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2021 DIGILAW 101 (ORI)

Balasubramanian Prabhakaran v. State Of Odisha (Vigilance)

2021-03-05

SATRUGHANA PUJAHARI

body2021
JUDGMENT S. Pujahari, J. - Present is an application filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. seeking quashment of the charge-sheet filed and the order of cognizance passed under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Sections 420, 379, 120-B of I.P.C. and Section 21 of the MMDR Act, 1957 in T.R. No.80 of 2011 in the court of the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Keonjhar corresponding to VGR Case No.59 of 2009 registered by Balasore Vigilance Police Station, and also for quashment of further proceeding of the said case as against the present petitioner arraigned as a co-accused therein. 2. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. P.K. Pani, the learned Sr. Standing counsel appearing for the Vigilance Department. 3. Perused the F.I.R., charge-sheet and other available papers on record as well as the impugned order of cognizance passed by the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Balasore. It may be mentioned here that the case upon transfer is now pending for trial in the court of the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Keonjhar. 4. Facts leading to the submission of charge-sheet and the consequential proceeding in the case referred to above, may be briefly stated as follows:- (a) Smt. Indrani Patnaik arraigned as a co-accused in the case vide her application dated 08.05.1998 had applied for mining lease for extraction of iron and manganese ore over an area of 106.1127 hectors of land at village- Unchabali in the district of Keonjhar. Although the area of land so applied for by her included some forest land, by suppressing the said fact and ignoring some other omissions in the application, Sri Jagdish Prasad Agrawal, the then Joint Secretary, Steel and Mines Department, Government of Odisha recommended for grant of mining lease for twenty years in favour of Smt. Indrani Patnaik. It is further alleged that although upon such recommendation, the State Government approved grant of lease for twenty years, Sri Jagdish Prasad Agrawal by way of manipulation of the documents sent the recommendation letter to the Government of India showing the approved lease period to be of thirty years instead of twenty years. After receipt of approval from the Government of India, Sri Jagdish Prasad Agrawal communicated the same to Smt. Indrani Patnaik and issued proceeding in that connection without taking approval from the higher authorities concerned. After receipt of approval from the Government of India, Sri Jagdish Prasad Agrawal communicated the same to Smt. Indrani Patnaik and issued proceeding in that connection without taking approval from the higher authorities concerned. Subsequently, when an area of 103.432 hectors of land out of the lease area was found to be forest land, recommendation was submitted to the Government of India for diversion of forest land, and surface right permission was given to the leaseholder Smt. Indrani Patnaik over an area of 37.9338 hectors including 35.270 hectors of forest land, and accordingly, possession was delivered to the leaseholder Smt. Indrani Patnaik on 07.05.2008. (b) Sri Dipti Ranjan Patnaik, the Power of Attorney holder of the lessee Smt. Indrani Patnaik issued work order dated 24.02.2008 to the present petitioner who was the Managing Director of the Private Company, namely, M/s. Triveni Earth Movers Pvt. Limited to extract / raise iron ore, subgrade and other materials from Unchabali Iron and Manganese Mine of Smt. Indrani Patnaik, to transport the said mining materials to designate stockyards, for processing the Run Off Materials (ROM) into finished products etc. (c) A joint physical verification led by Vigilance Team was conducted at the aforesaid Mines of Smt. Indrani Patnaik on 24.09.2009 which allegedly revealed that the physical stock of Iron Ore was 182637.695 MT as against the closing stock / book balance of 487205.870 MT leaving a shortage of 304568.170 MT of Iron Ore, cost of which was assessed to be Rs.1827409020.00 @ Rs.6000/- per MT, and the said quantity of Iron ore having been disposed of in a clandestine manner without any disclosure on record, there was evasion of sales tax and royalty to the tune of Rs.81319701.39. During the said joint verification, it was further found that the lessee in connivance with the raising contractor and some public servants despatched excess quantity of 1581635.57 MT of Iron Ore which had been unlawfully procured causing loss of Rs.9489813426.00 to the Government. It is further alleged that the lessee has also not paid sales tax of Rs.525799215.00 which has been assessed by the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Tax (Vigilance) on account of fabrication of record of sale of Iron ore. It is further alleged that the lessee has also not paid sales tax of Rs.525799215.00 which has been assessed by the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Tax (Vigilance) on account of fabrication of record of sale of Iron ore. (d) Pursuant to the F.I.R. lodged basing upon the joint physical verification of the Mines of Smt. Indrani Patnaik, investigation was taken up for the allegations, inter-alia, that the mining leaseholder Smt. Indrani Patnaik in connivance with her husband Power of Attorney holder Sri Dipti Ranjan Patnaik and Raising Contractor of which the petitioner is the Managing Director and also the coaccused public servants derived monetary advantage to the tune of Rs.10096932336.00 at the cost of the State Exchequer, by taking undue favour from the co-accused public servants, who acted as such by abusing their official position. On completion of investigation, the Vigilance police ultimately submitted charge-sheet No.42 dated 22.11.2010 under Sections 120-B, 420, 379 IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 21(1) of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (for short the "MMDR Act") against the accused persons including the present petitioner. It may be mentioned here that the raising contractor company, namely, M/s. Triveni Earth Movers Private Limited who figured as an accused in the F.I.R., has not been charge-sheeted and the present petitioner being the Managing Director of the said Company has been arraigned as a co-accused in the charge-sheet. Cognizance has been taken of the aforesaid offences by the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Balasore vide order dated 06.12.2010 in T.R. Case No.44 of 2010, and upon transfer, the case being re-numbered as T.R. No.80 of 2011 is now pending in the court of the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Keonjhar. 5. Cognizance has been taken of the aforesaid offences by the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Balasore vide order dated 06.12.2010 in T.R. Case No.44 of 2010, and upon transfer, the case being re-numbered as T.R. No.80 of 2011 is now pending in the court of the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Keonjhar. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner while urging for quashment of the proceeding before the Court below qua the petitioner, has raised various points and his contentions, in sum and substance, are as follows:- (i) The very inception of the case or registration of F.I.R. by the Vigilance Police preceded by the joint verification of the Mines of Smt. Indrani Patnaik is beyond jurisdiction and illegal inasmuch as by the date 24.09.2009 when the joint physical verification was conducted by the Vigilance Team or the date 02.12.2009 when the F.I.R. was registered at Vigilance Police Station, Balasore Division, the Vigilance Police / Authorities had no power to conduct any detection, search or seizure in any mine which power was vested to them only on 27.01.2010 vide the State Government Notification No.IV(A)SM101/209-307/SM. The inspection / investigation carried out by Vigilance police without any authorization under Section 24 of the MMDR Act being illegal cannot be relied on. In this context, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of CBI vrs. State of Rajasthan, (1996) 9 SCC 735 . (ii) The charge-sheet submitted being entirely based upon the inspection done on 24.09.2009, i.e., before registration of the F.I.R., and no investigation having been conducted after registration of the F.I.R., the charge-sheet is contrary to the provisions under Chapter-XII of the Cr.P.C., and hence is liable to be quashed. Reliance is placed on a decision of the Apex Court in the case Lalita Kumari vrs. Government of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 1 . (iii) The procedure laid down under Section 22 of the MMDR Act having not been followed in this case and no complaint having been filed, and filing of chargesheet / Final Form by Vigilance Police in terms of Section 173 of Cr.P.C. being forbidden under Section 22 of the MMDR Act, the order of cognizance of offence under Section 21 of the MMDR Act is liable to be quashed. Reliance is placed on the decisions of the Apex Court as well as this Court in the cases of Jeewan Kumar Raut vrs. CBI, (2009) 7 SCC 526 and Surendra Kumar Agarwal vrs. State of Orissa, (2009) 2 OrissaLR 407 . (iv) The Raising Contractor M/s. Thriveni Earthmovers Pvt. Ltd. or the present petitioner has nothing to do with the sale of minerals inasmuch as the limited job assigned to the Raising Contractor being to extract the minerals on the basis of the work order given by the mining leaseholder with due adherence to the applicable Rules and the prescriptions under the statutory clearance, the said Raising Contractor or the present petitioner has incurred no penal liability for the alleged overt acts. (v) The Indian Bureau of Mines, a Statutory Regulatory Authority in respect of major minerals had inspected the Mines of Smt. Indrani Patnaik on 08.12.2008 in exercise of power under the provisions of Minerals Conservation and Development Rules, 1988, and in its report had certified that for the period from May, 2008 to November, 2008 the Mines owner had excavated 784950 MT of Iron Ore from the Mines, and the said Bureau again inspected the Mines in question on 09.12.2009 and certified that for the period from 01.04.2008 to November, 2009 the total production of Iron Ore from the Pits of Mine was 30,86,776 MT. Thus, by no stretch of imagination it can be said that from the excavated pits at the Mines of Indrani Patnaik alone 849589.560 MT of Iron Ore could have been produced. The inspection report of the said Bureau which is well equipped and qualified to measure the quantity will have precedence over the report of the Vigilance. (vi) The calculation / assessment of the excavated mineral / production made by the Vigilance is thoroughly misconceived and erroneous which may be owing to their application / consideration of incorrect conversion factor and recovery factor of Iron Ore. While as per the mining plan approved by Indian Bureau of Mines, the conversion factor for the mining leasehold area of Smt. Indrani Patnaik is 3.5 tonnes/m3 which is meant for processed ore used to assess the quantity of processed ore stacked in stockyard for the purpose of mining transit permit, but not to measure the quantity of Run Off Mines (ROM) extracted from a given pit. Similarly, while the Indian Bureau of Mines has certified the recovery factor to be upto 70% for the mining leasehold area of Smt. Indrani Patnaik, the Investigating Agency in the present case has erroneously applied 35% as the recovery factor. (vii) The Central Empowered Committee appointed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India after conducting an independent survey, enquiry and investigation has concluded in its report dated 16.10.2014 that for the period from May, 2008 to March, 2009 the production in the Mines of Smt. Indrani Patnaik was to the tune of 1434956 MT and hence the allegation of the Investigating Agency in this case that the production was 842589.560 MT only has no force. (viii) The prosecution having even failed to suggest the place or location outside the leasehold area of Smt. Indrani Patnaik wherefrom the alleged excess quantity of mineral was extracted, the allegation of theft without identifying the source of theft is not sustainable. (ix) The Revisional Authority constituted under Section 30 of the MMDR Act having set-aside the demand order issued by the State Government calling upon the leaseholder Smt. Indrani Patnaik to pay Rs.1132 Crore as recovery under Section 21(5) of the MMDR Act pursuant to the charge-sheet filed by the Vigilance Police in this case, and the said order having been upheld by this Court vide the order dated 08.08.2016 in W.P.(C) No.10129 of 2012, and the said order in effect having already exonerated the leaseholder Smt. Indrani Patnaik from the very same allegations as made in the present chargesheet, the petitioner, who is only the Managing Director of the Raising company engaged by the leaseholder, cannot be subjected to the same allegations. Reliance in this regard is placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Radheshyam Kejriwal vrs. State of West Bengal, (2011) 3 SCC 581 . 6. Repudiating the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. Pani, the learned Sr. Reliance in this regard is placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Radheshyam Kejriwal vrs. State of West Bengal, (2011) 3 SCC 581 . 6. Repudiating the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. Pani, the learned Sr. Standing counsel appearing for the Vigilance Department, submitted, interalia, that the Vigilance police in exercise of power under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 as well as under Section 151 of Cr.P.C. conducted the investigation, and by the time the charge-sheet was filed, the Vigilance Department had already been authorized by the Steel and Mines Department, Government of Odisha Notification dated 27.01.2010 to exercise the power under the MMDR Act, 1957, and hence the authority of the Investigating Agency to submit the charge-sheet under Section 21 of the MMDR Act besides for other offences cannot be questioned. Relying on the case of State of NCT Delhi vrs. Sanjay, (2014) 59 OCR 522 , the learned Sr. Standing counsel for the Vigilance Departmnet further submitted that Section 21 of the MMDR Act is not a bar for taking action by police for theft of minerals. It is further submitted by him that during the joint physical verification conducted at the Mines in question, on taking into consideration different factors, such as, Geological condition, presence of other rock segments, nature of Iron mineralization, structural behavior, other portion etc., the recovery percentage of Iron Ore was ascertained to be 30% to 40% whereas in the approved mining plan, the recovery percentage shown to be 70% was confined to the Iron Ore Horizon only dehors the various field conditions indicated above. Similarly, the conversion factor was determined by the Inspection Team basing on the volumes of the Iron Ore approved by the then Deputy Director of Mines and confirmed by the Director of Geology, Odisha regarding recovery percentage of excavation of Iron Ore. It is the further submission of the learned Sr. Similarly, the conversion factor was determined by the Inspection Team basing on the volumes of the Iron Ore approved by the then Deputy Director of Mines and confirmed by the Director of Geology, Odisha regarding recovery percentage of excavation of Iron Ore. It is the further submission of the learned Sr. Standing counsel appearing for the Vigilance Department that the demand of royalty made by the State Government to the lessee being a civil dispute in between them only having no connection to the offences committed by the public servants and private persons resulting in loss to the State Exchequer, the petitioner-co-accused cannot seek any advantage from the said dispute or any decision thereon, in order to extricate himself from the dragnet of the present prosecution in the face of prima-facie materials on record regarding his active involvements in the offences. Relying on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Sonu Gupta vrs. Deepak Gupta and others,2015 OCR 993 (SC)(Para-8), he further submits that at the stage of taking cognizance or even at the stage of framing charge, sufficiency of materials for the purpose of conviction is not the requirement, and that if the materials placed before the Court are capable of raising a strong suspicion against the accused, the Court will be justified in rejecting a prayer of the accused for quashment of the order of cognizance or discharge. 7. As regards the scope of exercise of inherent power of this Court to quash or interfere with the proceeding of a case, the law propounded by the Apex Court in the case of R.P. Kapur vrs. The State of Punjab, (1960) AIR SC 862 , may be referred to as follows:- "xxxxx It is well-established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceeding in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. xxxxxxxx" 8. The F.I.R. registered on 02.12.2009 is apparently based upon the report or finding of the Joint Verification Team which visited the Mines in question on 24.09.2009. It is the contention of the petitioner that since the State Government Notification authorizing the Vigilance police to conduct any detection, search or seizure in any Mines came to being only on 27.01.2010, i.e., subsequent to the date of the joint verification as well as the date of registration of the F.I.R., all those actions of the Vigilance police were without jurisdiction, and the very inception of the case is illegal. The legality of the charge-sheet is also questioned by the petitioner on the ground, inter-alia, that the case is shown to have been made out solely on the basis of the aforesaid joint physical verification of the Mines made on 24.09.2019 and that during the course of investigation the Investigating Officer / Team has not made any visit to the case mine. It needs no mention that F.I.R. sets the criminal law into motion, and before registration of F.I.R. the power of police to investigate any offence does not reckon. In the context, a reference may be made to Sections 156 and 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As per Section 156(2) of Cr.P.C., no proceeding of investigation conducted by a police officer in any case as mentioned in sub-section (1) shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the Police Officer concerned was not empowered to investigate. As per Section 156(2) of Cr.P.C., no proceeding of investigation conducted by a police officer in any case as mentioned in sub-section (1) shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the Police Officer concerned was not empowered to investigate. A reading of Section 154 of Cr.P.C. vis- -vis Section 157 would show that the power of police to investigate comes into play either when the F.I.R. disclosing cognizable offence is lodged by Informant under sub-section (1) of Section 154 or when from the information received or otherwise in view of Section 157(2) of Cr.P.C. the Officer-in-charge of the Police Station gets reason to suspect commission of cognizable offence. 9. In the case of Lalita Kumari (supra) the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held, inter-alia, that if the information lodged with police discloses commission of a cognizable offence, no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation, and registration of the F.I.R. is mandatory, and that if an information received does not disclose commission of any cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted for the limited purpose of ascertaining whether or not a cognizable offence is disclosed, but not to verify the veracity or otherwise of the information. In the given facts and circumstances, the aforesaid authority of the Apex Court hardly provides any assistance to the petitioner. The F.I.R. in the present case opens with the statement "On the allegation of corruption on illegal mining, theft and transportation of Iron Ore from M/s. Indrani Patnaik Mines located at Unchabahali at Joda in Keonjhar district, a Vigilance enquiry was taken up". Thus, as it appears, with reference to some allegation regarding the corruption etc., an inquiry / joint verification was taken up by the Vigilance police which led to lodging and registration of the F.I.R. purportedly in view of Section 157 of Cr.P.C. 10. Thus, as it appears, with reference to some allegation regarding the corruption etc., an inquiry / joint verification was taken up by the Vigilance police which led to lodging and registration of the F.I.R. purportedly in view of Section 157 of Cr.P.C. 10. The F.I.R. was registered under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short the "P.C. Act") and Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code (for short "I.P.C.") and Section 21 of the MMDR Act, and on completion of the investigation chargesheet was filed for the aforesaid offences and also for the offences under Sections 420 and 379 of IPC against four public servants along with the mining leaseholder, her power of attorney holder and the present petitioner. To put in other words, the F.I.R. was registered not only under Section 21 of the MMDR Act but also for the offences under the P.C. Act and offence of criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B of IPC. In that view of the matter, it cannot be said that in absence of the requisite authorization under Section 24 of the MMDR Act as on the date of the F.I.R., the very registration of the F.I.R. and the investigation taken up by the Vigilance police was without jurisdiction or illegal. To reiterate, the authorization under Section 24 of the MMDR Act was notified on 27.01.2010, i.e., before submission of the charge-sheet. It also cannot be held at this stage of the proceeding that in course of investigation the Investigating Officer did not visit the Mines or that the charge-sheet was filed solely basing upon the findings of the Joint Verification Team who admittedly had visited the mining site prior to the date 27.01.2010. It is also premature now to opine that no other incriminating material was collected by the Investigating Officer in course of the investigation. 11. Relying on a decision of this Court in the case of Surendra Kumar Agarwal (supra), the learned counsel for the petitioner argued that in absence of any complaint as provided under Section 22 of the MMDR Act and also for non-compliance with the provision under Section 23A of the said Act which provides for compounding of the offence, the prosecution launched for the offence under Section 21 of the said Act cannot be sustained in law. In this context, the pronouncement of the Apex Court in the case of Sanjay (supra) cited by the learned Sr. Standing counsel for the Vigilance Department assumes more relevance. The principal question which arose for consideration in a batch of appeals before the Apex Court was whether the provisions contained in Sections 21, 22 and other Sections of the MMDR Act, 1957 operate as a bar against prosecution of a person charged with allegations constituting offence under Sections 379, 114 and other provisions of IPC. Their Lordships in the said case held as follows:- "66. Considering the principles of interpretation and the wordings used in Section 22, in our considered opinion, the provision is not a complete and absolute bar for taking action by the police for illegal and dishonestly committing theft of minerals including sand from the river bed. 67. xxxx xxxxx 68. There cannot be any dispute with regard to restrictions imposed under the MMDR Act and remedy provided therein. In any case, where there is a mining activity by any person in contravention of the provisions of Section 4 and other sections of the Act, the officer empowered and authorized under the Act shall exercise all the powers including making a complaint before the jurisdictional magistrate. It is also not in dispute that the Magistrate shall in such cases take cognizance on the basis of the complaint filed before it by a duly authorized officer. In case of breach and violation of Section 4 and other provisions of the Act, the police officer cannot insist Magistrate for taking cognizance under the Act on the basis of the record submitted by the police alleging contravention of the said Act. In other words, the prohibition contained in Section 22 of the Act against prosecution of a person except on a complaint made by the officer is attracted only when such person sought to be prosecuted for contravention of Section 4 of the Act and not for any act or omission which constitute an offence under Indian Penal Code. 69. In other words, the prohibition contained in Section 22 of the Act against prosecution of a person except on a complaint made by the officer is attracted only when such person sought to be prosecuted for contravention of Section 4 of the Act and not for any act or omission which constitute an offence under Indian Penal Code. 69. However, there may be situation where a person without any lease or licence or any authority enters into river and extracts sands, gravels and other minerals and remove or transport those minerals in a clandestine manner with an intent to remove dishonestly those minerals from the possession of the State, is liable to be punished for committing such offence under Section 378 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code. Xxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx 71. Hence, merely because initiation of proceeding for commission of an offence under the MMDR Act on the basis of complaint cannot and shall not debar the police from taking action against persons for committing theft of sand and minerals in the manner mentioned above by exercising power under the Code of Criminal Procedure and submit a report before the Magistrate for taking cognizance against such person. In other words, in a case where there is a theft of sand and gravels from the Government land, the police can register a case, investigate the same and submit a final report under Section 173, Cr.P.C. before a Magistrate having jurisdiction for the purpose of taking cognizance as provided in Section 190(1)(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 72. xxxxx xxxxxx Hence, for the commission of offence under Section 378 Cr.P.C., on receipt of the police report, the Magistrate having jurisdiction can take cognizance of the said offence without awaiting the receipt of complaint that may be filed by the authorized officer for taking cognizance in respect of violation of various provisions of the MMDR Act. Consequently the contrary view taken by the different High Courts cannot be sustained in law and, therefore, overruled." 12. The question as to the power of police to investigate a case involving allegation regarding contravention of Section 4 of the MMDR Act vis- -vis Section 22 of the said Act again came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of Kanwar Pal Singh vrs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and another, 2020 14 SCC 331 . The question as to the power of police to investigate a case involving allegation regarding contravention of Section 4 of the MMDR Act vis- -vis Section 22 of the said Act again came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of Kanwar Pal Singh vrs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and another, 2020 14 SCC 331 . Referring, interalia, to the case of Sanjay (supra) the Apex Court held as follows:- "6. This Court in Sanjay (supra) has cited several decisions wherein the challenge to the prosecution on the ground that there can be no multiplicity of offences under different enactments was resolved and answered by relying upon Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, which we would like to reproduce for the sake of convenience: AIR 1955 SC 196 (1994) 3 SCC 440 "26. Provision as to offences punishable under two or more enactments. Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence." Section 26 of the General Clauses Act permits prosecution for 'different offences' but bars prosecution and punishment twice for the 'same offence' under two or more enactments. The expression 'same offence' has been interpreted by this Court in numerous decisions viz., Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay8 with reference to the provisions of the Sea Customs Act and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947; Om Parkash Gupta v. State of U.P.9 and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Veereshwar Rao Agnihotri10 with reference to Section 409 of the IPC and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act; T.S. Baliah v. ITO11 with reference to Section 52 of the Income Tax Act, 1922 and Section 177 of the IPC; Collector of Customs v. Vasantraj Bhagwanji Bhatia12, with reference to the provisions of the Customs Act 1962 and the provisions of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968; State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan13 with reference to the provisions of Sections 447, 429 and 379 of the IPC and provisions of the Wildlife AIR 1953 SC 325 AIR 1957 SC 458 AIR 1957 SC 592 AIR 1969 SC 701 (1988) 3 SCC 467 (1988) 4 SCC 655 (Protection) Act, 1972; Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab14 with reference to Section 39 of the Electricity Act, 1910 and the provisions of theft under the IPC; and Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Vimal Kumar Surana15 with reference to the provisions of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 and offences under Sections 419, 468, 471 and 472 of the IPC. Elucidating on the provisions of Section 4 read with Sections 21 and 22 of the Mines Regulation Act and the offence under Section 379 of the IPC, it was observed in Sanjay (supra): "69. Considering the principles of interpretation and the wordings used in Section 22, in our considered opinion, the provision is not a complete and absolute bar for taking action by the police for illegal and dishonestly committing theft of minerals including sand from the riverbed. The Court shall take judicial notice of the fact that over the years rivers in India have been affected by the alarming rate of unrestricted sand mining which is damaging the ecosystem of the rivers and safety of bridges. It also weakens riverbeds, fish breeding and destroys the natural habitat of many organisms. If these illegal activities are not stopped by the State and the police authorities of the State, it will cause serious repercussions as mentioned hereinabove. It will not only change the river hydrology but also will deplete the groundwater levels. 70. It also weakens riverbeds, fish breeding and destroys the natural habitat of many organisms. If these illegal activities are not stopped by the State and the police authorities of the State, it will cause serious repercussions as mentioned hereinabove. It will not only change the river hydrology but also will deplete the groundwater levels. 70. There cannot be any dispute with regard to restrictions imposed under the MMDR Act and remedy provided therein. In any case, where there is a mining activity by any person in contravention of the provisions of Section 4 and other sections of the Act, the officer empowered and authorised under the Act shall exercise all the powers including making a complaint before the Jurisdictional Magistrate. It is also not in dispute that the Magistrate shall in such cases take AIR 1965 SC 666 (2011) 1 SCC 534 cognizance on the basis of the complaint filed before it by a duly authorised officer. In case of breach and violation of Section 4 and other provisions of the Act, the police officer cannot insist the Magistrate for taking cognizance under the Act on the basis of the record submitted by the police alleging contravention of the said Act. In other words, the prohibition contained in Section 22 of the Act against prosecution of a person except on a complaint made by the officer is attracted only when such person is sought to be prosecuted for contravention of Section 4 of the Act and not for any act or omission which constitutes an offence under the Penal Code. 71. However, there may be a situation where a person without any lease or licence or any authority enters into river and extracts sand, gravel and other minerals and remove or transport those minerals in a clandestine manner with an intent to remove dishonestly those minerals from the possession of the State, is liable to be punished for committing such offence under Sections 378 and 379 of the Penal Code. 72. From a close reading of the provisions of the MMDR Act and the offence defined under Section 378 IPC, it is manifest that the ingredients constituting the offence are different. 72. From a close reading of the provisions of the MMDR Act and the offence defined under Section 378 IPC, it is manifest that the ingredients constituting the offence are different. The contravention of terms and conditions of mining lease or doing mining activity in violation of Section 4 of the Act is an offence punishable under Section 21 of the MMDR Act, whereas dishonestly removing sand, gravel and other minerals from the river, which is the property of the State, out of the State's possession without the consent, constitute an offence of theft. Hence, merely because initiation of proceeding for commission of an offence under the MMDR Act on the basis of complaint cannot and shall not debar the police from taking action against persons for committing theft of sand and minerals in the manner mentioned above by exercising power under the Code of Criminal Procedure and submit a report before the Magistrate for taking cognizance against such persons. In other words, in a case where there is a theft of sand and gravel from the government land, the police can register a case, investigate the same and submit a final report under Section 173 CrPC before a Magistrate having jurisdiction for the purpose of taking cognizance as provided in Section 190(1)(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure." (emphasis supplied) 11. We would again advert to the decision in Sanjay (supra) which had overruled the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Seema Sarkar v. State17 wherein the High Court held the proceedings to be invalid and illegal as the Magistrate had taken cognizance on the basis of a charge-sheet submitted by the police under Section 21(2) of the Mines Regulation Act and Section 379 of the IPC, observing that the cognizance was one that cannot be split or divided. The High Court had further observed that as the complaint was not made in terms of Section 22 of the Mines Regulation Act, the cognizance was bad and contrary to law. We have already noted the decision of the Delhi High Court which had directed that the FIR should not be treated as registered under Section 379 of the IPC but only under Section 21 of the Mines Regulation Act. We have already noted the decision of the Delhi High Court which had directed that the FIR should not be treated as registered under Section 379 of the IPC but only under Section 21 of the Mines Regulation Act. These decisions of the Calcutta High Court and the Delhi High Court were reversed and set aside by this Court in Sanjay (supra) after referring to Section 26 of the General Clauses Act and the meaning of the expression 'same offence', to observe that the offence under Section 21 read with Section 4 of the Mines Regulation Act and Section 379 of the IPC are different and distinct. The aforesaid reasoning compels us to reject the contention of the appellant that the action as impugned in the FIR (1995) 1 Cal LT 95 is a mere violation of Section 4 which is an offence cognizable only under Section 21 of the Mines Regulation Act and not under any other law. There is no bar on the Court from taking cognizance of the offence under Section 379 of the IPC. We would also observe that the violation of Section 4 being a cognizable offence, the police could have always investigated the same, there being no bar under the Mines Regulation Act, unlike Section 13(3)(iv) of the TOHO Act. 12. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we would uphold the order of the High Court refusing to set aside the prosecution and cognizance of the offence taken by the learned Magistrate under Section 379 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act. We would, however, clarify that prosecution and cognizance under Section 21 read with Section 4 of the Mines Regulation Act will not be valid and justified in the absence of the authorisation. Further, our observations in deciding and answering the legal issue before us should not be treated as findings on the factual allegations made in the complaint. The trial court would independently apply its mind to the factual allegations and decide the charge in accordance with law. In light of the aforesaid observations, the appeal is partly allowed, as we have upheld the prosecution and cognizance of the offence under Section 379 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act. There would be no order as to costs." 13. In light of the aforesaid observations, the appeal is partly allowed, as we have upheld the prosecution and cognizance of the offence under Section 379 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act. There would be no order as to costs." 13. The law thus is settled that it shall not be illegitimate on the part of the police to investigate a case involving offence under Section 21 of the MMDR Act, but when it comes to the question of taking cognizance, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence unless and until a complaint in writing is made by the person authorized to do so in view of Section 22 of the MMDR Act. In the present case, admittedly, no complaint as enjoined under Section 22 of the MMDR Act having been filed, the order of cognizance of the offence under Section 21 of the said Act is held to be illegal. Next remains, the offence under I.P.C. of which cognizance has been taken by the learned Court below, qua the present petitioner. 14. Admittedly, in the F.I.R. the petitioner was not named either in his personal capacity or in the capacity as the Managing Director of the Raising Contractor Company M/s. Thriveni Earthmovers Pvt. Ltd. for the alleged offences. The allegation made in the F.I.R. in so far as the same is directed against the Contractor-company is extracted here below; "xxxx In violation of the provision, terms and conditions the mining lease holder has engaged a raising contractor namely M/s. Triveni Earth Movers Pvt. Ltd. who has been carrying on the mining operation in toto." "xxxxx Thus there is gross discrepancies in the quantity of production despatched closing stock in the records of the Dy. Director, Mines, Joda, the Raising Contractor and the IBM, which indicates that the mining lease holder has been carrying on illegal mining operation in connivance with the mining and forest officials." "xxxxxx Hence, all the aforementioned officials as well as Managing Partners of M/s. Indrani Patnaik Mines and M/s. Triveni Earth Movers Pvt. Ltd. are liable for criminal misconduct U/s.13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of P.C. Act, 1988 / 120-B IPC and 21 M.M.D.R. Act. The criminal liability of other officials in showing favour will be found out during further course of investigation. The criminal liability of other officials in showing favour will be found out during further course of investigation. I, therefore, request that a criminal case there under may kindly be registered against the aforementioned officials and the private firm and its representatives for detailed investigation." 15. A bare reading of the F.I.R. which was the immediate follow-up of the joint physical verification would show that the Raising Contractor Company was indicted in the F.I.R. for the reason of its being engaged by the lessee in carrying on the alleged illegal mining operation in connivance with some mining and forest officials, and on such allegation the F.I.R. was apparently registered against the Raising Contractor along with others. In the charge-sheet, however, it was not the Raising Contractor Company but the petitioner in his capacity as the Managing Director of the said Company was made a co-accused. It is the contention of the petitioner that he being the Managing Director of the Company, not involved in the day to day contractual extraction work, no penal liability can be vicariously attracted to him in absence of any specific provision in the statute for fixing the criminal liability vicariously on the Directors of a Company. The learned counsel for the petitioner in support of this contention has placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Sunil Bharti Mittal vrs. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2015) 4 SCC 609 . In the said case, a Three Judge Bench of the Apex Court referring to various judgments including some foreign judgments, held, inter-alia, as follows:- "(ii) Principle of "alter ego", as applied 37. The moot question is whether the aforesaid proposition, to proceed against the appellants is backed by law? In order to find the answer, let us scan through the case law that was cited during the arguments. 38. First case which needs to be discussed is Iridium India. Before we discuss the facts of this case, it would be relevant to point out that the question as to whether a company could be prosecuted for an offence which requires mens rea had been earlier referred to in a Constitution Bench of five Judges in Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement. The Constitution Bench had held that a company can be prosecuted and convicted for an offence which requires a minimum sentence of imprisonment. The Constitution Bench had held that a company can be prosecuted and convicted for an offence which requires a minimum sentence of imprisonment. In para 8 of the judgment, the Constitution Bench clarified that the Bench is not expressing any opinion on the question whether a corporation could be attributed with requisite mens rea to prove the guilt. Para 8 reads as under: "8......... It is only in a case requiring mens rea, a question arises whether a corporation could be attributed with requisite mens rea to prove the guilt. But as we are not concerned with this question in these proceedings, we do not express any opinion on that issue." 39. In Iridium India, the aforesaid question fell directly for consideration, namely, whether a company could be prosecuted for an offence which requires mens rea and discussed this aspect at length, taking note of the law that prevails in America and England on this issue. For our benefit, we will reproduce paras 59-64 herein: "59. The courts in England have emphatically rejected the notion that a body corporate could not commit a criminal offence which was an outcome of an act of will needing a particular state of mind. The aforesaid notion has been rejected by adopting the doctrine of attribution and imputation. In other words, the criminal intent of the 'alter ego' of the company/body corporate i.e. the person or group of persons that guide the business of the company, would be imputed to the corporation. 60. It may be appropriate at this stage to notice the observations made by MacNaghten, J. in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd.: A body corporate is a "person" to whom, amongst the various attributes it may have, there should be imputed the attribute of a mind capable of knowing and forming an intention indeed it is much too late in the day to suggest the contrary. It can only know or form an intention through its human agents, but circumstances may be such that the knowledge of the agent must be imputed to the body corporate. Counsel for the respondents says that, although a body corporate may be capable of having an intention, it is not capable of having a criminal intention. In this particular case the intention was the intention to deceive. Counsel for the respondents says that, although a body corporate may be capable of having an intention, it is not capable of having a criminal intention. In this particular case the intention was the intention to deceive. If, as in this case, the responsible agent of a body corporate puts forward a document knowing it to be false and intending that it should deceive, I apprehend, according to the authorities that Viscount Caldecote, L.C.J., has cited, his knowledge and intention must be imputed to the body corporate. 61. The principle has been reiterated by Lord Denning in Bolton (H.L.) (Engg.) Co. Ltd. v. T.J. Graham & Sons Ltd. in the following words: A company may in many ways be likened to a human body. They have a brain and a nerve centre which controls what they do. They also have hands which hold the tools and act in accordance with directions from the centre. Some of the people in the company are mere servants and agents who are nothing more than hands to do the work and cannot be said to represent the mind or will. Others are Directors and managers who represent the directing mind and will of the company, and control what they do. The state of mind of these managers is the state of mind of the company and is treated by the law as such. So you will find that in cases where the law requires personal fault as a condition of liability in tort, the fault of the manager will be the personal fault of the company. That is made clear in Lord Haldane's speech in Lennard's Carrying Co. Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd. (AC at pp.713 & 714). So also in the criminal law, in cases where the law requires a guilty mind as a condition of a criminal offence, the guilty mind of the Directors or the managers will render the company themselves guilty. 62. The aforesaid principle has been firmly established in England since the decision of the House of Lords in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass. In stating the principle of corporate liability for criminal offences, Lord Reid made the following statement of law: 'I must start by considering the nature of the personality which by a fiction the law attributes to a corporation. In stating the principle of corporate liability for criminal offences, Lord Reid made the following statement of law: 'I must start by considering the nature of the personality which by a fiction the law attributes to a corporation. A living person has a mind which can have knowledge or intention or be negligent and he has hands to carry out his intentions. A corporation has none of these: it must act through living persons, though not always one or the same person. Then the person who acts is not speaking or acting for the company. He is acting as the company and his mind which directs his acts is the mind of the company. There is no question of the company being vicariously liable. He is not acting as a servant, representative, agent or delegate. He is an embodiment of the company or, one could say, he hears and speaks through the person of the company, within his appropriate sphere, and his mind is the mind of the company. If it is a guilty mind then that guilt is the guilt of the company. It must be a question of law whether, once the facts have been ascertained, a person in doing particular things is to be regarded as the company or merely as the company's servant or agent. In that case any liability of the company can only be a statutory or vicarious liability.' 63. From the above it becomes evident that a corporation is virtually in the same position as any individual and may be convicted of common law as well as statutory offences including those requiring mens rea. The criminal liability of a corporation would arise when an offence is committed in relation to the business of the corporation by a person or body of persons in control of its affairs. In such circumstances, it would be necessary to ascertain that the degree and control of the person or body of persons is so intense that a corporation may be said to think and act through the person or the body of persons. The position of law on this issue in Canada is almost the same. Mens rea is attributed to corporations on the principle of 'alter ego' of the company. 64. The position of law on this issue in Canada is almost the same. Mens rea is attributed to corporations on the principle of 'alter ego' of the company. 64. So far as India is concerned, the legal position has been clearly stated by the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement. On a detailed consideration of the entire body of case laws in this country as well as other jurisdictions, it has been observed as follows: '6. There is no dispute that a company is liable to be prosecuted and punished for criminal offences. Although there are earlier authorities to the effect that corporations cannot commit a crime, the generally accepted modern rule is that except for such crimes as a corporation is held incapable of committing by reason of the fact that they involve personal malicious intent, a corporation may be subject to indictment or other criminal process, although the criminal act is committed through its agents.'" 40. It is abundantly clear from the above that the principle which is laid down is to the effect that the criminal intent of the "alter ego" of the company, that is the personal group of persons that guide the business of the company, would be imputed to the company/corporation. The legal proposition that is laid down in the aforesaid judgment in Iridium India case is that if the person or group of persons who control the affairs of the company commit an offence with a criminal intent, their criminality can be imputed to the company as well as they are "alter ego" of the company. 41. In the present case, however, this principle is applied in an exactly reverse scenario. Here, company is the accused person and the learned Special Magistrate has observed in the impugned order that since the appellants represent the directing mind and will of each company, their state of mind is the state of mind of the company and, therefore, on this premise, acts of the company are attributed and imputed to the appellants. It is difficult to accept it as the correct principle of law. As demonstrated hereinafter, this proposition would run contrary to the principle of vicarious liability detailing the circumstances under which a Director of a company can be held liable. It is difficult to accept it as the correct principle of law. As demonstrated hereinafter, this proposition would run contrary to the principle of vicarious liability detailing the circumstances under which a Director of a company can be held liable. (iii) Circumstances when Director/person in charge of the affairs of the company can also be prosecuted, when the company is an accused person 42. No doubt, a corporate entity is an artificial person which acts through its officers, Directors, Managing Director, Chairman, etc. If such a company commits an offence involving mens rea, it would normally be the intent and action of that individual who would act on behalf of the company. It would be more so, when the criminal act is that of conspiracy. However, at the same time, it is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is no vicarious liability unless the statute specifically provides so. 43. Thus, an individual who has perpetrated the commission of an offence on behalf of a company can be made an accused, along with the company, if there is sufficient evidence of his active role coupled with criminal intent. Second situation in which he can be implicated is in those cases where the statutory regime itself attracts the doctrine of vicarious liability, by specifically incorporating such a provision. 44. When the company is the offender, vicarious liability of the Directors cannot be imputed automatically, in the absence of any statutory provision to this effect. One such example is Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. In Aneeta Hada, the Court noted that if a group of persons that guide the business of the company have the criminal intent, that would be imputed to the body corporate and it is in this backdrop, Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has to be understood. Such a position is, therefore, because of statutory intendment making it a deeming fiction. Here also, the principle of "alter ego", was applied only in one direction, namely, where a group of persons that guide the business had criminal intent, that is to be imputed to the body corporate and not the vice versa. Such a position is, therefore, because of statutory intendment making it a deeming fiction. Here also, the principle of "alter ego", was applied only in one direction, namely, where a group of persons that guide the business had criminal intent, that is to be imputed to the body corporate and not the vice versa. Otherwise, there has to be a specific act attributed to the Director or any other person allegedly in control and management of the company, to the effect that such a person was responsible for the acts committed by or on behalf of the company." 16. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Shiv Kumar Jatia vrs. State of NCR of Delhi, (2019) 76 OCR 271.(SC) Paragraphs-29 and 30 of the said decision may be quoted here below:- "29. By applying the ratio laid down by this Court in the case of Sunil Bharti Mittal (supra) it is clear that an individual either as a Director or a Managing Director or Chairman of the company can be made an accused, along with the company, only if there is sufficient material to prove his active role coupled with the criminal intent. Further the criminal intent alleged must have direct nexus with the accused. Further in the case of Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat & Ors. (supra) this Court has examined the vicarious liability of Directors for the charges levelled against the Company. In the aforesaid judgment this Court has held that, the Penal Code does not contain any provision for attaching vicarious liability on the part of the Managing Director or the Directors of the Company, when the accused is a Company. It is held that vicarious liability of the Managing Director and Director would arise provided any provision exists in that behalf in the Statute. It is further held that Statutes indisputably must provide fixing such vicarious liability. It is also held that, even for the said purpose, it is obligatory on the part of the complainant to make requisite allegations which would attract the provisions constituting vicarious liability. 30. It is further held that Statutes indisputably must provide fixing such vicarious liability. It is also held that, even for the said purpose, it is obligatory on the part of the complainant to make requisite allegations which would attract the provisions constituting vicarious liability. 30. In the judgment of this Court in the case of Sharad Kumar Sanghi v. Sangita Rane (Supra) while examining the allegations made against the Managing Director of a Company, in which, company was not made a party, this Court has held that when the allegations made against the Managing Director are vague in nature, same can be the ground for quashing the proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. In the case on hand principally the allegations are made against the first accused-company which runs Hotel Hyatt Regency. At the same time, the Managing Director of such company who is accused No.2 is a party by making vague allegations that he was attending all the meetings of the company and various decisions were being taken under his signatures. Applying the ratio laid down in the aforesaid cases, it is clear that principally the allegations are made only against the company and other staff members who are incharge of day to day affairs of the company. In absence of specific allegations against the Managing Director of the company and having regard to nature of allegations made which are vague in nature, we are of the view that it is a fit case for quashing the proceedings, so far as the Managing Director is concerned." 17. The learned Sr. Standing counsel appearing for the Vigilance Department, however, sought to distinguish the aforesaid cases from the present one, with his rival contention that while the ratio of the cited cases is that no individual can be made accused along with the Company unless there is sufficient evidence for his active role in the business coupled with the criminal intent, in the present case, the Managing Director of the Company has been made accused without the Company being arraigned as an accused. According to him, the petitioner in the present case acted against the Company's will and interest and the omission and commission as alleged being his personal unauthorized wrongful act, the same cannot be attributed to the Company so as to make the company vicariously liable. According to him, the petitioner in the present case acted against the Company's will and interest and the omission and commission as alleged being his personal unauthorized wrongful act, the same cannot be attributed to the Company so as to make the company vicariously liable. He has relied upon a decision of Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) in the case of State of Maharashtra vrs. Syndicate Transport Co. (P) Ltd. and others, (1964) AIR Bombay 195 . In the said case vide paragraph-17 it was held as follows:- "17. In my view, therefore, "the scope within which criminal proceedings can be brought against institutions which has been become so prominent a feature of everyday affairs" ought to toe widened so as to make corporate bodies indictable for offences flowing from the acts or omissions of their human agents. Ordinarily, a corporate body like a company acts through its managing director or board of directors or authorized agents or servants and the criminal act or omission of an agent including his state of mind, intention, knowledge or belief ought to be treated as the act or omission including the state of mind, intention, knowledge or belief of the company. I do not mean or intend to suggest that in every case where an agent of a limited company acting in its business commits a crime, the company is automatically to be held criminally responsible. As adumbrated, a company canot be indictable for offences like bigamy, perjury, rape etc. which can only be committed by a human individual or for offences punishable with imprisonment or corporal punishment. Barring these exceptions, a corporate body ought to be indictable for criminal acts or omissions of its directors or authorized agents or servants, whether they involve mens rea or not, provided they have acted or have purported to act under authority of the corporate body or in pursuance of the aims or objects of the corporate body. The question whether a corporate body should or should not be liable for criminal action resulting from the acts of some individual must depend on the nature of the offence disclosed by the allegations in the complaint or in the charge-sheet, the relative position of the officer or agent vis- -vis the corporate body and the other relevant facts and circumstances which could show that the corporate body, as such, meant or intended to commit that act. Each case will have necessarily to depend on its own facts which will have to be considered by the Magistrate or Judge before deciding whether to proceed against a corporate body or not." 18. The learned Sr. Standing counsel for the Vigilance Department has further cited the case of State of Karnatak vrs. J. Jaylalitha, (2017) 67 OCR 796 ,(SC) to submit that when the corporate character is employed for the purpose of committing illegality or for defrauding others, the Court ought to ignore the corporate character and scan the reality behind the corporate veil so as to enable it to pass appropriate orders to do justice between the parties. 19. The law on the question of liability of company and its official has been lucidly propounded by the Apex Court in the cases of Sunil Bharti Mittal (supra) and Shiv Kumar Jatia (supra). The criminal intention of the Company's Directors or officials can be attributed to the company to make it liable therefor, and as has been held in the afore quoted decisions of the Apex Court an individual who has perpetrated commission of an offence on behalf of the company can be made accused along with the company, but the said vicarious liability cannot be imputed to him automatically. To make him liable vicariously there must be statutory provision to that effect. No presumption can be drawn against the person occupying the position of a Chairman or Managing Director only on the basis of his position as such. Mens rea is attributed to the company on the basis of the alter-ego of the company whereas vicarious penal liability can be imputed to the Directors or officials of the company by virtue of a statutory provision to that effect and on taking into consideration the materials on record showing their active role in the business of the company coupled with criminal intent. 20. Reverting to the case at hand, a perusal of the F.I.R., charge-sheet and other papers as produced by the prosecution on record so far, would reveal that M/s. Thriveni Earthmovers Pvt. Ltd. was engaged by the lessee as the Raising Contractor in the Mine. There is nothing to show that either the present petitioner dehors his position in the said company was engaged by the lessee or he rendered any service to the lessee in his personal or individual capacity. There is nothing to show that either the present petitioner dehors his position in the said company was engaged by the lessee or he rendered any service to the lessee in his personal or individual capacity. There is also no material on record to make out a prima-facie case that the petitioner acted against the company's will or interest much less for his personal gain. Needless to mention that there is no provision in the I.P.C. to impute vicarious liability to the Directors or officials of the company for the alleged omissions or commissions committed by the company. It is true, as per the deeming provision under Section 23 of the MMDR Act, every person responsible to the Company for the conduct of the business of the company is liable to be proceeded against for the offence allegedly committed by the company. But, in the present case, as already held, there has been no legal or valid order of cognizance of any offence under Section 22 of the MMDR Act against the petitioner, and the accusations against him are confined to I.P.C. alone. 21. The learned counsel for the petitioner has cited a decision of this Court in the case of Odisha Mining Corporation Ltd. vrs. State of Odisha and others,2019 SCCOnLineOri 293 and also on CRLMP No.417 of 2016 (Pankaj Kumar vrs. State of Odisha and others), disposed of by this Court on 28.01.2020. Both these cases being distinguishable from the present one on fact and law are found not relevant to be deliberated upon. 22. This Court is also conscious of the submission advanced by the learned Sr. Standing counsel for the Vigilance Department that since depending upon the evidence to be adduced during trial, Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be taken resort to as against the Raising Contractor-company, at present the petitionerManaging Director can not take a plea that he is not liable to be indicted for the reason of the company being not chargesheeted. This contention of the learned Sr. Standing counsel is not acceptable for the basic reason that this Court can not go by any hypothetical notion. Whether or not Section 319 of the Code can be pressed into service in course of the future proceeding of the case is not a question of present. This contention of the learned Sr. Standing counsel is not acceptable for the basic reason that this Court can not go by any hypothetical notion. Whether or not Section 319 of the Code can be pressed into service in course of the future proceeding of the case is not a question of present. What all that is necessary at present is to pronounce upon:- whether the prosecution in its present form and substance is liable to be quashed qua the petitioner. Redundant to mention that, if at the appropriate stage of the proceeding such an eventuality arises, the trial Court would decide the question of applicability of Section 319 Cr.P.C. in right perspective without being influenced by any observation made herein, and also keeping in view the law propounded by the Apex Court as referred to. 23. The next contention of the petitioner is that the proceeding is liable to be quashed inasmuch as the very allegation brought against the mining lease holder regarding extraction of excess quantity of ore or availing of wrongful pecuniary advantage has been improbabalized by the report of the Central Empowered Committee appointed by the Apex Court. He has also cited the decision of our Court in W.P.(C) No.10219 of 2012, vide which the order of the Revisional Authority under Section 30 of the MMDR Act setting aside the demand notice issued by the State Government against the lessee has been confirmed. As it appears, the basis of the demand notice issued by the State Government under Section 21(5) of the MMDR Act was the finding of the Joint Verification Team, and the very same report of Joint Verification Team has laid the foundation of the present prosecution. Needless to mention that since the Raising Contractor worked under the mining lease holder as her agent, the decision of this Court in the aforesaid writ petition in favour of the principal also enures to the Agent-company. 24. Add to the above, the learned counsel for the petitioner cited before this Bench the judgment dated 27.11.2020 passed by a Single Bench of this Court in CRLREV No.831 of 2018, when the matter was again taken up for further hearing on 23.12.2020 upon being mentioned. 24. Add to the above, the learned counsel for the petitioner cited before this Bench the judgment dated 27.11.2020 passed by a Single Bench of this Court in CRLREV No.831 of 2018, when the matter was again taken up for further hearing on 23.12.2020 upon being mentioned. The said CRLREV was filed by the Lessee and her power of attorney holder who have been arraigned as co-accused in the very same prosecution in the Court below, challenging the order by which their petition for discharge had been rejected by the Court below. The said CRLREV having already been allowed by this Court discharging the Lessee from the prosecution, it is now submitted by the learned counsel for the present petitioner that in view of the said decision, nothing survives in favour of the prosecution to proceed against the present petitioner who has been made a co-accused only because he happened to be the Managing Director of the Company which had been given a raising contract by the Lessee. As it appears, the learned single Bench in the afore-cited case, on taking note of the order of the Revisional Authority constituted under Section 30 of the MMDR Act and the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in W.P.(C) No.10219 of 2012 referred to hereinbefore, and also relying on a recent pronouncement of the Apex Court in the case of Ashoo Surendranath Tewari vrs. Deputy Superintendent of Police, EOW, CBI and another,2020 SCCOnLineSC 739, held that the allegations leveled by the prosecution for trial of the mining leaseholder are not acceptable, and accordingly, the Lessee has been discharged from the prosecution. There being nothing before me to deny that the Division Bench order in W.P.(C) No.10219 of 2012 and the Single Bench judgment dated 27.11.2020 in CRLREV No.831 of 2018 passed by this Court have attained finality, the contention of the learned Sr. Standing counsel for the Vigilance Department that the order passed in the aforesaid W.P.(C) being confined to the question of the revenue which was of civil nature having no bearing on the prosecution of the petitioner, holds no more good. Hence, the petitioner cannot be held liable to be proceeded against for the offences alleged. 25. Standing counsel for the Vigilance Department that the order passed in the aforesaid W.P.(C) being confined to the question of the revenue which was of civil nature having no bearing on the prosecution of the petitioner, holds no more good. Hence, the petitioner cannot be held liable to be proceeded against for the offences alleged. 25. In the facts and circumstances narrated above and for the discussion made with reference to the provisions and propositions of law, it would be manifestly unjust to allow continuance of the proceeding against the petitioner. Consequently, the impugned order of cognizance qua the petitioner calls for interference by this Court in exercise of power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. 26. In the result, this CRLMC is allowed, and the chargesheet filed and the order of cognizance passed under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Sections 420, 379, 120-B of I.P.C. and Section 21 of the MMDR Act, 1957 in T.R. No.80 of 2011 in the court of the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Keonjhar corresponding to VGR Case No.59 of 2009 qua the petitioner are hereby quashed. Urgent certified copy be granted on proper application.