JUDGMENT : P.G. AJITHKUMAR, J. 1. The petitioner is the tenant-respondent in Rent Control Petition No. 11 of 2008 on the files of the Rent Control Court, Thiruvananthapuram. Respondents/landlords filed the Rent Control Petition claiming eviction under Section 11(2)(b) and 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The Rent Control Petition was allowed on 01.01.2019 ordering eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act, ex-parte the petitioner. He filed Interlocutory Application No. 952 of 2019 before the Rent Control Court for setting aside the ex-parte order. It was dismissed as per order dated 18.09.2019. That order is under challenge in this Original Petition. 2. After dismissal of I.A. No. 952 of 2019, the petitioner filed Rent Control Appeal No. 5 of 2020 before the Rent Control Appellate Authority (Additional District Judge-VI), Thiruvananthapuram. There was a delay of 381 days in filing the appeal. The petitioner filed Interlocutory Application No. 1 of 2020 for condonation of the delay. The Appellate Authority after considering in detail, dismissed that application holding that sufficient cause was not shown to condone the delay. Consequent to the said order, R.C.A. No. 5 of 2020 was dismissed as time barred. Challenging the said orders, the petitioner filed R.C. Revision No. 23 of 2021 before this Court under Section 20 of the Act. 3. The petitioner would contend that despite the respondents having no objection for allowing Interlocutory Application No. 952 of 2019, the Rent Control Court proceeded to dismiss the petition. The Rent Control court followed the law laid down in Ratheesh vs. K.M. Chako, 2018 (5) KHC 35 that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not applicable to the Rent Control proceedings, which was then the valid law, dismissed the petition. The petitioner submitted that having the said decision been overruled by a Full Bench of this Court in Hamsa K.K. and Others vs. Athikottu Snehalatha and Others, 2020 (6) KHC 609 the impugned order turned out to be illegal, and therefore, the ex-parte order of eviction dated 01.01.2019 in R.C.P. No. 11 of 2018 is liable to be set aside. 4. Heard the learned counsel appearing for both the petitioner and the respondents. 5. 4. Heard the learned counsel appearing for both the petitioner and the respondents. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the Rent Control Court was justified in dismissing his application for setting aside the ex-parte order in view of the position of law as existed then, but the change in the law entails him to get the order set aside, after condoning the delay, if any. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents, on the other hand, argues that the petitioner approached this Court without any bona-fides and, as he already availed the remedy of appeal by filling R.C.A. No. 5 of 2020, this Original Petition does not deserve consideration. It is further contended that the petitioner himself an Advocate by profession, cannot be heard to contend that he was not aware of the provisions of the law and the progress of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court. Further, the petitioner having filed the Rent Control Appeal without disclosing dismissal of I.A. No. 952 of 2019 by the Rent Control Court, cannot be extended the benefit of a discretionary remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 6. The petitioner is an Advocate having more than 20 years of practice. The petition scheduled building was taken on rent by him as early on 25.06.2007 for a monthly rent of Rs. 8,000/-. The Rent Control Petition for eviction was filed on the ground of arrears of rent and bona-fide need of the 2nd respondent for starting a business of his own, who is the son of the 1st respondent. During the pendency of the Rent Control Petition, the petitioner paid the entire arrears of rent, and therefore, the respondents did not press the claim for eviction under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act. Although notice was duly served on the petitioner, he did not appear before the Rent Control Court. Hence, after declaring the petitioner ex-parte, evidence tendered by the respondents was recorded and an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act was passed on 01.01.2019 directing the petitioner to put the respondents in vacant possession of the building within a period of one month. 7. The period provided under Rule 13(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Rules, 1979 for filing an application to set aside an ex-parte order is fifteen days. 7. The period provided under Rule 13(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Rules, 1979 for filing an application to set aside an ex-parte order is fifteen days. Therefore, the application filed on 30.01.2019 by the petitioner for setting aside the ex-parte order dated 01.01.2019 was out of time. A contention was raised by the petitioner that he came to know regarding the ex-parte order only late, and therefore, there was no delay, but the same is too feeble a contention to be accepted. In the absence of any evidence, it could only be said that the petitioner knew about the order of eviction on the date itself, especially when the petitioner is an Advocate practising in the same station. The Rent control Court considered the said aspect and rightly held that the petitioner knew about the ex-parte order on its date itself. 8. The learned Rent Control Court relied on Ratheesh (supra) to hold that it has no powers for condoning delay and consequently dismissed the application. In Ratheesh a two- Judge Bench of this Court held that the Limitation Act would not apply to the proceedings under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. Ratheesh was decided on the premises that the rule laid down in Mukri Gopalan vs. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker, (1995) 5 SCC 5 that the appellate authority while acting under Section 18 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act has the power to condone delay in filing appeal after the expiry of period of limitation has been overruled in M.P. Steel Corporation vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, (2015) 7 SCC 58 . What held in M.P. Steel Corporation was that in the light of the three-Judge Bench judgments in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises vs. Irrigation Department, (2008) 7 SCC 169 and Commissioner of Sales Tax vs. Parson Tools and Plants, (1975) 4 SCC 22 the Limitation Act will not apply to quasi-judicial bodies or Tribunals and to the extent Mukri Gopalan (supra) is in conflict with the said judgments is not good law. The correctness of judgment in Ratheesh insofar it held that the whole of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act comes within the sweep of the overruling in M.P. Steel Corporation was doubted when K.K. Hamsa’s case came up for hearing before the Division Bench and accordingly it has been referred to a larger Bench for consideration. The correctness of judgment in Ratheesh insofar it held that the whole of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act comes within the sweep of the overruling in M.P. Steel Corporation was doubted when K.K. Hamsa’s case came up for hearing before the Division Bench and accordingly it has been referred to a larger Bench for consideration. The question whether Section 5 of the limitation Act applies to rent control proceedings was thus considered by a Full Bench of this Court in K.K. Hamsa. 9. The Full Bench after detailed deliberation held as regards applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation act to the Appellate Authority in paragraph 15 as: “In Gopakumar vs. Ancy Thankachan Philip, 2019 (3) KHC 760 , a Division Bench of this Court after considering the judgments of the Apex Court in M.P. Steel Corporation (supra) as well as in Mukri Gopalan's case (supra) held that the judgment in Ratheesh's case (supra) shall not be taken as an authority to hold that Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked by the Appellate Authority under the Act. Ratheesh (supra) was decided on the premise that in M.P. Steel Corporation (supra), the Apex Court has held that the judgment in Mukri Gopalan (supra) is not good law. In fact, in Ratheesh (supra), the Division Bench failed to notice that Mukri Gopalan (supra) was decided taking into account two specific issues. One is that the Appellate Authority under Section 18 of the Rent Control Act is a Court and therefore Limitation Act would apply, and secondly that Parsons Tools (supra) was decided on its own facts and statutory scheme, or else Section 29(2) would have applied to quasi judicial bodies or Tribunals. In M.P. Steel Corporation (supra), the Apex Court held that the second part of the finding in Mukri Gopalan (supra) was not good law. The first part was in fact approved in M.P. Steel Corporation (supra). Hence, we are of the view that the judgment in Ratheesh (supra) does not lay down the correct law and to that extent, stands overruled.” 10. The Full Bench also posed the question whether Rent Control Court is a “Court” in order to apply the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. Hence, we are of the view that the judgment in Ratheesh (supra) does not lay down the correct law and to that extent, stands overruled.” 10. The Full Bench also posed the question whether Rent Control Court is a “Court” in order to apply the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. The Full Bench on this point held that the Rent Control Court is not a persona designata; it is a Court and in the absence of any express exclusion, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act applies. Consequently, the Rent Control Court has the power to condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 11. Then arises the question whether the declaration by this Court in K.K. Hamsa’s case that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to the rent control proceedings by overruling its earlier decision has retrospective effect and applies to all pending proceedings. In this regard the decision of the Apex Court in the celebrated case, Golak Nath and Others vs. State of Punjab and Another, AIR 1967 SC 1643 can be referred to. It was held: “If a subsequent decision changes the earlier one, the latter decision does not make law but only discovers the correct principle of law. The result of this view is that it is necessarily retrospective in operation.” 12. In that view of the matter, the decision of the Rent Control Court dismissing I.A. No. 952 of 2019 in R.C.P. No. 11 of 2018 on the sole ground of non-applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act becomes wrong. 13. Now the question is whether the petitioner has the right to approach this Court by filing this Original Petition after having suffered dismissal of R.C.A. No. 5 of 2020. In that context, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents has pointed out that without disclosing about the dismissal of I.A. No. 952 of 2019 by the Rent Control Court, he preferred that appeal and by that itself, the petitioner should be denied the relief which he claimed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, which always is a discretionary one. 14. 14. Explanation to Rule 13 of Order IX of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 reads: “Where there has been an appeal against a decree passed ex-parte under this rule, and the appeal has been disposed of on any ground other than the ground that the appellant has withdrawn the appeal, no application shall lie under this rule for setting aside that ex-parte decree.” 15. Going by Explanation to Rule 13 of Order IX of the Code, it may be said that petitioner’s remedy of an application for setting aside the ex-parte order is foreclosed after disposal of the appeal. When Rule 13 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Rules, 1979 is the provision enabling one to file an application for setting aside an ex-parte order passed by a Rent Control Court, the restriction created by the said explanation cannot be imported to the rent control proceedings. Therefore, filing of the appeal by the petitioner and suffering its dismissal did not create any bar to the application filed by him to set aside the ex-parte order of eviction under Section 11 of Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. Therefore, the contention that the petitioner did not disclose the factum of dismissal of I.A. No. 952 of 2020 while filing R.C.A. No. 5 of 2020 does not ordinarily have any significance although, fairness required to mention that fact. But the petitioner being a practising Advocate, we hasten to have a little elaboration on this aspect. 16. Preamble to the Rules framed by the Bar Council of India under Section 49(1)(c) of the Advocates Act in the matter of standards of professional conduct and etiquette to be observed by advocates reads as follows: “An advocate shall, at all times, comport himself in a manner befitting his status as an officer of the Court, a privileged member of the community, and a gentleman, bearing in mind that what may be lawful and moral for a person who is not a member of the Bar, or for a member of the Bar in his non- professional capacity may still be improper for an Advocate. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing obligation, an Advocate shall fearlessly uphold the interests of his client and in his conduct conform to the rules hereinafter mentioned both in letter and in spirit....” 17. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing obligation, an Advocate shall fearlessly uphold the interests of his client and in his conduct conform to the rules hereinafter mentioned both in letter and in spirit....” 17. The Apex Court in P.D. Gupta vs. Ram Murti and Another, (1997) 7 SCC 147 while discussing about the level of standard expected from lawyers while pleading in courts observed: “A lawyer owes a duty to be fair not only to his client but to the court as well as to the opposite party in the conduct of the case. Administration of Justice is a stream which has to be kept pure and clean. It has to be kept unpolluted. Administration of Justice is not something which concerns the Bench only. It concerns the Bar as well. Bar is the principal ground for recruiting Judges. No one should be able to raise a finger about the conduct of a lawyer.” 18. About the responsibility of lawyers to courts the Apex Court explained in Chadha vs. Triyugi Narain Mishra, (2001) 2 SCC 221 , thus: “A counsel, being an officer of court, shall apprise the Judge with the correct position of law whether for or against either party.” 19. The foregoing discussion makes it clear that when an Advocate pleads for his client, it is his obligation to act with utmost faith and bona-fides. He is expected to convey every information which he knows about the lis and required by law to disclose in court. Only then the court would be able to reach a just decision in the case. When an Advocate becomes a party to the case, he or she is all the more responsible to act with utmost faith and fairness. The petitioner was therefore certainly obliged to mention about dismissal of I.A. No. 952 of 2019 in the Appeal Memorandum in R.C.A. No. 5 of 2020. 20. The respondents did not raise any objection in allowing I.A. No. 952 of 2019. The Rent Control Court dismissed the application only because of the technical reason of lack of power to condone the delay. 20. The respondents did not raise any objection in allowing I.A. No. 952 of 2019. The Rent Control Court dismissed the application only because of the technical reason of lack of power to condone the delay. We held above that in the light of the decision in Hamsa’s case (supra), the position has changed and the decision of the Rent Control Court dismissing I.A. No. 952 of 2019 in R.C.P. No. 11 of 2018 on the sole ground of non-applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act becomes wrong. 21. The question now arises is whether the order in I.A. No. 952 of 2019 is liable to be interfered with invoking the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Article 227 of the Constitution of India deals with power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. Under clause (1) of Article 227 of the Constitution, every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. Jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 was examined in detail by this Court in Subaida vs. Deputy Tahsildar (RR), Thrissur District and Others, 2019 KHC 24 (rendered by one among us, Anil K. Narendran J.) where it was held: “The power is discretionary and has to be exercised very sparingly on equitable principle. This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases, but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration in the larger public interest, whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievances. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline. The object of superintendence under Article 227, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to the High Court. The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to the High Court. The supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited, where interference qua an interlocutory order of a subordinate court or tribunal is concerned. In such matters, the High Court has to consider the question as to whether such an interlocutory order of the subordinate court or tribunal was vitiated due to want of jurisdiction or that the said Court or tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction or that the order passed by it had resulted in failure of justice.” 22. Having considered the entire aspects of the matter in detail in the light of the above legal principles, we are of the view that this is a fit case where powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is required to be exercised. 23. We are not forgetting the fact that there were laches on the part of the petitioner. His contention is that his functioning as the Secretary of Kerala State Child Welfare Council during the period disabled him from appearing in court and filing objections on time in R.C.P. No. 11 of 2018. His own statement that three more lawyers have been sharing the advocates’ office in the petition scheduled building handicaps the said contention. However, having approached the court by filing I.A. No. 952 of 2019 within a period of one month after passing the ex-parte order, a liberal view has to be taken in the matter. It is trite to say that standing on technicalities will defeat the very purpose of rendering justice and it is only appropriate to afford him an opportunity to contest the matter. 24. It is trite to say that standing on technicalities will defeat the very purpose of rendering justice and it is only appropriate to afford him an opportunity to contest the matter. 24. In the light of the principle laid down in Radhey Shyam and Another vs. Chhabi Nath and Others, (2015) 5 SCC 423 , in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court may not only quash or set aside the impugned proceedings, judgment or order, but it may also make such directions as the facts and circumstances of the case may warrant, may be, by way of guiding the inferior court or tribunal as to the manner in which it would now proceed further or afresh as commended to or guided by the High Court. In appropriate cases, the High Court, while exercising supervisory jurisdiction, may substitute such a decision of its own in place of the impugned decision, as the inferior court or tribunal should have made. 25. At the cost of repetition, we point out that the petitioner being a lawyer has the sublime duty to be fair not only to the court but also to the opposite party. He, however, failed to be diligent in conducting his case resulting in inconvenience not only to the respondents but also to the court. The inconvenience caused to the respondents has to be sufficiently compensated. We accordingly, hold that the Original Petition can be allowed and the order dated 18.09.2019 in I.A. No. 952 of 2019 and the order of eviction dated 01.01.2019 in R.C.P. No. 11 of 2018 can be set aside on the condition of payment of costs of Rs. 20,000/- (Twenty thousand only) to the respondents. The costs shall be paid within a period of two weeks. On such payment, the Rent Control Court will restore R.C.P. No. 11 of 2018 on file and proceed with in accordance with law. Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be a direction to the trial court to dispose of the R.C.P. as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within a period of four months from 29.11.2021, on which date both parties will appear before the Rent Control Court. 26. Original Petition is allowed as above. R.C. Rev. No. 23 of 2021 27. 26. Original Petition is allowed as above. R.C. Rev. No. 23 of 2021 27. The R.C. Revision is closed in view of the judgment in O.P. (R.C.) No. 24 of 2021.