JUDGMENT : Shekhar B. Saraf, J. 1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India wherein the writ petitioners are aggrieved by the decision of the State Respondents which rejected the transfer of FPS and kerosene oil licenses from the petitioner no. 1 to the petitioner 2 on compassionate grounds; the primary ground of rejection being that the degree of relationship of the petitioner no. 2 is not permissible under the definition of “family members” as stated in the notification dated March 7, 2017, issued under the West Bengal Public Distribution System (Maintenance and Control) Orders of 2013. 2. The facts of this case, in so far as they are material to this writ petition, is circumscribed within a narrow compass and is encapsulated as follows: a) Nimai Chand Parihari (hereinafter referred to as “petitioner no. 1”) is the father-in-law of Smt. Putulrani Ghosh Parihari (hereinafter referred to as “petitioner no. 2”). The petitioner no. 2 is the widow of the predeceased son of petitioner no. 1. b) While FPS and kerosene oil dealership licenses were originally granted to the petitioner no. 1, due to ailments arising out of old age, the petitioner no. 1 furnished a relevant application to the State authorities for the transfer of these licenses to his son, prior to his demise. This application was both considered and accepted by the authorities. c) However, post such transfer of these licenses in favour of Subhabrata Parihari, the son of the petitioner no. 1, he was murdered by Maoists during an ill-fated incident in the Maoist infested area of the Jungle Mahal region on October 19, 2010. Post the untimely demise of the son of petitioner no. 1 and considering the peculiarity of the circumstances, both licenses were yet again transferred in the name of the petitioner no. 1. d) For reasons yet again attributable to old-age and multiple illnesses, the petitioner no. 1 made a representation dated January 8, 2018 requesting the Sub-Divisional Controller (F&S), Jhargram (hereinafter referred to as Respondent No. 6) to transfer the aforesaid dealership (comprising licenses for both the fair price shop as well as kerosene oil) in favour of the petitioner no. 2, the only other surviving heir in the family as the daughter of the petitioner no. 1 is married and continues to reside in her matrimonial home. 2, the only other surviving heir in the family as the daughter of the petitioner no. 1 is married and continues to reside in her matrimonial home. A similar representation seeking such transfer was also filed before the Respondent No.6, by the petitioner no. 2. e) While no action was initiated on these representations by the State respondents, the petitioner no. 1 filed another follow-up representation dated July 18, 2018 before the District Controller (F&S), Jhargram (hereinafter referred to as Respondent No. 5), seeking the transfer of licenses in favour of petitioner no. 2. Subsequently, the Respondent No. 5 instructed the Respondent No. 6 to proceed with the formalities involved for such transfer while considering it as an exceptional case. f) While fresh documents were submitted by both petitioners upon instructions received from Respondent No. 6, the Respondent No. 6 directed the Inspector (F&S) to proceed with an enquiry and submit a report on the same. Based on such enquiry, a report was submitted which favourably recommended such transfer of dealership to the petitioner. g) Despite such a recommendation, no further action was taken by the Respondent No. 5. The petitioner no. 2 was compelled to furnish another representation dated February 14, 2019 before the District Magistrate, Jhargram seeking the transfer of both licenses in her favour on a compassionate basis, in place of petitioner no. 1. Based on such representation, the District Magistrate, Jhargram vide memo dated April 2, 2019 requested the Principal Secretary (F&S Department) to initiate the sought transfer proceedings on compassionate grounds. h) Subsequently, the petitioners received a memo bearing no. 1917/1(4)/FMR/13-L-51/2014 (Pt-1) dated July 2, 2019 issued by the Deputy Director (License), Directorate of DDP&S which conveyed the State Government’ s decision rejecting the plea of transfer of both licenses to the petitioner no. 2 on the ground that the relationship of “daughter-in-law” does not come under the purview of “family members” as per the notification dated March 7, 2017. i) Aggrieved by above memo dated July 2, 2017 and the non-inclusion of a widow of a predeceased son within the definition of family members in the notification dated March 7, 2017 and memorandum dated January 15, 2020, the petitioners invoked this Court’ s writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the propriety of the memo no. 634/SCF&S/KGR/2017 dated June 9, 2017 as well as seeking a declaration stating the inclusion of daughter-in-law of a predeceased son within the definition of “family members”. 3. It was also brought to my attention, that while this petition remained in a state of pendency, petitioner no. 1 has also passed away. Mr. Saha Roy, the learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that while the petitioners’ representations were kept in a state of pendency, the State Government has amended the previous Control Order of 2013. Post such amendment, the widow of a pre-deceased son now stands incorporated in the definition of “family members” in the new notification dated December 16, 2020. Mr. Saha Roy also argued that given the delay caused by the inactivity of the respondents in processing the above representations, the same may be considered in continuation under the new notification dated December 16, 2020. 4. Per contra, Mr. Sengupta, the learned counsel for the State Respondents has sought to cast certain aspersions on the issue of this transfer of licenses to the petitioner no. 2, given that a prior case of transfer had already occurred previously in the case of both petitioner no.1 and his pre-deceased son. 5. I have heard the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the respective parties and perused the materials placed on record. 6. In Bijon Mukherjee –v- State of West Bengal reported in 2018 (4) CHN (CAL) 454, I had the occasion to examine, in great detail, several Supreme Court judgments and laid down the principles as regards to the issue of compassionate appointment. Paragraphs 25 and 26 of the aforesaid judgment are quoted below: “25. I had on an earlier occasion, examined the principles relating to compassionate appointment in the case of W.P. 2825 (W) of 2018 (Smt. Ipsita Chakrabarti nee Dua –v- State of West Bengal and Ors.). After considering the Supreme Court judgements delivered in the cases of State Bank of India and Anr. –v- Somvir Singh reported in (2007) 4 SCC 778 ; I.G. (Karmik) and Ors. –v- Prahalad Mani Tripathi reported in (2007) 6 SCC 162 ; National Institute of Technology –v- Niraj Kumar Singh reported in (2007) 2 SCC 481 ; Union Bank of India and Ors. –v- Somvir Singh reported in (2007) 4 SCC 778 ; I.G. (Karmik) and Ors. –v- Prahalad Mani Tripathi reported in (2007) 6 SCC 162 ; National Institute of Technology –v- Niraj Kumar Singh reported in (2007) 2 SCC 481 ; Union Bank of India and Ors. –v- M.T. Latheesh (supra); this Court held that the appointment on compassionate grounds is to be done in accordance with the rules framed by the employer and there is no right to claim compassionate appointment on any other ground. Furthermore, the Court had held that this appointment is given only for meeting the immediate hardship faced by the family due to the death of the bread earner and the financial condition of the family is a guiding factor for such appointment. The relevant paragraph enunciating the ratio decidendi of the judgement is delineated below: “10. After going through the judgments passed by the Supreme Court on the issue of compassionate appointment, the following principles emerge:- (a) Appointment on compassionate grounds is an exception craved out to the general rule that recruitment to public services is to be made in a transparent and accountable manner providing opportunity to all eligible persons to compete and participate in the selection process. (b) The right of a dependent of an employee who died in harness for compassionate appointment is based on the scheme, executive instructions, rules etc. framed by the employer and there is no right to claim compassionate appointment on any other ground apart from the above scheme conferred by the employer. (c) Appointment on compassionate ground is given only for meeting the immediate hardship which is faced by the family by reason of the death of the bread earner. When an appointment is made on compassionate ground it should be kept confined only to the purpose it seems to achieve, the idea being not to provide for endless compassion. (d) Compassionate appointment has to be exercised only in warranting situations and circumstances existing in granting appointment and guiding factors should be financial condition of the family.” 26. After observing the ratio and the legal positions contended by the Counsels appearing on behalf of the parties as well as the precedents examined above, I am persuaded to opine that appointment on compassionate grounds seeks to relieve the immediate financial hardship faced by the dependants of the deceased. After observing the ratio and the legal positions contended by the Counsels appearing on behalf of the parties as well as the precedents examined above, I am persuaded to opine that appointment on compassionate grounds seeks to relieve the immediate financial hardship faced by the dependants of the deceased. It acts as an exception to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution as the defendant are given preferential appointment ahead of other equally meritorious candidates similarly placed and hence it cannot be claimed as a right. With the object of appointment on compassionate grounds in mind, it is palpably clear to me that this appointment must be done in accordance with the rules for such appointment. The dependant seeking such appointment must be eligible for such consideration and facing financial hardship to the extent delineated by the rules.” 7. Moreover, it is trite law that after the Full Bench decision of this Court in State of West Bengal –v- Purnima Das and Ors., reported in 2017 (4) CHN (CAL) 362, denial of appointment on compassionate ground to women solely on the grounds of either gender or marital status is de hors Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Full Bench had explicitly held that the classification of married daughters as a different species cannot be termed as a reasonable classification. The relevant paragraphs of Purnima Das (supra) are reproduced as stated below: “84. ..... Exclusion of any member of a family on the ground that he/she is not so dependent would be justified, but certainly not on the grounds of gender or marital status. If so permitted, a married daughter would stand deprived of the benefit that a married son would be entitled under the scheme. A married son and a married daughter may appear to constitute different classes but when a claim for compassionate appointment is involved, they have to be treated equally and at par if it is demonstrated that both depended on the earnings of their deceased father/mother (Government employee)for their survival. It is, therefore, difficult for us to sustain the classification as reasonable. 89. ...... Regrettably, the scheme of the Government is deficient by failing to provide for those married daughters who could, given a chance, establish their dependency on their bread-winner father/mother (Government employee) who passes away while in service. It is, therefore, difficult for us to sustain the classification as reasonable. 89. ...... Regrettably, the scheme of the Government is deficient by failing to provide for those married daughters who could, given a chance, establish their dependency on their bread-winner father/mother (Government employee) who passes away while in service. Instead of a total exclusion from the purview of the scheme of compassionate appointment, the Government could have considered qualifying such exclusion by stipulating that those married daughters having the support of their matrimonial homes would stand excluded. Such stipulation, apart from lending credence to the scheme, would be in accord with the equality clause enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 and the directive contained in Article 39(a). We are minded to make such observation bearing in mind that every law enacted or scheme introduced having the force of law, particularly welfare legislation for the benefit of the weaker section of the people, must be implemented in the proper spirit for achieving the noble object for which such law or scheme is brought into existence.” Emphasis supplied. 8. The previous definition of “family members” in the previous notification dated March 7, 2017 in so far as they excluded a widow of a pre-deceased son, was also in the teeth of the observations made by the Full Bench in Purnima Das (supra). Previously, this Court had partially struck down the notification dated March 7, 2017 by the judgment dated September 19, 2019 in Anjana Modak –v- State of West Bengal bearing W.P. No. 449 of 2019 and the memorandum dated January 15, 2020 clearly indicates that the State Government willfully chose to comply with the same. Resultantly, while ‘married daughters’ were brought within the ambit of consideration for compassionate appointment, a ‘widow of a pre-deceased son’ was not. 9. However, the intention of the legislature has now conformed to the winds of the changing times which call for demolishing pre-existing disabilities which were based on the notions of patriarchy and misogyny; this is indeed reflected through the new notification dated December 16, 2020 and the amended degrees of relationships stated in the definition of “family members”. 10. Considering the facts in the above case, it is clear that the fair price shop dealership was earlier in the name of the husband of the petitioner no. 2. 10. Considering the facts in the above case, it is clear that the fair price shop dealership was earlier in the name of the husband of the petitioner no. 2. Upon the death of the husband, the same was transferred on compassionate ground to the petitioner no. 1 (now deceased). The law existing at the time of death of the petitioner no. 1 did not include widow of predeceased son as a family member. However, upon the amendment in December 16, 2020, a widow of the predeceased son has been included as a family member. 11. Strictly speaking, compassionate appointment has to be granted as per the rules and regulations in place at the time of the death of the person concerned. However, in the particular peculiar facts and circumstances, where the son was the original licence-holder, the petitioner no. 2 would have been entitled to compassionate appointment on the death of the son. Furthermore, the legislative intent is clear, as the legislature has included widow of the predeceased son as a family member. 12. In light of the same and due to the fact that compassionate appointment is of a beneficial character, I am of the view that the widow of the predeceased son should be granted compassionate appointment in the particular case. 13. To end the controversy and to bring to stop further litigation on the subject, I direct the appropriate authority to grant licence in favour of the petitioner no. 2 in accordance with law within a period of six weeks from date. 14. With these observations, W.P.A. 3092 of 2020 is disposed of. Since, no affidavit-in-opposition has been called for, the allegations made in the writ petition are deemed to have not been admitted by the respondents. 15. There will be no order as to costs. 16. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties upon compliance of all necessary formalities.