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2021 DIGILAW 1032 (JHR)

Md. Islam, S/o. Kadir Khan v. State of Jharkhand

2021-12-13

RATNAKER BHENGRA, SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR

body2021
JUDGMENT : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. The marriage of Salamun Khatun with Md. Islam was performed on 16th April 2011 at village Amarpur under Govindpur police station. An information about death of Salamun Khatun by burning was given to her parents around 02:00 PM on 17th May 2011. The dead body of Salamun Khatun with severe burn injuries was found lying in Quarter No.303 at CCL Colony situated at Sunday Bazar, Neecheypatti within Bermo (Gandhi Nagar) police station of District Bokaro. A written report was given by Aiyesha Khatoon to the officer-in-charge of Gandhi Nagar police station making allegations against Md. Islam and other members of his family that the accused put her daughter to death by burning her alive. 2. Bermo (Gandhi Nagar) PS Case No. 57 of 2011 was registered on 18th May 2011 under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code against Md. Islam, his parents and two brothers as well as their wives. 3. Dr. Ajay Kumar Sinha who was posted as Medical Officer at Tenughat Sub-Divisional Hospital rendered an opinion that death of Salamun Khatun occurred about 18-24 hours before postmortem examination and the cause of death was neurogenic shock. The dead body of Salamun Khatun was brought by her parents at village Amarpur and her last rites were performed by them. The Investigating Officer recorded statement of the parents and other relatives of Salamun Khatun and they all expressed their apprehension that on account of non-fulfillment of demand of a motorcycle and fridge Salamun Khatun was set on fire in her matrimonial home by her husband. The statement of Manoj Paswan who was the next door neighbour of Md. Islam was recorded by the Investigating Officer the day after registration of First Information Report. He gave a statement before the Investigating Officer that after a quarrel with her husband Salamun Khatun poured kerosene oil and set herself on fire. He further stated that Md. Islam tried to put off fire and in the process suffered burn injuries. He also informed the Investigating Officer that Salamun Khatun was rushed to hospital for the treatment. 4. On the basis of the materials collected in course of the investigation, a charge sheet was laid against Md. Islam under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code. By an order dated 19th November 2011, he was put on trial for committing dowry death of Salamun Khatun. 4. On the basis of the materials collected in course of the investigation, a charge sheet was laid against Md. Islam under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code. By an order dated 19th November 2011, he was put on trial for committing dowry death of Salamun Khatun. He denied the charge and claimed trial. 5. The learned Additional Sessions Judge-2nd, F.T.C., Bermo at Tenughat held that the act of Md. Islam in not sending his wife to her maternal home may not be an offence but there is direct evidence of the mother of Salamun Khatun that the accused demanded a motorcycle and fridge in dowry, and these two acts combined together come within the purview of harassment and cruelty. The learned trial Judge further held that a presumption under section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act that the accused committed dowry death of his wife would arise against the accused because soon before her death Salamun Khatun was subjected to cruelty and harassment by him. Holding that the ingredients to constitute the offence under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code are proved by the prosecution, the learned trial Judge held Md. Islam guilty for the said offence and awarded sentence of RI for life and a fine of Rs. 25,000/- under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code with a default stipulation that he shall undergo further RI for six months. 6. In Sessions Trial Case No. 305 of 2011, the learned Additional Sessions Judge has held as under : “30. Coming back to the case in hand, I find that it has been proved and established well that victim lady after her marriage with the accused once had reached her maternal home, both stayed there one day and before leaving the house her husband-accused demanded a motorcycle and a fridge as a dowry giving only ten days time by issuing threats that if on the given time his demand was not fulfilled the result would be fatal and the victim will not come back. Mere not sending of one's wife to her maternal home itself may not be an offence but here is a case in which there is direct evidence of mother-in-law of the accused that the husband of her deceased daughter demanded a motorcycle and a fridge in the dowry. Mere not sending of one's wife to her maternal home itself may not be an offence but here is a case in which there is direct evidence of mother-in-law of the accused that the husband of her deceased daughter demanded a motorcycle and a fridge in the dowry. Under such circumstances not sending of wife due to non-fulfillment of dowry demand definitely comes under the purview of harassment or cruelty. Though the term 'threat' is not coming out in the evidence of informant but in totality an inference can be drawn that if within given time of ten days the demand of accused-husband was not fulfilled he will not sent her daughter back. This part of her evidence given by the informant mother of the deceased which has amply been corroborated by almost others therefore in the facts and circumstances of the case in hand can be translated in to the threats issued by the accused on account of non-fulfillment of dowry demand. As such, I find that the death of Salamun Khatun had taken place within seven years of her marriage. Her death occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances in the facts and circumstances of this case and she soon before her death was subjected to cruelty and harassment by her husband-accused Md. Islam for the fulfillment of the said dowry demands. Under the circumstances therefore, it is imperative for invoking the legal presumption as envisaged in Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. 31. In the ultimate analysis I find and hold the accused Md. Islam guilty for the offence of dowry death and convict him therefore under Section 304B of the I.P.C. The convict already is under judicial custody and he is remanded back to be produced on 11.02.2015 for hearing on the quantum of sentence.” 7. Mr. Arwind Kumar, the learned counsel for the appellant, makes the following submissions : (i) The prosecution evidence as regards harassment and torture of Salamun Khatun at the hands of her husband in connection to demand of dowry is inconclusive. (ii) The prosecution failed to establish that soon before her death Salamun Khatun was put to harassment and torture. (iii) The father of Salamun Khatun did not support the prosecution case and even her mother and the neighbour made statements in the Court which create serious doubt on involvement of the appellant in the occurrence. (ii) The prosecution failed to establish that soon before her death Salamun Khatun was put to harassment and torture. (iii) The father of Salamun Khatun did not support the prosecution case and even her mother and the neighbour made statements in the Court which create serious doubt on involvement of the appellant in the occurrence. (iv) The medical evidence does not suggest any characteristic feature of a homicidal death by burning rather it supports the defence story that Salamun Khatun caught fire while cooking food and died an accidental death. (v) The defence of the appellant that he suffered burn injury while trying to save his wife is supported by evidence of PW2, PW12 and PW13. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant refers to the judgment in “Baijnath v. State of M.P.”, (2017) 1 SCC 101 , to submit that the prosecution miserably failed to prove that soon before her death Salamun Khatun was put to harassment in connection to demand of dowry. 9. Mrs. Priya Shreshtha, the learned Spl. PP, has produced extracts from Textbooks on medical jurisprudence to show us that in the circumstances of the present case accidental death by burning could never have happened. The learned Spl. PP would painstakingly take us to the Sessions Court judgment to press hard that conviction of the appellant has been authored in a well considered judgment and no inference is warranted by this Court in the matter. 10. Mere factum of unnatural death of a woman in the matrimonial home is not sufficient to convict the accused. In “Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab”, (2011) 15 SCC 285 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that merely because death of a woman has taken place in her matrimonial home that by itself is not sufficient to raise a presumption under section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act. We would keep in mind that except PW6 and PW12 all other material witnesses are related to Salamun Khatun and therefore exercise due care and caution as indicated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in “Masalti v. State of U.P.”, AIR 1965 SC 202 to find out whether the evidence tendered by them in the Court was motivated on account of any ill will. Keeping in mind that merely because Salamun Khatun caught fire in her matrimonial home the appellant cannot be held guilty for dowry death, we would now proceed to examine the evidences laid by the prosecution during the trial. 11. PW1 who is uncle of the deceased stated in the cross examination that he could meet Salamun Khatun after her marriage just once. He further admitted that his evidence in the Court was based on the information given to him by his wife. PW5 who is also uncle of the deceased claimed in the Court that Salamun Khatun herself told him about demand of dowry. PW6 and PW9 are cousin brothers of the deceased. They denied suggestions by the defence that Salamun Khatun caught fire accidentally at the time of cooking and that no demand of dowry was made by the appellant. Their evidence on demand of a motorcycle and fridge by the appellant is not direct but lends corroboration to evidence of the other witnesses on demand of dowry. They are related witnesses who truthfully accepted in the Court that no dowry demand was made in their presence. 12. PW2 and PW4, co-villagers of the informant, deposed in the Court that they were informed by the father of Salamun Khatun that her husband was asking a motorcycle and fridge in dowry. PW2 admitted in the Court that he saw slight burn marks on the right hand of Md. Islam, and PW4 stated in the cross examination that no demand of dowry was made in his presence. PW10 and PW11 who are also co-villagers of the informant came in the Court to testify that there was a demand of dowry by the appellant. PW11 was gram pradhan (village head) who arranged a vehicle for bringing Salamun Khatun to village Amarpur. Mrs. Priya Shreshtha, the learned Spl.PP after referring to the statement of PW12 recorded under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure submits that according to this witness Salamun Khatun committed suicide by setting herself on fire after a quarrel with her husband, whereas the appellant set up a defence of accidental death of his wife, and while so PW12 cannot be said to have supported the defence. 13. 13. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 defines dowry to mean any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly– (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or (b) by the parent of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person. By now it is well settled that the expression dowry occurring under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code would carry the same meaning as defined under section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 14. Except PW5 who said in the Court that Salamun Khatun told him about demand of a motorcycle and fridge by her husband, and PW7 who is the mother of Salamun Khatun, the primary source of information of other witnesses about demand of a motorcycle and fridge by the appellant was PW8 who, however, was declared hostile at the instance of the prosecution. But the evidence of PW7 that her son-in-law had made demands of dowry remained intact. In “Nathusingh v. State of M.P.”, (1974) 3 SCC 584 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that evidence of a hostile witness cannot destroy the prosecution case or make it doubtful. PW8 took U turn in the Court and resiled from his previous statements made before the Investigating Officer. Still, the prosecution has proved demand of dowry by the appellant. The evidence of PW7 provided sufficient sustenance to the prosecution and it was successful in establishing harassment of Salamun Khatun in connection to demand of dowry, with the help of other witnesses. PW7 stated that when her husband had gone for bidai of Salamun Khatun the appellant did not agree and said that unless his demand was fulfilled he would not agree for bidai of his wife. She remained firm in the cross examination and insisted that she used to talk to her son-in-law, and that he would make demand of a motorcycle and fridge. 15. Under section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, the Court may presume the existence of any fact which if it thinks likely to have happened. She remained firm in the cross examination and insisted that she used to talk to her son-in-law, and that he would make demand of a motorcycle and fridge. 15. Under section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, the Court may presume the existence of any fact which if it thinks likely to have happened. Therefore, if an inference can be drawn from the materials on record that Salamun Khatun was subjected to harassment and torture in connection to any demand of dowry, subject to the prosecution establishing other necessary ingredients for constituting the offence under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, the appellant can be held guilty for dowry death. Of course, before an inference in this regard is drawn the Court is required to approach the issue with the common course of natural event, human conduct and public and private business. 16. There are as many as nine witnesses who came in the dock to testify against the appellant that he made a demand of motorcycle and fridge from the parents of Salamun Khatun and refused to sent her to her parent's place when her father came for bidai. PW8 who is the father of Salamun Khatun refused to own his statement made before the Investigating Officer that his son-in-law demanded a motorcycle and fridge from him and except PW7 other witnesses accepted in the Court that they came to know about demand of dowry by Md. Islam from the father of Salamun Khatun. PW5 has though said that Salamun Khatun told him about demand of dowry by her husband but this statement of PW5 is not substantive evidence, rather it would remain in the realm of hearsay. Because Salamun Khatun is dead, veracity of the statement made by her before PW5 cannot be tested by cross examination. Notwithstanding that, evidence tendered by the other witnesses is not altogether worthless and their statements made on oath which are in tune with their previous statements made before the Investigating Officer are usable by the prosecution. 17. The rule of hearsay is that statement of a person who is not called in the witness box and which is not covered by the exceptions under section 6 and section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act can still be used to show that such statement was made before the witness, and to that extent such evidence is admissible. 17. The rule of hearsay is that statement of a person who is not called in the witness box and which is not covered by the exceptions under section 6 and section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act can still be used to show that such statement was made before the witness, and to that extent such evidence is admissible. In “Subramaniam v. Public Prosecutor”, (1956) 1 WLR 965, the Privy Council held that the evidence of a statement made to a witness who is not himself called as a witness is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement, but, it is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth of the statement but the fact that it was made. In the present case, the evidence of PW5 that Salamun Khatun told him about demand of dowry is not hearsay to the extent that she made such statement before him. At this stage, we would indicate that the evidence of PW5 finds support from PW7 who tendered evidence of a substantive kind. The Court can now draw an inference about harassment of Salamun Khatun in connection to demand of dowry. We are of the opinion that the prosecution has proved that there was a demand of dowry and harassment of Salamun Khatun by the appellant. 18. The offence under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code is established where the prosecution establishes that (i) death occurred within seven years of marriage (ii) death was caused by any burn or any bodily injury or in the circumstances otherwise than normal, and (iii) soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty and harassment in connection to demand of dowry. 19. The prosecution rested its case on circumstantial evidence and, as it would appear from a reading of the Sessions Court’s judgment, the appellant is held guilty by raising a presumption under section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act. In “Bansi Lal v. State of Haryana”, (2011) 11 SCC 359 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that once essential ingredients of dowry death are established by the prosecution it is the duty of the Court to raise a presumption that the accused caused dowry death. In “Bansi Lal v. State of Haryana”, (2011) 11 SCC 359 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that once essential ingredients of dowry death are established by the prosecution it is the duty of the Court to raise a presumption that the accused caused dowry death. The judgment in “Aftab Ahmad Anasari v. State of Uttaranchal”, (2010) 2 SCC 583 provides valuable insight how to proceed in a case which is based on circumstantial evidence. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that if the combined effect of all the proved facts taken together is conclusive in establishing the guilt, conviction of the accused can be recorded even though one or more of such facts were not decisive. 20. A presumption would arise against the accused under section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act where the prosecution shows that “soon before her death the woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with any demand of dowry” by her husband or his relatives. 21. In “Baijnath”, (2017)1 SCC 101 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has explained how presumption under section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act is raised : “29. Noticeably this presumption as well is founded on the proof of cruelty or harassment of the woman dead for or in connection with any demand for dowry by the person charged with the offence. The presumption as to dowry death thus would get activated only upon the proof of the fact that the deceased lady had been subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand for dowry by the accused and that too in the reasonable contiguity of death. Such a proof is thus the legislatively mandated prerequisite to invoke the otherwise statutorily ordained presumption of commission of the offence of dowry death by the person charged therewith. 30. A conjoint reading of these three provisions, thus predicate the burden of the prosecution to unassailably substantiate the ingredients of the two offences by direct and convincing evidence so as to avail the presumption engrafted in Section 113-B of the Act against the accused. Proof of cruelty or harassment by the husband or his relative or the person charged is thus the sine qua non to inspirit the statutory presumption, to draw the person charged within the coils thereof. Proof of cruelty or harassment by the husband or his relative or the person charged is thus the sine qua non to inspirit the statutory presumption, to draw the person charged within the coils thereof. If the prosecution fails to demonstrate by cogent, coherent and persuasive evidence to prove such fact, the person accused of either of the abovereferred offences cannot be held guilty by taking refuge only of the presumption to cover up the shortfall in proof.” 22. In yet another decision, in “Bakshish Ram and another v. State of Punjab”, (2013) 4 SCC 131 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under : “19. …......a perusal of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC shows that there must be material to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. In other words, the prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of “death occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances .........” 23. We need to bear in mind that just after one month of the marriage Salamun Khatun died homicidal death in her matrimonial home. That by itself is a sufficient circumstance for the Court to infer that soon before her death Salamun Khatun was subjected to harassment and torture in connection to demand of dowry by her husband because it is proved as a fact from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses that soon after the marriage the appellant started demanding a motorcycle and fridge. 24. The defence set up by the appellant that his wife caught fire while cooking and he tried to put off the fire and in the process suffered burn injury is not supported by any evidence which would probabilise his defence. The statement made by the Investigating Officer that he found burn injury over right hand of the accused is not admissible in evidence simply for the reason that in the cross examination he admits that there is no mention in the case-dairy about any burn injury suffered by the accused. One stray statement of PW2 that he saw burn injury on the hand of the appellant is also of no consequence and best ignored. One stray statement of PW2 that he saw burn injury on the hand of the appellant is also of no consequence and best ignored. Moreover, the perpetrator of a crime may also suffer burn injury while trying to set the victim on fire and therefore mere presence of some burn injury over right hand of the appellant is not sufficient to hold that he suffered such injuries while he was trying to save his wife. 25. All the witnesses who accompanied the parents of Salamun Khatun and headed towards the hospital on the information of the appellant made statements in the Court that when they were on the way to Bokaro hospital the appellant called and asked them not to go there because Salamun Khatun had succumbed to the burn injuries and he had brought her back home. This piece of evidence which may appear as an innocuous information provides indications about culpable state of mind of the appellant who tried to create an impression as if he was trying to save his wife. Except PW12, who tried to project an altogether different story, no person from CCL Colony, Neecheypatti came in the Court to support the appellant. Salamun Khatun died in her matrimonial home in the afternoon of 17th May 2011 but no other neighbour of the appellant came forward to say that Salamun Khatun accidentally caught fire in the kitchen. Normally the other persons would also accompany the injured person to the hospital if an accident occurs in the neighbourhood. Had there been any truth in the defence set up by the appellant many would have come forward in his support and accompanied him to the hospital. But that is not the case here. 26. Dr. Ajay Kumar Sinha conducted autopsy over the dead body of Salamun Khatun at 12:20 PM on 18th May 2011. He observed that both eyes and mouth of the victim who was of average body built were open; her teeth had turned black and; rigor mortis was present in both upper and lower extremities. As PW3, Dr. Ajay Kumar Sinha proved the postmortem report and affirmed in the Court that he observed cracks and fissures over skin of the deceased and found the dead body in pugilistic posture. 27. According to medical jurisprudence, the dead body is found in pugilistic posture where the victim was subjected to extreme heat or fire. As PW3, Dr. Ajay Kumar Sinha proved the postmortem report and affirmed in the Court that he observed cracks and fissures over skin of the deceased and found the dead body in pugilistic posture. 27. According to medical jurisprudence, the dead body is found in pugilistic posture where the victim was subjected to extreme heat or fire. It is stated that when a body was under fire or other extreme heat the muscles contract and the arms take on an appearance of the stand of a boxer. Therefore, by observation of the doctor that the dead body of Salamun Khatun was in a pugilistic posture it should not be confused that she died while engaged in a fight with the assailant. 28. PW3 has made the following significant observations in the postmortem report : “Whole face, scalp with hair of scalp burned. Whole neck (all around), clust, both breast, abdominal wall, pelvic, whole back, both gluteal region, pelvic part (vagina), both thighs (All around) both lower and upper extremities (all around) from thigh to toe and shoulder joint to Nails of fingers burned. Brain and meninges, larynx, trachea, bronchial tube, both lungs and pleura are congested. Heart chambers were full of blood, stomach and intestine was red and inflamed. Spleen become enlarged and liver swelled, both kidneys were congested. All injuries are antemortem in nature” 29. According to PW3, all the aforesaid injuries were antemortem in nature, caused within 18-24 hours before postmortem examination and cause of death of Salamun Khatun was neurogenic shock. 30. Modi in his Textbook “Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology” (26th Edition) writes that in case of death by intense heat the brain and its meninges are usually congested. The burn injuries are classified in different categories depending on the cause of burn such as due to dry heat, moist heat (scalds), chemicals or radiation. The learned writer has observed that Dupuytren classified burns into six degrees – depending on nature of the severity. The modern classification, however, prefers classification of burns into three categories by grouping the six degrees of burns. The “Epidermal burns” combines first degree and second degree burns. Modi writes that if burns are caused by flame or a heated solid substance, the skin would be blackened and the hair singed at the seat of lesion. These characteristics are generally found in second degree burns. 31. The “Epidermal burns” combines first degree and second degree burns. Modi writes that if burns are caused by flame or a heated solid substance, the skin would be blackened and the hair singed at the seat of lesion. These characteristics are generally found in second degree burns. 31. No such sign was observed by PW3, which could have provided an indication of accidental death. The burns produced by flame may or may not produce blisters but singeing of the hair, eye-brows and blackening of the skin are almost always found if the victim has suffered burn injuries from flames of the fire. 32. The “Dermo – Epidermal burns” are found in third degree and fourth degree burns – the whole skin is destroyed in fourth degree burns. The third category is the “deep burns”. In fifth degree burns great scarring and deformity of the dead body may be seen whereas six degree burns involved charring of the whole limb including the bones. 33. The learned counsel for the appellant would refer to the statement of PW3 in the cross examination that he did not observe smell of kerosene oil, cooking gas, petrol etc. emitting from the dead body to submit that the aforesaid observations of PW3 completely rule out any possibility of homicidal death of Salamun Khatun. However, for this reason alone we are not inclined to hold that Salamun Khatun caught fire accidentally and died due to burn injuries. As noticed above, PW3 observed cracks and fissures of tissues over the skin and the dead body of Salamun Khatun was found in pugilistic posture. Such severe burn injuries would not be found in accidental burn deaths unless the victim was caught in a kind of inferno. 34. An accused has a right to remain silent, but, in a prosecution under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code if the prosecution establishes a prima facie case against the accused his silence or a false explanation to the incriminating circumstances implicating him in the crime of dowry death would provide an additional link in the chain of circumstances. In the present case, the appellant set up a defence which is found false and that by itself is a highly incriminating circumstance raising grave suspicion on his complicity in the crime. 35. In the present case, the appellant set up a defence which is found false and that by itself is a highly incriminating circumstance raising grave suspicion on his complicity in the crime. 35. In view of the aforesaid discussions, we hold that the prosecution has conclusively proved the charge under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code. 36. On the question of maximum sentence awarded to the appellant, we are of the opinion that any leniency shown by the Court in this kind of matters would be a kind of injustice to family of the victim girl. 37. In a long line of judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the cardinal principle of sentencing policy is that the sentence imposed on an offender should reflect the crime he has committed and it should be proportionate to the gravity of the offence. 38. In “Ahmed Hussein Vali Mohammed Saiyed v. State of Gujarat”, (2009) 7 SCC 254 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed thus : “99.….. The object of awarding appropriate sentence should be to protect the society and to deter the criminal from achieving the avowed object to (sic break the) law by imposing appropriate sentence. It is expected that the courts would operate the sentencing system so as to impose such sentence which reflects the conscience of the society and the sentencing process has to be stern where it should be. Any liberal attitude by imposing meagre sentences or taking too sympathetic view merely on account of lapse of time in respect of such offences will be resultwise counterproductive in the long run and against the interest of society which needs to be cared for and strengthened by string of deterrence inbuilt in the sentencing system. 100. Justice demands that courts should impose punishment befitting the crime so that the courts reflect public abhorrence of the crime. The court must not only keep in view the rights of the victim of the crime but the society at large while considering the imposition of appropriate punishment. The court will be failing in its duty if appropriate punishment is not awarded for a crime which has been committed not only against the individual victim but also against the society to which both the criminal and the victim belong.” 39. The court will be failing in its duty if appropriate punishment is not awarded for a crime which has been committed not only against the individual victim but also against the society to which both the criminal and the victim belong.” 39. In Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana”, (2021) 6 SCC 1 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code is one among many legislative initiatives undertaken by the Parliament to remedy a long-standing social evil. However, in spite of legislative interventions demand of dowry and harassment and torture of a woman in connection to demand of dowry have gone to the extent of causing her death. The situation has been captured in paragraph No. 11 of “Satbir Singh”, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under : “11. However, despite the above measures, the issue of dowry harassment was still prevalent. Additionally, there was a growing trend of deaths of young brides in suspicious circumstances following demands of dowry. The need for a stringent law to curb dowry deaths was suo motu taken up by the Law Commission in its 91st Law Commission Report. The Law Commission recognised that the IPC, as it existed at that relevant time, was insufficient to tackle the issue of dowry deaths due to the nature and modus of the crime...” 40. Salamun Khatun was a young girl of 20 years. She could live in her matrimonial home just for one month. She was murdered in her matrimonial home but unfortunately the learned trial Judge did not frame a charge under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. We do not find any mitigating circumstance in favour of the appellant for awarding a lesser punishment to him. On the contrary, aggravating circumstances in the case are overwhelming and do not warrant infliction of any other punishment except maximum punishment upon the appellant. 41. As observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in “Satbir Singh”, the malaise of dowry death has still engulfed the society, and unwarranted sympathy to a person accused of dowry death would definitely send a wrong message to the society and the sufferers. We are, therefore, not inclined to interfere with award of sentence of RI for life under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code inflicted upon Md. Islam. 42. Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 178 of 2015 is dismissed. 43. We are, therefore, not inclined to interfere with award of sentence of RI for life under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code inflicted upon Md. Islam. 42. Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 178 of 2015 is dismissed. 43. The appellant shall serve the remaining sentence awarded to him by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-2nd, F.T.C., Bermo at Tenughat in Sessions Trial Case No. 305 of 2011. 44. IA No. 309 of 2020 stands disposed of. 45. Let the lower Court records be transmitted to the Court concerned, forthwith. 46. Let a copy of the Judgment be transmitted to the Court concerned and the concerned Jail Superintendent through FAX.