JUDGEMENT : Shree Chandrashekhat, J. Namkum P.S. Case No. 18 of 2007 was registered on 14.02.2007 under section 363/34 of the Indian Penal Code (in short, IPC) against Rajesh Prajapati and Deepu Prajapati. In his written complaint dated 14.02.2007, Rajendra Kumar raised a suspicion against Rajesh Prajapati and Deepu Prajapati with whom he was litigating a land dispute in the Court that they have abducted Prashant Kumar, his son, due to enmity. In course of the investigation a friend of Prashant Kumar disclosed that in the evening of 13.02.2007 he had seen Prashant Kumar in the company of unknown persons and Anil Gupta told the police that around that time he had found Monti and Ganpat Kumar moving with an unknown boy on a bicycle with a bag. On the basis of the informations collected from several persons the police zeroed in on Ganpat Kumar who when interrogated by the police confessed his crime and suffered a disclosure statement. At his pointing the dead body of Prashant Kumar and crime ar1icles which were concealed inside the ground were dug out in presence of the Magistrate. The offences under sections 364 and 302 IPC were therefore added in the report. Monti was not apprehended and has remained absconding. A charge-sheet was laid against Ganpat Kumar after the investigation and he has faced the trial on the charge framed under sections 363, 364, 302 and 201 IPC. In the trial, the prosecution has examined altogether 22 witnesses who have tendered evidence, primarily circumstantial evidence, which was found sufficient by the learned Additional Judicial Commissioner, Fast Track Court No. VI, Ranchi to convict the appellant under sections 364-A/34, 302/34 and 201/34 IPC. The appellant was sentenced to RI for life with a fine of Rs. 10,000/- both under sections 302/34 and 364-A/34 IPC with a default stipulation that he would undergo further imprisonment for two years in default of payment of the fine amount, on each count. He has been further sentenced to RI for seven years with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- under section 201/34 IPC with a default stipulation to undergo further imprisonment for one year. 2. The judgment of conviction of the appellant passed in Sessions Trial o. 460 of 2007 has been assailed by Mr. He has been further sentenced to RI for seven years with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- under section 201/34 IPC with a default stipulation to undergo further imprisonment for one year. 2. The judgment of conviction of the appellant passed in Sessions Trial o. 460 of 2007 has been assailed by Mr. A. K. Kashyap, the learned senior counsel for the appellant, on the grounds that the incriminating circumstances sought to be established by the prosecution against the appellant were not proved by cogent evidence; the circumstances in the broken chain of circumstances do not form together a firm foundation for conviction and; the appellant has been convicted solely on the basis of his so-called confessional statement which was extracted by force. 3. The case of the prosecution against the appellant is based on circumstantial evidence. The guiding principles on the circumstantial evidence which originated in "Reg v. Hodge"[(1838) 2 Lew 227 : 68 ER 1136] is that before convicting a person on the basis of circumstantial evidence the court must be satisfied not only that the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the person but is also inconsistent with any other rational inference pointing to innocence of the accused. This rule of evidence which is known as Hodge rule is firmly ingrained in the criminal justice system in India. In "Bodhraj @ Bodha v. State of Jammu & Kashmir" (2002) 8 SCC 45 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that there is no doubt that conviction can be passed solely on circumstantial evidence but it should be tested on the touchstone of the law relating to circumstantial evidence laid down by this Court (reference is of Hon'ble Supreme Court) as far back as in 1952 (this has reference to "Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. The State of Madhya Pradesh" [ AIR 1952 SC 343 : “10….It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused…….”). Soon after "Hanumant Govind Nargundkar", in "Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab" AIR 1954 SC 62 the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down that where the case depends upon the conclusion drawn from the circumstances the cumulative effect of the circumstances must be such as to negate innocence of the accused and bring home the offence beyond any reasonable doubt. Since then, the opinion in "Hodge" case has been consistently applied by the Courts in India in evaluating the circumstantial evidence tendered against a person accused of a crime. 4. PW-I and PW-4 are the friends and classmate of Prashant Kumar and PW-2 is the Tutor. In the afternoon of 13.02.2007 Prashant Kumar had left home for tuition and after spending sometime at the house of PW-2 left for home at around 05:00 PM. PW-I has deposed in the Court that Prashant, Nishant, Abhijeet, Rahul, Rajani and Supriya were taking tuition under PW-2 in one batch. At around 04:00 PM on 13.02.2007 he reached the house of PW-2 where his wife informed him that her husband is busy in the school for practical examination and she asked the students to complete the work of the previous day. After sometime when the wife of PW-2 informed that her husband would be coming home late and he had asked the students to go back home, he alongwith Prashant Kumar left for home. He has further stated that he parted company with Prashant Kumar near the gate of his house who had told him that he was also going home. In the night when Prashant Kumar did not reach home his father came and inquired about him. PW-2 has also narrated a similar story in the Court. PW-3 is the Magistrate who has conducted inquest in presence of PW-11 and PW-14, and PW 4 has seen Prashant Kumar in the company of an unknown boy. In the night when Prashant Kumar did not reach home his father came and inquired about him. PW-2 has also narrated a similar story in the Court. PW-3 is the Magistrate who has conducted inquest in presence of PW-11 and PW-14, and PW 4 has seen Prashant Kumar in the company of an unknown boy. PW-5 is a friend of Monti and PW-6 is the mother of PW-5. They have said that Monti and Ganpat Kumar had stayed with them for few days between 29.03.2007 and 02.04.2007. PW-7 has stated that the appellant was working at Gangotri Plastic Factory and residing there. PW-8 is a neighbour of the appellant who has supported the prosecution on recovery and seizure of Avon bicycle and a motorcycle from the house of Rupesh, on the basis of disclosures made by the appellant. PW-9 is another friend of Monti. In the presence of PW-10, PW-l1, PW-14, PW-16 and PW-22 the dead body of Prashant Kumar was recovered from a place behind Gangotri Plastic Factory. PW-10 is the owner of Gangotri Plastic Factory who has stated in the Court that the appellant was working in his factory and on 14.04.2007 he was brought there by the police. PW-11 is another seizure witness who has stated about recovery of an iron pipe and a spade, which according to the prosecution was used by the appellant for digging the earth to conceal the dead body. He has stated that in his presence the police had collected and sealed blood-stained soil in a polythene pack. PW-12 has produced the iron pipe, spade and blood-stained oil in the Court and PW-9 and PW-13 are hear ay witnesses. PW-14, PW-I5, PW-16 and PW-17 are the relatives of Prashant Kumar who have tendered evidence on missing of Prashant Kumar, ransom calls and letter, payment of ransom money and the appellant found in the company of Monti at the Gossner College. PW-19, the investigating officer ha recorded statement of the witnesses, interrogated the appellant and recorded his confession statement. He has stated in the Court that on 05.03.2007 PW-16 had produced an envelop containing a threatening letter- that on the information of PW-S he had visited Gangotri Plastic Factory and inquired about the appellant from his brother, and; that the brother of the appellant had escorted him to lunger from where the appellant was brought for interrogation. He has stated in the Court that on 05.03.2007 PW-16 had produced an envelop containing a threatening letter- that on the information of PW-S he had visited Gangotri Plastic Factory and inquired about the appellant from his brother, and; that the brother of the appellant had escorted him to lunger from where the appellant was brought for interrogation. He has proved the confessional statement of the appellant vide exhibit-14, each page of which was signed by the appellant. He has further stated that on disclosure of the appellant and upon his identification the dead body of Prashant Kumar was recovered from a place behind Gangotri Plastic Factory; the dead body was exhumed in presence of the Magistrate, and; the inquest was conducted by the Magistrate in presence of the officer incharge of Namkum P.S. The recovery memo of an iron pipe and spade vide exhibit-15, Avon bycycle belonging to Prashant Kumar vide exhibit-16 and seizure of the motorcycle from house of Rupesh Kumar vide exhibit-17 were proved by him and he has affirmed in the Court that the seizures were made on disclosure and pointing of the appellant. PW-20 has deposed in the Court that he purchased Avon bicycle from the appellant and PW-21 has produced the seized bicycle in the Court. 5. PW-14, PW-15, PW-16 and PW-17 are the related witnesses but the appellant was not known to them. The friends and Tutor of Prashant Kumar also had no previous acquaintances with the appellant. These witnesses are closely related/associated with the deceased and they have tendered cogent and convincing evidence in the Court. PW-4, PW-5, PW-6, PW-20 and PW-22 are the other material witnesses for the prosecution and with them also no trace of animosity with the appellant is found in the suggestions by the defence during their cross-examination. These witnesses are closely related/associated with the deceased and they have tendered cogent and convincing evidence in the Court. PW-4, PW-5, PW-6, PW-20 and PW-22 are the other material witnesses for the prosecution and with them also no trace of animosity with the appellant is found in the suggestions by the defence during their cross-examination. Since long the credibility of related witnesses and the worth of their evidence in the Court have continued to be debated before the Hon'ble Apex Court and on each occasion it has been held that relationship is not a ground to discard the evidence of a witness, one of the earliest judgments on the point was in "Masalti v. State of U.P" AIR 1965 SC 202 , The material witnesses on whom the prosecution has laid its case to prove the circumstance of last seen together and sale of the bicycle belonging to Prashant Kumar are independent witnesses and the appellant was not known to the others, except PW-22, They have identified the appellant for the first time in the Court and on that ground a plea was raised that intrinsic value of their evidence would be substantially diminished and identification of the appellant by them for the first time in the Court should not be made basis for the conviction, To put it simple, the argument is that without prior Test Identification Parade identification of the appellant by the prosecution witnesses in the Court is of no worth. We find an answer to this plea in several judgements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and we would refer to the one in "Hari Nath and Another v. State of U.P." (1988) 1 SCC 14 . The necessity of Test Identification Parade to corroborate identification of an unknown accused in the Court is a rule of prudence and not an absolute rule, In "Hari Nath" the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that absence of corroboration by test identification may not assume materiality if either the witness had known the accused earlier or where the reasons for gaining an enduring impression of the identity in the mind and memory of the witness are otherwise brought out. In "Sidhartha Vashisht @ Alanu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi)" (2010) 6 SCC 1 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has referred to several judgements on relevance of a prior Test Identification Parade and finally concluded that the Court may appreciate dock identification as being above board and more than conclusive even there is no previous test identification, PW-4 has identified the appellant as the person who was moving along with Monti and Prashant Kumar in the evening of 13.02.2007 and PW-20 has recognized him as the person from whom he had purchased the bicycle belonging to Prashant Kumar. These witnesses had sufficient time and opportunity to observe physical features of the appellant and there is nothing unusual about these witnesses recollecting the 'scene' when they saw him in the dock. There is no allegation that the appellant was shown to the witnesses and it is really immaterial that they could know his name from the newspaper. PW-22 was a co-worker who has also seen the appellant and Monti with an unknown boy (Prashant Kumar) in the evening around 06:00-06:30 PM. He has identified the dead boy of the unknown boy with whom the appellant and Monti were moving. The identification of an accused by a witness in the Court is a substantive evidence which can be relied upon by the Court to record conviction of an accused without any further corroboration by Test Identification. The identification of the appellant by PW-4, PW-20 and PW-22 is sufficient to establish identity of the person in whose company Prashant Kumar was last seen alive in the evening of 13.02.2007 and who had sold the bicycle carried by Prashant Kumar. From cross-examination of these witnesses, we do not find a suggestion of any worth to challenge presence of PW-4 and PW-22 at the place and time when they saw the appellant in the company of the deceased. PW-4 has deposed in the Court that Prashant Kumar is a co-collegiate who lives in the same colony (muhalla). On 13.02.2007 when he was going to market on the way an the mor (turning point) he met Prashant Kumar who was coming with another boy. He told him that the boy was creating nuisance (kichain). PW-4 has deposed in the Court that Prashant Kumar is a co-collegiate who lives in the same colony (muhalla). On 13.02.2007 when he was going to market on the way an the mor (turning point) he met Prashant Kumar who was coming with another boy. He told him that the boy was creating nuisance (kichain). His evidence is weakened by his statement that he did not see that 'boy' fully and completely but what is more significant is that the defence has not cross-examined him, except putting a question to him whether he has seen anybody committing murder of Prashant Kumar. PW-22 has deposed in the Court that at about 06:00-06:30 in the evening of 13.02.2007 when he came out of his room he saw Ganpat and Monti coming with an unknown boy who was carrying a bicycle and bag and on 14.04.2007 at the pointing of the appellant the dead body of that unknown boy was recovered. He has identified the dead body as of the unknown boy with Whom the appellant and Monti were coming in the evening of 13.02.2007. He was cross-examined with reference to his employment at Gangotri Plastic Factory and he has stated in the Court that he has neither produced any certificate of employment nor has disclosed his salary. From the trend of his cross-examination it appears that the defence has tried to impeach his testimony by showing that he is a stock witness, but there is evidence of the owner of the factory who has deposed in the Court that PW-22 was employed there. The evidence that he has seen the deceased in the evening of 13.02.2007 in the company of Monti and the appellant has remained unchallenged and there is no cross-examination by the defence on this point. The circumstance of last seen together is weighing heavily against the appellant and a presumption shall be raised against him under section 106 of the Evidence Act that he is the person who has killed Prashant Kumar. The time gap between last seen together and recovery of the dead body of Prashant Kumar is though too large, yet does not contradict the prosecution story that Prashant Kumar was killed around 14/15.02.2007- PW-18 has rendered an opinion that the time elapsed since death would be between 5 to 10 weeks from the postmortem examination. 6. The time gap between last seen together and recovery of the dead body of Prashant Kumar is though too large, yet does not contradict the prosecution story that Prashant Kumar was killed around 14/15.02.2007- PW-18 has rendered an opinion that the time elapsed since death would be between 5 to 10 weeks from the postmortem examination. 6. In every criminal trial the prosecution is required to lead cogent and consistent materials which are sufficient to establish complicity of the accused in the crime and before the onus shifts to the accused by operation of section 106 of the Evidence Act the prosecution must establish a prima-facie case against the accused. The misconception on applicability of section 106 of the Evidence Act was finally laid at rest in "Shambu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer, AIR 1956 SC 404 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be used to undermine the well established rule of law that, save in a very exceptional class of cases, the burden is on the prosecution and never shifts. The circumstance that Prashant Kumar was lastly seen alive in the company of the appellant and Monti was not a casual, accidental or coincidental meeting when they were seen together. Monti who was known to Prashant Kumar and the appellant were seen with him in the evening of 13.02.2007 and the evidence of last seen together has remained intact. The appellant is therefore required in law to offer a satisfactory explanation as to what has happened after Prashant Kumar was last seen alive in his company. The provisions of section 106 of the Evidence Act clearly lay down that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of the person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him, and if an accused fails to furnish an explanation which is accepted by the Court as a probable and satisfactory explanation to the incriminating circumstance of last seen together, by virtue of section 106 of the Evidence Act the Courts are required to draw an adverse inference against the accused. In "Navaneethakrishnan v. State, (2018) 16 SCC 161 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has elucidated the law on the point as under: 22. In "Navaneethakrishnan v. State, (2018) 16 SCC 161 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has elucidated the law on the point as under: 22. "…..It is a settled legal position that the law presumes that it is the person, who was last seen with the deceased, would have killed the deceased and the burden to rebut the same lies on the accused to prove that they had departed. Undoubtedly, the last seen theory is an important event in the chain of circumstances that would completely establish and/or could point to the guilt of the accused with some certainty. However, this evidence alone cannot discharge the burden of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and requires corroboration." 7. There are other clinching materials to establish guilt of the appellant. The prosecution has proved recovery of the dead body of Prashant Kumar, an iron rod and a spade from Gangotri Plastic Factory Campus. The inquest report was prepared at 10:25 AM on 14.04.2007 and the iron pipe and spade were recovered at 10:45 AM. The factory campus would be frequented by several persons and it was argued that the recoveries made pursuant to disclosures of the appellant are from an open and accessible place on account of which evidentiary value of the recoveries would be diminished. But the evidence which has come on record show that the dead body and the crime articles were concealed inside the earth and were dug out at the pointing of the appellant. PW-3, PW-10, PW-11, PW-14, PW-16 and PW-22 have stated in the Court that the dead body of Prashant Kumar was concealed beneath the ground and was recovered at the instance of the appellant. The appellant had exclusive knowledge of the place where the dead body was concealed. The inquest report mentions that the dead body was buried inside the earth in the campus of Gangotri Plastic Factory. PW-3, the Magistrate and PW- 18, the doctor, have found remnant earth on the dead body of Prashant Kumar. It further appears that to mask the dead body the appellant had sprinkled lime over the ground. In '"State of Himachal Pradesh v. Jeet Singh" (1999) 4 SCC 370 the Hon'ble Supreme court has observed that recovery of the articles made from any place which is "open or accessible to others" does not make the statement of the accused inadmissible under section 27 of the Evidence Act. In '"State of Himachal Pradesh v. Jeet Singh" (1999) 4 SCC 370 the Hon'ble Supreme court has observed that recovery of the articles made from any place which is "open or accessible to others" does not make the statement of the accused inadmissible under section 27 of the Evidence Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under: "26. There is nothing in Section 27 of the Evidence Act which renders the statement of the accused inadmissible if recovery of the articles was made from any place which is "open or accessible to others". It is a fallacious notion that when recovery of any incriminating article was made from a place which is open or accessible to others, it would vitiate the evidence under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Any object can be concealed in places which are open or accessible to others. For example, if the article is buried in the main roadside or if it is concealed beneath dry leaves lying on public places or kept hidden in a public office, the article would remain out of the visibility of others in normal circumstances. Until such article is disinterred, its hidden state would 'remain unhampered. The person who hid it alone knows where it is until he discloses that fact to any other person. Hence, the crucial question is not whether the place was accessible to others or not but whether it was ordinarily visible to others. If it is not, then it is immaterial that the concealed place is accessible to others." 8. Mr. A. K. Kashyap, the learned senior counsel for the appellant would contend that non-examination of some of the witnesses in whose presence recoveries were made and PW-10 stating in his cross-examination that he has signed a plain paper are such lacunae in the prosecution case that make the recoveries doubtful and the Court should not act upon the evidence of the Panch witnesses. We find that irrespective of the confessional statement of the appellant the prosecution has proved that the dead body of Prashant Kumar was recovered in presence of the appellant and evidence of the witnesses that the appellant had pointed out the place from where the recoveries were affected has remained unshaken. We find that irrespective of the confessional statement of the appellant the prosecution has proved that the dead body of Prashant Kumar was recovered in presence of the appellant and evidence of the witnesses that the appellant had pointed out the place from where the recoveries were affected has remained unshaken. There is nothing in the cross-examination of the witnesses which would throw a doubt on presence of these witnesses at the time and place from where the dead body of Prashant Kumar and the crime articles were recovered by the investigating officer. 9. Mr. A.K.Kashyap, the learned senior counsel has contended that on his Own admission the investigating officer has recorded confessional statement of the appellant before his arrest and therefore section 27 of the Evidence Act has no application in this case. 10. The confessional statement of the appellant was recorded at 05:04 AM and the arrest memo was prepared at 06:10 AM. Atleast for two reasons we would not agree with the learned senior counsel that before section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is sought to be pressed the prosecution must establish that the accused was arrested. First of all the expression 'arrest' which is not formally defined in the major Acts as understood in the legal parlance does not mean handcuffing. A simple touch by the police is good enough and constitutes arrest. The dictionary meaning of the word 'custody', such as care, guardianship, charge, safekeeping, imprisonment, detention, confinement etc. comprehend a variety of circumstances and not limited to actual physical confinement of an accused always in jail. Secondly, though prior in time the confessional statement of the appellant and preparation of the arrest memo form part of the same transaction and it is really inconsequential which came to be prepared first. The preparation of arrest memo is a ministerial act and it is impracticable to insist that the police must first prepare the arrest memo and then proceed to record the confessional statement. In "Mohd. Arif v. State (NCT of Delhi)" 2011 (13) SCC 621 the Hon'ble Supreme Court ha observed that for the accused being in custody of the investigating agency he need not have been formally arrested and it is enough if his movements were under the control of the investigating agency. In "Mohd. Arif v. State (NCT of Delhi)" 2011 (13) SCC 621 the Hon'ble Supreme Court ha observed that for the accused being in custody of the investigating agency he need not have been formally arrested and it is enough if his movements were under the control of the investigating agency. It was further clarified that a formal arrest is not necessary and the fact that the accused was in effective custody of the police is sufficient to satisfy the requirements under section 27. In "Vikram Singh v. State of Punjab" (2010) 3 SCC 56 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that there is no need of a formal arrest for the applicability of section 27. The observations of the Hon'ble supreme Court in paragraph no. 18 of "Bodhraj" on which much emphasis was laid by the learned senior counsel that; "mere statement that the accused led the police and the witnesses to the place where he had concealed the articles is not indicative of the information given", has to be understood in the factual background of the case. One of the witnesses (PW-18) deposed in the Court that the other co-accused persons made a statement before him that they had got the deceased killed, and a revolver and its license were recovered at the instance of the co-accused. There was no written confessional statement of the accused. As to the applicability of section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the exact information given by the accused while in custody which led to recovery of the articles has to be proved and therefore the information given should be recorded and if not so recorded, the exact information must be adduced through evidence. On behalf of the appellant reliance was also placed on "Salish Kumar v. State of H.P" (2020) 7 SCC 637 in which the primary question before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was whether the dead body was recovered prior to recording of confessional statement of the accused persons. Recovery of a single barrel gun with the cartridge from the house of the license holder on the disclosure of one of the accused and absence of call details report as to the alleged calls made by the accused weighed heavily with the trial Court while acquitting the accused. In paragraph no. Recovery of a single barrel gun with the cartridge from the house of the license holder on the disclosure of one of the accused and absence of call details report as to the alleged calls made by the accused weighed heavily with the trial Court while acquitting the accused. In paragraph no. 19 of the reported judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the witnesses do not appear to be trustworthy so as to maintain conviction of the accused and evidence of the prosecution does not inspire confidence. These cases are clearly distinguishable on facts. 11. There is no doubt on recovery of the dead body of Prashant Kumar, an iron pipe and a spade on the disclosure of the appellant in the presence of PW-10, PW-11, PW-14, PW-16 and PW-22. These materials are independently incriminating and coupled with a part of the disclosure made by the appellant clearly point out towards his involvement in kidnapping for ransom and murder of Prashant Kumar. The learned senior counsel for the appellant has relied on "Dudh Nath Pandey v. State of U.P" (1981) 2 SCC 166 to contend that mere recovery of the incriminating article is not sufficient to hold that the appellant has committed murder of Prashant Kumar. On going through the judgment in "Dudh Nath Pandey", we observe that the facts in both cases are entirely different and answer to the plea urged on behalf of the appellant can be found in paragraph no. 15 of the reported judgement, thus: "15…..The evidence surrounding the discovery of the pistol may not be discarded as wholly untrue but it leaves a few significant questions unanswered and creates a sense of uneasiness in the mind of a criminal court, the Court of conscience that it has to be: How could the appellant have an opportunity to conceal the pistol in broad daylight on a public thoroughfare? if he reloaded the pistol as a measure of self-prosecution, as suggested by the prosecution, why did he get rid of it so quickly by throwing it near the Hathi Park itself? And how come that the police hit upon none better than Ram Kishore (PH 4) to "witness the discovery of the pistol? Ram Kishore had already deposed in seven different cases in favour of the prosecution and was evidently at the beck and call of the police. 12. And how come that the police hit upon none better than Ram Kishore (PH 4) to "witness the discovery of the pistol? Ram Kishore had already deposed in seven different cases in favour of the prosecution and was evidently at the beck and call of the police. 12. The confessional statement of an accused before the police is not admissible in evidence, however, a part the statement of an accused which contains exculpatory matters not amounting to confession can be looked into by the Court in a trial or a proceeding. In his confessional statement the appellant has described in considerable details the facts and circumstances leading to kidnapping, demand of ransom and murder or Prashant Kumar. The confessional statement of the appellant was recorded at 05:04 AM on 14.04.2007 in presence of several senior police officers. The investigating officer who has recorded the confessional statement has deposed in the court that the appellant gave his disclosure statement which was reduced into writing and each page of the confessional statement was signed by the appellant. The confessional statement of the appellant was laid in evidence in the trial and it \vas marked as exhibit-14. For the first time in his examination under section 313 CrPC the appellant has set-up a defence that his confessional statement was extracted by force, but before that he did not retract his statement nor did he ever complain to the Court when he was produced before the Magistrate that his confessional statement was not voluntary. The other police officers in whose presence the confessional statement of the appellant was recorded were not examined during the trial but in our opinion that is neither a lacuna in the prosecution case nor a mistake of the prosecution during the trial for plurality or multiplicity of the same and similar evidence is not a requirement under section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act which provides that for the proof of any fact in a case no particular number of witnesses is required. The investigating officer has fairly admitted in his cross-examination that the appellant was questioned and released on his personal bond. He was arrested when in course of interrogation the second time he admitted that he had kidnapped and killed Prashant Kumar with the help of Monti. The investigating officer has fairly admitted in his cross-examination that the appellant was questioned and released on his personal bond. He was arrested when in course of interrogation the second time he admitted that he had kidnapped and killed Prashant Kumar with the help of Monti. It is not necessary that confessional statement of the accused is recorded in presence of independent witnesses) and therefore if a part of the disclosures made by the accused comes within the sweep of section 27 it is immaterial whether or not any public witness was examined by the prosecution to prove the confessional statement and recoveries made pursuant thereof. The story narrated by the appellant in his confessional statement was not cooked up by the police can be discerned from the events that followed. The appellant has confessed that he hit Prashant Kumar on his head with the iron pipe and by that time the postmortem examination was not conducted. PW-18 who has conducted the postmortem examination has found one lacerated wound measuring about "6 cm x 3 cm", scalp deep on the left parietal region of the head. He has opined that the injury was antemortem in nature and caused by hard and blunt substance. The medical evidence further corroborates the prosecution story that Prashant Kumar was murdered around 14/15.02.2007 and his dead body was concealed beneath the ground. PW-18 has observed complete adipocytes changes all over the dead body which according to him generally starts three week after the death and continues upto 3 to 6 months. He has also stated that the dead body seemed to be kept in an environment like inside the ground or in water. 13. The expression 'discovery of fact' under section 27 of the Evidence Act requires the prosecution to prove by credible evidence that discovery of a new fact which was a relevant and material fact was made in pursuance of the information supplied by the accused in the custody. On more than one occasion the Hon'ble Supreme court has referred to the decision in "Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor" AIR 1947 PC 67 and reiterated that discovery of a fact arises by raising of the fact that the information given by the accused exhibited his knowledge or mental awareness as to its existence on a particular place and "discovery of fact" cannot be just identified with the object produced or found. The knowledge of the appellant about the place where the dead body of Prashant Kumar and the crime articles were concealed and his disclosure to the investigating officer about such place would constitute "fact discovered" as envisaged under section 27 of the Evidence Act and, thus, can be proved by the prosecution. The presence of too many independent persons who have come to the Court to prove the recoveries by itself is an assurance to credibility of the prosecution case that on disclosure of the appellant recoveries were effected from a place behind Gangotri Plastic Factory. In "Pawan Kumar v. State of U.P" (2015) 7 SCC 148 two co-accused disclosed the name of another accused at whose instance various incriminating materials including pistols, cartridges, bullets and blood-stained articles were recovered. The Hon'ble Supreme court has held that simply denying their role without proper explanation as to the knowledge about those incriminating materials is not sufficient and the accused cannot take shelter under section 25 of the Evidence Act. In "Aftab Ahmad Anasari v. State of Uttaranchal" (2010) 2 SCC 583 recovery of clothes of the deceased from a place shown by the accused was found covered under section 27 of the Evidence Act. 14. Another circumstance which was heavily relied upon by the prosecution against the appellant is sale of the bicycle of Prashant Kumar which he was carrying in the evening of 13.02.2007. The bicycle which was seized by the investigating officer from the house of PW-20 was produced in the Court by PW-21. The seizure of bicycle which was recovered on disclosure of the appellant has been proved by PW-8 and PW-22, and PW-20 who purchased the bicycle from the appellant has stated from the dock that he had purchased Avon bicycle from the appellant for Rs.400/-. He has stated that on insistence of the appellant and Monti he had purchased the bicycle and on 15th April 2007 when Ganpat came to his house with the police and the bicycle was seized then only he could know that it was a stolen property. On behalf of the accused an attempt was made to create a doubt that PW-20 did not purchase Avon bicycle from the appellant, but, we observe that his statement was recorded by the Magistrate under section 164 CrPC and in the cross-examination his stand was not shaken. On behalf of the accused an attempt was made to create a doubt that PW-20 did not purchase Avon bicycle from the appellant, but, we observe that his statement was recorded by the Magistrate under section 164 CrPC and in the cross-examination his stand was not shaken. PW-16 has produced a receipt vide exhibit-X/3 evidencing purchase of the seized bicycle and it was duly identified. A remarkable feature of this case is that there was no suggestion by the defence that the prosecution witnesses had any I animosity with the appellant. These witnesses were actuated with a motive to falsely implicate the appellant is not shown and it is not acceptable that the investigating officer has fabricated the entire evidence against him. In "State (Govt. of CT of Delhi) v. Sunil" (2001) 1 SCC 652 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that it is an archaic notion that actions of the police officers should be approached with initial distrust. In "Shankar Gajanan Kalan v. State of Maharashtra" (1996) 11 SCC 151 the ornaments worn by the deceased were found missing. Two witnesses were examined by the prosecution to prove that those ornaments could have been removed by the accused and none else. One witness stated in the Court that the accused came to his shop and offered six golden beads for sale and the other witness disclosed that when she demanded money from the accused which was given in loan to him, he offered one pair of gold earrings in liquidation of the debt. Those ornaments were identified in the trial to be belonging to the deceased and on the basis of these circumstances the Court came to hold that the accused was guilty for murder. In the present case, the prosecution has produced sufficient materials through PW-16 and PW-20 to prove that the bicycle of Prashant Kumar was sold by the appellant. Prashant Kumar was seen moving with a bicycle and bag in the evening of 13.02.2007 and the seized bicycle was the one which was purchased by his father. The recovery of Avon bicycle and the purchaser himself affirming in the Court purchase of the bicycle from the appellant are highly incriminating materials against the appellant which he has failed to satisfactorily explained when he was examined under section 313 CrPC. 15. The recovery of Avon bicycle and the purchaser himself affirming in the Court purchase of the bicycle from the appellant are highly incriminating materials against the appellant which he has failed to satisfactorily explained when he was examined under section 313 CrPC. 15. There is no call detail report; who wrote the ransom letter received by the father of Prashant Kumar was not established during the trial, and; PW-16 has admitted in the Court that the abductor did not disclose his name over telephone. On such facts it was contended that the advertisement issued in the newspaper-Ranchi Express was just a notice by way of 'information' to the general public and since demand of ransom is not proved so as to constitute the offence under section 364-A IP the foundation of the prosecution case has not been established and, therefore, the appellant cannot be convicted for the murder as well. 16. This aspect of the case has been dealt with by the learned trial Judge with reference to the prosecution evidence in the following manner: "33. As far as involvement of the accused in the offence of kidnapping and demand of ransom is concerned, the evidence available on record is mainly in the form of evidence of PW 5, PW 14 Anup Kumr, P W 16, and P W. 17 apart from the evidence of I.O P.W.19. Informant P.W.16 has slated that he could recollect after seeh1g the accused Ganpat that he was one of the persons moving on motorcycle which look away the bag containing a sum of rupees two lakhs from bridge on 3rd March 07. P W 14 Anup Kumar is the person being nephew of the informant who had accompanied the informant and his wife along with one Rajesh to Gassner college field on 1.4.07 where informant 'was called upon by the kidnappers to pay another installment of ransom amount along with mobile SIM. While they were waiting for the kidnappers to approach them P.W. 14 being Mahalla boy identified the accused Monti standing in the Gossnar college field along with another boy (who was later identified by him as accused Ganpat) and after they felt that he identified them, both of them started fleeing away from that place. While they were waiting for the kidnappers to approach them P.W. 14 being Mahalla boy identified the accused Monti standing in the Gossnar college field along with another boy (who was later identified by him as accused Ganpat) and after they felt that he identified them, both of them started fleeing away from that place. Combined appreciation of the evidence of P.W.5, 14, 16, 17 and 19 goes to show that after both accused fled away from the Gossnar college field and despite chase by P.W.14 succeeded to escape near Harmu housing colony Chouraha. There where about could be known by the police upon interrogation of chain of friends of accused Monti which led them to P.W.5 Dashrath Gari. The said P.W.5 has categorically identified the accused Ganpat Paswan as one of the two persons along with his friend Monti who remained in his house between 29.3.07 and 2.4.07 and has taken his scooty for some unknown purpose. He has also proved his 164 CrPC statement before this court, wherein also he has mentioned that two boys including Monti who had resided in his house were having enough money and finally they were left by him to take a vehicle either to Bhagalpur or Munger. In evidence of other 'witnesses including P.W.7 in para 9, P.W.22 and PW10 etc it has come repeatedly that accused Ganpat has been residing in the back portion of the Gangotri factory as he was working with his friend Monti in the said factory as labourer from sometime back. I.O of the case P.W.19 having taken clue regarding working of accused Monti and Ganpat' in the Gangotri factory, searched him out from his native place at Munger and thereafter he made discloser statement which led to recovery of dead body and articles as discussed above. The evidence and the pieces of the circumstances discussed above makes out a chain which goes to show that accused Ganpat was also involved in the kidnapping and asking the informant for ransom along with his co-accused friend Monti, who is still absconding. 17. The provisions of section 364-A require that the accused kidnapped or abducted the person; kept him under detention after such kidnapping and abduction; and the kidnapping or abduction was for ransom. 17. The provisions of section 364-A require that the accused kidnapped or abducted the person; kept him under detention after such kidnapping and abduction; and the kidnapping or abduction was for ransom. In "Malleshi v. State of Karnataka" (2004) 8 SCC 95 it was held that the offence of abduction is a continuing offence and there can be no delinite manner in which demand is to be made. The testimony of the father of Prashant Kumar and the investigating officer would indicate that for about two months the police had no clue where Prashant Kumar had gone. It was only after a series of enquiries were made from several persons the police could get relevant informations from Dasrath (PW-5) and brother of the appellant. PW-16, father of the victim has stated that on 01.03.2007 he received a letter for arranging Rupees Twenty Lacs as ransom and he was asked to publish a notice about missing of his son in the newspaper. He had gone to Gossner College with PW-14 to pay ransom money and at that time his wife was also accompanying him. There is evidence of PW-5 and PW-6 who have stated that Monti and the appellant had stayed in their home between 29.03.2007 and 02.04.2007. PW-5 is a friend of Monti and his statement under section 164 CrPC was recorded during the investigation. He has deposed in the Court that during the period between 29.03.2007 to 02.04.2007 he provided his Scooty bearing no. JHO1K 4495 to them and he found that they were carrying lots of money with them. PW-6 is the mother of PW-5 and she has corroborated the evidence of her son that about one year back two boys had come to stay in her house and her son had lend his Scaoty to them. PW-14, PW-16 and PW-17 are the witnesses who have spoken about ransom call. They had gone to Gossner College to pay ransom. The testimony of PW- 16 in the Court is exhaustive. It narrates the entire sequence of events leading to arrest of the appellant by the police. He has clearly stated that he received ransom calls and a letter on 01.03.2007 for Rupees Twenty Lacs ransom and after a series of talks the abductor finally agreed for Rupees Five Lacs. He is corroborated by PW-14 and PW-17 on the material aspects of the case. He has clearly stated that he received ransom calls and a letter on 01.03.2007 for Rupees Twenty Lacs ransom and after a series of talks the abductor finally agreed for Rupees Five Lacs. He is corroborated by PW-14 and PW-17 on the material aspects of the case. Section 59 of the Evidence Act provides that all facts, except the contents of documents or electronic records, may be proved by oral evidence. Section 60 provides that oral evidence of a witness to establish a fact who says that he has seen or heard a fact himself is sufficient. The demand of ransom as a fact has been proved by the prosecution and keeping in mind the other facts and circumstances of the case it can be safely inferred that the appellant had a role in making calls and writing letter for ransom. The appellant had come with Monti, who was residing in the same locality, to Gossncr College field on 01.04.2007 to collect ransom money. Both when found that PW-16 was accompanied by PW-14 started fleeing away. They were chased by PW-14 but somehow managed to escape. PW-16 has truthfully stated in the Court that it was PW-14 who could identify Monti at Gossner College and not him. PW- 14 has deposed in the Court that he had gone with his uncle, aunt and cousin brother to Gassner College behind the Church Complex to deliver ransom money and there he saw Monti and the appellant who on seeing him started fleeing away. He has identified the appellant in the Court as the 'other' boy who was with Monti. PW- 16 and PW- 17 though do not say in the Court that they have seen the appellant with Monti at Gossner College have supported PW-14 by saying that Monti was recognised by PW-14 because he was living in the same locality. The circumstance that Monti and the appellant started fleeing away from Gossner College field on seeing PW- 14 by itself may not be an incriminating circumstance, but, when seen in the context of other circumstances this piece of evidence would definitely form a connecting link in the chain of circumstances. There is no cross-examination of PW- 14, PW-16 and PW-17 to challenge their presence at Gossner College on 01.04.2007 and the appellant has failed to offer any explanation during his examination under section 313 CrPC. There is no cross-examination of PW- 14, PW-16 and PW-17 to challenge their presence at Gossner College on 01.04.2007 and the appellant has failed to offer any explanation during his examination under section 313 CrPC. In "Phula Singh v. State of H.P " (2014) 4 SCC 9 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the accused has a duty to furnish an explanation in his statement under section 313 Cr.PC regarding any incriminating material that has been produced against him, however, if the accused has chosen to remain silent or in complete denial when his statement under section 3 13 Cr.PC was recorded the Court would be entitled to draw an inference, including such adverse inference against the accused as may be permissible in accordance with law. In "Munish Mubar v. State of Haryana" (2012) 10 SCC 464 car of the accused was parked at Delhi Airport and it was found there for about three hours on the date of Occurrence. The call records of his telephone established that he was present in the vicinity of the place of Occurrence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that it was the duty of the accused to furnish some explanation in his statement under section 313 CrPC, as under what circumstances his car was parked at Delhi Airport and it remained there for three hours on the date of Occurrence, and merely making a bald statement that he was innocent and recoveries had been planted and the call records were false and fabricated documents were not enough. 18. Apart from the evidence on last seen together, recovery of Avon bicycle and evidence of the purchaser are such incriminating materials which on their Own are sufficient to prove guilt of the appellant. In "Aftab Ahmad Anasari v. State of Uttaranchal” the Hon'ble supreme Court held that if the combined effect of all of the facts taken together is conclusive in establishing the guilt of the accused, the conviction would be justified even though it may be that one or more of these facts by itself/themselves is/are not decisive. The Court has further held that the circumstances proved should be such as to exclude every hypothesis except the one sought to be proved, but this does not mean that before the prosecution case succeeds each and every hypothesis suggested by the accused must be excluded, howsoever extravagant and fanciful it may be. The Court has further held that the circumstances proved should be such as to exclude every hypothesis except the one sought to be proved, but this does not mean that before the prosecution case succeeds each and every hypothesis suggested by the accused must be excluded, howsoever extravagant and fanciful it may be. The judgment in "Baiju Kumar Soni v. State of Jharkhand"(2019) 7 SCC 73 on which the learned senior counsel for the appellant has placed heavy reliance is clearly distinguishable on facts. A call was received from a S.T.D booth threatening the witness that he may have to pay the price. When a minor girl had gone missing on 08.01.2006 while she was playing in front of her house, a report was lodged with the police. A scarf and a drawing book allegedly belonging to the girl was recovered from the house of the appellants. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has acquitted the accused observing that no evidence was produced by the prosecution to establish a circumstance that the mobile numbers from which threatening calls were made belonged to the prosecution witnesses or were in anyway under their control and there was no forensic or handwriting report establishing that the threatening letters were written by the accused. The accused was therefore held entitled to the benefit of doubt. In the present case, the circumstances proved by the prosecution clearly inculpate him for commission of the crime and the chain of circumstances is so complete as to exclude any rational inference about hi innocence. The evidences produced by the prosecution in the trial against the appellant clearly proved the charges under sections 302/34 IPC and 364-A/34 IPC for abducting Prashant Kumar for ransom and hi murder. The dead body was concealed beneath the earth and it was recovered at pointing of the appellant and, therefore, he has rightly been convicted under section 201/34 IPC for causing disappearance of the dead body. 19. In view of the aforesaid discussions, we find no merit in this criminal appeal and, accordingly, Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 1028 of 2010 is dismissed. 20. Let the lower court records be transmitted to the Court concerned, forthwith. 21. Let a copy of the judgement be transmitted to the court concerned and the concerned Jail superintendent.