ORDER : 1. Heard Mr. Mahesh Tewari, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner. 2. This Cr. M. P. has been filed for quashing the first information report being Nirsa P.S. Case No. 153 of 2009, corresponding to G.R. No. 2342 of 2009, which has been lodged against the petitioner under Sections 414/120B of the Indian Penal Code along with Section 32(2) of the Coal Mines Act, pending in the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the coal which was involved in this case has been released in favour of one Ram Bilash Yadav pursuant to the petition filed by him. It is submitted that before releasing the coal, the learned court below had called for a report from the police and the police had supported the release of coal in favour of Ram Bilash Yadav and the coal was ultimately released in his favour. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in the aforesaid circumstances no case is made out against the petitioner. Learned counsel further submits that the case was instituted under the provisions of Indian Penal Code as well as the special Act i.e Coal Mines Act and in view of the special Act no FIR could have been instituted under the provisions of Indian Penal Code. It is submitted that in aforesaid view of the matter the entire criminal case including the F.I.R. is fit to be quashed and set aside. 4. Learned counsel for the State Mr. Veer Vijay Pradhan opposes the prayer of the petitioner and submits that no case for quashing of the FIR has been made out. 5. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties , this court finds that the present case has been filed for quashing of the first information report being Nirsa P.S. Case No. 153 of 2009 corresponding to G.R. No. 2342 of 2009 which was lodged against the present petitioner under Section 414/120B of the Indian Penal Code along with Section 32(2) of the Coal Mines Act and the said case is said to be pending before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad. This court finds that the F.I.R. is based on the written report submitted by opposite party No. 2 Sub Inspector CID (3) Dhanbad Police Station, Dhanbad. 6. This court finds that the F.I.R. is based on the written report submitted by opposite party No. 2 Sub Inspector CID (3) Dhanbad Police Station, Dhanbad. 6. The prosecution story is that on 24.07.2009, on the basis of secret information about illegal coal, the informant along with other police personnel proceeded from Dhanbad at 8 P.M. At about 9.30 P.M. they reached at Singhpur village and came in front of big gate having boundary wall from all sides of the premises namely Shree Niwasa Udyog. On reaching the said gate they saw 15 to 20 labours loading coal on a truck using basket from bicycle and some were supervising the work. On coming to know about the police, all the persons fled away by jumping the wall and taking advantage of the darkness. The officer in charge of Nirsa police station was informed. On information the A.S.I. along with police personnel came there. In the presence of the independent witnesses namely (1) Sanjiv Kumar Singh and (2) Abhijit Rai, the premises were searched and many articles and the premises was coal bhatha. On further enquiry it transpired that the coal Bhatha belongs to Narendra Singh @ Ninda Singh, Vijay Yadav, Pravin Sharma and Manu Tiwari who in league with each other purchased the illegal mined coal and after getting the same loaded on truck sell the same to other destination. It was also revealed that such illegal business starts at 6 O’clock in the evening and continues till late at night. Some articles along with steam coal were seized in the presence of Sanjiv Kumar Singh and Abhijit Rai and seizure list was prepared and the same were kept in the custody of A.S.I. On the basis of these allegations and the evidence it was stated that said Shree Niwas Udyog and its proprietor Narendra Singh, Vijay Kumar Yadav, Pravin Sharma and Manu Tiwari, truck bearing registration no. WB-37B/6281 and its owner, motorcycle bearing registration no. JH-10B/6369 and its owner, Kawasaki having registration no. WB-12M/3500 and its owner and Yamaha crux motorcycle having registration no. WB-38H/0244 and its owner deal in illegally mined coal and after getting the same loaded on the truck sent it to other places. 7. WB-37B/6281 and its owner, motorcycle bearing registration no. JH-10B/6369 and its owner, Kawasaki having registration no. WB-12M/3500 and its owner and Yamaha crux motorcycle having registration no. WB-38H/0244 and its owner deal in illegally mined coal and after getting the same loaded on the truck sent it to other places. 7. This court further finds that one person namely Ram Bilash Yadav, claimed to be an accused in this case, filed a surrender cum bail petition along with a bunch of papers which were sent for verification vide order 11.08.2009 and the matter was directed to be posted on 22.08.2009. Said Ram Bilash Yadav, had filed a petition dated 11.08.2009 (annexure-4) for release of seized coal in his favour which was opposed by the police by filing a verification report dated 20.08.2009 (annexure- 5) on the ground that the seized coal was apparently was purchased from the various cycle riders who were made to excavate the coal illegally. On 22.08.2009, the learned court below observed that from the F.I.R. it transpired that Ram Bilas Yadav is not an accused in the case and the Investigating Officer of the case had not filed any requisition against him and accordingly the detention of said Ram Bilas Yadav was found to be illegal and said Ram Bilas Yadav was directed to be released. This court further finds that release order of the coal much less release of coal in favour of said Ram Bilas Yadav is not on record of this case and apparently the police in its said report had opposed the prayer for release of coal in favour of Ram Bilas Yadav. This court is of the considered view that in view of the allegations made in the FIR, it cannot be said that ex-facie no case is made out against the petitioner who is admittedly named as an accused in the F.I.R. The arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the coal was claimed by one Ram Bilas Yadav which was released in his favour after a favourable report was given by the police is not borne out of the records placed before this court, rather the records indicate otherwise. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of this case, this court is not inclined to quash the FIR and finds that the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is devoid of any merits. 8. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of this case, this court is not inclined to quash the FIR and finds that the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is devoid of any merits. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that there is special law and special procedure to deal with the alleged offences relating to coal and accordingly no F.I.R. could have been lodged under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code. This court is of the considered view that this argument of the petitioner is also devoid of any merits considering the facts and circumstances of this case when seen in the light of the ratio of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme court reported in (2014) 9 SCC 772 (State (NCT of Delhi) versus Sanjay and other analogous cases). 9. This court finds that in the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2014) 9 SCC 772 (supra), the point which fell for consideration was as to whether the provisions contained in Section 21 and 22 and other sections of Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 operate as a bar against prosecution of a person who has been charged with allegation which constitutes offences under Sections 379/114 and other provisions of Penal Code, 1860. In other words, the issue was whether the provisions of Mines and Minerals Act explicitly or impliedly exclude the provisions of the Penal Code when the act of an accused is an offence both under the Penal Code and under the provisions of Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act. The matter related to illegal removal of sand from river bed and selling of such sank. In the said case, the F.I.R. was instituted by the police suo motu on the charges of illegal mining under Section 379/114 of the Indian Penal Code besides being cognizable offence and under Section 21(4) of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957. The accused in the said case had challenged the registration of the case on the ground that offence, if at all committed, cognizance could have been taken under the provisions of the MMRD Act only on the basis of complaint to be filed under Section 22 of the Act by the authorized officer. 10. The accused in the said case had challenged the registration of the case on the ground that offence, if at all committed, cognizance could have been taken under the provisions of the MMRD Act only on the basis of complaint to be filed under Section 22 of the Act by the authorized officer. 10. Apart from the aforesaid case arising in Delhi, other cases from other High Courts including High Court of Gujarat were under consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It was found that conflicting views were taken by the Gujarat High Court, the Delhi High Court, the Calcutta High Court, the Madras High Court and the Jharkhand High Court. Accordingly, the issue was settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court who was of the definite opinion that ingredients constituting offence under the MMDR Act and ingredients of offence of dishonestly removing sand and gravel, which is the property of a State, from the riverbeds without consent, is a distinct offence under Indian Penal Code. The Hon’ble Supreme Court was of the view that on receipt of a police report, the Magistrate having jurisdiction can take cognizance of the offence under Section 378 of the Indian Penal Code without awaiting the receipt of complaint that may be filed by the authorized officer for taking cognizance in respect of violation of various provisions of MMDR Act. Consequently, it was held that contrary view taken by the different High Courts cannot be sustained in law and, therefore were overruled. Paragraph 72 and 73 of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow for ready reference: 72. From a close reading of the provisions of the MMDR Act and the offence defined under Section 378 IPC, it is manifest that the ingredients constituting the offence are different. The contravention of terms and conditions of mining lease or doing mining activity in violation of Section 4 of the Act is an offence punishable under Section 21 of the MMDR Act, whereas dishonestly removing sand, gravel and other minerals from the river, which is the property of the State, out of the State’s possession without the consent, constitute an offence of theft. Hence, merely because initiation of proceeding for commission of an offence under the MMDR Act on the basis of complaint cannot and shall not debar the police from taking action against persons for committing theft of sand and minerals in the manner mentioned above by exercising power under the Code of Criminal Procedure and submit a report before the Magistrate for taking cognizance against such persons. In other words, in a case where there is a theft of sand and gravel from the government land, the police can register a case, investigate the same and submit a final report under Section 173 CrPC before a Magistrate having jurisdiction for the purpose of taking cognizance as provided in Section 190(1)(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 73. After giving our thoughtful consideration in the matter, in the light of the relevant provisions of the Act vis-à-vis the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Penal Code, we are of the definite opinion that the ingredients constituting the offence under the MMDR Act and the ingredients of dishonestly removing sand and gravel from the riverbeds without consent, which is the property of the State, is a distinct offence under IPC. Hence, for the commission of offence under Section 378 IPC, on receipt of the police report, the Magistrate having jurisdiction can take cognizance of the said offence without awaiting the receipt of complaint that may be filed by the authorised officer for taking cognizance in respect of violation of various provisions of the MMDR Act. Consequently, the contrary view taken by the different High Courts cannot be sustained in law and, therefore, overruled. Consequently, these criminal appeals are disposed of with a direction to the Magistrates concerned to proceed accordingly. 11. This court finds that in the present case, the F.I.R. has been registered not only for alleged offence under Sections 414/120B of the Indian Penal Code but also under the Coal Mines Act and it is for the Magistrate at the stage of taking cognizance of offence upon submission of charge sheet to find out under which Section cognizance is to be taken. This court, upon considering the ratio of the aforesaid judgment passed by the Hon’ble supreme court is of the considered view that merely because offence under the Coal Mines Act is also included along with the alleged offence under Indian Penal Code in the F.I.R., the F.I.R. itself cannot be quashed. It cannot be said that ex-facie upon perusal of the FIR no offence is made out against the petitioner. Moreover, it is not clear from the records of this case as to whether investigation has been completed or not and as to whether charge-sheet has been submitted against the petitioner or not. 12. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid findings, this court is not inclined to quash the FIR in exercise of powers under section 482 of Cr.P.C. and accordingly the present petition is hereby dismissed. 13. However, dismissal of this case will not prejudice the case of the petitioner in any manner before the learned court below. 14. Before parting with this case, this court finds that vide order dated 15.06.2016, the status report was called for from the learned trial court with respect to the stage of the case. Pursuant to the said order, the status report was received vide letter dated 08.09.2016 by stating that the case was pending awaiting order from this court in the present case. Thereafter the matter was taken up by this court on 18.10.2016 and it was observed that the present application was filed in the year 2009, and there was no interim order passed in the present case. It was also observed that in spite of absence of any interim order, the learned trial court had kept the case pending giving flimsy reason that application under Section 482 Cr. P.C. was pending before this court. In such circumstances this court vide order dated 18.10.2016 directed the trial court to submit an explanation as to why, in spite of there being no interim order passed in this case, the trial has not progressed. Pursuant to the order dated 18.10.2016, the explanation has been received from the concerned court vide letter dated 16.11.2016 stating that from the records of the case it transpired that on 28.03.2011, this court was pleased to pass interim order in another case i.e. Cr. Pursuant to the order dated 18.10.2016, the explanation has been received from the concerned court vide letter dated 16.11.2016 stating that from the records of the case it transpired that on 28.03.2011, this court was pleased to pass interim order in another case i.e. Cr. M.P. No. 1430 of 2009 staying further proceeding in connection with Nirsa P.S. Case No. 153 of 2009 corresponding to G.R. No. 2342 of 2009 and on 10.05.2011 this court was pleased to direct in the said case to continue the interim order and as such record was pending before the learned trial court awaiting further order from the High Court. It appears that both the cases i.e. Cr. M. P. No. 1430 of 2009 and the present case arise out from the same F.I.R. Although no interim order was passed in the present case but on account of interim order passed in Cr. M. P. No. 1430 of 2009, the case against the present petitioner also remained stayed. This court is of the considered view that interim order having been passed in the case of other co-accused could not have been treated as interim order passed with respect to the present petitioner as well. However, since this case is being dismissed, no further order is being passed in this connection. It is further not clear from the explanation furnished by the learned court below as to whether the investigation in the present case has been completed or not and consequently charge sheet has been submitted against the petitioner or not. The learned trial court is directed to proceed in connection with the petitioner in accordance with law. 15. Pending I.A., if any, stands dismissed as not pressed. 16. Let this order be communicated to the court concerned through FAX/e.mail. Petition dismissed.