JUDGMENT : Heard the parties. 2. Petitioner has approached this Court with a prayer for issuance of a writ of ‘quo warranto’ for removal of respondent No. 5 from the post of Chairman, Jharkhand State Pollution Control Board (for short “JSPCB”) on the ground that he has been appointed in complete violation of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Tegi Tagi Tara Vs. Rajendra Singh Bhandari & Ors. [ (2018) 11 SCC 734 ]. Petitioner has further prayed for a direction upon the respondents to frame appropriate guidelines or recruitment rules in State Pollution Control Board (for short “SPCB”) as per mandate given in the case of Tegi Tagi Tara. Petitioner has also prayed for quashing and setting aside the notification dated 24.06.2020 (Annexure-4), by which the respondent No. 5 has been appointed as Chairman, JSPCB. After quashment of the said notification, the petitioner prays for a direction upon the respondents to fill-up the post of Chairman, JSPCB after framing proper guidelines/ recruitment rules considering the institutional requirement of the JSPCB in pursuance of direction issued by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case Tegi Tagi Tara. 3. The facts of the case lies in a narrow compass. The Deputy Secretary, Forest, Environment & Climate Department vide its notification dated 05.12.2017 has reconstituted the Jharkhand State Pollution Control Board and several persons were appointed as Member of the Pollution Board merely on the basis of their designation. It is the case of the petitioner that on 17.02.2020, a meeting was held by the Selection Committee, which comprised of Additional Chief Secretary, Forest, Environment & Climate Department and Principal Chief Conservator of Forest and headed by the Chief Secretary, Government of Jharkhand, for appointment of Head of Forest Force (HoFF) under the Indian Forest Service, Jharkhand Cadre, wherein the Selection Committee has made recommendation of following persons in order of merit : (I) Shri Lal Ratnakar Singh (1984), Shri Shashi nank Kyuliyar (1986) (II) Shri Priyesh Kumar Verma (1986) 4. Thereafter, the Chief Secretary, Govt. of Jharkhand, recommended the name of Shri Shashi Nand Kyuliyar for seeking approval of Hon’ble the Chief Minister for appointment to the post of Principal Chief Conservator of Forest (HoFF) as Shri Lal Ratnakar Singh has already superannuated from service. Thereafter, the Chief Secretary, Govt. of Jharkhand, recommended the name of Shri Shashi Nand Kyuliyar for seeking approval of Hon’ble the Chief Minister for appointment to the post of Principal Chief Conservator of Forest (HoFF) as Shri Lal Ratnakar Singh has already superannuated from service. However, the Hon’ble Chief Minister on 22.06.2020 took a decision to appoint respondent No. 5, Priyesh Kumar Verma, to the post of PCCF (HoFF) and further took decision that respondent No. 5 shall also hold the office of Chairman, Jharkhand State Pollution Control Board. Thereafter, the Joint Secretary, Forest, Environment & Climate Change, Govt. of Jharkhand vide its notification dated 24.06.2020, appointed the respondent No. 5 to the post of PCCF (HoFF). The Joint Secretary, Forest, Environment & Climate Change, Govt. of Jharkhand in the said notification further ordered that in addition to the post of PCCF (HoFF), the respondent No. 5 shall also hold the office of Chairman, JSPCB till further orders. 5. Aggrieved by the appointment of respondent No. 5, as he has been appointed as PCCF in total disregard to the recommendation of the Selection Committee on 17.02.2020, which comprised of Additional Chief Secretary, Forest, Environment & Climate Department and Principal Chief Conservator of Forest and headed by Chief Secretary, State of Jharkhand, the petitioner has knocked the door of this Court with a prayer for issuance of an appropriate writ of quo warranto for removal of respondent No. 5 from the post of Chairman, JSPCB. 6. Mr. Diwakar Upadhyay, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner assiduously urges that respondent No. 5 has no authority to hold the office of Chairman, JSPCB by virtue of being PCCF (HoFF) inasmuch as the candidature of the best suitable candidate considering APARs which includes parameters such as outstanding merit and competence has been totally ignored. The appointment of respondent No. 5 is also contrary to the well-established principle of service jurisprudence which clearly provides that the most eligible person shall be selected to hold public office. Learned counsel further argues that Section 4 of Air Act clearly mandates that the State Government can nominate only such person as Chairman of State Pollution Control Board who possesses a special knowledge or practical experience in matters relating to environmental protection or a person having a special knowledge and experience in dealing with the matters relating to environment protection. Learned counsel further argues that Section 4 of Air Act clearly mandates that the State Government can nominate only such person as Chairman of State Pollution Control Board who possesses a special knowledge or practical experience in matters relating to environmental protection or a person having a special knowledge and experience in dealing with the matters relating to environment protection. Learned counsel accordingly submits that appointment of respondent No. 5 is in complete violation of eligibility conditions enshrined under Section 4 of the Air Act as he was not having any special knowledge or practical experience in the matters relating to environment protection and the respondent No. 5 has been appointed to the post of Chairman, JSPCB only because he has been holding the post of PCCF (HoFF) which is not permissible in the eyes of law. Learned counsel further submits that a number of work has to be executed by the Chairman of the Board which includes controlling water pollution and to maintain or restoration of wholesome of water, hence, the Chairman of the State Pollution Control Board is required to be in possession of practical knowledge in the matters relating to control of water pollution. Learned counsel lastly submits that the appointment of respondent No. 5 as the Chairman, JSPCB is violative of the directions issued by the Hon’ble Apex Court which clearly stipulates that the States are duty bound to frame rules/ guidelines relating to appointment of Member/ Chairman of the State Pollution Control Board before making any such appointments. 7. Per contra, counter-affidavit has been filed. Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, learned Advocate General appearing for the respondents submits that the writ application is not maintainable since it has been filed with malafide intention. Learned counsel submits that respondent No. 5 was appointed to the post of PCCF (HoFF) and was assigned the additional charge of Chairman, JSPCB till further order vide another separate notification dated 24.06.2020. Learned counsel further argues that a recruitment rule for appointment of Chairman, JSPCB has already been notified much prior by the State Government vide notification No. 2990 dated 18.07.2013, thereafter, as per the order passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 1359 of 2017, the State Government has processed the amendment of said recruitment rule for appointment to the post of Chairman, JSPCB. Learned counsel further argues that after framing the aforesaid rule, process has already been initiated for appointment of Chairman, JSPCB and the same is likely be completed very shortly. 8. Mr. Kalyan Roy, learned counsel appearing for respondent-JSPCB vehemently opposes the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that it is not a PIL and the writ petition is not maintainable, which is apparent from Annexure-5 to the writ petition, as no regular appointment has been done and the same is a stop gap arrangement. Learned counsel further argues that the petitioner is not prejudiced and has no locus to raise the issue of appointment of respondent No. 5. 9. Be that as it may, having gone through the rival submissions of the parties and upon perusal of the documents brought on record, it appears that most of the grievances of the writ petitioner has already been redressed. From the arguments advanced by the learned Advocate General and from the averments made in the counter-affidavit and the documents brought on record, it appears that State has already framed Rules for appointment of Chairman, Jharkhand State Pollution Control Board and the same has been notified by the State Government vide notification No. 2990 dated 18.07.2013. Further, it appears that the process has already been initiated for appointment of the Chairman, JSPCB and the same is likely to be completed very soon. 10. Mr. Diwakar Upadhyay, learned counsel for the petitioner also concedes on this point and confines his prayers on the writ of quo warranto for removal of respondent No. 5 from the post of Chairman, JSPCB. 11. Admittedly, the essential requirement and qualification which is meant for the post of PCCF (HoFF) is different from the qualification required for appointment to the post of Chairman, JSPCB inasmuch as the Chairman, JSPCB is required to possess special knowledge or practical experience in matters relating to environment protection or having a special knowledge and experience in dealing with the matters relating to environment protection. The same finds place in the Rules which has been floated by the State Government for appointment of Chairman, JSPCB. However, the appointment of respondent No. 5 is not a regular appointment, rather, it is a stop gap arrangement and the person, who has been appointed is holding the additional charge of Chairman, JSPCB. The same finds place in the Rules which has been floated by the State Government for appointment of Chairman, JSPCB. However, the appointment of respondent No. 5 is not a regular appointment, rather, it is a stop gap arrangement and the person, who has been appointed is holding the additional charge of Chairman, JSPCB. Learned Advocate General very candidly submits that the process for regular appointment of the Chairman, JSPCB has already been started, which is likely to be concluded very soon and person having the experience and knowledge as per the Rule shall be appointed on the post of Chairman, JSPCB. Learned Advocate General further argues that since the said post cannot be kept vacant for such a long period, hence, respondent No. 5 was given the additional charge of Chairman, as a stop gap arrangement, as per the recommendation and consideration of the State Government, till a fresh appointment is made. This Court is fully convinced with the arguments advanced by learned Advocate General. 12. Now, the sole question for consideration is whether writ of quo warranto can be issued by this Court in the instant case and whether the present writ petition is maintainable. 13. Mr. Diwakar Upadhyay, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has tried to impress upon this Court that this writ petition is maintainable as the State has not come-out with any Rule for appointment of Chairman, JSPCB and the person appointed on the said post, i.e. respondent No. 5, does not have the requisite qualification and even though the petitioner is not directly affected or prejudiced by his appointment, but a writ of quo warranto can be issued and prayer can be made to that extent before this Court by any public spirited person and as such, since appointment of respondent No. 5 is dehors the Rules and only to accommodate respondent No. 5, though competent to hold the post of Chairman, JSPCB, the entire exercise has been done and as such, the appointment of respondent No. 5 is fit to be quashed and set aside and regular appointment be done. Contrary to that, the same has been vehemently opposed by the learned Advocate General. Contrary to that, the same has been vehemently opposed by the learned Advocate General. Impressing the Court that the writ petition is not maintainable as the same has been filed with malafide intention, learned Advocate General refers to counter-affidavit, the relevant para of which is reproduced herein below : “Keeping the above in mind, we are of the view that it would be appropriate, while setting aside the judgment and order of the NGT to direct the Executive in all the States to frame appropriate guidelines or recruitment rules within six months, considering the institutional requirements of the SPCBs and the law laid down by Statute, by this Court and as per the reports of various committees and authorities and ensure that suitable professionals and experts are appointed to the SPCBs. A recruitment rule for appointment of Chairman JSPCB have been notified much prior by the State Government vide notification No. 2990 date 18.07.2013.” It was further argued that already new Rule has been framed in view of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court for appointment of Chairman and also another Rules has been framed for appointment of Member Secretary and fresh advertisement has also been issued for appointment of Chairman and Member Secretary and the process of which is likely be completed within a short span of time. Learned Advocate General further argues that it is not for the first time that the PCCF (HoFF) has been given the additional charge of Chairman, JSPCB but earlier also when the said post was vacant, stop gap arrangement was made and PCCF (HoFF) was given additional charge of Chairman, JSPCB. Petitioner has earlier knocked the door of Central Administrative Tribunal and the matter was remitted for fresh decision and thereafter, the decision has already been taken in favour of respondent No.5. 14. Admittedly, the issue of maintainability of such a writ is the discretionary power of a Court and while exercising such discretion, the Court has to take into consideration public interest, the consequences to follow its issue and all the circumstances of the case. The scope and power of the High Court to issue a writ of quo warranto under Article 226 of the Constitution is not wider that it is in England and Courts in this country have followed the principles including the limitations which have been well established in England. 15. The scope and power of the High Court to issue a writ of quo warranto under Article 226 of the Constitution is not wider that it is in England and Courts in this country have followed the principles including the limitations which have been well established in England. 15. In the instant case no interference is warranted for the following facts and reasons : (I) Appointment of respondent No. 5 is a stop gap arrangement and not a regular appointment. (II) The directions issued by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 1359 of 2017 has been fully considered and taken care of and the State has already framed Rules and floated advertisement for regular appointment of Chairman, JSPCB. 16. Regarding discretion of the Court, the view expressed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of P.L. Lakhanpal Vs. A.N. Ray & Ors. [ AIR 1975 Del. 66 ] is quoted herein below : “ALSBURY'S Laws of England, Third Edition, Volume 11, Para 281 (1) contains a summary of the decisions of English Courts with regard to the discretion of the Court in issuing a writ of quo warranto. It is said:- "An information in the nature of a quo warranto was not issued, and an injunction in lieu thereof will not be granted, as a matter of course. It is in the discretion of the Court to refuse or grant it according to the facts and circumstances of the case........... the Court might in its discretion decline to grant a quo warranto information where it would be vaxatious to do so, or where an information would be futile in its results, or where there was an alternative remedy which was equally appropriate and effective." The leading case on the subject of quo warranto from which many of the statements are derived is R. v. Speyer, (1916) 1 K.B. 595. Lord Reading, Chief Justice has observed:- "If the irregularity in the appointment of an office held at pleasure could be cured by immediate reappointment, the Court in the exercise of its discretion would doubtless refuse the information.” Lush, J. expressed the view that the Court would not make an order ousting the holders of public offices from their office if the existing defect, if there is one, could be cured, and they could be reappointed. Rex v. Stacey, 99 English Reports 938 (2) holds that writ of quo warrant, is not a motion of course and it is in the discretion of the Court to issue it considering the circumstances of the case. Frederic Guilder Julius v. The Right Rev. The Lord Bishop of Oxford: The Rev. Thomas Thellusson Carter, 5 Appeal Cases 214 (3) also states that the issue of writ of quo warranto is in the discretion of a Court. The Canadian view as stated in The King exrel Boudret v. Johnston, (1923) 2 Deminion Law Reports 278 (4) is that the Court has to take into consideration public interest, the consequences to follow the issue of a writ of quo warranto and all the circumstances of the case. These general propositions have been accepted in America as appears from the statements contained in sections 5, 9, 10 and 18 in American Jurisprudence, Second Edition, Volume 65. The above views and statements indicate and reflect the principles which have guided courts outside our country in issuing writs of quo warranto. There is abundant authority that these principles have been accepted and applied in this country. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of D. Nagaraj & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. [ (1977) 2 SCC 148 ] has held as under : “7. The sole question that requires to be determined in these appeals is whether the appellants could maintain the aforesaid writ petitions. It is well settled that though Article 226 of the Constitution in terms does not describe the classes of persons entitled to apply thereunder, the existence of the right is implicit for the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction by the High Court under the said article. It is also well established that a person who is not aggrieved by the discrimination complained of cannot maintain a writ petition. It is also well established that a person who is not aggrieved by the discrimination complained of cannot maintain a writ petition. The constitutional validity of the Abolition Act abolishing all hereditary village offices including the office of the Shambogue or Village Accountant having been upheld by this Court in B.R. Shankaranarayana v. State of Mysore and the first preference in the matter of appointment of Village Accountants having been given by Rule 4 of the 1970 Rules to all persons belonging to the category and class of the appellants who had served as village officers, the appellants who did not apply for appointment as Village Accountants in response to the aforesaid notification issued by the Recruitment Committee and did not possess the prescribed qualification, could not complain of the un-constitutionality of the 1970 Rules or of the infringement of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution which merely forbid improper or invidious distinctions by conferring rights or privileges upon a class of persons arbitrarily selected from out of a larger group who are similarly circumstanced but do not exclude the laying down of selective tests nor prevent the Government from laying down general educational qualifications for the post in question. The High Court was, therefore, right in holding that the appellants have no right to maintain the aforesaid writ petitions. The appeals accordingly fail and are dismissed but without any order as to costs.” The same view has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case Ultimate V. Carbon v. T.N. Pollution Control Board, [ (2021) 10 SCC 655 ]. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment is quoted herein below : “51. The procedure of quo warranto confers jurisdiction and authority on the judiciary to control executive action in the matter of making appointments to public offices against the relevant statutory provisions. Before a citizen can claim a writ of quo warranto he must satisfy the court inter alia that the office in question is a public office and it is held by a person without legal authority and that leads to the inquiry as to whether the appointment of the said person has been in accordance with law or not. A writ of quo warranto is issued to prevent a continued exercise of unlawful authority. 57. A writ of quo warranto is issued to prevent a continued exercise of unlawful authority. 57. This Court in Ashok Kumar Yadav case vide para 9 observed that it was difficult to see how the Division Bench of the High Court could have possibly undertaken an inquiry into the question whether the Chairman and the members of the Commission were men of integrity, calibre and qualification; that such an inquiry was a totally irrelevant inquiry because even if they were men lacking in integrity, calibre and qualification, it would not make their appointments invalid so long as the constitutional and legal requirements in regard to appointment are fulfilled. It was held that none of the constitutional provisions, namely, Articles 316 and 319 stood violated in making appointments of the Chairperson and members of the Commission nor was any legal provision breached. Therefore, the appointments of the Chairperson and members of the Commission were made in conformity with the constitutional and legal requirements, and if that be so, it was beyond the jurisdiction of the High Court to hold that such appointments were invalid on the ground that the Chairman and the members of the Commission lacked integrity, calibre and qualification. The Supreme Court observed that it passes their comprehension as to how the appointments of the Chairman and members of the Commission could be regarded as suffering from infirmity merely on the ground that in the opinion of the Division Bench of the High Court the Chairperson and the members of the Commission were not men of integrity or calibre. In the present case, as stated hereinabove, there is a breach/violation of the proviso to Section 4(1) of the 2003 Act, hence, the writ was maintainable. 59. It was held by this Court in R.K. Jain case that judicial review is concerned with whether the incumbent possessed requisite qualification for appointment and the manner in which the appointment came to be made or the procedure adopted was fair, just and reasonable. When a candidate was found qualified and eligible and is accordingly appointed by the executive to hold an office as a member or Vice-President or President of a tribunal, in judicial review the court cannot sit over the choice of the selection. It is for the executive to select the personnel as per law or procedure. Shri Harish Chandra was the Senior Vice-President at the relevant time. It is for the executive to select the personnel as per law or procedure. Shri Harish Chandra was the Senior Vice-President at the relevant time. The question of comparative merit which was the key contention of the petitioner could not be gone into in a PIL; that the writ petition was not a writ of quo warranto and in the circumstances the writ petition came to be dismissed. 61. In Hari Bansh Lal v. Sahodar Prasad Mahto the appointment of Shri Hari Bansh Lal as Chairman, Jharkhand State Electricity Board stood challenged on the ground that the Board had been constituted in an arbitrary manner; that Shri Hari Bansh Lal was a person of doubtful integrity; that he was appointed as a Chairman without following the rules and procedure and in the circumstances the appointment stood challenged. On the question of maintainability, the Division Bench of this Court held that a writ of quo warranto lies only when the appointment is contrary to a statutory provision. 62. It was further held in Hari Bansh Lal case that “suitability” of a candidate for appointment to a post is to be judged by the appointing authority and not by the court unless the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules/provisions. It is important to note that this Court went into the merits of the case and came to the conclusion that there was no adequate material to doubt the integrity of Shri Hari Bansh Lal who was appointed as the Chairperson of Jharkhand State Electricity Board. This Court further observed that in the writ petition there was no averment saying that the appointment was contrary to statutory provisions. 64. Even in R.K. Jain case, this Court observed vide para 73 that judicial review is concerned with whether the incumbent possessed qualifications for the appointment and the manner in which the appointment came to be made or whether the procedure adopted was fair, just and reasonable. We reiterate that the Government is not accountable to the courts for the choice made but the Government is accountable to the courts in respect of the lawfulness/legality of its decisions when impugned under the judicial review jurisdiction. We do not wish to multiply the authorities on this point.” 17. We reiterate that the Government is not accountable to the courts for the choice made but the Government is accountable to the courts in respect of the lawfulness/legality of its decisions when impugned under the judicial review jurisdiction. We do not wish to multiply the authorities on this point.” 17. From the aforesaid logical propositions and judicial pronouncements, this Court is of the considered view that no interference is warranted in the instant writ petition and as such, the same is hereby dismissed. 18. Before parting with the order, I hereby direct the respondent-State to conclude the process of appointment of the Chairman, Jharkhand State Pollution Control Board, as expeditiously as possible.