JUDGMENT M.S. Sonak, J. - Heard Mr. S.G. Desai, the learned Senior Advocate who appears along with Ms. Shalaka Shalke for the Appellants in both the appeals and Mr. Amit Palekar for the Respondents. 2. On 7/9/2020, we had made it clear that subject to constraints of time, an endeavor shall be made to dispose of this Appeal finally at the stage of admission. The learned Counsel for the parties agree that both these Appeals can be disposed of by a common Judgment and Order since, the challenge in both these Appeals is to the common Judgment and Order dated 28/1/2020 made by the District Judge, South Goa at Margao (Commercial Court). 3. Commercial Appeal Stamp Number (Main) No.639 of 2020 is directed against the dismissal of application for a temporary mandatory injunction at Exhibit 7 and Commercial Appeal Stamp Number (Main) No.923 of 2020 is directed against the dismissal of application at Exhibit D-17. Both the applications were filed before the Commercial Court by the Appellant herein. Accordingly, both these Commercial Appeals are admitted and taken up for final disposal with the consent of and at the request of the learned Counsel for the parties. 4. The challenge in both these Appeals is to the order dated 28/1/2020, made by the District Court, South Goa, at Margao in Special Civil Suit (Commercial) No.7/2019, dismissing the Appellant's (original Plaintiff) applications at Exhibits 7, 17 and 24, seeking, inter alia, for a temporary mandatory injunction, requiring the Respondents (original Defendants) to vacate the suit hotel premises and hand over the vacant and peaceful possession thereof to the Appellant. 5. The case of the Appellants is that vide Agreement of Leave and Licence dated 13/4/2018, they had permitted the Respondents to run and manage the Appellant's suit hotel premises for 99 months commencing from 1/5/2018 and ending on 31/7/2026, if not otherwise terminated in the manner provided in the said agreement. The Appellant's case is that the Respondents defaulted the payment of license fees and committed several other breaches of the Agreement dated 13/4/2018 and, therefore, the Appellant terminated such license and instituted the suit seeking several reliefs, including a decree to direct the Respondents to hand over the keys of the suit hotel premises, forthwith and/or cease to carry out the business in the suit premises by themselves or through their agents, etc. A decree for monetary relief was also applied for by the Appellant since, it was the case of the Appellant that several amounts were due under the Agreement dated 13/4/2018, before its termination. 6. The Appellant applied for a temporary mandatory injunction to require the Respondents to hand over the suit premises forthwith to the Appellant and/or to cease to carry out any business from the suit premises, pending final disposal of the Suit. 7. The Respondents denied the case set out by the Appellant in the plaint but submitted that the agreement, though styled as one of leave and license was, in fact, a lease deed. The Respondents also contended that the agreement contemplated carrying out several renovations and repairs to the suit premises by the Respondents, to make the suit premises usable as hotel premises and further that such repairs and renovations were in fact undertaken by the Respondents at their cost, estimated at Rs. 1.00 crore or thereabouts. The Respondents further contended that there was no default whatsoever in the payment of rents, but based on a misinterpretation of clauses 7 and 8 of the agreement, the Appellant claimed defaults and, in a high-handed manner, attempted to repudiate the agreement. The Respondents submitted that in fact, excess payments have been made to the Appellant and, therefore, the suit is liable to be dismissed. The Respondents opposed the grant of any temporary mandatory injunction or orders for deposit of alleged license fees on monthly basis. 8. The Commercial Court, by the impugned order, has dismissed the applications seeking relief of temporary mandatory injunction and declined to make any order for deposits. Hence, the present Appeals. 9. Mr. S.G. Dessai, the learned Senior Advocate for the Appellants submits that from a plain perusal of the Agreement dated 13/4/2018, it is more than apparent that the Respondents were only the licensees in respect of the suit premises. He submits that even the Commercial Court in the impugned Order has recorded a finding that the Respondents were only the licensees of the suit premises. He submits that the license having been terminated, the Respondents have no right or authority to continue in the suit premises. Therefore, the temporary mandatory injunction, as prayed for, ought to have been granted by the learned Commercial Court. He relies on Sant Lal Jain vs. Avtar Singh, (1985) 2 SCC 332 in support of his submissions. He submits that the license having been terminated, the Respondents have no right or authority to continue in the suit premises. Therefore, the temporary mandatory injunction, as prayed for, ought to have been granted by the learned Commercial Court. He relies on Sant Lal Jain vs. Avtar Singh, (1985) 2 SCC 332 in support of his submissions. 10. Mr. Desai submits that the learned Commercial Court has misconstrued clauses 7 and 8 of the agreement dated 13/4/2018. He submits that the correct interpretation of the said clauses is that the license fees referred to in Schedule I were payable each month and not periodically, as was falsely and dishonestly urged by the Respondents and accepted by the learned Commercial Court. He submitted that it is inconceivable that the suit premises comprising 44 hotel rooms, could have been licensed to the Respondents only on periodical payment of the amounts set out in Schedule I. Mr. Desai submits that from the context, it is very clear that the license fees referred to in Schedule I were to be paid each month. Mr. Desai submits that for the first 4 months even the Respondents correctly understood the import of clauses 7 and 8 of the agreement and paid license fees at the rate of Rs. 6.00 lakhs per month. Mr. Desai submits that since all these aspects have not been properly considered by the learned Commercial Court, there is a case made out to warrant interference with the impugned order. 11. Mr. Desai submitted that the learned Commercial Court has the power to grant a temporary mandatory injunction and even the parameters necessary for such grant, were duly satisfied by the Appellant. He relies on Dorab Cawasji Warden vs. Coomi Sorab Warden and ors., (1990) AIR SC 867 in support of his contention. 12. Finally, Mr. Desai submitted that this is a case where the learned Commercial Court has exercised the discretion arbitrarily, capriciously, and perversely. He submits that the learned Commercial Court has erred on principle and permitted the licensee, who is in breach of the terms of the license, to continue in the suit premises. He, therefore, submits that this is a case where the impugned order is liable to be set aside and the temporary mandatory injunction granted to the Appellant, requiring the Respondents to restore the suit premises to the Appellant, forthwith. He, therefore, submits that this is a case where the impugned order is liable to be set aside and the temporary mandatory injunction granted to the Appellant, requiring the Respondents to restore the suit premises to the Appellant, forthwith. He relies on Ramdev Food Products (P) Ltd. vs. Arvindbhai Rambhai Patel and ors, (2006) 8 SCC 726 . and Wander Ltd. and another vs. Antox India P. Ltd.,1990 Supp SCC 727 in support of his contentions. 13. Mr. Palekar, the learned Counsel for the Respondents submits that as of now, there is only prima facie finding that the agreement, in question, constitutes a license. He submits that the agreement refers to the expression "rent", in clause 19(a). He submits that in terms of the agreement, the Respondents have expended an amount of Rs. 1.00 crore or thereabouts for the refurbishing, repairing, and renovating of the suit premises so that they could be used as a decent hotel. He submits that all payments in terms of the agreement, have been made and the Appellant is sitting over the hefty deposit of Rs. 50.00 lakhs. He submits that no sooner than the renovations were completed, the Appellant sought the ouster of the Respondents. He points out that the Appellant filed false complaints to the Authorities to obstruct the Respondents from taking benefits under the Agreement dated 13/4/2018. He submits that the learned Commercial Court has correctly interpreted clauses 7 and 8 of the agreement and Schedule I to the Agreement. He submits that grant of a temporary mandatory injunction would amount to a grant of final relief in the suit. He submits that neither has the Appellant made out any prima facie case nor is the balance of convenience even remotely in favor of the Appellant. He submits that applying the principles in Wander Ltd (supra), these Appeals are liable to be dismissed. He submits that it would be in the interests of both parties if the Commercial Suit itself is ordered to be disposed of expeditiously. 14. The rival contentions now fall for our determination. 15. The scope of an appeal against a discretionary order granting or refusing the relief of a temporary injunction, has been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramdev Food Products (P) Ltd. (supra), and Wander Ltd, (supra). 14. The rival contentions now fall for our determination. 15. The scope of an appeal against a discretionary order granting or refusing the relief of a temporary injunction, has been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramdev Food Products (P) Ltd. (supra), and Wander Ltd, (supra). In fact, Ramdev Food Products (supra), follows the principles set out in Wander Ltd, (supra) and, therefore, it is only appropriate that we refer to Wander Ltd. (supra). 16. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that usually, the prayer for grant of an interlocutory injunction is at a stage when the existence of the legal right asserted by the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and remain uncertain till they established at the trial on evidence. The Court, at this stage, acts on certain well-settled principles of administration of this form of interlocutory remedy which is both temporary and discretionary. The interlocutory remedy is intended to preserve in status quo, the rights of the parties which may appear on a prima facie case. The Court, in restraining a defendant from exercising what he considers his legal right but what the plaintiff would like to be prevented, put into the scales, the concept of balance of convenience. 17. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that once the discretion is exercised by the Trial Court, the Appellate Court will, normally, not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of the first instance and substitute its own discretion, except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate Court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and judicially the fact that the Appellate Court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the Trial Court's exercise of discretion. 18. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and judicially the fact that the Appellate Court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the Trial Court's exercise of discretion. 18. Therefore, the contentions raised in this appeal will have to be evaluated by applying the aforesaid principles as settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in such matters. 19. Now, this is a case where the Appellant does not seek restoration of status quo that prevailed which is before the institution of the Suit and the application for temporary mandatory injunction, but rather, the Appellant, in a sense, seeks to alter the status quo and requires the Respondents, who are running the hotel business from the suit premises, to restore the suit premises along with the hotel business, to the Appellant. Though it is not as if the Commercial Court is powerless, in a given case, to consider such relief of mandatory injunction at the interlocutory stage, however, as was held in Dorab Cawasji Warden (supra), the principles summarized in paragraphs 14 and 15 will have to be applied for the grant of such relief. 20. Paragraphs 14 and 15 in Dorab Cawasji Warden (supra) read as follows : " 14. The relief of interlocutory mandatory injunctions are thus granted generally to preserve or restore the status quo of the last non-contested status which preceded the pending controversy until the final hearing when full relief may be granted or to compel the undoing of those acts that have been illegally done or the restoration of that which was wrongfully taken from the party complaining. But since the granting of such an injunction to a party who fails or would fail to establish his right at the trial may cause great injustice or irreparable harm to the party against whom it was granted or alternatively not granting of it to a party who succeeds or would succeed may equally cause great injustice or irreparable harm, courts have evolved certain guidelines. Generally stated these guidelines are: (1) The plaintiff has a strong case for trial. That is, it shall be of a higher standard than a prima facie case that is normally required for a prohibitory injunction. (2) It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury which normally cannot be compensated in terms of money. Generally stated these guidelines are: (1) The plaintiff has a strong case for trial. That is, it shall be of a higher standard than a prima facie case that is normally required for a prohibitory injunction. (2) It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury which normally cannot be compensated in terms of money. (3) The balance of convenience is in favour of the one seeking such relief. 15. Being essentially an equitable relief the grant or refusal of an interlocutory mandatory injunction shall ultimately rest in the sound judicial discretion of the court to be exercised in the light of the facts and circumstances in each case. Though the above guidelines are neither exhaustive nor complete or absolute rules, and there may be exceptional circumstances needing action, applying them as a prerequisite for the grant or refusal of such injunctions would be a sound exercise of judicial discretion." 21. Applying the principles in Dorab Cawasji Warden (supra), we do not think that the Appellant has made out some case of a higher standard than a prima facie case that is normally required for a prohibitory injunction. True, even the learned Commercial Court has held that the agreement dated 13/4/2018 is, prima facie, a leave and license agreement. But, this is only a prima facie finding. Clause 19(a) of the agreement refers to the payment of 'rent'. The agreement, at least prima facie, contemplates undertaking repairs and renovations to the suit premises by the Respondents. The Respondents have raised a plea that this was a case of a lease, though the agreement was styled as one for leave and license. Mr. Palekar also submitted that the license, which permits undertaking of repairs and renovations to immovable property, may not be revocable. All that we say, at this stage, is that though the Appellant may have made out a prima facie case that the Agreement dated 13/4/2018 was that of the license, the Appellant, cannot be said to have made out a case of a higher standard than a prima facie case, which is one of the prerequisites for grant of relief of interlocutory mandatory injunction. 22. Besides, in this case, the learned Commercial Court has considered in some detail, the aspect irreparable or serious injury, which normally cannot be compensated in terms of money, and the aspect of the balance of convenience. 22. Besides, in this case, the learned Commercial Court has considered in some detail, the aspect irreparable or serious injury, which normally cannot be compensated in terms of money, and the aspect of the balance of convenience. The Commercial Court has held in favor of the Respondents on both these aspects. 23. The Commercial Court has referred to the material regards repairs and renovations undertaken by the Respondents to the suit premises. The Commercial Court has also referred to the deposit of Rs. 50.00 lakhs retained by the Appellant. The Commercial Court has reasoned that the due date for making further deposits was yet to reach. The Commercial Court has also prima facie interpreted clauses 7 and 8 of the Agreement and concluded that the license fees referred to in Schedule I were payable periodically and not every month as contended by the Appellant. Since the rival contentions of both the parties have been considered by the Commercial Court fairly, it is difficult to agree with Mr. Desai that the discretion exercised by the Commercial Court attracts the vice of arbitrariness, capriciousness, or perversity. Ultimately, the Commercial Court has exercised discretion in the matter and, therefore, it will not be proper for this Court to substitute its own discretion, particularly when no case of arbitrariness, capriciousness, or perversity is made out. 24. Sant Lal Jain (supra) was in the context of final reliefs in a suit instituted by the licensor against the licensee. It is in that context that the Hon'ble Apex Court referred to Milka Singh vs. Diana, (1964) AIR(J&K) 99 in which it was held that after the termination of the license, the licensee is under a clear obligation to surrender his possession to the owner and if he fails to do so, he can be compelled to discharge his obligation by way of a mandatory injunction under Section 55 of the Specific Relief Act. Sant Lal Jain (supra) is, however, not an authority for the proposition that in every case a licensee can be ousted from the licensed premises at the interim stage itself, even before the final status of the transaction is yet to be determined and even without adverting to the aspects of irreparable loss and prejudice and the balance of convenience. Sant Lal Jain (supra) is, however, not an authority for the proposition that in every case a licensee can be ousted from the licensed premises at the interim stage itself, even before the final status of the transaction is yet to be determined and even without adverting to the aspects of irreparable loss and prejudice and the balance of convenience. Therefore, merely because the Commercial Court has held that the agreement dated 13/4/2018 prima facie construed the license and not lease that, by itself, was not sufficient for grant of a temporary mandatory injunction. 25. On the aspect of whether the license fees referred to in Schedule I were payable monthly or periodically, reference is necessary to clauses 7 and 8 of the agreement dated 13/4/2018, which read as follows : "7 LICENSEE FEE: The LICENSEE shall pay to the LICENSOR a licence fee as set out in the Schedule of License Fees contained in SCHEDULE-I. 8 The licence fee stipulated above shall be paid by the LICENSEE through ECS into the LICENSOR'S Bank Account bearing No. 187 102 00002905, with AXIS Bank, Vasco-da Gama Branch, with IFS Code: UTIB0000187 on or before the 6 th of the month immediately following the month in respect of which the licence fee has accrued and/or fallen due to the LICENSOR." 26. The aforesaid clauses are to be construed in conjunction with Schedule I to the Agreement dated 13/4/2018, which reads as follows : Date of commencement Date of expiry Licence fee payable. 1. 01-05-2018 01-01-2019 31-12-2018 31-03-2019 Rs.6,00,000 Rs.8,00,000 2. 01-04-2019 29-02-2020 Rs.8,40,000 3. 01-03-2020 31-01-2021 Rs.8,82,000 4. 01-02-2021 31-12-2021 Rs.9,26,100 5. 01-01-2022 30-11-2022 Rs.9,72,405 6. 01-12-2022 31-10-2023 Rs.10,21,025 7. 01-11-2023 30-09-2024 Rs.10,72,076 8. 01-10-2024 31-08-2025 Rs.11,25,680 9. 01-09-2025 31-07-2026 Rs. 11,81,964 27. Now, there is nothing in Clauses 7 and 8 of the agreement to conclusively establish that the licence fees referred to in Schedule I were payable each month as contended by Mr. Desai. Rather, the expression used in Clause 8 is that the fees have to be paid 'on or before the 6 th of the month immediately following the month in 16 respect of which the licence fee has accrued and/or fallen due to the LICENSOR.' Even Schedule I therefore, does not refer to any monthly fees. 28. Desai. Rather, the expression used in Clause 8 is that the fees have to be paid 'on or before the 6 th of the month immediately following the month in 16 respect of which the licence fee has accrued and/or fallen due to the LICENSOR.' Even Schedule I therefore, does not refer to any monthly fees. 28. Assuming that there is some ambiguity in clauses 7 and 8, then, the resolution of such ambiguity will have to await the trial. At least, at this stage, the Commercial Court, cannot be faulted for the prima facie interpretation put by it of clauses 7 and 8 of the agreement dated 13/4/2018. The interpretation cannot be styled as perverse or absurd, as was suggested on behalf of the Appellant. Ultimately, these are agreements drawn by the parties having equal bargaining power. These are commercial contracts, not contracts entered into by some laypersons, or persons having inequality in bargaining power. The Appellant is also secured to some extent by the security deposit made by the Respondents. 29. Since, it was contended by Mr. Desai that for the first four months the license fees referred to in Schedule I were paid by the Respondents every month, we had requested the parties to place on record the summary of payments. Both the parties have placed on record a summary of payments/statement of accounts. The versions submitted by the parties do not tally. The Respondents have placed on record statement of accounts, giving details of cheque numbers or transaction numbers. From the perusal of the same, at least prima facie it is difficult to accept the contention of Mr. Desai on behalf of the Appellant. In any case, these are matters which will have to be determined at the trial. Suffice to hold that there is no arbitrariness or perversity against the view taken by the Commercial Court. Besides, the Appellant cannot be said to have fulfilled the predicates for grant of a mandatory injunction at the interlocutory stage. Grant of such a relief, which would amount to a virtual grant of final relief in the suit, at the interlocutory stage. The grant of such relief will not restore the status quo prevailing immediately before the institution of the suit but will amount to substantially decreeing the suit at the interlocutory stage itself. 30. Grant of such a relief, which would amount to a virtual grant of final relief in the suit, at the interlocutory stage. The grant of such relief will not restore the status quo prevailing immediately before the institution of the suit but will amount to substantially decreeing the suit at the interlocutory stage itself. 30. In the Commercial Appeal Stamp Number (Main) No.923 of 2020, we feel that the Appellant is entitled to some relief and the Respondents are required to be put to some terms about payments. are also to be put to terms. This is because some dispute was raised at the Bar that the Respondents have failed to make payments in terms of the agreement dated 13/4/2018 even in terms of the interpretation proposed by the Respondents and prima facie accepted by the Commercial Court. The Respondents who now continue in the suit premises cannot avoid deposit of amounts consistent with the prima facie interpretation accepted by the learned commercial court. 31. Further, merely because, in terms of the Agreement dated 13/4/2018, the Commercial Court came to a prima facie conclusion that the license fee was not payable monthly but periodically, the Appellant's application at Exhibit 17 should not have been dismissed in its entirety. The Respondents ought to have been directed to deposit the payments in terms of Schedule I, periodically in the Commercial Court. 32. The Commercial Appeal Stamp Number (Main) No.923 of 2020 is, therefore partly allowed and it is directed that during the pendency of the Commercial Suit, the Respondents will have to deposit before the Commercial Court the amounts in terms of the agreement dated 13/4/2018 consistent with the interpretation in the impugned order i.e. periodically. The Appellant shall be at liberty to apply to the Commercial Court for withdrawal of such amounts without prejudice. Such applications, if and when made, will have to be disposed of by the Commercial Court on their own merits and in accord with the law. If there is any default on the part of the Respondents in depositing the amounts in terms of this direction, again, the Appellant will be at liberty to file a suitable application before the Commercial Court for appropriate orders. The Commercial Court to dispose of such application, if and when taken out, expeditiously. If there is any default on the part of the Respondents in depositing the amounts in terms of this direction, again, the Appellant will be at liberty to file a suitable application before the Commercial Court for appropriate orders. The Commercial Court to dispose of such application, if and when taken out, expeditiously. If, there are any arrears, then, the Respondents are granted two months to deposit the same before the Commercial Court. 33. Both the Commercial Appeals stand disposed of in the aforesaid terms. There shall be no order as to costs. 34. We, however, clarify that the observations in the impugned order, or for that matter, the observations in this order, are only prima facie and to decide whether the Appellant was entitled to a mandatory injunction at the interlocutory stage itself. Therefore, none of these observations should influence the Commercial Court whilst disposing of the Commercial Suit on its own merits and in accord with the law. 35. Having regard to the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act, we direct that the Commercial Court should endeavor to dispose of Special Civil Suit (Commercial) No.7 of 2019 expeditiously. The parties and their Counsel to cooperate with the Commercial Court in the expeditious disposal of the Suit.