ORDER : Anand Pathak, J. 1. This is an application by State seeking leave to appeal under Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the judgment dated 06-03-2020 whereby the respondents/accused namely Santosh Kushwah and Bhura alias Ramkrishna have been acquitted by the trial Court in SST No. 93/2015 for offence under Section 376(D) of IPC and Section 5(g)/6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as 'the POCSO Act'). 2. Precisely stated facts of the case are that as per the contents of FIR on 22-04-2015 at 9:15 pm the prosecutrix (PW-4) lodged the report against accused persons to the effect that when in the night, she went to answer the call of nature then accused persons appeared on the spot, dragged her to their home, girded her limbs and committed rape over her. Later on FIR was registered and after medical examination investigation carried out and charge-sheet was filed. 3. Before the trial Court, points for consideration were age of prosecutrix as well as the allegations of rape. After considering the relevant documents and evidence in this regard, trial Court found the age of prosecutrix about 16 years and found to be a child under Section 2(d) of POCSO Act. After appreciating the evidence, trial Court acquitted the respondents/accused. Therefore, this leave to appeal has been preferred along with appeal memo so as to challenge the order of acquittal. 4. It is submission of learned counsel for the appellant/State that when girl went to answer the call of nature at that time accused persons dragged her to their home and committed rape over her. Medical report indicates commission of offence of rape. Trial Court erred in recording acquittal in favour of accused and caused illegality. 5. Heard counsel for the applicant/State and record perused. 6. In this case State is seeking is leave to appeal against the judgment of acquittal recorded in favour of respondents/accused. Testimony of two eye-witnesses namely Lakhan alias Golu (PW-1) and Bhure Singh (PW-7) go at loggerheads. Lakhan alias Golu (PW-1) witnessed the incident along with Bhure Singh (PW-7) when both were coming back from a function around 2-3 am in the night on fateful day i.e. 21-04-2015. Testimony of two eye-witnesses namely Lakhan alias Golu (PW-1) and Bhure Singh (PW-7) go at loggerheads. Lakhan alias Golu (PW-1) witnessed the incident along with Bhure Singh (PW-7) when both were coming back from a function around 2-3 am in the night on fateful day i.e. 21-04-2015. According to Lakhan alias Golu (PW-1), removal of quilt revealed that limbs of prosecutrix (PW-4) were tied, she was without clothes and accused Bhura was in intimate position whereas testimony of Bhure Singh (PW-7) reveals that when he removed the quilt, he found both the accused Bhura as well as Santosh over the bed along with prosecutrix. It is highly surprising that two witnesses refer the presence of two persons in different numerical way. Lakhan alias Golu (PW-1) refers presence of accused Bhura whereas Bhure Singh (PW-7) refers the presence of Bhura as well as Santosh. Such dichotomy of deposition renders the case of prosecution doubtful. Interestingly, Lakhan alias Golu (PW-1) and Bhure Singh (PW-7) were not declared hostile by the prosecution, therefore, statements of both the witnesses are binding over the prosecution. In the case of Rajaram Vs. State of Rajasthan, 2005 SCC (Cri.) 1050, Apex Court has held that if a prosecution witness does not support prosecution case and is not declared hostile, statement of such witness is binding on the prosecution. 7. From the testimony of prosecution witnesses sufficient contradictions and omissions are being surfaced because the route which ought to had been taken by the eye witnesses was not the regularly used/usual route between Nateran to Vardha. Therefore, on this point also testimony of witnesses become doubtful. 8. So far as the testimony of prosecutrix (PW-4) is concerned, in her cross-examination, she accepts that she has one toilet in her house and admits that she regularly uses her toilet and she does not have any need to go out to address the call of nature. Therefore, story of prosecution indicates an improbable event because in such unearthly hours in night, it is highly improbable that prosecutrix would move outside her house for use of toilet when she already had one in her house. She admits that written report Ex-P/4 was caused to be written by her father and not on her instructions. But interestingly, neither statements of father nor mother were taken during investigation nor they were produced before the Court as witnesses. She admits that written report Ex-P/4 was caused to be written by her father and not on her instructions. But interestingly, neither statements of father nor mother were taken during investigation nor they were produced before the Court as witnesses. This further renders the story of prosecution doubtful. The nature of clothes used to gird the prosecutrix was also doubtful because both the witnesses go in different directions regarding their testimony. 9. So far as medical opinion is concerned, doctor did not find any injury over the person of prosecutrix and one minor contusion over her thigh and breasts could have been caused by prosecutrix herself. 10. In the case of Ashish Batham Vs. State of M.P., AIR 2002 SC 3206 , the Court has held that there is a long mental distance between "may be true" and "must be true" and this basic and golden rule only helps to maintain vital distinction between "conjectures" and "sure conclusion" to be arrived at one touchstone of dispassionate judicial scrutiny based upon a complete and comprehensive appreciation of all features of the case as well as quality and credibility of evidence brought on record. It is oft repeated that graver the charge is greater should be the proof required, to bring home the analogy that till the charges are proved beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of clear, cogent, credible or unimpeachable evidence, the question of indicting or punishing the accused does not arise. Trial Court has rightly appreciated the necessary contours of the controversy and thereafter passed a reasoned judgment recording acquittal in favour of accused persons. 11. It is settled principle of law that if the trial Court after due appreciation of the evidence comes to the conclusion about the finding of acquittal then normally if the finding is not perverse, this should not be interfered with by the Appellate Court. For this, reliance can be placed on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Chandrappa vs. State of Karnataka 2007 AIR SCW 1850, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court laid down the legal principles to entertain the appeal against acquittal and held as under:- "39. For this, reliance can be placed on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Chandrappa vs. State of Karnataka 2007 AIR SCW 1850, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court laid down the legal principles to entertain the appeal against acquittal and held as under:- "39. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge; (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on question of fact and of law; (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court". 12. In the case of Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 2010 SC 589 , wherein it is observed as under:- "It is open to the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and conclusions drawn by the trial Court but only in a case when the judgment of the trial court is stated to be perverse. The word "perverse" to mean "against the weight of evidence". 13. The word "perverse" to mean "against the weight of evidence". 13. Trial Court has considered all the aspects in detail and after considering all the material evidence in this regard found the case of prosecution as doubtful. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of K. Prakashan Vs. P.K. Surenderan (2008) 1 SCC 258 and T. Subramanian v. State of Tamil Nadu (2006) 1 SCC 401 held that if two views are possible and one view is taken by the trial Court after due appreciation of evidence including the demeanor of witnesses then unless sheer perversity or illegality crept in to the judgment of trial Court scope of interference in appeal is limited. 14. Considering the same, it appears that no case for interference is made out. Therefore, leave is declined and accordingly the application is hereby dismissed. Judgment dated 06-03-2020 of trial Court stands affirmed. 15. Copy of this order be sent to the trial Court for information.