ORDER : This petition is filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., praying this Court to set aside the order of issue of process dated 30.08.2018 passed by the Prl. Civil Judge & JMFC Court, Sindhanur in Crl.Case No.804/2018 (arising out of Private Complaint No.406/2012) against the petitioners to face trial for the offences punishable under sections 341, 342, 364A, 120(B) read with Section 34 of IPC. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned High Court Government Pleader for respondent No.1 and learned counsel for respondent No.2. 3. The factual matrix of the case is that respondent No.2 has filed a private complaint which is numbered as PC No.406/2012 before the Trial Court and the learned Magistrate after receiving the complaint took cognizance and proceeded to hold an enquiry and accordingly examined the complainant as CW.1 and also examined one witness as CW.2 and thereafter issued process against these petitioners vide order dated 30.08.2018 and hence, the present petition is filed seeking relief of quashing of issuance of process against these petitioners. Petitioner Nos.1 and 2 are the daughter-in-law and uncle of daughter-in-law of the respondent No.2. The allegation made against these petitioners that at the instance of petitioner Nos.1 and 2, petitioner Nos.3 and 4 subjected the respondent No.2 for abuse and without registering the case brought them to the police station and pressurized to pay an amount of Rs.30,00,000/-in favour of petitioner No.1 and also an allegation is made that petitioner Nos.3 and 4 wrongfully confined respondent No.2 in conspiracy with petitioner Nos.1 and 2 and petitioner Nos.3 and 4 are Additional Superintendent of Police (for short ‘the ASP’) and Head Constable CPI and even threatened on 29.09.2012 and made them to sit till late night and asked them to come on the next date along with money. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently contended that petitioner Nos.3 and 4 in discharge of their public duties in pursuance of the representation given to the Superintendent of Police dated 14.09.2012 an intimation was sent to the respondent No.2 for enquiry but inspite of the intimation was given the respondent No.2 did not turn up and thereafter he was secured. The learned counsel would also submit that in view of judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of dowry harassment and other matrimonial cases, the police cannot register the case and the receipt of the complaint only for the purpose of enquiry, they were secured when the respondent No.1 did not appear inspite of intimation given. Hence, the very initiation of criminal prosecution against the petitioner Nos. 3 and 4 who are discharging their public duties consequent upon the representation which was given to the Superintendent of Police. The Superintendent of Police in turn directed the CPI Central to look into the matter and hence, it cannot be termed as powers exercising by petitioner Nos.3 and 4 is excess. 5. In support of his argument the learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of D. Devaraja vs. Owais Sabeer Hussain reported in AIR 2020 SC 3292 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court discussing Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act (in short ‘the KP Act’) with regard to taking of cognizance is concerned in the complaint alleging police excesses while complainant was in police custody if any previous sanction is obtained before taking cognizance against the accused police officer. The Hon'ble Apex Court in detail discussed in paragraph-71 that even if the act alleged is in excess of discharging of public duties they get the police protection and if that act is done, in connection with reasonable act and the performance of the official duty, the excess will not to be a ground to deprive the policemen of the protection of government sanction for initiating criminal action against him. 6. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa, Through Kumar Raghvendra Singh and Others vs. Ganesh Chandra Jew reported in 2004 SCC (Crl.) 2104 and brought to the notice of this Court Section 197 of Cr.P.C., wherein protection is given to the public servant if it is in discharge of official duty. The Hon'ble Apex Court held that even if same is in excess in discharge of public duty, and even if the said act is done in reasonable action for his official duty, the police officer has to be protected. 7. The Hon'ble Apex Court held that even if same is in excess in discharge of public duty, and even if the said act is done in reasonable action for his official duty, the police officer has to be protected. 7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent No.2 would contend that even though representation is given, no case was registered and the act done by the petitioner Nos.3 and 4 is not in reasonable action that is official duty and if case is registered and thereafter secured the respondent No.2, then it would have been in connection with discharge of official duty. But in the case on hand, without registering the case went to the house of respondent No.2 and even these petitioners pressurized the complaint and witnesses 2 and 3 to remove their shirt and pants and since C.W.1 and 2 not agreed to pay the said amount of Rs.30,00,000/-and the removal of shirt and pant of the CW.2 and 3 witnesses is not in reasonable action with their official duty and hence, the judgment referred by the learned counsel for the petitioners are not applicable to the facts of the case on hand. The learned counsel in his argument would submit that this Court in Criminal Petition No.996/2021 dated 24.05.2021 in the case of S. Shivakumar and Others vs. The State of Karnataka and Others referred the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in D. Devaraja’s case referred supra and distinguished the factual aspects of the case where also without registration of the case, the complainant was confined in the police station for a period of two days and he was subjected to assault and due to the humiliation, he took extreme step of committing suicide. Hence, the this Court came to the conclusion that protection given under Section 170 of the KP Act will not come to the aid of the police official and the same is not even excess of their power but it is abuse of powers given to them and hence, the protection cannot be given in favour of the petitioner Nos.3 and 4. The learned counsel would submit that matter was already settled before the Lok-Adalath. The learned counsel would submit that matter was already settled before the Lok-Adalath. In the Lok-adalath proceedings, the amount which was agreed was paid and demanded excess amount that too by adopting the method of coercion against respondent No.2 and other witnesses and hence, it is not a fit case to exercise power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., to quash the proceedings. 8. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned counsel for the respondent No.2 and having taken note of the material available on record, the respondent No.2 had filed a private complaint and the learned Magistrate referred the matter under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C., and thereafter police after investigation has filed the B-Report. The same was questioned by filing the protest memo and thereafter sworn statement was recorded and thereafter learned Magistrate proceeded to issue the process. Once the Breport is filed, the complainant has to mention in the protest memo the allegation against the respondent/ accused. But on perusal of the objection statement filed by the complainant available at page No.41 only it is termed as objection stating that Investigating Officer has not enquired the complainant and further allegation is made that he has not recorded the statement of the complainant and hence, the said report has to be rejected and only statement was made that accused Nos.3 to 5 are officers of the police department and hence, the IO has filed the B-report. It is settled law that once the protest memo is filed before the learned Magistrate, disagreeing the B-report, the said protest memo should contain the allegation against the petitioners and on perusal of this protest memo, which is mentioned as objection to B-report, no such averments are made in the protest memo and only formal objection is filed, once B-report is filed the contents of the complaint cannot be looked into, the Court has to look into the contents of the protest memo. No doubt, the Criminal Procedure Code does not define any practice of filing of protest memo and the same is a conventional. Once B-report is filed, the complainant has to be given an opportunity and in this case, the opportunity was given and complainant has not narrated anything in the objection statement or protest memo constituting the offence against the petitioners herein. Once B-report is filed, the complainant has to be given an opportunity and in this case, the opportunity was given and complainant has not narrated anything in the objection statement or protest memo constituting the offence against the petitioners herein. The learned Magistrate failed to take note of the contents of the protest memo and once the protest memo is filed, the protest memo has to be considered as complaint. No doubt, the complainant in his sworn statement narrated the contents of the original complaint and one witness has been examined as CW.2 narrating the contents of the original complaint and the learned Magistrate while issuing the process in terms of the order discussed with regard to sworn statement and also relied upon the document Exs. C1 to C6 and also observed that accused Nos.3, 4 and 5 are the public officers and before taking cognizance against the public servants, the Court has to examine whether sanction is required and there is also an exception where a criminal act is done not in reasonable relation to discharge of public duties it does not require sanction under Section 197 of Cr.P.C. 9. No doubt under Section 197 of Cr.P.C., the protection is given to the public servant who have discharged their public duties in connection with their discharge of official duties and if it is not in connection with public duty then, no need to invoke Section 197 of Cr.P.C., but in the case on hand, representation given to the Superintendent of Police dated 14.09.2012 is not in dispute and also on perusal of the complaint, the same is referred in the complaint that consequent upon the said representation, the Superintendent of Police directed the CPI to enquire into the matter and in view of the said direction, the intimation was sent to the respondent No.2 and where he did not turn up for the intimation then respondent No.2 was secured to the police station and hence, it is clear that consequent upon the complaint made to the Superintendent of Police, the respondent No.2 was secured but the allegation is that he was pressurized to settle the issue. 10. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner brought to the notice of this Court the judgment of the D. Devaraja’s case referred supra that if it is in excess of powers in connection with reasonable action in connection to discharge of their public duty then protection has to be given to the police officer invoking Section 170 of KP Act. But in the case on hand, it is not in dispute that representation was given by the first petitioner to the police and in terms of said representation only, the police have acted upon i.e., petitioner Nos.3 and 4. 11. Learned counsel for the respondent also brought to the notice of this Court petitioner No.1 also filed a PCR No.49/2012 and the same was dismissed after considering the material and the same is not challenged and it has reached its finality but the fact that there was a dispute with regard to payment of amount of Rs.30,00,000/-between the parties which emerges on perusal of the record. When the police have acted upon in terms of the reasonable relation of their police duty and based on the representation dated 14.09.2012 given by the first petitioner, discharged the public duties, it cannot be termed as the same is an abuse of their power. Admittedly, the respondent No.2 was called upon to police station consequent upon the representation, he did not go to the police station and police have not directly registered the case in view of the guidelines of the Hon'ble Apex Court in a matrimonial case that too to conduct an enquiry and in terms of the same, respondent No.2 was secured and the respondent’s counsel also does not dispute the fact that intimation was given in pursuance of the representation and also the fact that though intimation was given he did not come to the police station and the same is evident from the complaint itself. When such being the case even if excess of the duty and the Hon'ble Apex Court discussed in the judgment referred supra, that the police officers having protection under Section 170 of the KP Act and also in D. Devaraja’s case in paragraph-71 held that if such act is in reasonable action in discharge of public duty protection has to be given to the police. 12. 12. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.2 also relied upon the judgment of this Court in S. Shivakumar’s case referred supra and no doubt, in the said case this Court has distinguished the judgment of the D. Devaraja’s case wherein the complainant’s son was wrongfully detained in the police station for a period of two days and he was subjected to assault as a result he sustained injuries. He was admitted to the hospital on account of assault made by the Police officials and thereafter also victim made an attempt to commit suicide and he was provided treatment. This Court distinguished the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Devaraja’s case decided on 18.06.2020 and held that the factual aspects of the case not come within the purview of the said case wherein the act of the police not only excess but it was beyond the duties of the public duty and hence, not accepted the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in coming to the conclusion that the facts and circumstances of the case do not come to the aid of the police officials. But in the case on hand, as I have already discussed, the same was not in reasonable connection with the discharge of public duty and also petitioner No.1 is the daughter-in-law of respondent No.2 and petitioner No.2 is the son of petitioner No.1 and no doubt the records also reveals that both the parties are in litigation in filing the private complaint against each other and already complaint given by petitioner No.1 was also dismissed and the same has not been questioned and reached its finality. The dispute is with regard to matrimonial dispute and respondent No.2 is father-in-law of petitioner No.1. The dispute has arisen with regard to the quantum of payment of permanent alimony. First of all, the objections filed to the ‘B’ report does not contain any ingredients of offences which have been invoked against the petitioners. I have already pointed out, the protest memo ought to have been filed in the nature of the complaint and the same is also not in the nature of the complaint, but it is in the form of filing of objections to the ‘B’ report. I have already pointed out, the protest memo ought to have been filed in the nature of the complaint and the same is also not in the nature of the complaint, but it is in the form of filing of objections to the ‘B’ report. When protest memo does not constitute ingredients of any offence invoked against the petitioner, I am of the opinion that the learned Magistrate has committed an error in proceeding against the petitioners and in issuing process only relying upon the sworn statement of PWs.1 and 2. It is the settled law that very protest memo should contain each and every ingredients of offences invoked against the petitioners and the same is not found in the protest memo. When such being the facts and circumstances of the case, it is appropriate to exercise power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., or otherwise it amounts to abuse of process. 13. In view of the discussions made above, I pass the following: ORDER The petition is allowed. The impugned order of issuance of process dated 30.08.2018 passed by the Principal Civil Judge and JMFC, Sindhanur, in Criminal Case No.804/2018 (arising out of P.C.No.406/2012) against the petitioners is hereby quashed.