made in the writ petitions does not come under the jurisdiction of the Jharkhand Education Tribunal. It is submitted that the provisions as contained under Section 8(d) of the Act, 2005 empowers the Tribunal to hear the grievances of the guardians and parents of students against the management of the educational institutions regarding teaching standards, fee structure, infrastructural facilities, development works and allied matters related thereto. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the concept of Rule Ejusdem Generis would be applicable here to emphasize the real purport and meaning of general words “and allied matters related thereto.” It is thus submitted that when general words pertaining to a distinct class, category or genus are followed by particular and specific words of the same nature, the general words are construed as limited to things of the same kind as those specified. In support of the said contention, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners puts reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni vs. State of Madras and Kerala and Others, (1960) 3 SCR 887 : AIR 1960 SC 1080 , the relevant paragraph of which reads as under: “52.......The rule is that when general words follow particular and specific words of the same nature, the general words must be confined to the things of the same kind as those specified. But it is clearly laid down by decided case that the specific words must form a distinct genus or category. It is not an inviolable rule of law, but is only permissible inference in the absence of an indication to the contrary. On the basis of this rule, is contended, that the right or the custom mentioned in the clause is a distinct genus and the words “or otherwise” must be confined to things analogous to right or contract such as lost grant, immemorial user etc. On the basis of this rule, is contended, that the right or the custom mentioned in the clause is a distinct genus and the words “or otherwise” must be confined to things analogous to right or contract such as lost grant, immemorial user etc. It appears to us that the word “otherwise” in the context only means “whatever may be the origin of the receipt of maintenance.” One of the objects of the legislation is to by-pass the decrees of courts and the Privy Council observed that the receipt of maintenance might even be out of bounty. It is most likely that a word of the widest amplitude was used to cover even acts of charity and bounty. If that be so, under the impugned Act even a payment of maintenance out of charity would destroy the character of an admitted sthanam which ex facie is expropriatory and unreasonable.” 7. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, the learned counsel for the respondent-school while refuting the aforesaid contention made on behalf of the petitioners submits that where an expression made in any statute has been defined, the said expression will have the same meaning and it is not required to find out as to what is the general meaning of the expression. In support of the said submission, the learned counsel for the respondent-school has put reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of United Bank of India vs. Debts Recovery Tribunal and Others, (1999) 4 SCC 69 . In the said case, the appellant- Bank had filed a suit in Calcutta High Court for recovery of debt from the defendants as well as for other ancillary and incidental relief. During the pendency of the said suit, the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 came into force and by operation of Section 31 of the said Act, the suit was transferred to the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The said transfer was challenged before the High Court wherein it was held that the said claim was for an undetermined amount and, therefore, it could not have been said to be a debt within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the Act, 1993. The Bank having challenged the said order of the Calcutta High Court before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, Their Lordships while deciding the said issue have observed as under: 15. The Bank having challenged the said order of the Calcutta High Court before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, Their Lordships while deciding the said issue have observed as under: 15. In the case in hand, there cannot be any dispute that the expression “debt” has to be given the widest amplitude to mean any liability which is alleged as due from any person by a bank during the course of any business activity undertaken by the bank either in cash or otherwise, whether secured or unsecured, whether payable under a decree or order of any court or otherwise and legally recoverable on the date of the application. In ascertaining the question whether any particular claim of any bank or financial institution would come within the purview of the tribunal created under the Act, it is imperative that the entire averments made by the plaintiff in the plaint be looked into and then find out whether notwithstanding the specially-created tribunal having been constituted, the averments are such that it is possible to hold that the jurisdiction of such a tribunal is ousted. With the aforesaid principle in mind, on examining the averments made in the plaint, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the claim in question made by the plaintiff is essentially one for recovery of a debt due to it from the defendants and, therefore, it is the Tribunal which has the exclusive jurisdiction to decide the dispute and not the ordinary civil court. In this view of the matter the High Court was in error to hold that the dispute in question is not entertainable by the Tribunal under Section 17 of the Act. We accordingly set aside the impugned order of the Calcutta High Court and direct that the suit in question which stood transferred to the Tribunal constituted under the Act and was registered as Transferred Application No. 163 of 1996 be disposed of by the Tribunal in accordance with law. These appeals are allowed but in the circumstances, without any order as to costs. 8. These appeals are allowed but in the circumstances, without any order as to costs. 8. The learned counsel for the respondent-school has also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of K.A. Abdul Jaleel vs. T.A. Shahida, (2003) 4 SCC 166 in which the question fell for consideration of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as to whether the Family Court had the jurisdiction to adjudicate any question relating to the properties of divorced parties. While answering the said question, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: 10. The Family Courts Act was enacted to provide for the establishment of Family Courts with a view to promote conciliation in, and secure speedy settlement of, disputes relating to marriage and family affairs and for matters connected therewith. From a perusal of the Statement of objects and reasons, it appears that the said Act, inter-alia, seeks to exclusively provide within the jurisdiction of the Family Courts matters relating to the property of the spouses or either of them. Section 7 of the Act provides for the jurisdiction of the Family Court in respect of suits and proceedings as referred to in the Explanation appended thereto. Explanation (c) appended to Section 7 refers to a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage with respect to the property of the parties or of either of them. 13. The Family Court was set up for settlement of family disputes. The reason for enactment of the said Act was to set up a court which would deal with disputes concerning the family by adopting an approach radically different from that adopted in ordinary civil proceedings. The said Act was enacted despite the fact that Order 32-A of the Code of Civil Procedure was inserted by reason of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, which could not bring about any desired result. 14. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the jurisdiction of a court created specially for resolution of disputes of certain kinds should be construed liberally. The restricted meaning if ascribed to Explanation (c) appended to Section 7 of the Act, in our opinion, would frustrate the object wherefor the Family Courts were set up. 9. 14. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the jurisdiction of a court created specially for resolution of disputes of certain kinds should be construed liberally. The restricted meaning if ascribed to Explanation (c) appended to Section 7 of the Act, in our opinion, would frustrate the object wherefor the Family Courts were set up. 9. Having considered the respective judgments cited on behalf of the petitioners as well as the respondent-school, this Court is of the view that the Rule Ejusdem Generis is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. If any question arises as to whether the Tribunal having been constituted for specific purpose has the jurisdiction to entertain and decide such matter, the object and reasons for constitution of such Tribunal is required to be looked into. It is to be kept in mind by the Court that if a restricted construction of any word used in the statute will defeat the purpose of the very constitution of the Tribunal, such construction should be avoided. 10. On bare reading of the object for creation of the Jharkhand Education Tribunal, 2005, it would be evident that the same has been constituted for looking into the grievances of teachers of aided, affiliated and private educational institutions and that of the parents/ guardians of the students studying therein. When the said object of the Act, 2005 is read with Section 8(d) wherein after specifying few matters, it has been stipulated that other allied matters related thereto would also be within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Thus, I am not impressed with the argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners to the extent that the words “allied matters related thereto” do not cover the dispute in question. 11. Now, the question before this Court is as to whether, in spite of the constitution of a special Tribunal for hearing and adjudicating the disputes of the nature specified therein, would it be appropriate for this Court to entertain such matter under extraordinary writ jurisdiction? 12. In the case of U.P. Jal Nigam and Another vs. Nareshwar Sahai Mathur and Another, (1995) 1 SCC 21 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: 4. 12. In the case of U.P. Jal Nigam and Another vs. Nareshwar Sahai Mathur and Another, (1995) 1 SCC 21 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: 4. When a statutory Tribunal was constituted specially to look into the grievances of government servants, it is statutory obligation on the part of such government servants, first to avail themselves of the statutory remedy. In case, they are aggrieved against the order passed by the Tribunal, the remedy under Article 226 is always available to them. Under these circumstances, when the two Division Benches had rightly declined to entertain the writ petitions and directed the parties to avail themselves of the statutory remedy, another Division Bench was wholly unjustified in entertaining the writ petition under the impugned order and directing its early disposal. 13. Further, in the case of Secretary, Minor Irrigation and Rural Engineering Services, U.P. and Others vs. Sahngoo Ram Arya and Another, (2002) 5 SCC 521 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held thus: 11. These appeals are preferred against the order made by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. W.P. No. 47130 of 2000 etc. on 1.2.2001. A Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad by the impugned judgment has held that the petitioner in the said writ petitions has an alternate remedy by way of petitions before the U.P. Public Services Tribunal (the Tribunal), and had permitted the writ petitioner therein to approach the Tribunal and directed the Tribunal to entertain any such petition to be filed by the writ petitioner without raising any objection as to limitation. There was a further direction to the Tribunal to decide the matter expeditiously. 12. Mr. Sunil Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the remedy before the Tribunal under the U.P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act is wholly illusory inasmuch as the Tribunal has no power to grant an interim order. Therefore, he contends that the High Court ought not to have relegated the petitioner to a fresh proceeding before the said Tribunal. We do not agree with these arguments of the learned counsel. When the statute has provided for the constitution of a Tribunal for adjudicating the disputes of a government servant, the fact that the Tribunal has no authority to grant an interim order is no ground to bypass the said Tribunal. We do not agree with these arguments of the learned counsel. When the statute has provided for the constitution of a Tribunal for adjudicating the disputes of a government servant, the fact that the Tribunal has no authority to grant an interim order is no ground to bypass the said Tribunal. In an appropriate case after entertaining the petitions by an aggrieved party if the Tribunal declines an interim order on the ground that it has no such power then it is possible that such aggrieved party can seek remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution but that is no ground to bypass the said Tribunal in the first instance itself. Having perused the impugned order, we find no infirmity whatsoever in the said order and the High Court was justified in directing the petitioner to approach the Tribunal. In the said view of the matter, the appeals are dismissed. No costs. 14. In the case of Union of India and Others vs. Major General Shri Kant Sharma and Another, (2015) 6 SCC 773 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: 36. The aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court can be summarised as follows: (i) The power of judicial review vested in the High Court under Article 226 is one of the basic essential features of the Constitution and any legislation including the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 cannot override or curtail jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. [Refer: L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 and S.N. Mukherjee (1990) 4 SCC 594 ] (ii) The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and this Court under Article 32 though cannot be circumscribed by the provisions of any enactment, they will certainly have due regard to the legislative intent evidenced by the provisions of the Acts and would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the Act. [Refer: Mafatlal Industries Ltd. (1997) 5 SCC 536 ] (iii) When a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. [Refer: Mafatlal Industries Ltd. (1997) 5 SCC 536 ] (iii) When a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. [Refer: Nivedita Sharma (2011) 14 SCC 337] (iv) The High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance. [Refer: Nivedita Sharma (2011) 14 SCC 337] 15. I have also perused a recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Assistant Commissioner (CT) LTU, Kakinada and Others vs. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Case Limited, 2020 Online SC 440, wherein it has been held that though the High Court can entertain a writ petition against any order or direction passed/action taken by the State while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it ought not to do so as a matter of course when the aggrieved person could have availed an effective alternative remedy in the manner prescribed by law. Undoubtedly, the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is very wide, yet it must exercise a self-imposed restraint and not to entertain the writ petition if an alternative/ efficacious remedy is available to the aggrieved person. 16. Mr. Ajit Kumar, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has also put reliance on few judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in support of his contention that the alternative remedy does not operate as a bar to entertain a writ jurisdiction and to make judicial review in the cases wherein the fundamental rights have been breached or there has been failure of compliance of the principles of natural justice or the orders or proceedings impugned are wholly without jurisdiction. The learned Senior Counsel has put reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Sayed Maqbool Ali vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2011) 15 SCC 383 , wherein it has been held that if a writ petitioner makes out a case for invoking extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court should not relegate him to avail alternative remedy before the Civil Court merely because the matter may involve an incidental examination of disputed question of facts. 17. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has also put reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Ahluwalia vs. State of Punjab and Others, (2012) 12 SCC 331. The fact of the said case is that the appellant who was working as an Administrative Officer in DAV Public School, Lawrence Road, Amritsar was dismissed from service. The appellant filed an appeal before the Disciplinary Committee against the said order of dismissal under Bye-law 49 of the CBSE Affiliation Bye-Laws, however, the same was also rejected. The appellant thereafter, being aggrieved by the said rejection, filed a writ petition before the High Court and the learned Single Judge dismissed the said writ petition in limine holding inter-alia that the respondent- school being an unaided private school managed by a society cannot be said to be an instrumentality of the State and hence, the writ petitioner had the efficacious/alternative remedy against the order of dismissal before the Civil Court. The Letters Patent Appeal filed by the said Administrative Officer was also dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court quashed the order of the Disciplinary Committee by holding that no person can be a Judge in his own cause and it was not appropriate for the principal of the school to participate in the proceeding conducted by the Disciplinary Committee as the allegations made by the appellant at all stages of the enquiry was not only against the principal, but also against the manager of the school. The Hon’ble Apex Court also observed in the said case that the principal of the school was required to disassociate herself from the proceedings to nullify any plea of apprehended bias. The Hon’ble Apex Court also observed in the said case that the principal of the school was required to disassociate herself from the proceedings to nullify any plea of apprehended bias. However, after quashing the order passed by the Disciplinary Committee, the Hon’ble Supreme Court thought it proper not to remand the matter to the said Committee in view of the fact that the Tribunal was already constituted in the State of Punjab and the said matter involved disputed question of facts. Hence, the appellant was permitted to prefer appeal before the Punjab School Education Tribunal, Mohali with a further direction to the said Tribunal to decide the appeal on merits within a period of three months. The relevant part of the said judgment is quoted as under for ready reference: “15........Mr. Parikh, learned counsel for the appellant, however, submits that civil suit would not be an alternative efficacious remedy in the facts of this case. In support of this submission, he brought to our notice certain observations made by a Constitution Bench of this Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation and Others vs. State of Karnataka and Others, (2002) 8 SCC 481 . Learned counsel pointed out that, in the aforesaid case, this Court had directed that the Appellate Tribunal should be set up in each district of each State to hear appeals over the decisions taken by the disciplinary bodies of even purely private educational institutions. It was emphasised that speedy resolution of the disputes between the teachers and the management is in the interest of all, i.e. students, management as well as the concerned teachers. It appears that at the time when the appeal of the appellant was heard, such a tribunal had not been set up in the State of Punjab. The appeal filed before the Disciplinary Committee was also not referred to the District Judge by the Disciplinary Committee. 16. We are of the considered opinion that since the writ petition clearly involves disputed questions of fact, it is appropriate that the matter should be decided by an appropriate tribunal/court. 17. At this stage, we are informed that the State of Punjab has set up a tribunal, namely, Punjab School Education Tribunal, Mohali, which is empowered to entertain appeals even where orders have been passed by unaided private educational institutions. In that view of the matter, the remedy of appeal is clearly available to the appellant. 17. At this stage, we are informed that the State of Punjab has set up a tribunal, namely, Punjab School Education Tribunal, Mohali, which is empowered to entertain appeals even where orders have been passed by unaided private educational institutions. In that view of the matter, the remedy of appeal is clearly available to the appellant. It would, therefore, be appropriate for the appellant to avail the remedy of appeal before the aforementioned Education Tribunal.” 18. It would thus appears that though the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Ahluwalia (supra) has held that a writ petition is maintainable even if the respondent institution is purely unaided private educational institution as it performs public function i.e. providing education to children in their institutions throughout India, yet considering the fact that the State Education Tribunal was already constituted and the issue involved disputed question of fact, instead of deciding the case on its merit, the appellant was given liberty to challenge the impugned order passed by the Disciplinary Committee before the said Education Tribunal. 19. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has also put reliance on several other judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court to put emphasis of his argument that the present writ petition is maintainable even against private unaided school as it discharges public functions. However, the main question is not that the present writ petition is maintainable against the private schools, rather the issue is as to whether this Court while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should mandatorily entertain the writ petition on its merit despite the fact that a special Tribunal i.e. Jharkhand Education Tribunal is already functional in the State. 20. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has also put heavy reliance on the judgment rendered by the Kerala High Court in the case of Mrs. Sobha George Adolfus vs. State of Kerala and Others, W.P. (C) No. 30712 of 2015. The fact of the said case is that a writ petition was filed due to denial of promotion to a child from Class 6 to Class 7 by the respondent-school. Sobha George Adolfus vs. State of Kerala and Others, W.P. (C) No. 30712 of 2015. The fact of the said case is that a writ petition was filed due to denial of promotion to a child from Class 6 to Class 7 by the respondent-school. The Kerala High Court framed the issue for determination of the question as to whether a student has the right to be promoted in a minority institution upto the elementary school level and while deciding the said issue, after citing various judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it has been held that a writ petition is maintainable against a private body which discharges a State function of imparting education to children upto the age of 14 years. It has also been held in the aforesaid case that denial of promotion upto elementary school level in minority schools would amount to denial of fundamental rights of the child as the same would have a direct bearing on the right to life of the child guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, whereas the protection under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India is not available to a minority educational institution so as to allow it to hold back any child in a class upto elementary education. 21. Nonetheless, in the aforesaid case, the Kerala High Court has not decided the issue as to whether a writ petition can be said to be maintainable despite the fact that an alternative/efficacious remedy is available to the aggrieved student by filing a suitable complaint before the State Education Tribunal. The Kerala High Court in the said case has decided the issue of denial of promotion to a student to the higher class whereas in the present case, the stand of the respondents is that the action has been taken against the writ petitioners/students for their misconduct and undisciplined behavior. Thus, the issue as well as the factual position of the present case is entirely different from the judgment rendered by the Kerala High Court in Mrs. Sobha George Adolfus (supra) and as such, the same is not applicable in the present case. 22. Thus, the issue as well as the factual position of the present case is entirely different from the judgment rendered by the Kerala High Court in Mrs. Sobha George Adolfus (supra) and as such, the same is not applicable in the present case. 22. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has also put reliance on the judgment rendered by the Bombay High Court in the case of Jayshree Vijay Mundaware vs. Principal/Head Mistress of Ashoka Universal School, W.P. No. 5378 of 2013, wherein a Bench of the said High Court framed the issue for determination as to whether the writ petition was maintainable against an unaided private minority educational institution at the instance of the parents whose children were expelled from the said school on the ground of misbehavior and/or the bad behavior of the parents/relative of the child and/or for non-payment of disputed enhanced fee. In that case also, the issue was not as to whether the writ petitions were maintainable even after existence of the State Education Tribunal to resolve the dispute between the management of education institution and the parents/ students. Moreover, in the said case also, the Bombay High Court advised the State Government to provide necessary alternative and effective mechanism to resolve the disputes of such nature. 23. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the considered view that a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation and availability of efficacious/alternative forum for redressal of grievances. Had there been no Tribunal constituted by the State Government for adjudicating the dispute of this nature, this Court while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would have accepted the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners with regard to the maintainability of the present writ petition. The learned Senior Counsel has, however, failed to show any such exceptional circumstance to entertain the present writ petitions inspite of an alternative/efficacious remedy being available to the petitioners before the Jharkhand Education Tribunal. Moreover, the claim of the petitioners is that they have not been given any opportunity of hearing before the disciplinary action was taken against them as well as that they are entitled to be promoted even as per the school’s guidelines since they have successfully completed the previous classes. Moreover, the claim of the petitioners is that they have not been given any opportunity of hearing before the disciplinary action was taken against them as well as that they are entitled to be promoted even as per the school’s guidelines since they have successfully completed the previous classes. On the contrary, the contention of the respondent-school is that the petitioners’ parents were repeatedly warned about the misconduct and indiscipline of the petitioners, however, they did not improve their behavior and in that situation, the disciplinary action has been taken against them as per the school’s guidelines so as to save its reputation. Since the said claim and counter claim made on behalf of the parties involve disputed question of facts which require laying of respective evidences and factual adjudication, the same can be effectively be heard and disposed of by the Jharkhand Education Tribunal. 24. The writ petitions are accordingly dismissed on the point of maintainability itself keeping in view that an alternative/efficacious remedy is available to the petitioners to file appropriate applications for redressal of their grievances before the Jharkhand Education Tribunal.