JUDGMENT : This writ petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for quashing order dated 02.07.2013 passed by Civil Judge (Sr. Div.)-V, Dhanbad in Title (Eviction) Suit No. 03 of 1998 on the petition filed by plaintiffs (respondents herein) under Section 15 of the Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, by which it was held the defendant-original writ petitioner is liable to pay the rent at the rate of agreed rate i.e. Rs. 1908/- per month for all shops and further directed to deposit the arrear rent @ Rs. 1908/- per month from the month of December, 1994 till date with further direction to deposit current rent of every month at the same rate by 15th of succeeding month, as the defendant had raised objection regarding the status of the plaintiffs as his landlord, which is to be decided in the suit, it was ordered that the said deposited rent shall not be withdrawn till disposal of the suit or any other order passed by this Court; and also for quashing order dated 24.08.2013 by which defence of the petitioner has been struck off. 2. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleadings made in the writ petition read as under: The respondents-plaintiffs filed a suit being Title Suit No. 17 of 1988 for declaration of title over the scheduled property and for confirmation of possession over the same. The defendant-original writ petitioner appeared and filed written statement. The suit was decreed vide order dated 31.07.1997 against the defendant-writ petitioner. Against the said judgment, the defendant-writ petitioner filed a petition, which was registered as Misc. Case No. 1 of 1997, before Sub Judge – V, Dhanbad under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was dismissed vide order dated 14.11.1997. Thereafter, he filed M.A. Case No. 72 of 1997, which was also dismissed vide order dated 19.08.1998. Aggrieved thereof, he filed revision before the High Court being Civil Revision No. 423 of 1998(R), which was dismissed vide order dated 16.07.2001, against which the petitioner filed Special Leave Petition No. 19184 of 2001, which was dismissed on 23.11.2001. Thereafter, he filed M.A. Case No. 72 of 1997, which was also dismissed vide order dated 19.08.1998. Aggrieved thereof, he filed revision before the High Court being Civil Revision No. 423 of 1998(R), which was dismissed vide order dated 16.07.2001, against which the petitioner filed Special Leave Petition No. 19184 of 2001, which was dismissed on 23.11.2001. The petitioner, thereafter, filed appeal being Title Appeal No. 72 of 2001 before the learned District Judge, which was dismissed on 20.12.2001 on the ground of limitation, against which the petitioner filed Second Appeal No. 180 of 2002, which was admitted on 09.11.2004 and is pending for final hearing. It was the case of the writ petitioner before the Court below that since the right, title and interest over the suit premises is still to be decided by the Hon’ble High Court, it cannot be said that the petitioner is tenant of the respondents. It has further been stated that after the decree and judgment dated 31.07.1997 in Title Suit No. 17 of 1988, the plaintiffs-respondents filed Title (Eviction) Suit No. 3 of 1998 against the defendant-petitioner claiming the ownership of the shop rooms and the rent. The defendant petitioner appeared in suit and filed written statement denying any relationship of landlord and tenant between 4 the respondents and the petitioner under the Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act. In the Eviction suit, the plaintiffs-respondents filed a petition under Section 15 of the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act [herein after referred to as “Act”] on 16.08.1999 with a prayer that arrears of rent may be deposited by the petitioner, against which a rejoinder was filed by the defendant-petitioner on 27.09.1999. The Court after hearing the parties rejected the said petition vide order dated 01.12.2005. It is alleged that against the said order the respondents did not do anything up-to 2007 and on 21.07.2007 filed another petition under Section 15 of the Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act for the same relief, which was rejected vide order dated 21.12.2010. Thereafter, the plaintiffs respondents filed another petition under Section 15 of the Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act for the same relief which was again rejected vide order dated 26.06.2013 as not pressed. Thereafter, the plaintiffs respondents filed another petition under Section 15 of the Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act for the same relief which was again rejected vide order dated 26.06.2013 as not pressed. The plaintiffs-respondents again filed petition on 28.06.2013 under Section 15 of the Act for the same relief claiming rent from the period December, 1994, rejoinder to which was filed by the defendant-original petitioner immediately on 01.07.2013 denying any relationship of landlord and tenant between the respondents and the petitioner and further dispute of ownership of the suit premises is subjudice before this Court in Second Appeal No. 180 of 2002. The learned trial Court disposed of the said petition holding that the defendants-writ petitioners are liable to pay the rent at the rate of agreed rate i.e. Rs. 1908/- per month for all shops and further directed to deposit the arrear rent at the rate of Rs. 1908 per month from the month of December, 1994 till date with further direction to deposit current rent of every month at the same rate by 15th of succeeding month, as the defendant had raised objection regarding the status of the plaintiffs as his landlord, which is to be decided in the suit, it was ordered that the said deposited rent shall not be withdrawn till disposal of the suit or any other order passed by this Court. The order dated 02.07.2013 since was not complied with, the trial Court struck off the defence of the petitioner vide order dated 24.08.2013 and case was fixed for plaintiffs’ evidence, which has been challenged by the writ petitioner by filing interlocutory application being I.A. No. 8996 of 2013, which was allowed by this Court vide order dated 25.06.2014. The writ petitioner-defendant has filed the writ petition in exercise of power conferred to this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India assailing order dated 02.07.2013 as also order dated 24.08.2013 disputing relationship of landlord and tenant between the respondents and the petitioner by making reference of order/judgment passed by the competent Court in Title Suit no. 17 of 1988 as also judgment passed by first appellate Court dated 20.12.2001 in Title Appeal No. 72 of 2001 and further the matter of declaration of title is pending before the High Court in Second Appeal No. 180 of 2002 for adjudication. 3. Mr. 17 of 1988 as also judgment passed by first appellate Court dated 20.12.2001 in Title Appeal No. 72 of 2001 and further the matter of declaration of title is pending before the High Court in Second Appeal No. 180 of 2002 for adjudication. 3. Mr. J.K. Pasari, learned counsel for the petitioner taking aid of judgment rendered in the case of Mohammad Imteyaz Ahmad Vs. Abdul Quayum [ (2003) 2 JCR 145 ], wherein it has been alleged that before passing order under Section 15 of the Act, the trial Court ought to have recorded a prima facie finding with respect to relationship of landlord and tenant has submitted that since such finding has not been recorded, the order passed by trial Court is not sustainable in the eyes of law. Apart from that one additional ground has been taken, while questioning order dated 24.08.2013 whereby defence has been struck off, taking the plea that after passing final order under Section 15 of the Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act directing to make payment of rent as also strucking off the defence, the original defendant has died and thereafter the present petitioner has been substituted, therefore, the order of 7 strucking off the defence will not be applicable so far legal heirs of the defendant is concerned, who are petitioners in the present writ petition. 4. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel for the plaintiffs respondents has submitted, by refuting the submission made on behalf of learned counsel for the petitioners so far as it relates to non-availability of prima facie finding of relationship of landlord and tenant in between the respondents and the petitioners, that the trial Court has prima facie found the relationship of landlord and tenant in between the respondents and the petitioner and thereafter order under Section 15 of the Act has been passed, therefore, the judgment referred by the petitioners in the case of Mohammad Imteyaz Ahmad (Supra) in the facts of the given case is not applicable. So far as the second ground that the order of strucking off the defence will not be applicable so far legal heirs of the defendant is concerned, who are petitioners in the present writ petition, it has been submitted that since the instant petition is under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court, in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, is only supposed to see the legality and propriety of the impugned order, if available in its face, as such said ground is not fit to be considered by this Court. 5. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by the trial Court in the impugned orders. 6. The admitted facts in this case is that after the decree and judgment dated 31.07.1997 passed in Title Suit No. 17 of 1988, the plaintiffs-respondents have filed Title (Eviction) Suit No. 3 of 1998 against the defendant-original petitioner, namely, Purushottam Das Rajgaria claiming ownership of the shop rooms and the rent, in which the defendant-writ petitioner appeared and filed written statement on 22.07.1999 denying any relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiffs-respondents defendant-petitioner and thereafter filed additional written statement on 04.08.2009 due to amendment sought for by the plaintiff in the plaint and prayer was made to dismiss the aforesaid Title (Eviction) Suit. In the said eviction suit, the respondents-plaintiffs filed a petition under Section 15 of the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act on 28.06.2013 (Annexure 5) praying therein for direction upon the defendant-writ petitioner to pay all arrears of rent, against which a rejoinder was filed on 01.07.2013. The trial Court after hearing the parties disposed of the said petition vide order dated 02.07.2013 directing the defendants-writ petitioners to pay the rent at the rate of agreed rate i.e. Rs. 1908 per months for all shops and further directed to deposit the arrear rent @ Rs. The trial Court after hearing the parties disposed of the said petition vide order dated 02.07.2013 directing the defendants-writ petitioners to pay the rent at the rate of agreed rate i.e. Rs. 1908 per months for all shops and further directed to deposit the arrear rent @ Rs. 1908 per month from the month of December, 1994 till date with further direction to deposit current rent of every month at the same rate by 15th of succeeding month, as the defendant had raised objection regarding the status of the plaintiffs as his landlord, which is to be decided in the suit, it was ordered that the said deposited rent shall not be withdrawn till disposal of the suit or any other order passed by this Court; and also for quashing order dated 24.08.2013 by which defence of the petitioner has been struck off. 7. The defendant-writ petitioner has approached this Court challenging the order dated 02.07.2013 on the ground that the order is passed without application of mind and without consideration of rejoinder filed to the petition dated 01.07.2013 wherein serious dispute about existence of relationship of tenant and landlord in between the respondents and petitioner has been raised as also on the ground that the trial Court without coming to prima facie finding upon existence of relationship of landlord and tenant has passed the impugned order. In the meanwhile, when the order dated 02.07.2013 has not been complied with prayer was made by the plaintiffs-respondents to struck off the defence of the defendant against ejectment, as they have not complied with the order passed by the trial Court dated 02.07.2013 under Section 15 of the Act, which was allowed vide order dated 24.08.2013, the same has been challenged by the writ petitioner-defendant by filing an Interlocutory Application being I.A. No. 8996 of 2013 with a prayer for amendment in the prayer portion of the writ petition by addition of the prayer for quashing order dated 24.08.2013 whereby defence of the writ petitioner has been struck off. The aforesaid Interlocutory Application being I.A. No. 8996 of 2013 was allowed vide order dated 25.06.2014. 8. This Court, on the basis of aforesaid admitted fact, is required to consider the objection made by the writ petitioner about the legality and propriety of order dated 02.07.2013 and 24.08.2013. The aforesaid Interlocutory Application being I.A. No. 8996 of 2013 was allowed vide order dated 25.06.2014. 8. This Court, on the basis of aforesaid admitted fact, is required to consider the objection made by the writ petitioner about the legality and propriety of order dated 02.07.2013 and 24.08.2013. But, prior to that it is relevant to refer the provisions of Section 15 of the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, which reads as under: “15.Deposit of rent by tenants in suits for ejectment.— (1) If, in a suit for recovery of possession of any building the tenant contests the suit as regards claim for ejectment, landlord may move an application at any stage of the suit for order on the tenant to deposit rent month by month at a rate at which it was last paid and also subject to the law to limitation, the arrears of rent, if any, and the Court after giving opportunity to the parties to be heard, may make any order for deposit of rent month by month at such rate as may be determined and the arrears of rent, both before [or] after the institution of the suit if any and on failure of the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent within fifteen days of the date of order or the rent at such rate for any month by the fifteenth day of the next following month; the Court shall order the defence against ejectment to be struck off and the tenant to be placed in the same position as if he had not defended the claim to ejectment and further the Court shall not allow the tenant to cross-examine the landlord's witnesses. (2). If in any proceeding referred to in sub-section (1) there is any dispute as to the person or persons to whom the rent is payable the Court may direct the tenant to deposit in Court the amount payable by him under sub-section (1) and in such case no person shall be entitled to withdraw the amount in deposit until the Court decides the dispute and makes an order for payment of the same. (3). (3). If the Court is satisfied that any dispute referred to in subsection (2) has been raised by a tenant for reasons which are false or frivolous the Court may order the defence against the eviction to be struck off and proceed with the hearing of the suit as laid down in sub-section (1)." It is evident from the aforesaid provision that if, in a suit for recovery of possession of any building the tenant contests the suit as regards claim for ejectment, landlord may move an application at any stage of the suit for order on the tenant to deposit rent month by month at a rate at which it was last paid and also subject to the law to limitation, the arrears of rent, if any, and the Court after giving opportunity to the parties to be heard, may make any order for deposit of rent month by month at such rate as may be determined and the arrears of rent, both before [or] after the institution of the suit if any and on failure of the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent within fifteen days of the date of order or the rent at such rate for any month 12 by the fifteenth day of the next following month; the Court shall order the defence against ejectment to be struck off and the tenant to be placed in the same position as if he had not defended the claim to ejectment and further the Court shall not allow the tenant to cross-examine the landlord's witnesses. Thus, it would be evident from the aforesaid provision of law that the trial Court has been conferred with the power to pass an order for making payment of arrears of rent as well as current rent and in case of default in compliance of the aforesaid order, the Court has also been conferred with power to struck off the defence. Herein, the order has been passed on a petition filed under Section 15 of the Act on 02.07.2013 for making payment of arrears of rent as well as current rent and after that on the prayer made on behalf of plaintiffs-respondents order dated 24.08.2013 has been passed for strucking off the defence of the defendant-writ petitioner. 9. Herein, the order has been passed on a petition filed under Section 15 of the Act on 02.07.2013 for making payment of arrears of rent as well as current rent and after that on the prayer made on behalf of plaintiffs-respondents order dated 24.08.2013 has been passed for strucking off the defence of the defendant-writ petitioner. 9. Contention has been raised by learned counsel for the petitioner that there is no prima facie finding recorded by the learned trial Court in order dated 02.07.2013 about having the relationship of landlord and tenant. This Court in order to appreciate the aforesaid finding has gone across order dated 02.07.2013, as appended as Annexure 8 to the writ petition, wherefrom it transpires that the trial Court after appreciating the factual aspect has recorded the finding to the effect that: “............. I find that it is admitted fact that the keys of the aforesaid six shops were given to the defendant by receiver appointed in Title Suit no. 17/88 on monthly rental of Rs. 1908/- for all shops. This fact itself makes it clear that the defendant entered in above shops as a tenant because when he started to pay rent for against their possession in the aforesaid shops, in my opinion in no stretch of imagination his status may be other than a tenant. Further in course of argument defendant could not say anything regarding charge of his status. It is also admitted fact that the Title Suit no. 17/88 has already been decided in favour of plaintiff which is under challenge before Hon’ble High Court. From the above discussion, I come to the conclusion that plaintiffs are claiming themselves owner of the aforesaid shops on the basis of judgment and decree passed in Title Suit no. 17/88 which is under challenge before the Hon’ble High Court. At this point of time there may be dispute as defendant is tenant of plaintiffs or not but there is no doubt that entry of defendants in the aforesaid shops was as the tenant. 17/88 which is under challenge before the Hon’ble High Court. At this point of time there may be dispute as defendant is tenant of plaintiffs or not but there is no doubt that entry of defendants in the aforesaid shops was as the tenant. There is nothing on record to reflect that there is any change the status of defendant.” [emphasis supplied] This Court after having gone through the aforesaid finding is of the considered view that the trial Court has come to a prima facie finding about existence of relationship of landlord and tenant in between the plaintiffs-respondents and petitioner-defendant, as such what has been contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that there is no prima facie finding about existence of relationship of landlord and tenant is having no force. Accordingly, said ground is hereby rejected. 10. The second ground has been taken about the applicability of order of strucking of the defence so far it relates to substituted legal heirs of the original defendant and it has been submitted that whatever order has been passed against the original defendant will not be applicable with respect to his legal heir. 11. Serious objection to such submission has been made by learned counsel for the appearing respondents by taking the plea that petitioners cannot be allowed to agitate this point before this Court in a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, which admittedly has been filed by original defendant. 12. Admittedly, the fact herein is that the original defendant has died on 17.05.2018, much after passing of order dated 02.07.2013 and 24.08.2013 and after filing of writ petition, and the consequence of death of original defendant is his substitution through legal heir(s), who are now the petitioners to the present writ petition. 13. However, this Court before coming to the conclusive finding about legality and propriety of the impugned orders, deem it fit and proper to delve upon the issue of jurisdiction conferred upon this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, as has been raised by learned counsel for the respondents. 13. However, this Court before coming to the conclusive finding about legality and propriety of the impugned orders, deem it fit and proper to delve upon the issue of jurisdiction conferred upon this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, as has been raised by learned counsel for the respondents. It is not in dispute that the power conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is supervisory in nature and High Court under the power of superintendence and supervisory jurisdiction has got power to look into the legality and propriety of the order under the provision of Article 227 of the Constitution of India, if the order is interlocutory in nature. The scope of Article 227 has been discussed in detail in the case of Surya Dev Rai Vrs. Ram Chander Rai and Ors., [ (2003) 6 SCC 675 ] wherein it has been held that the High Court can look into the legality and propriety of the order by testing it on the face of record and to set it right. The said view has repeatedly been taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. Vrs. Rajendra Shankar Patil, [ (2010) 8 SCC 329 ] the scope of Article 227 which relates to the supervisory powers of the High Courts have been laid down and by taking aid of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Full Bench of Calcutta High Court in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. Vrs. Sukumar Mukherje, [AIR 1951 Calcutta 193], wherein it has been laid down that Article 227 of the Constitution of India does not vest the High Court with limit less power which may be exercised at the Court’s discretion to remove the hardship of particular decisions. The power of superintendence confers power of a known and well recognized character and should be exercised on those judicial principles which give it its character. In general words, the High Court’s power of superintendence is a power to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of the authority, to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner. The power of superintendence is not to be exercised unless there has been; (a).An unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction, not vested in a court or tribunal; or (b). The power of superintendence is not to be exercised unless there has been; (a).An unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction, not vested in a court or tribunal; or (b). gross abuse of jurisdiction; or (c).an unjustifiable refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in courts or tribunals. Further, in the aforesaid judgment the Hon’ble Apex Court has taken aid of a judgment rendered in Mani Nariman Daruwala alias Bharucha (deceased) though its LRs & Ors Vrs. Phiroz N. Bhatena, reported in (1991) 3 SCC 141 wherein it has been laid down that in exercise of power conferred under Article 227, the High Court can set aside or reverse finding of an inferior court or tribunal only in a case where there is no evidence or where no reasonable person could possibly have come to the conclusion which the court or tribunal has come to. The Hon’ble Apex Court has made it clear that except to this limited extent the High court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the finding of facts. Likewise, the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani & Anr. Vrs. Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi, [ (1995) 6 SCC 576 ] it has been laid down that the High Court under Article 227 cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. Its exercise must be restricted to grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law and justice. It has been laid down at paragraph 47 of the judgment rendered in Shalini Shyam Shetty (supra) that the jurisdiction under Article 227 is not original nor is it appellable. This jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227 is for both administrative and judicial superintendence. Therefore, the powers conferred under Article 226 and 227 are separate and distinct and operate in different fields. Another distinction between these two jurisdictions is that under Article 226 the High Court normal annuls or quashes an order or proceedings but in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court, apart from annulling the proceeding, can also substitute the impugned order by the order which the inferior tribunal should have made. Another distinction between these two jurisdictions is that under Article 226 the High Court normal annuls or quashes an order or proceedings but in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court, apart from annulling the proceeding, can also substitute the impugned order by the order which the inferior tribunal should have made. It has further been laid down regarding the powers to be exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India that the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence, can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it within the bounds of its authority, in order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested with them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. Apart from that, High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals and courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. It is evident from the proposition laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court that the jurisdiction conferred to this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is very limited and the High Court sitting in exercise of power 19 conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is only supposed to look into the legality and propriety of the order which appears from its face. It is further settled position of law that since this Court in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is to test the order by looking into the legality and propriety if apparent from the face of the order and if any such point which was available to the litigant, if not raised before the trial Court, the same cannot be allowed to be agitated under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, it is for the reason that the High Court sitting under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is to look into the legality and propriety of the order passed by the trial Court by appreciating the defect apparent from the face of the order. 14. Thus, the second ground, as has been agitated by learned counsel for the petitioner, according to considered view of this Court, will not be appropriate to be considered since no such ground was available due to the reason that the above order was passed during the lifetime of the original defendant who being aggrieved with order has preferred the instant petition only on the ground of no prima facie finding of relationship of landlord and tenant as such this Court has considered the aforesaid ground, as above, as held by Hon’ble Apex Court regarding the jurisdiction of Article 227 of the Constitution of India, will not be proper for this Court to consider this ground, which has been raised by the present petitioners, who have been substituted after the death of original defendant, who died during the pendency of the instant petition, and cannot be allowed to raise this ground for the first time in this proceeding, hence the second ground as agitated is of not worth to be considered. 15. Accordingly, the said ground is rejected. 16. This Court since has already referred hereinabove about the jurisdiction of this Court in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and since the main ground about non-existence of relationship of landlord and tenant as has been agitated on behalf of petitioner is not sustainable and there is prima facie finding about relationship of landlord and tenant in the impugned order, as has been referred hereinabove, this Court is of the view that the orders impugned require no interference by this Court. 17. Accordingly, the present writ petition fails and is dismissed. 18. 17. Accordingly, the present writ petition fails and is dismissed. 18. Consequent upon dismissal of the writ petition, interim order granted by this Court vide order dated 21.01.2014 stands vacated. 19. All pending Interlocutory Applications stand disposed of.