JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned Senior Advocate Mr. R.S. Sanjanwala with learned advocate Mr. Dipen Desai for the petitioners, learned advocate Mr. Chitrajeet Upadhyay with learned advocate Mr. Anand V. Thakkar for respondents no. 4 to 14 and learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. K.M.Antani for the respondentState through video conference. 2. Rule returnable forthwith. Learned advocate Mr. Anand Thakkar waives service of notice of rule on behalf of respondent nos. 4 to 14 and learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. K.M. Antani waives service of notice of rule on behalf of respondent State. 3. Having regard to the controversy involved in the petition, which is in a very narrow compass, with the consent of the learned advocates for the respective parties, the matter has been taken up for final hearing. 4. By this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have prayed for the following reliefs : “(A) The Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue writ of certiorari or writ in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 23.12.2020 passed by the respondent No.1 Commissioner, Municipalities Administration, Gujarat annexed at Annexure-A to the petition. (B) The Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue writ of certiorari or writ in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, quashing and setting aside the order dated 28.12.2020 passed by the respondent No.3 Collector, Banaskantha annexed at Annexure 3 to the petition. (C) The Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or writ in the nature of mandamus or writ or prohibition or writ in the nature of prohibition, or any other appropriate writ, direction or order prohibiting the respondent authorities from declaring the bye elections of the Dhanera Municipality. (D) Pending final hearing and disposal of this petition, the Hon’ble Court be pleased to stay the execution, operation, and implementation of impugned order dated 23.12.2020 passed by the respondent No.1Commissioner, Municipalities Administration, Gujarat annexed at Annexure-A to the petition. (E) Pending final hearing and disposal of this petition, the Hon’ble Court be pleased to stay the execution, operation and implementation of order dated 28.12.2020 passed by the respondent No.3-Collector, Banaskantha annexed at Annexure 3 to the petition. (E) Pending final hearing and disposal of this petition, the Hon’ble Court be pleased to stay the execution, operation and implementation of order dated 28.12.2020 passed by the respondent No.3-Collector, Banaskantha annexed at Annexure 3 to the petition. (F) Pending final hearing and disposal of this petition, the Honble Court be pleased to restrain the respondents from declaring the bye elections of the Dhanera Municipality and also of the President and Vice President. (G) The Hon’ble Court be pleased to grant such other and further relief in the interest of justice.” 5. Brief facts of the case are as under : 5.1) The petitioners are the elected members of Dhanera Municipality. The general election of Dhanera Municipality was held on 17.02.2018 and result was declared on 19.02.2018, wherein, out of total 28 seats, the petitioners herein belonging to the political party Indian National Congress got elected for 18 seats whereas, 11 seats went to the other political party being Bhartiya Janta Party. 5.2) It is the case of the petitioners that from the said 18 councilors who got elected, one councilor namely Balvantji Chhogaji Barot who also became the President of the Municipality was subsequently disqualified and thereby the petitioners herein belonging to the political party Indian National Congress had 17 elected councilors in Dhanera Municipality and, therefore, the petitioners were in majority. 5.3) It is the case of the petitioners that elections of the President and Vice-President was to be held every two and half years and therefore, on expiry of two and half years, election of President of Dhanera Municipality was declared by the Deputy Collector, Dhanera by issuing agenda notice dated 07.08.2020 and the election was held on 20.08.2020. 5.4) It is the case of the petitioners that since the ruling party is in the minority, the show cause notices under Section 37 and Section 70 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act,1963 (for short “the Act,1963”) were issued to the petitioners and the said proceedings were initiated at this point of time only with a view to remove/disqualify the petitioners so that they cannot participate in the elections of the President and Vice President. 5.5) It is the case of the petitioners that the respondent No.1 Commissioner, Municipalities Administration had issued show cause notice in exercise of powers under Section 37 of the Act.1963 to remove the petitioners, calling upon the petitioners to reply on 18.08.2020. 5.5) It is the case of the petitioners that the respondent No.1 Commissioner, Municipalities Administration had issued show cause notice in exercise of powers under Section 37 of the Act.1963 to remove the petitioners, calling upon the petitioners to reply on 18.08.2020. It is the case of the petitioners that the notice is only issued to the petitioners who are belonging to the political Party Indian National Congress though all the 13 issues for which show cause notice has been issued for which resolutions have been passed in the general body meeting which includes the elected members of the Bhartiya Janta Party which shows the malafide intention of the authority. 5.6) It is the case of the petitioners that for the very same issue, for which respondent No.1 has issued notice under Section 37 of the Act,1963, the Regional Commissioner initiated proceedings under Section 70 of the Act,1963 for recovery, at the instance of the councilors who were in minority though they were very much part of the resolutions passed by the Municipality. The next date of hearing of the said notice was kept on 20.08.2020 and at 12:00 p.m., election of the President and Vice President was to be held. 5.7) It is the case of the petitioners that both the show cause notices under Section 37 and Section 70 of the Act, 1963 were challenged before this Court by the present petitioners by way of a petition being Special Civil Application No.9675 of 2020. It is the case of the petitioners that the aforesaid petition was preferred challenging the show cause notices since the proceedings under Section 37 and Section 70 were strategically initiated at the time of the elections of President and Vice President. This Court vide order dated 19.08.2020 protected the petitioners by directing the authorities to adjourn the proceedings beyond the date of elections. 5.8) It is the case of the petitioners that the elections of President and Vice President was held on 25.08.2020 wherein, the petitioner No.8 was elected as President and petitioner No.16 came to be elected as Vice President. This Court vide order dated 19.08.2020 protected the petitioners by directing the authorities to adjourn the proceedings beyond the date of elections. 5.8) It is the case of the petitioners that the elections of President and Vice President was held on 25.08.2020 wherein, the petitioner No.8 was elected as President and petitioner No.16 came to be elected as Vice President. 5.9) It is the case of the petitioners that since the election of President and Vice President was over, the petitioners withdrew the petition with a view to raise all contentions before the respondent No.1 Authority, which in turn was permitted by this Court and the petition came to be disposed off on 27.08.2020. 5.10) The petitioners thereafter, submitted reply on 15.10.2020 to the show cause notice. According to the petitioners, however, no personal hearing was given to the petitioner. It appears that thereafter, the impugned order dated 23.12.2020 was passed. After passing of the impugned order dated 23.12.2020, order dated 28.12.2020 was passed by the Collector, Banaskantha at Palanpur giving effect to the order dated 23.12.2020 by handing over the charge of the President of Nagarpalika to one Josnaben Yogesbhai Trivedi under section 42(7) the Act, 1963.Being aggrieved by the said action of the respondent authorities, the petitioners have preferred the present petition with the aforesaid prayers. 6. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala submitted that during the pendency of the petition, the respondent authorities have issued an agenda notice dated 15.1.2021 declaring the election for the post of President. Therefore, the petitioner filed Civil Application No.2/2021 praying for interim relief. This Court passed the following order on 19.01.2021 : “Heard learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala assisted by learned advocate Mr. Dipen Desai for the applicants and learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. K.M. Antani for the respondent – State through video conference. By this application the applicants original petitioners have prayed for the following reliefs : “(A) Pending final hearing and disposal of Special Civil Application no.670 of 2021, the Hon'ble Court be pleased to stay the execution, operation, and further implementation of the agenda notice dated 15.01.2021 annexed at Annexure-B to this application and thereby be pleased to stay the elections of President and Vice President of Dhanera Municipality. (B) The Hon'ble Court be pleased to grant such other and further relief in the interest of justice.” This Court passed the following order on January, 2021 in the main petition, which reads as under :“ 1. Heard learned senior advocate Mr. R.S. Sanjanwala for learned advocate Mr. Dipen Desai for the petitioners, learned advocate Mr. Chitrajit Upadhyay for caveators and learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Kanva Antani for respondent No.1 through video conference. 2. Learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Antani states that copy of the petition is served upon him today at 11:00 a.m. By learned advocate Mr. Dipen Desai appearing for the petitioners. 3. Learned advocate Mr. Chitrajit Upadhyay states that he has filed a caveat for Gitaben Raychandbhai Vaghela and others. However, the petitioners have not joined the caveators as party in the present petition and therefore, a separate Civil Application is filed for joining the caveators as respondents in the petition. 4. Office to list Civil Application filed by learned advocate Mr. Upadhyay on behalf of Gitaven Raychandbhai Vaghela and others along with Special Civil Application on 20th January, 2021. Learned AGP to file reply, if any, on or before the next date of hearing and serve a copy of the same upon the petitioners.” Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala submitted that though this Court has adjourned the matter on 20th January, 2021 because of the time sought by the learned Assistant Government Pleader, as well as, learned advocate Mr.Upadhyay, the Deputy Collector, Dhanera issued agenda notice on 15th January, 2021 for holding the election of President and Vice President of Dhanera Municipality on 20th January, 2021. From the above facts, when the petitioners have challenged the order dated 23rd December, 2020 removing them as member of Dhanera Municipality, and as the matter is sub-judice for adjudication, the Deputy Collector, Dhanera could not have issued agenda for holding election for the post of President and Vice President of Dhanera Municipality on the date on which the matter is adjourned by this Court. It is averred in the application that the order dated 13th January, 2021 was communicated to the concerned authorities. This Court has refused to hear learned advocate Mr. C.B. Upadhyay, as the Civil Application for joining party is still pending. It is averred in the application that the order dated 13th January, 2021 was communicated to the concerned authorities. This Court has refused to hear learned advocate Mr. C.B. Upadhyay, as the Civil Application for joining party is still pending. It is pertinent to observe that when the matter with regard to the removal of applicants-petitioners as members of the Municipality is pending and when there is already an interim arrangement made by order dated 28th December, 2020 by the Collector, which is produced at Annexure-J at page no.200 of the main petition, as per the provisions of subsection 7 of Section 42 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963, there was no need to issue the agenda for holding an election for the post of President and Vice President of Dhanera Municipality by the Deputy Collector before the hearing of the main petition. In such peculiar facts and circumstances, this application is allowed. The execution, operation and further implementation of the impugned agenda notice dated 15th January, 2021 at Annexure-B to the application is stayed till final disposal of the Special Civil Application no.670 of 2021, meaning thereby, the election of President and Vice President of Dhanera Municipality, which is proposed to be held on 20th January, 2021 is stayed till final disposal of the Special Civil Application no.670 of 2021. This application is disposed of accordingly. Learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Antani is hereby directed to convey this order to the concerned officer forthwith. Registry is directed to provide a copy of writ of this order to the learned advocate for the applicants through email so as to enable him to serve the same through Email/ Registered A.D. Post. Direct service is permitted today.” 7. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala submitted that respondent no.1 has no jurisdiction to pass order under section 37 of the Act, 1963 which provides that only the State Government can exercise such powers of removal of the members of any Municipality for the reasons mentioned therein. It was submitted that Division Bench of this Court in R/Misc. Civil Application No. 2/2020 in R/Writ Petition (PIL) No. 125/2019 and other allied matters, rejected the application under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 on the ground that the Director of Municipalities and now the Commissioner Municipalities, Administration is not authorised to take action under section 37 of the Act, 1963. Civil Application No. 2/2020 in R/Writ Petition (PIL) No. 125/2019 and other allied matters, rejected the application under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 on the ground that the Director of Municipalities and now the Commissioner Municipalities, Administration is not authorised to take action under section 37 of the Act, 1963. It was submitted that the Division Bench held that it would be Secretary/ Principal Secretary/ Additional Chief Secretary heading the department of local bodies in the State Government who would be authorized under section 37 of the Act, 1963 to take appropriate action and accordingly, the Contempt petition was rejected. 8. It was submitted by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala for the petitioners that respondent no.1 has passed the impugned order contrary to the provisions of section 37 of the Act,1963, and more particularly, the manner in which the order is passed speaks volume for itself. It was further submitted that the impugned order purportedly passed under section 37 of the Act, 1963 is nothing but an abuse of process of law and while elaborating the same, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala invited the attention of the Court to the findings recorded by respondent no.1 in the impugned order. Referring to the findings recorded in the impugned order, it was pointed out that in none of the findings which are given against the petitioner with regard to nine charges in the show cause notice, respondent no.1 has not given any reason for arriving at the conclusion for rejecting the explanation tendered by the petitioners to hold that the charge is proved. It was pointed out that the petition is required to be allowed only on this ground. The learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala also referred to the various defenses raised by the petitioners in support of his submissions with regard to the charges levelled against the petitioners in the show cause notice and pointed out that there is no financial loss which has occurred to the Municipality because of the functioning of the petitioners more particularly, the President and Vice-President of the Municipality. 9. On the other hand, learned AGP Mr. 9. On the other hand, learned AGP Mr. Antani submitted that the impugned order is a detailed reasoned order whereby respondent no.1 has reproduced the entire written submissions of the petitioners and thereafter considering the materials on record as well as the details mentioned in the show cause notice, the findings are given and it was not necessary for respondent no.1 to give findings in detail as the impugned order is passed by an administrative officer though may be discharging quasi-judicial function and in such circumstances, no interference is required to be made as the impugned order is passed by the competent authority in accordance with law. 10. Learned AGP Mr. Antani submitted that respondent no.1 is authorised to exercise jurisdiction under section 37 of the Act, 1963 in view of notification of the State Government dated 30.7.2018 issued in consonance with section 278A read with section 46A of the Act, 1963. 11. Learned advocate Mr. Upadhyay who appears for the newly joined respondents no. 4 to 14 who have made complaints against the petitioners for not functioning in the interest of Municipality submitted that the impugned order has to be read along with the show cause notice and in the show cause notice, the petitioners were called upon to show cause the financial irregularities mentioned therein and therefore, it cannot be said that merely because in the impugned order, respondent no.1 has not described financial loss while arriving at the findings to the effect that nine charges levelled against the petitioners are proved, the impugned order is bad in law. He therefore, submitted that no interference may be made in the impugned order. 12.Having heard the learned advocates for the respective parties and having gone through the materials on record and on perusal of the impugned order dated 23.12.2020 passed by respondent no. He therefore, submitted that no interference may be made in the impugned order. 12.Having heard the learned advocates for the respective parties and having gone through the materials on record and on perusal of the impugned order dated 23.12.2020 passed by respondent no. l while exercising powers under section 37 of the Act, 1963, it emerges that respondent no.1 narrated charges against the petitioners in the show cause notice dated 6.8.2020 and thereafter recorded the written submissions tendered by the petitioners on 15.10.2020 and thereafter recorded the findings, without giving any justification for the conclusion for each of the charges which is held to be proved against the petitioners or charges which are held to be not proved against the petitioners and to arrive at such conclusion only one line observation is made in the findings given in the impugned order. For example, apropos charge no. 1 with regard to the approval granted by letter dated 5.6.2018 of Engineer of Water Supply and Sewage Board, it was submitted by the petitioners that the work was approved by resolution no. 119(1), 119(42) in the meeting held on 27.3.2018. Rejecting such explanation of the petitioner, it was only stated in one line that such defense is not acceptable because the tender was accepted at higher price without disclosing as to what was the actual tender price and no reason is assigned as to how it is given at higher price and for that purpose what inquiry was made as contemplated under section 37 of the Act, 1963 and in what manner loss is caused to Municipality. In each and every finding given for each and every charge, the respondent no.1 has not referred to any reason or finding arrived at as per the inquiry made as contemplated under section 37. For such purpose, it would be germane to refer to section 37 of the Act, 1963 which reads thus : “37. Removal from office (1) The State Government may remove from office (a) any councillor of a municipality, [on its own motion or on receipt of] a recommendation of the municipality in that behalf supported by a majority of the total number of the then councillor of the municipality; or (b) any president or vice-president of a municipality. Removal from office (1) The State Government may remove from office (a) any councillor of a municipality, [on its own motion or on receipt of] a recommendation of the municipality in that behalf supported by a majority of the total number of the then councillor of the municipality; or (b) any president or vice-president of a municipality. If, after giving the councillor, president or as the case may be vice-president an opportunity of being heard and giving due notice in that behalf to the municipality and after making such inquiry as it deems necessary, the State Government is of the opinion that the councillor, president or as the case may be, vice-president has been guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties or of any disgraceful conduct or has become incapable of performing his duties under this Act. (2) A president or vice-president removed under subsection (1) shall not be eligible for reelection as a president or vice-president during the reminder of the term of the municipality.” 13. On perusal of the section 37 of the Act, it prescribes that the State Government has power to remove any councillor of Municipality on its own motion or on receipt of a recommendation of the Municipality in that behalf, supported by a majority of the total number of the then councillors of the Municipality or any President or Vice-president of the Municipality after giving due notice on that behalf to the Municipality and after making such inquiry as it deems necessary. In facts of the case, on perusal of impugned order, there is no reference to any such inquiry which has been held by the authority. It is true that the show cause notice dated 6.8.2020 refers to financial loss to the Municipality alleged to have been caused for 13 charges levelled against the petitioners but at the same time in the impugned order, no reason muchless any finding to that effect is recorded by respondent no.1. It is a trite law to mention that how the authority discharging administrative function while exercising the powers under quasi judicial jurisdiction should pass the order. It is a trite law to mention that how the authority discharging administrative function while exercising the powers under quasi judicial jurisdiction should pass the order. However, as the impugned order is a classic example of total disregard to such settled legal position as to how such orders are required to be passed, it would be necessary again to refer to various decisions, wherein guidance and guidelines are given to the authorities to keep the same in mind while passing the orders whereby the fate of the petitioners are decided. Therefore, it would be necessary to refer to the following decisions of the Apex Court as well as High Court : (i) The Bombay High Court in case of G.J. Kanga and another v. S.S. Basha reported in (1993) 95 BOMLR 632, has held as under: “14. A quasi-judicial function is one which stands midway between a judicial and an administrative function. I. On the one hand, it differs from a purely administrative act in the following respects : (a) A purely administrative act does not decide any rights of private parties though it may affect them. But a quasi judicial act determines private rights with a binding force. R. v. Dublin Corpn., (1878)2 Ir. 371(367) : R. v. Local Govt. Bd., (1902)2 I.R. 349(373). (b) An administrative act may be non-statutory and does not necessarily require statutory authority. But a body is called quasi-judicial only when it has statutory authority to discharge the function in question. (c) A purely administrative body has no procedural obligation, unless it is specifically imposed by state. E.G. Frankin v. Minister of Town & Country Planning, reported in (1947)2 All E.R. 289(295) H.L. ; University of Celyon v. Fernande, reported in (1960)1 All E.R. 631(637) P.C. ; Ridge v. Baldwin, reported in (1963)2 All E.R. 66 (75; 86; 109). But as soon as function is held to be 'quasi-judicial', the law requires that the rules of natural justice must be observed in discharging that function. Union of India v. Verma. But as soon as function is held to be 'quasi-judicial', the law requires that the rules of natural justice must be observed in discharging that function. Union of India v. Verma. (d) While an administrative or ministerial function may be delegated, a judicial or quasi judicial function cannot, in the absence of express statutory provision, be delegated, Vine v. National Dock Labour Bd., reported in (1959)3 All E.R. 393(950) H.L. (e) What distinguished a judicial from an administrative decision is that the decision of a Court is objective, i.e. arrived at by the application of fixed standards; even the discretion which a Court of Justice is allowed to exercise in some particular cases, has to be exercised in accordance with certain fixed principles. Sharp v. Wakefield, reported in (1891) A.C. 173(179). On the other hand, the decisions of administrative authorities are usually subjective in the sense that they are reached without applying any standard at all, except that of expediency or policy. Labour Relations Board v. J.E.I. Works, reported in (1949) A.C. 134(149). 15. An administrative function is called quasi-judicial when there is an obligation to adopt the judicial approach and to comply with the basic requirements of justice; when there is no such obligation, the decision is called 'purely administrative'. Ridge v. Baldwin, reported in (1963)2 All E.R. 66(7374, 113) H.L. 16. It follows from the above that the quasi-judicial obligation to follow the principles of natural justice attaches to a function or the exercise of a power; and much of confusion would arise if it is supposed to attach to an office. Ridge v. Baldwin, (supra). It is possible for judicial officer to pass a particular order which is ministerial and for an administrative officer to make an order or arrive at a decision which is quasi-judicial, Errington v. Minister of Health, reported in (1935)1 K.B. 249 C.A.” (ii) The Supreme Court in case of S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India reported in 1990 (4) SCC 594 , has held as under : “33. Tarachand Khatri v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Others, [1977] 2 SCR 198 was a case where an inquiry was conducted into charges of misconduct and the disciplinary authority, agreeing with the findings of the Inquiry Officer, had imposed the penalty of dismissal. Tarachand Khatri v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Others, [1977] 2 SCR 198 was a case where an inquiry was conducted into charges of misconduct and the disciplinary authority, agreeing with the findings of the Inquiry Officer, had imposed the penalty of dismissal. The said order of dismissal was challenged on the ground that the disciplinary authority had not given its reasons for passing the order. The said contention was negatived by this Court and distinction was drawn between an order of affirmance and an order of reversal. It was observed (SCR p.208 : SCC p.480, para 19): " ..... while it may be necessary for a disciplinary or administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions to state the reasons in support of its order if it differs from the conclusions arrived at and the recommendations made by the Inquiry Officer in view of the scheme of a particular enactment or the rules made there under, it would be laying down the proposition too broadly to say that even an ordinary concurrence must be supported by reasons." 34. In Raipur Development Authority and Others v. Chokhamal Contractors and Others, [1989] 2 S.C.C. 721 a Constitution Bench of this Court was considering the question whether it is obligatory for an arbitrator under the Arbitration Act, 1940 to give reasons for the award. It was argued that the requirement of giving reasons for the decision is a part of the rules of natural justice which are also applicable to the award of an arbitrator and reliance was placed on the decisions in Bhagat Raja case (Supra) and Siemens Engineering Co. case (Supra). The said contention was rejected by this Court. After referring to the decisions in Bhagat Raja case (Supra); Som Datt Datta case (Supra) and Siemens Engineering Co. case (Supra) this Court has observed (SCC pp. 751-52, para 35) : "It is no doubt true that in the decisions pertaining to Administrative Law, this court in some cases has observed that the giving of reasons in an administrative decision is a rule of natural justice by an extension of the prevailing rules. It would be in the interest of the world of commerce that the said rule is confined to the area of Administrative Law ..... It would be in the interest of the world of commerce that the said rule is confined to the area of Administrative Law ..... But at the same time it has to be borne in mind that what applies generally to settlement of disputes by authorities governed by public law need not be extended to all cases arising under private law such as those arising under the law of arbitration which is intended for settlement of private disputes." 35. The decisions of this Court referred to above indicate that with regard to the requirement to record reasons the approach of this Court is more in line with that of the American Courts. An important consideration which has weighed with the Court for holding that an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions must record the reasons for its decision, is that such a decision is subject to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution as well as the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution and that the reasons, if recorded, would enable this Court or the High Courts to effectively exercise the appellate or supervisory power. But this is not the sole consideration. The other considerations which have also weighed with the Court in taking this view are that the requirement of recording reasons would (i) guarantee consideration by the authority; (ii) introduce clarity in the decisions; and (iii) minimise chances of arbitrariness in decision-making. In this regard a distinction has been drawn between ordinary Courts of law and tribunals and authorities exercising judicial functions on the ground that a Judge is trained to look at things objectively uninfluenced by considerations of policy or expediency whereas an executive officer generally looks at things from the standpoint of policy and expediency. 36. Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority. But the other considerations, referred to above, which have also weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative authority must record reasons for its decision, are of no less significance. These considerations show that the recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. These considerations show that the recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a Court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge. 37. Having considered the rationale for the requirement to record the reasons for the decision of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions we may now examine the legal basis for imposing this obligation. While considering this aspect the Donoughmore Committee observed that it may well be argued that there is a third principle of natural justice, namely, that a party is entitled to know the reason for the decision, be it judicial or quasi-judicial. The committee expressed the opinion that “there are some cases where the refusal to give grounds for a decision may be plainly unfair; and this may be so, even when the decision is final and no further proceedings are open to the disappointed party by way of appeal or otherwise" and that "where further proceedings are open to a disappointed party, it is contrary to natural justice that the silence of the Minister or the Ministerial Tribunal should deprive them of the opportunity." (P 80) Prof. H.W.R. Wade has also expressed the view that "natural justice may provide the best rubric for it, since the giving of reasons is required by the ordinary man's sense of justice." (See Wade, Administrative Law, 6th Edn. P. 548). In Siemens Engineering Co. case (Supra) this Court has taken the same view when it observed that "the rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principles of audi alteram parlem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process." This decision proceeds on the basis that the two wellknown principles of natural justice, namely (i) that no man should be a Judge in his own cause and (ii) that no person should be judged without a hearing, are not exhaustive and that in addition to these two principles there may be rules which seek to ensure fairness in the process of decision-making and can be regarded as part of the principles of natural justice. This view is in consonance with the law laid down by this Court in A.K. Kraipak and Others v. Union of India and Others, [1970] 1 SCR 457, wherein it has been held: "The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules namely (i) no one shall be a Judge in his own cause (nemo dabet esse judex propria causa) and (ii) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice." 38. A similar trend is discernible in the decisions of English Courts wherein it has been held that natural justice demands that the decision should be based on some evidence of probative value. (See: R. v. Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner ex P. Moore; Mahon v. Air New Zealand Ltd.) 39. A similar trend is discernible in the decisions of English Courts wherein it has been held that natural justice demands that the decision should be based on some evidence of probative value. (See: R. v. Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner ex P. Moore; Mahon v. Air New Zealand Ltd.) 39. The object underlying the rules of natural justice "is to prevent miscarriage of justice" and secure "fairplay in action." As pointed out earlier the requirement about recording of reasons for its decision by an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions achieves this object by excluding chances of arbitrariness and ensuring a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. Keeping in view the expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice, we are of the opinion, that the requirement to record reason can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise of power by administrative authorities. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The extent of their application depends upon the particular statutory framework whereunder jurisdiction has been conferred on the administrative authority. With regard to the exercise of a particular power by an administrative authority including exercise of judicial or quasi judicial functions the legislature, while conferring the said power, may feel that it would not be in the larger public interest that the reasons for the order passed by the administrative authority be recorded in the order and be communicated to the aggrieved party and it may dispense with such a requirement. It may do so by making an express provision to that affect as those contained in the Administrative Procedure Act, 1946 of U.S.A. and the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act, 1977 of Australia whereby the orders passed by certain specified authorities are excluded from the ambit of the enactment. Such an exclusion can also arise by necessary implication from the nature of the subject matter, the scheme and the provisions of the enactment. The public interest underlying such a provision would out weight the salutary purpose served by the requirement to record the reasons. The said requirement cannot, therefore, be insisted upon in such a case.” (iii) This Court in case of Testeels Ltd. v. N.M. Desai and another reported in AIR 1970 Guj 1 , has held as under : “3. The public interest underlying such a provision would out weight the salutary purpose served by the requirement to record the reasons. The said requirement cannot, therefore, be insisted upon in such a case.” (iii) This Court in case of Testeels Ltd. v. N.M. Desai and another reported in AIR 1970 Guj 1 , has held as under : “3. There are two strong and cogent reasons why we must insist that every quasi-judicial order must disclose reasons in support of it. The necessity of giving reasons flows as a necessary corollary from the rule of law which constitutes one of the basic principles of our constitutional set up. Our Constitution posts a welfare State in which every citizen must have justice social, economic and political and in order to achieve the ideal of welfare State, the State has to perform several functions involving acts of interferences with the free and unrestricted exercise of private rights. The State is called upon to regulate and control the social and economic life of the citizen in order to establish socioeconomic justice and remove the existing imbalance in the socioeconomic structure. The State has, therefore, necessarily to entrust diverse functions to administrative authorities which involve making of orders and decisions and performance of acts affecting the rights of individual members of the public. In exercise of some of these functions, the administrative authorities are required to act judicially. Now what is involved in a judicial process is well settled and as pointed out by Shah J., in Jaswant Sugar Mills's case, AIR 1963 SC 677 (supra), a quasi-judicial decision involves the following three elements: (1) It is in substance a determination upon investigation of a question by the application of objective standards to facts found in the light of preexisting legal rules: (2) It declares rights or imposes upon parties obligations affecting their civil rights; and (3) the investigation is subject to certain procedural attributes contemplating an opportunity of presenting its case to a party, ascertainment of facts by means of material if a dispute be on question of facts, and if the dispute be on question of law, on the presentation, of legal argument, and a decision resulting in the disposal of the matter on findings based upon those questions of law and fact. The administrative authorities having a duty to act judicially cannot therefore decide on considerations of policy or expediency. The administrative authorities having a duty to act judicially cannot therefore decide on considerations of policy or expediency. They must decide the matter "solely on the facts of the particular case solely on the material before them and apart from any extraneous considerations" by applying "preexisting legal norms to factual situations". The duty to act judicially excludes arbitrary exercise of power and it is, therefore, essential to the rule of law that the duty to act judicially is strictly observed by the administrative authorities upon whom it is laid. If any departure from the observance of the duty to act judicially could pass unnoticed, it would open the door to arbitrariness and make a serious inroad on the rule of law. To quote the words of the Supreme Court in S. G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1427 : ". . . . .. the absence of arbitrary power is the first essential of the rule of law upon which our whole constitutional system is based. In a system governed by rule of law, discretion, when conferred upon executive authorities, must be confined within clearly defined limits. The rule of law from this point of view means that decisions should be made by the application of known principles and rules and, in general, such decisions should be predictable and the citizen should know where he is. If a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule it is unpredictable and such a decision is the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with the rule of law." Now the necessity of giving reasons is one of the most important safeguards to ensure observance of the duty to act judicially. If the administrative officers can make orders without giving reasons, such power in the hands of unscrupulous or dishonest officers may turn out to be a potent weapon for abuse of power. But if reasons are required to be given for an order, it will be an effective restraint on such abuse as the order, if it discloses extraneous or irrelevant considerations or is arbitrary, will be subject to judicial scrutiny and correction. As observed by Subba Rao J., as he then was, in Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd., v. Union of India, AIR 1966 SC 671 , "A speaking order will at its best be a reasonable and at its worst at least a plausible one". As observed by Subba Rao J., as he then was, in Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd., v. Union of India, AIR 1966 SC 671 , "A speaking order will at its best be a reasonable and at its worst at least a plausible one". The condition to give reasons introduces clarity, checks the introduction of extraneous or, at any rate, minimises arbitrariness in the decision making process it gives satisfaction to the party against whom the order is made and guarantees consideration of all relevant factors and discharge of his functions by the officer in accordance with the requirement of law. We may in this connection usefully quote the following passage from "American Administrative Law" by Bernard Schwartz at page 163: "The value of reasoned decisions as a check upon the arbitrary use of administrative power seems clear.... The right to know the reasons for a decision which adversely affects one's person or property is a basic right of every litigant (and that whether the forum be judicial or administrative). But the requirement that reasons be given does more than merely vindicate the right of the individual to know why a decision injurious to him has been rendered. For the obligation to give a reasoned decision is a substantial check upon the misuse of power. The giving of reasons serves both to convince those subject to decisions that they are not arbitrary and to ensure that they are not, in fact, arbitrary. The need publicly to articulate the reasoning process upon which a decision is based, more than anything else, requires the Magistrate (judicial or administrative) to work out in his own mind all the factors which are present in a case. A decision supported by specific findings and reasons is much less likely to rest on caprice or careless consideration. As Judges Jerome Frank well put it in language as applicable to decision-making by administrators as by trial judges, the requirement of reasons has the primary purpose of evoking care on the part of the decider. . . . ." If the administrative officers having a duty to act judicially are required to set forth in writing the mental processes of reasoning which have led them to the decision, it would to a large extent help to ensure performance of the duty to act judicially and exclude arbitrariness and caprice in the discharge of their functions. . . . ." If the administrative officers having a duty to act judicially are required to set forth in writing the mental processes of reasoning which have led them to the decision, it would to a large extent help to ensure performance of the duty to act judicially and exclude arbitrariness and caprice in the discharge of their functions. The public should not be deprived of this only safeguard. 4. Another reason of equal cogency which weighs with us in spelling out the necessity for giving reasons is based on the power of judicial review which is possessed by the High Court under Article 226 and the Supreme Court under Article 32. The High Court under Article 226 and the Supreme Court under Article 32 have the power to quash by certiorari a quasi-judicial order made by an administrative officer and this power of review exercisable by issue of certiorari can be effectively exercised only if the order is a speaking order and reasons are given in support of it. If no reasons are given, it would not be possible for the High court or the Supreme Court exercising its power of judicial review to examine whether the administrative officer has made any error of law in making the order. It would be the easiest thing for an administrative officer to avoid judicial scrutiny and correction by omitting to give reasons in support of his order. The High Court and the Supreme Court would be powerless to interfere so as to keep the administrative officer within the limits of the law. The result would be that the power of judicial review would be stultified and no redress being available to the citizen, there would be insidious encouragement to arbitrariness and caprice. The power of judicial review is a necessary concomitant of the rule of law and if judicial review is to be made an effective instrument for maintenance of the rule of law, it is necessary that administrative officers discharging quasi-judicial functions must be required to give reasons in support of their orders so that they can be subject to judicial scrutiny and correction. 5. This has always been regarded as a most important reasons in the United States for insisting that quasi-judicial decisions must show reasons on their face. 5. This has always been regarded as a most important reasons in the United States for insisting that quasi-judicial decisions must show reasons on their face. To quote from Schwartz's "American Administrative Law" at page 166: "In the United States, perhaps the most prominent reasons advanced for the requirements of reasoned decisions is the role of such decisions in facilitating review by the courts. If the bases of administrative decisions are not articulated, it is most difficult for a reviewing court to determine whether the decision is a proper one. 'We must know what a decision means before the duty becomes ours to say whether it is right or wrong', reads an often cited statement of Gardozo J., . . . . . . for judicial control to be of practical value, the administrative tribunal or agency, ‘in making its order, should not make it an unspeaking or unintelligible order, but should in some way, state upon the face of the order the element which had led to the decision'. The words quoted are from a noted judgment of Lord Cairns, L.C., in which he laid down the distinction between 'speaking' and 'unspeaking' orders, which has become of basic importance in present day English Administrative law. When Lord Cairns speaks of an 'unspeaking or unintelligible order', he obviously means an order which gives no reasons. If the administrator does not give reasons, he, in effect, disarms the exercise of the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction. In such a case, the Court cannot examine further than the face of the challenged decision, which, in Lord Sumner's famous phrase, 'speaks' only with 'inscrutable face of a sphinx'." It is therefore necessary for giving full meaning and content to the power of judicial review conferred on the High Court and the Supreme Court by the Constitution that every administrative officer exercising quasi-judicial functions must make a speaking order, that it, give reasons in support of the order. If the order speaks only with the “inscrutable face of a sphinx" it would be impossible for the High Court and the Supreme Court to effectively exercise their power of judicial review by means of certiorari. 6. This view is not only supportable on principle but it is also in consonance with the trend of juristic thought in the United States where there is considerable development in the field of administrative law in recent times. 6. This view is not only supportable on principle but it is also in consonance with the trend of juristic thought in the United States where there is considerable development in the field of administrative law in recent times. In the United States, as will be evident from the two passages from Schwartz's "Amercian Administrative Law" quoted above, the American Courts have always insisted that administrative decisions should be speaking ones, that is, they must contain at least the findings upon which they are based and the reasons which have prevailed with them in introducing this requirement are the same two reasons which have found favour with us. It is also interesting to find that the administrative law in France has moved in the same directions. For a long time Conseil d'Etat consistently refused to require that the administration should give reasons for its decisions in the absence of a statutory provision imposing that requirement. But in a decision rendered by it in 1950 Conseil d'Etat opened, in the words of one commentator, “a first breach in the established jurisprudence under which in the absence of a legal text requiring it the decisions of the administrative authorities need not be reasoned ones" and annulled an administrative decision in which no reasons were given. The Commissaire du gouvernment there advocated a bold departure from the prior case law and stated that the Conseil should require reasoned decision in every case in which the administrator was exercising quasi-judicial functions, even though the Legislature did not expressly impose such requirement. Otherwise, he asked, how could the Conseil really determine the validity of a challenged decision? In its decision adopting the approach of the Commissaire, the Conseil d'Etat stated that the obligation to give reasons was imposed “in order to enable the reviewing court to determine whether the directions and prohibitions contained in the law have been followed." This is the same reason which has motivated the American Courts in requiring that administrative decisions must contain findings that show their basis and it is the same reason which has appealed to us for taking the view that in India too, as in the United States and France, administrative officers exercising quasi-judicial functions must make speaking orders. 7. 7. The position in England is of course different and therefore strongest reliance was placed upon it on behalf of the State in England, though in the Liquor Licence Cases decided in the latter half of the nineteenth century the view was taken that the Licensing Justices who were empowered to refuse liquor licences on four specified grounds must specify the grounds for refusal in the order made by them and if they failed to do so, an order of mandamus would issue to compel them to hear and determine the applications according to law, it appears that, as a general rule, no duty to give reasons in support of a quasi-judicial order is recognised by the Courts. The decisions in the Liquor Licence Cases are regarded as somewhat anomalous and the considered view has always been that a quasi-judicial authority is not subject to any duty to give reasons for its decision. The decision in Robinson v. Minister of Town and Country Planning, (1947) KB 702 clearly seems to suggest that even if the Minister exercises quasi-judicial functions, there is no obligation on him to give reasons for his decision. This view is also implicit in the decision of the Court of Appeal in Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal (1952) 1 K.B., 338. In that case, the Court held that a quasi-judicial decision of an administrative tribunal could be quashed by certiorari for error of law where it “spoke" its error on its face. But where the decision was not contained in such a "speaking order", the court would not intervene. There is implicit in this decision the recognition of the possibility that a quasi-judicial authority may not make a speaking order. This being the position, the Donoughmore Committee on Ministers' powers in its report made in 1932 formulated the principle that a party is entitled to know the reasons for the decision, be it judicial or quasi-judicial and recommended acceptance of this principle as a principle of natural justice. Pursuant to this recommendation the British Parliament when it came to enact the Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 1958 introduced Section 12 in that Act which now expressly requires that in certain circumstances, the administrative tribunals specified in the First Schedule as also the Ministers holding a statutory inquiry must give reasons for the decision. Pursuant to this recommendation the British Parliament when it came to enact the Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 1958 introduced Section 12 in that Act which now expressly requires that in certain circumstances, the administrative tribunals specified in the First Schedule as also the Ministers holding a statutory inquiry must give reasons for the decision. Thus what the Courts failed to achieve by the process of judicial construction had to be set right by Parliamentary legislation. But what the Parliament did serves to emphasize the necessity of giving reasons in support of a quasi-judicial decision. 8. So much on principle. But quite apart from principle, there is in our view clear authority for the proposition that every quasi-judicial decision must be supported by reasons. The germ of this principle is to be found in the decision of the Supreme Court in Express Newspaper (Private) Ltd., v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 578 . In that case the validity of the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 was challenged inter alia on the ground that the impugned Act did not provide for the giving of reasons for its decision by the Wage Board and thus render the petitioner's right to approach the Supreme Court for the enforcement of their fundamental rights nugatory. Dealing with this contention. N. H. Bhagwati J., speaking on behalf of the Supreme Court said: "It is no doubt true that if there was any provision to be found in the impugned Act which prevented the Wage Board from giving reasons for its decision, it might be construed to mean that the order which was thus made by the wage board could not be a speaking order and no writ of certiorari could ever be available to the petitioners in that behalf. It is also true that in that event this Court would be powerless to redress the grievances of the petitioners by issuing a writ in the nature of certiorari and the fundamental right which a citizen has of approaching this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution would be rendered nugatory." The Supreme Court, however, took the view that there was no provision in the main Act which prevented the Wage Board from giving reasons for its decision and the challenge was negatived on that ground. But these observations undoubtedly support, the second reason which we have given for taking the view that reasons must be given in support of every quasi-judicial decision.” iv) The Supreme Court in case of State of Orissa & others v. Chandra Nandi (judgment dated 1.4.2019 in Civil Appeal No.10690/2017), has held as under : “10. This Court has consistently laid down that every judicial or/and quasi-judicial order passed by the Court/Tribunal/Authority concerned, which decides the lis between the parties, must be supported with the reasons in support of its conclusion. The parties to the lis and so also the appellate/revisionary Court while examining the correctness of the order are entitled to know as to on which basis, a particular conclusion is arrived at in the order. In the absence of any discussion, the reasons and the findings on the submissions urged, it is not possible to know as to what led the Court/Tribunal/Authority for reaching to such conclusion. (See State of Maharashtra vs. Vithal Rao Pritirao Chawan, (1981) 4 SCC 129 , Jawahar Lal Singh vs. Naresh Singh & Ors., (1987) 2 SCC 222 , State of U.P. vs. Battan & Ors., (2001) 10 SCC 607 , Raj Kishore Jha vs. State of Bihar & Ors., (2003) 11 SCC 519 and State of Orissa vs. Dhaniram Luhar, (2004) 5 SCC 568 ).” 14. In view of the aforesaid settled legal position, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the impugned order passed by respondent no. l would satisfy any of the criteria prescribed in the aforesaid decisions as the impugned order on face of it, is not a speaking and reasoned order and therefore, without going into the merits of the case, the impugned order dated 23.12.2020 passed by respondent no.1 is required to quashed and set aside by remanding the matter back to respondent no.1 to pass a reasoned speaking order keeping in mind the aforesaid legal position. 15. The contention raised by the learned Senior Advocate Mr. 15. The contention raised by the learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala with regard to jurisdiction of respondent no.1 to pass the impugned order under section 37 of the Act,1963 is not tenable in law as respondent no.1 is conferred with powers by the State Government by notification dated 30.07.2018 in view of provisions of section 278A read with section 46A of the Act, 1963 and therefore, respondent no.1 is the authorised to pass the order under section 37 of the Act, 1963. Reliance placed by learned advocate Mr. Sanjanwala on the decision of Division Bench passed in R/Misc. Civil Application No. 2/2020 in R/Writ Petition (PIL) No. 125/2019 and other allied matters is concerned, the same was in realm of contempt jurisdiction fixing the liability of the particular officer and therefore, the same would not be applicable in the facts of the case in view of notification of the State Government which was not under challenge before the Division Bench of this Court. 16. In the memo of the petition in paragraph no. 2.15, it is stated on oath that no personal hearing is given to petitioner, and therefore, rojkam was called for and learned AGP Mr. Antani has produced rojkam on record. On perusal of the rojkam of 15.10.2020, it is revealed that written submissions were tendered and it was pointed out on behalf of the petitioners that they have not to make any further submissions and therefore, the matter was kept for orders. Be that as it may, it would be in the interest of justice to afford an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioners or their representatives if they desire so as to meet with the principles of natural justice as the matter is remanded back to respondent no.1. 17. In view of above facts and circumstances, the interest of justice would be served for all the concerns, if the petition is disposed of by giving the following directions: (i) The impugned order dated 23.12.2020 and consequential order dated 28.12.2020 are hereby quashed and set aside and the matter is remanded back to respondent no.1 to decide afresh denovo. 17. In view of above facts and circumstances, the interest of justice would be served for all the concerns, if the petition is disposed of by giving the following directions: (i) The impugned order dated 23.12.2020 and consequential order dated 28.12.2020 are hereby quashed and set aside and the matter is remanded back to respondent no.1 to decide afresh denovo. (ii) Respondent no.1 shall issue a notice of hearing to the petitioners within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of this order fixing the date of hearing within two weeks and thereafter, hear the petitioners or their representatives, consider the submissions in detail along with the documents to be relied upon on behalf of the petitioners and pass a detailed reasoned speaking order considering such submissions by giving reasons to arrive at the conclusion without being influenced by earlier order dated 23.12.2020 in accordance with law. Such exercise shall be completed within four weeks from the date of hearing given to the petitioners. Respondent no.1 is again reminded to keep in mind the settled legal position while passing the order in the capacity of quasi-judicial authority exercising jurisdiction under section 37 of the Act, 1963. 18. It is clarified that this Court has not gone into the merits of the matter and respondent no.1 is directed to pass a fresh denovo order on merits in accordance with law. 19. Petition is accordingly partly allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. No order as to costs. Registry is directed to provide a copy of writ of this order to all the concerned through Email. Direct service is permitted.