JUDGMENT : S. MANIKUMAR, J The petitioner, Legal Literacy Council, claimed to be a registered Legal Welfare Organization, has filed the instant writ petition for a direction to State of Kerala, Government Secretariat, Thiruvananthapuram, represented by its Chief Secretary, respondent No. 5, to take appropriate legal action against respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 respectively, who held the office of the President, Secretary and the Treasurer of the Kerala Union of Working Journalists, New Delhi Unit, New Delhi, the first respondent for the last 5 years. 2. A further direction was sought for to enact laws to the effect that it is the duty of the State of Kerala, Government Secretariat, Thiruvananthapuram, respondent No. 5, to collect the unutilised public money which has not been utilised for the last six years from the date of its sanction and also for a direction to respondent Nos. 5 to 8 and 11, to collect the allotted public money with interest from respondent Nos. 1 to 4 and ensure the same. 3. Short facts leading to the writ petition are as hereunder: State of Kerala, Government Secretariat, Thiruvananthapuram-695 001, represented by its Chief Secretary, the 5th respondent, granted Rs.25 lakhs to the Kerala Union of Working Journalists, the 1st respondent, to form 'Kerala Press Club” in New Delhi, after including the amount in the Budget of 2011, with an object and motive of providing infrastructure for the promotion and augmentation of journalistic profession, and to uphold the professional values, morals and ethics. The said amount was sanctioned in the year 2012 and handed over to the Secretary, Kerala Union of Working Journalist, by DD No. 689741 dated 16.08.2012. On receipt of the said DD, office bearers of the Union encashed the sanctioned amount and kept the same in the Union Bank account at Federal Bank, Cannaught place, New Delhi. The allegation is that the Union has not utilised the said amount for its apt purpose for which it was granted and misused the allotted fund. 4. From the materials on record, we find that as early as on 15.01.2020, permission has been granted to take fresh notice to respondent Nos. 3 and 9, returnable within three weeks. Since then, steps have not been taken, and therefore, the registry had put up a note on 14.01.2020 that “service not complete with respect to respondents 2, 3 and 4”. 3 and 9, returnable within three weeks. Since then, steps have not been taken, and therefore, the registry had put up a note on 14.01.2020 that “service not complete with respect to respondents 2, 3 and 4”. On 13.09.2021, the registry recorded a note that 'process as per order dated 15.01.2020 not received.' Thus, it is clear that no steps were taken for serving notice on respondent No. 3 and 9. That apart, respondent No. 2 has also not been served. 5. On this day, when the matter is taken up for further hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that if a week's time is given, steps would be taken for service of notice on respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 9. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has made submissions on the merits of the case as well. He further submitted that a sum of Rs.25 lakhs sanctioned by respondent No. 5 has not been properly utilised by respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and 4. He also submitted that even though some of the active members of KUWJ questioned the illegal action of respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 and also the alleged misuse of public money, there was no prompt action. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the materials on record. 8. Writ petition has been filed mainly based on the averment that a sum of Rs. 25 lakhs was sanctioned in the year 2012 for providing infrastructure for the promotion and augmentation of journalistic profession and the said amount was handed over to the Secretary, Kerala Union of Working Journalist. In his attempt to get information as regards the utilisation of the fund, Exhibit-P2 application dated 07.09.2017 seemed to have been submitted to the Public Information Officer, Office of the Department of Finance, Government Secretariat, Trivandrum to get the information as hereunder: 1. Whether the Government had sanctioned Rupees 25 lakhs to Kerala Union of Working Journalists (KUWJ) Delhi Unit in the year 2012? 2. If granted, for what purpose it was granted? And share the details of the cheque (including its date, number and the cheque issued to whose favour. 3. Whether KUWJ Delhi Unit utilised the granted fund for its apt/promised purpose? 4. Do the Government conducted any audit or enquiry about the utilization of granted fund? 5. 2. If granted, for what purpose it was granted? And share the details of the cheque (including its date, number and the cheque issued to whose favour. 3. Whether KUWJ Delhi Unit utilised the granted fund for its apt/promised purpose? 4. Do the Government conducted any audit or enquiry about the utilization of granted fund? 5. Whether KUWJ has the power/authority to hold the granted fund in its bank account for a period of more than five years? 6. If the granted fund is not utilised by the organisation, what are the official formalities and further actions initiated by the Government ? 9. Exhibit-P4 reply dated 28.11.2017 has been issued by the Deputy Director and State Public Information Officer answering two queries out of six queries and stating that queries 3 and 4 are related to the office of the Deputy Director, Information and Public Relations Officer, New Delhi, and that query Nos. 5 and 6 are related to the Finance Department. 10. On a perusal of Exhibit-P5 reply and the averments contained in paragraph 8 of the statement of facts, we find that thereafter on 16.12.2017, Exhibit-P5 letter was received by the petitioner from the State Public Information Officer in charge, Information Office, Kerala House, New Delhi, stating that no information is available with their office relating to query Nos. 3 and 4. It is the contention that KUWJ, Delhi Unit has not utilised the said amount for its apt purpose for which it was granted and misused the allotted fund. The Government conducted an audit of enquiry about the utilisation of the granted fund and the answer of the Public Information Officer in Exhibit-P5 is that no information is available with the office. 11. From the above, one thing is clear that there was no information and secondly, if the petitioner was not satisfied with the reply given by the State Public Information Officer, Information Office, New Delhi, for any of the reasons, it ought to have filed an appeal before the appellate authority, viz., the Deputy Director, Information Office, New Delhi. But, the petitioner has failed to do so. Secondly, the writ petition seems to have been filed on the basis of Exhibit-P7 news item published in the Online News Portal 'Marunadan Malayali' on 04.12.2017. 12. It is trite that writ petition cannot be entertained solely on the basis of newspaper reports. But, the petitioner has failed to do so. Secondly, the writ petition seems to have been filed on the basis of Exhibit-P7 news item published in the Online News Portal 'Marunadan Malayali' on 04.12.2017. 12. It is trite that writ petition cannot be entertained solely on the basis of newspaper reports. On the said aspect, we deem it fit to consider a few decisions: (i) In Laxmi Raj Shetty and Another v. State of Tamil Nadu [ (1988) 3 SCC 319 ], at paragraphs 25 and 26, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "25. ............ We cannot take judicial notice of the facts stated in a news item being in the nature of hearsay secondary evidence, unless proved by evidence aliunde. A report in a newspapers is only hearsay evidence. A newspaper is not one of the documents referred to in Section 78(2) of the Evidence Act, 1872 by which an allegation of fact can be proved. The presumption of genuineness attached under Section 81 of the Evidence Act to a newspapers report cannot be treated as proved of the facts reported therein. 26. It is now well settled that a statement of fact contained in a newspapers is merely hearsay and therefore inadmissible in evidence in the absence of the maker of the statement appearing in Court and deposing to have perceived the fact reported. The accused should have therefore produced the persons in whose presence the seizure of the stolen money from Appellant 2's house at Mangalore was effected or examined the press correspondents in proof of the truth of the contents of the news item. The question as to the admissibility of newspaper reports has been dealt with by this Court in Samant N. Balakrishna v. George Femandez and Ors. [ (1969) 3 SCR 603 ]. There the question arose whether Shri George Femandez, the successful candidate returned to Parliament from the Bombay South Parliamentary Constituency had delivered a speech at Shivaji Park attributed to him as reported in the Maratha, a widely circulated Marathi newspaper in Bombay, and it was said: "A newspaper report without any further proof of what had actually happened through witnesses is of no value. It is at best a secondhand secondary evidence. It is well known that reporters collect information and pass it on to the editor who edits the news item and then publishes it. It is at best a secondhand secondary evidence. It is well known that reporters collect information and pass it on to the editor who edits the news item and then publishes it. In this process the truth might get perverted or garbled. Such news items cannot be said to prove themselves although they may be taken into account with other evidence if the other evidence is forcible." We need not burden the judgment with many citations. There is nothing on record to substantiate the facts as reported in the newspapers showing recovery of the stolen amount from the residence of Appellant 2 at Mangalore. We have therefore no reason to discard the testimony of PW 50 and the seizure witnesses which go to establish that the amount in question was actually recovered at Madras on the 29th and the 30th as alleged." (ii) In S.A. Khan v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Another reported in (1993) 3 SCC 151 : AIR 1993 SC 1348 , at paragraph 22, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "22. In the present case, no evidence has been let in proof of the statement of facts contained in the newspaper report. The absence of any denial by Ch. Bhajan Lal will not absolve the applicant from discharging his obligation of proving the statement of facts as appeared in the Press report. In fact, Ch. Bhajan Lal in his counter affidavit has taken a stand that the statements attributed to him based on the newspaper report are mere hearsay and cannot in law be relied upon for the purpose of initiating such proceedings. Therefore, in the absence of required legal proof, the Court will not be justified in issuing a suo motu notice for contempt of court." (iii) In Ravinder Kumar Sharma v. The State of Assam and Ors., reported in AIR 1999 SC 3571 , at paragraph 25, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "25. Newspaper reports regarding the Central Government decision could not be any basis for the respondents to stop action under the Assam Control Order of 1961. The paper reports do not specifically refer to the Assam Control Order, 1961. In fact, Government of Assam itself was not prepared to act on the newspaper reports, as stated in its wireless message. Newspaper reports regarding the Central Government decision could not be any basis for the respondents to stop action under the Assam Control Order of 1961. The paper reports do not specifically refer to the Assam Control Order, 1961. In fact, Government of Assam itself was not prepared to act on the newspaper reports, as stated in its wireless message. Section 81 of the Evidence Act was relied upon for the appellant, in this behalf, to say that the newspaper reports were evidence and conveyed the necessary information to one and all including the respondents 2 and 3. But the presumption of genuineness attached under Section 81 to newspaper reports cannot be treated as proof of the facts stated therein. The statements of fact in newspapers are merely hearsay Laxmi Raj Setty v. State of Tamil Nadu [1988 CriLJ 1783]." (iv) In Vikas Vashishth v. Allahabad High Court reported in (2004) 13 SCC 485 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "4. At the very outset, we put it to the petitioner that a bare perusal of the petition shows that it is based entirely on newspaper reports and asked him whether before filing the petition he has taken care to verify the facts personally. His answer is in the negative. In the writ petition all the 21 High Courts have been included as respondents and Union of India has also been impleaded as the 22nd respondent. We asked the petitioner what has provoked him to implead all the High Courts as respondents and he states that it is his apprehension that similar incidents may occur in other High Courts though there is no factual foundation for such appreciation. 5. After affording the full opportunity of hearing, we are satisfied that what purports to have been filed as a public interest litigation is nothing more than a "publicity interest litigation". It is writ large that it has been filed without any effort at verifying the facts by the petitioner personally." (v) In Rohit Pandey v. Union of India reported in (2005) 13 SCC 702 , Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "1. It is writ large that it has been filed without any effort at verifying the facts by the petitioner personally." (v) In Rohit Pandey v. Union of India reported in (2005) 13 SCC 702 , Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "1. This petition purporting to be in public interest has been filed by a member of the legal fraternity seeking directions against the respondents to hand over the investigation of the case pertaining to recovery of light machine gun, which is said to have been stolen from the army according to reports published in two newspapers, to the Central Bureau of Investigation for fair investigation to ensure that the real culprits who are behind such theft of army arms and ammunition endangering the integrity and sovereignty of the country may be brought to book and action may be taken against them in accordance with law. The only basis for the petitioner coming to this Court are two newspaper reports dated 25-1-2004, and the other dated 12-2-2004. This petition was immediately filed on 16-2-2004 after the aforesaid second newspaper report appeared. On enquiry from the learned counsel, we have learnt that the petitioner is a young advocate having been in practice for a year or two. The Union of India, the State of Uttar Pradesh and the Chief Minister of the State of Uttar Pradesh, have been arrayed as party respondents. In the newspaper reports, there is no allegation either against the Union of India or against the Chief Minister. 2. We expect that when such a petition is filed in public interest and particularly by a member of the legal profession, it would be filed with all seriousness and after doing the necessary homework and enquiry. If the petitioner is so public-spirited at such a young age as is so professed, the least one would expect is that an enquiry would be made from the authorities concerned as to the nature of investigation which may be going on before filing a petition that the investigation be conducted by the Central Bureau of Investigation. Admittedly, no such measures were taken by the petitioner. There is nothing in the petition as to what, in fact, prompted the petitioner to approach this Court within two-three days of the second publication dated 12-2-2004, in the newspaper Amar Ujala. Admittedly, no such measures were taken by the petitioner. There is nothing in the petition as to what, in fact, prompted the petitioner to approach this Court within two-three days of the second publication dated 12-2-2004, in the newspaper Amar Ujala. Further, the State of Uttar Pradesh had filed its affidavit a year earlier i.e. on 7-10-2004, placing on record the steps taken against the accused persons, including the submission of the charge-sheet before the appropriate court. Despite one year having elapsed after the filing of the affidavit by the Special Secretary to the Home Department of the Government of Uttar Pradesh, nothing seems to have been done by the petitioner. The petitioner has not even controverted what is stated in the affidavit. Ordinarily, we would have dismissed such a misconceived petition with exemplary costs but considering that the petitioner is a young advocate, we feel that the ends of justice would be met and the necessary message conveyed if a token cost of rupees one thousand is imposed on the petitioner " (vi) In Holicow Pictures Pvt. Ltd. v. Prem Chandra Mishra and Ors. reported in (2007) 14 SCC 281 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: “18. Courts must do justice by promotion of good faith, and prevent law from crafty invasions. Courts must maintain the social balance by interfering-where necessary for the sake of justice and refuse to interfere where it is against the social interest and public good. (See State of Maharashtra v. Prabhu (1995) ILLJ 622 SC, and Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation v. GAR Re-Rolling Mills and Anr. [1994] 1 SCR 857. No litigant has a right to unlimited draught on the Court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes. Easy access to justice should not be misused as a licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions. [See Dr. B.K. Subbarao v. Mr. K. Parasaran (1996 CriLJ 3983)]. Today people rush to Courts to file cases in profusion under this attractive name of public interest. They must inspire confidence in Courts and among the public. 19. As noted supra, a time has come to weed out the petitions, which though titled as public interest litigations are in essence something else. K. Parasaran (1996 CriLJ 3983)]. Today people rush to Courts to file cases in profusion under this attractive name of public interest. They must inspire confidence in Courts and among the public. 19. As noted supra, a time has come to weed out the petitions, which though titled as public interest litigations are in essence something else. It is shocking to note that Courts are flooded with a large number of so called public interest litigations where even a minuscule percentage can legitimately be called as public interest litigations. Though the parameters of public interest litigation have been indicated by this Court in a large number of cases, yet unmindful of the real intentions and objectives, Courts are entertaining such petitions and wasting valuable judicial time which, as noted above, could be otherwise utilized for disposal of genuine cases. It is also noticed that petitions are based on newspaper reports without any attempt to verify their authenticity. As observed by this Court in several cases newspaper reports do not constitute evidence. A petition based on unconfirmed news reports, without verifying their authenticity should not normally be entertained. As noted above, such petitions do not provide any basis for verifying the correctness of statements made and information given in the petition. It would be desirable for the Courts to filter out the frivolous petitions and dismiss them with costs as aforestated so that the message goes in the right direction that petitions filed with oblique motive do not have the approval of the Courts.” 13. Yet another contention advanced by the writ petitioner is that one Senior Delhi News correspondent of Malayala Manorama, Mr. Binu V.V, has filed a complaint before the Director, Vigilance and Anti Corruption Bureau, Trivandrum, 11th respondent, to conduct a thorough enquiry about the alleged misuse of public money and to conduct an audit on the transactions happened in the Union bank account for the last five years. But, the same was not responded to. 14. The petitioner has also filed Exhibit-P8 complaint dated 20.10.2017 before the Vigilance and Anti Corruption Bureau. Even though Mr. Binu V.V. is stated to have filed a complaint, he has not pursued the same. Certainly, the petitioner cannot step into the shoes of the said Senior Member of the Malayala Manorama. But, the same was not responded to. 14. The petitioner has also filed Exhibit-P8 complaint dated 20.10.2017 before the Vigilance and Anti Corruption Bureau. Even though Mr. Binu V.V. is stated to have filed a complaint, he has not pursued the same. Certainly, the petitioner cannot step into the shoes of the said Senior Member of the Malayala Manorama. A reading of Exhibit-P8 shows that the complaint seemed to have been made after 5 years from the date of sanctioning of the amount. Since there is allegation against the Kerala Union of Working Journalists, New Delhi Unit, KUWJ and its President, Secretary and the Treasurer are arrayed as respondents 2 to 4 for the alleged misuse of the funds allocated for the specific purpose. 15. The information sought to be obtained, is in the year 2017 and thereafter, writ petition has been filed, in the year 2018. Writ petition ought to have been filed, within a reasonable time. Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, there is no time-limit for filing a writ petition. However, there should be a reasonable time to file a writ petition. 16. Though reasonable time is not prescribed in the rules framed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the words "reasonable time", as explained in Veerayee Ammal v. Seeni Ammal ( AIR 2001 SC 2920 ), at Paragraph 13, are extracted hereunder: "13. The word "reasonable" has in law prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the person concerned is called upon to act reasonably knows or ought to know as to what was reasonable. It may be unreasonable to give an exact definition of the word "reasonable". The reason varies in its conclusion according to idiosyncrasy of the individual and the time and circumstances in which he thinks. The dictionary meaning of the "reasonable time" is to be so much time as is necessary, under the circumstances, to do conveniently what the contract or duty requires should be done in a particular case. In other words it means, as soon as circumstances permit. The dictionary meaning of the "reasonable time" is to be so much time as is necessary, under the circumstances, to do conveniently what the contract or duty requires should be done in a particular case. In other words it means, as soon as circumstances permit. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar's The Law Lexicon it is defined to mean: "A reasonable time, looking at all the circumstances of the case; a reasonable time under ordinary circumstances; as soon as circumstances will permit; so much time as is necessary under the circumstances, conveniently to do what the contract requires should be done; some more protracted space than "directly"; such length of time as may fairly, and properly, and reasonably be allowed or required, having regard to the nature of the act or duty and to the attending circumstances; all these convey more or less the same idea." 17. There is an inordinate delay and laches on the part of the writ petitioner. What is laches is as under: "Laches or reasonable time are not defined under any Statute or Rules. "Laches" or "Lashes" is an old french word for slackness or negligence or not doing. In general sense, it means neglect to do what in the law should have been done for an unreasonable or unexplained length of time. What could be the laches in one case might not constitute in another. The laches to non-suit, an aggrieved person from challenging the acquisition proceedings should be inferred from the conduct of the land owner or an interested person and that there should be a passive inaction for a reasonable length of time. What is reasonable time has not been explained in any of the enactment. Reasonable time depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case." 18. Remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is equitable in nature, and delay defeats equity. On the aspect of delay, laches, and reasonable time, reference can be made to a few decisions: (i) In State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai reported in AIR 1964 SC 1006 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that unreasonable delay denies to the petitioner, the discretionary extraordinary remedy of mandamus, certiorari or other relief. On the aspect of delay, laches, and reasonable time, reference can be made to a few decisions: (i) In State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai reported in AIR 1964 SC 1006 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that unreasonable delay denies to the petitioner, the discretionary extraordinary remedy of mandamus, certiorari or other relief. (ii) In Dilbagh Rai Jarry v. Union of India [ AIR 1974 SC 130 : (1974) 3 SCC 554 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the question of condoning delay of an application filed beyond the statutory period of limitation and on the aspect of delay, the Supreme Court observed as under: "..........the Authority is competent to devise, consistently with the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder, its own procedure based on general principles of justice, equity and good conscience. One of such principles is that delay defeats equity. The Authority found that the applicant was guilty of gross negligence. He took no steps whatever to carry out the amendment for several months after the order permitting the amendment, and thereafter, when the case was at the final stage, he suddenly woke up, as it were, from slumber, and sought to amend his application. In the circumstances, the Authority rightly refused to put a premium on this delay and laxity on the part of the appellant." (iii) In P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu [ AIR 1974 SC 2271 : (1975) 1 SCC 152 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paragraph 2, held as under: "2... A person aggrieved by an order or promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year order of suspension such promotion; it is not that there is any period of limitation of the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters. The petitioner's petition should, therefore, have been dismissed in limine. Entertaining such petitions is a waste of time of the Court. It clogs the work of the Court and impedes the work of the Court in considering legitimate grievances as also its normal work. We consider that the High Court was right in dismissing the appellant's petition as well as the appeal." (iv) In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal reported in (1986) 4 SCC 566 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paragraph 24, held as under: “24. Now, it is well settled that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in the exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The evolution of this rule of laches or delay is premised upon a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices. The rights of third parties may intervene and if the writ jurisdiction is exercised on a writ petition filed after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. When the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meanwhile is an important factor which always weighs the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. We do not think it necessary to burden this judgment with reference to various decisions of this Court where it has been emphasised time and again that where there is inordinate and unexplained delay and third party rights are created in the intervening period, the High Court would decline to interfere, even if the State action complained of is unconstitutional or illegal. .........Of course, this rule of laches or delay is not a rigid rule which can be cast in a strait jacket formula, for there may be cases where despite delay and creation of third party rights the High Court may still in the exercise of its discretion interfere and grant relief to the petitioner. But, such cases where the demand of justice is so compelling that the High Court would be inclined to interfere in spite of delay or creation of third party rights would by their very nature be few and far between. Ultimately it would be a matter within the discretion of the court; ex hypothesi every discretion must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it." (v) In G.C. Gupta v. N.K. Pandey [ AIR 1988 SC 654 : (1988) 1 SCC 316 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paragraph 16, held as under: “16. Inordinate delay is not merely a factor for the Court to refuse appropriate relief but also a relevant consideration it be so minded not to unsettle settled things.” (vi) In State of Maharastra v. Digambar reported in AIR 1995 SC 1991 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, considered a case, where compensation for the acquired land was claimed belatedly, and, at paragraphs 12, 18 and 21, held as under: "12. How a person who alleges against the State of deprivation of his legal right, can get relief of compensation from the State invoking writ jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution even though, he is guilty of laches or undue delay is difficult to comprehend, when it is well settled by decision of this Court that no person, be he a citizen or otherwise, is entitled to obtain the equitable relief under Article 226 of the Constitution if his conduct is blameworthy because of laches, undue delay, acquiescence, waiver and the like. Moreover, how a citizen claiming discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution against a State, could be relieved of his obligation to establish his unblameworthy conduct for getting such relief, where the State against which relief is sought is a welfare State, is also difficult to comprehend. Moreover, how a citizen claiming discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution against a State, could be relieved of his obligation to establish his unblameworthy conduct for getting such relief, where the State against which relief is sought is a welfare State, is also difficult to comprehend. Where the relief sought under Article 226 of the Constitution by a person against the welfare State is founded on its alleged illegal or wrongful executive action, the need to explain laches or undue delay on his part to obtain such relief, should, if anything, be more stringent than in other cases, for the reason that the State due to laches or undue delay on the part of the person seeking relief, may not be able to show that the executive action complained of was legal or correct for want of records pertaining to the action or for the officers who were responsible for such action not being available later on. Further, where granting of relief is claimed against the State on alleged unwarranted executive action, is bound to result in loss to the public exchequer of the State or in damage to other public interest, the High Court before granting such relief is required to satisfy itself that the delay or laches on the part of a citizen or any other person in approaching for relief under Article 226 of the Constitution on the alleged violation of his legal right, was wholly justified in the facts and circumstances, instead of ignoring the same or leniently considering it. Thus, in our view, persons seeking relief against the State under Article 226 of the Constitution, be they citizens or otherwise, cannot get discretionary relief obtainable thereunder unless they fully satisfy the High Court that the facts and circumstances of the case clearly justified the laches or undue delay on their part in approaching the Court for grant of such discretionary relief. Therefore, where a High Court grants relief to a citizen or any other person under Article 226 of the Constitution against any person including the State without considering his blame-worthy conduct, such as laches or undue delay, acquiescence or waiver, the relief so granted becomes unsustainable even if the relief was granted in respect of alleged deprivation of his legal right by the State. xx xxx xxxx 18. xx xxx xxxx 18. Laches or undue delay, the blame-worthy conduct of a person in approaching a Court of Equity in England for obtaining discretionary relief which disentitled for grant of such relief was explained succinctly by Sir Barnes Peacock, long ago, in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong (1874) 5 PC 221) thus: "Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation, in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute or limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of Justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy." xx xxx xxxx 21. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of Justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy." xx xxx xxxx 21. Therefore, where a High Court in exercise of its power vested under Article 226 of the Constitution issues a direction, order or writ for granting relief to a person including a citizen without considering his dis-entitlement of such relief due to his blameworthy conduct of undue delay or laches in claiming the same, such a direction, order or writ becomes unsustainable as that not made judiciously and reasonably in exercise of its sound judicial discretion, but as that made arbitrarily." (vii) In State of Rajasthan v. D.R. Laxmi reported in (1996) 6 SCC 445 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that though the order may be void, if the party does not approach the Court, within a reasonable time, which is always a question of fact and have the order invalidated or acquiesced or waived, the discretion of the Court has to be exercised in a reasonable manner. (viii) In Board of Secondary Education of Assam v. Mohd. Sarifuz Zaman [ (2003) 12 SCC 408 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under: "12. Delay defeats discretion and loss of limitation destroys the remedy itself. Delay amounting to laches results in benefit of discretionary power being denied on principles of equity. Loss of limitation resulting into depriving of the remedy, is a principle based on public policy and utility and not equity alone......." (ix) In Karnataka Power Corporation Limited v. K. Thangappan and Another [ AIR 2006 SC 1581 : (2006) 4 SCC 322], the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paragraph 6, held as under: "6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party." (x) In Chairman, U. P. Jal Nigam and Another v. Jaswant Singh reported in AIR 2007 SC 924 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after considering a catena of decisions, on the aspect of delay, at paragraph 13, held as under: “13........Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants lost time or while away and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in such cases, the Court should be very slow in granting the relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be taken into consideration the question of acquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent whether other parties are going to be prejudiced if the relief is granted." (xi) In Virender Chaudhary v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation reported in (2009) 1 SCC 297 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: “The court exercises its jurisdiction only upon satisfying itself that it would be equitable to do so. Delay and/or laches, indisputably, are the relevant factors. “15. The Superior Courts, times without number, applied the equitable principles for not granting a relief and/or a limited relief in favour of the applicant in a case of this nature. While doing so, the court although not oblivious of the fact that no period of limitation is provided for filing a writ petition but emphasize is laid that it should be filed within a reasonable time. A discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India need not be exercised if the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.” Some of the decisions considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Virender Chaudhary's case (cited supra), are reiterated as follows: "16. In Uttaranchal Forest Development Corporation and Anr. v. Jabar Singh and Ors. A discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India need not be exercised if the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.” Some of the decisions considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Virender Chaudhary's case (cited supra), are reiterated as follows: "16. In Uttaranchal Forest Development Corporation and Anr. v. Jabar Singh and Ors. [ (2007) 2 SCC 1 12], this Court held: "It is not in dispute that the effective alternative remedy was not availed of by many of the workmen as detailed in paragraphs supra. The termination order was made in the year 1995 and the writ petitions were admittedly field in the year 2005 after a delay of 10 years. The High Court, in our opinion, was not justified in entertaining the writ petition on the ground that the petition has been filed after a delay of 10 years and that the writ petitions should have been dismissed by the High Court on the ground of laches." 17. In New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and Ors. [ (2007) 9 SCC 278 ], this Court held: "16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cutoff date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. (See Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy [ (2004) 1 SCC 347 ], U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh [ (2006) 11 SCC 464 ] and Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd., v. K.Thangappan [(2006) 4 SCC 332]) 17. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. (See Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy [ (2004) 1 SCC 347 ], U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh [ (2006) 11 SCC 464 ] and Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd., v. K.Thangappan [(2006) 4 SCC 332]) 17. Although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily, writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time. (See Lipton India Ltd. v. Union of India [ (1994) 6 SCC 524 ] and M.R.Gupta v. Union of India [ (1995) 5 SCC 628 ])” (xii) In S.S.Balu v. State of Kerala reported in (2009) 2 SCC 479 , following the decision in NDMC v. Pan Singh ( AIR 2007 SC 1365 ), at paragraph 17, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "17. It is also well-settled principle of law that “delay defeats equity”. The Government Order was issued on 15-1-2002. The appellants did not file any writ application questioning the legality and validity thereof. Only after the writ petitions filed by others were allowed and the State of Kerala preferred an appeal thereagainst, they impleaded themselves as party-respondents. It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment. It is, thus, not possible for us to issue any direction to the State of Kerala or the Commission to appoint the appellants at this stage. (xiii) In Vijay Kumar Kaul v. Union of India [ AIR 2012 SC 2274 : (2012) 7 SCC 610 ], following the earlier judgment relating to delay and laches, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that belated approach in filing writ petition is impermissible and at paragraphs 26 and 27, it is held as under: "26. From the aforesaid pronouncement of law, it is manifest that a litigant who invokes the jurisdiction of a Court for claiming seniority, it is obligatory on his part to come to the Court at the earliest or at least within a reasonable span of time. From the aforesaid pronouncement of law, it is manifest that a litigant who invokes the jurisdiction of a Court for claiming seniority, it is obligatory on his part to come to the Court at the earliest or at least within a reasonable span of time. The belated approach is impermissible as in the meantime interest of third parties gets ripened and further interference after enormous delay is likely to usher in a state of anarchy. 27. The acts done during the interregnum are to be kept in mind and should not be lightly brushed aside. It becomes an obligation to take into consideration the balance of justice or injustice in entertaining the petition or declining it on the ground of delay and laches. It is a matter of great significance that at one point of time equity that existed in favour of one melts into total insignificance and paves the path of extinction with the passage of time." (xiv) In Tukaram Kana Joshi v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation [ AIR 2013 SC 565 : (2013) 1 SCC 353 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paragraphs 12 and 14, held as under: "12. Delay and laches is adopted as a mode of discretion to decline exercise of jurisdiction to grant relief. There is another facet. The Court is required to exercise judicial discretion. The said discretion is dependent on facts and circumstances of the cases. Delay and laches is one of the facets to deny exercise of discretion. It is not an absolute impediment. There can be mitigating factors, continuity of cause action, etc. That apart, if the whole thing shocks the judicial conscience, then the Court should exercise the discretion more so, when no third-party interest is involved. Thus analysed, the petition is not hit by the doctrine of delay and laches as the same is not a constitutional limitation, the cause of action is continuous and further the situation certainly shocks judicial conscience. .......... 14. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. Discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably. In the event that the claim made by the applicant is legally sustainable, delay should be condoned. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. Discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably. In the event that the claim made by the applicant is legally sustainable, delay should be condoned. In other words, where circumstances justifying the conduct exist, the illegality which is manifest, cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in the injustice being done, because of a non-deliberate delay. The Court should not harm innocent parties if their rights have in fact emerged by delay on the part of the petitioners." (xv) In State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari reported in (2013) 12 SCC 179 , following the judgment in P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu, [ (1975) 1 SCC 152 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that in case a junior is promoted over his head, the senior must challenge it, at least within six months or at the most a year of such seniority and that anyone who sleeps over his right is bound to suffer. At paragraph 24, it is held as under: "24. There can be no cavil over the fact that the claim of promotion is based on the concept of equality and equitability, but the said relief has to be claimed within a reasonable time. The said principle has been stated in Ghulam Rasool Lone v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, [ (2009) 15 SCC 321 ]. ............ 27. We are absolutely conscious that in the case at hand the seniority has not been disturbed in the promotional cadre and no promotions may be unsettled.... the respondents chose to sleep like Rip Van Winkle and got up from their slumber at their own leisure, for some reason which is fathomable to them only. But such fathoming of reasons by oneself is not countenanced in law. Anyone who sleeps over his right is bound to suffer. 28. Remaining oblivious to the factum of delay and laches and granting relief is contrary to all settled principles and even would not remotely attract the concept of discretion. But such fathoming of reasons by oneself is not countenanced in law. Anyone who sleeps over his right is bound to suffer. 28. Remaining oblivious to the factum of delay and laches and granting relief is contrary to all settled principles and even would not remotely attract the concept of discretion. We may hasten to add that the same may not be applicable in all circumstances where certain categories of fundamental rights are infringed. But, a stale claim of getting promotional benefits definitely should not have been entertained by the Tribunal and accepted by the High Court." (xvi) In Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. T.T.Murali Babu reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108 , at paragraphs 16 and 17, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: “16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant – a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. 17. In the case at hand, though there has been four years’ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. 17. In the case at hand, though there has been four years’ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent-employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons – who compete with ‘Kumbhakarna’ or for that matter ‘Rip Van Winkle’. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.” 19. In the light of the above decisions and discussion, we are of the view that instant writ petition, filed in the year 2018, for the alleged misuse of public money and non utilisation of the same, for the purpose for which the same is sanctioned, cannot be entertained. Further, the petitioner has failed to effect service of notice on respondents 2, 3 and 9, even though there is an order, as early as on 15.01.2020, to take fresh notice to respondents 3 and 9. 20. As regards prayer No.(2), direction to enact a law, mandamus cannot be issued to legislate, that too, in a particular manner, as suggested by the petitioner. Reference can be made to a few decisions: (i) In Mallikarjuna Rao and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. [ (1990) 2 SCC 707 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: “13. The Special Rules have been framed under Article 309 of the Constitution. The power under Article 309 of the Constitution to frame rules is the legislative power. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. [ (1990) 2 SCC 707 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: “13. The Special Rules have been framed under Article 309 of the Constitution. The power under Article 309 of the Constitution to frame rules is the legislative power. This power under the Constitution has to be exercised by the President or the Governor of a State as the case may be. The High Courts or the Administrative Tribunals cannot issue a mandate to the State Government to legislate under Article 309 of the Constitution. The Courts cannot usurp the functions assigned to the executive under the Constitution and cannot even indirectly require the executive to exercise its rule making power in any manner. The Courts cannot assume to itself a supervisory role over the rule making power of the executive under Article 309 of the Constitution.” (ii) In Suresh Seth v. Commissioner, Indore Municipal Corporation and Ors. [ (2005) 13 SCC 287 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: “5. Learned counsel for the appellant has also submitted that this Court should issue directions for an appropriate amendment in the M.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 so that a person may be debarred from simultaneously holding two elected offices, namely that of a member of the Legislative Assembly and also of Mayor of a Municipal Corporation. In our opinion, this is a matter of policy for the elected representatives of people to decide and no direction in this regard can be issued by the court. That apart this Court cannot issue any direction to the Legislature to make any particular kind of enactment. Under our constitutional scheme Parliament and Legislative Assemblies exercise sovereign power to enact laws and no outside power or authority can issue a direction to enact a particular piece of legislation. In Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association v. Union of India, (1989) IILLJ 506 SC it has been held that no court can direct a legislature to enact a particular law. Similarly, when an executive authority exercises a legislative power by way of a subordinate legislation pursuant to the delegated authority of a legislature, such executive authority cannot be asked to enact a law which it has been empowered to do under the delegated legislative authority. Similarly, when an executive authority exercises a legislative power by way of a subordinate legislation pursuant to the delegated authority of a legislature, such executive authority cannot be asked to enact a law which it has been empowered to do under the delegated legislative authority. This view has been reiterated in State of J & K v. A.R. Zakki, AIR 1992 SC 1546 W. In A.K. Roy v. Union of India, 1982 CriLJ 340, it was held that no mandamus can be issued to enforce an Act which has been passed by the legislature. Therefore, the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted.” (iii) In Municipal Committee, Patiala v. Model Town Residents Asson. and Ors. [ (2007) 8 SCC 669 ], which dealt with a prayer to enact a law on taxation, and that the same can be made applicable to the case on hand, to understand the power of the court to issue a writ of mandamus, to legislate, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, held as under: “20. Before concluding, we have serious objections to the manner in which direction has been given by the Division Bench of the High Court to the Legislature. In this connection, we quote the last paragraph of the impugned judgment, which is as follows: “...Sections 3(1)(b) and 3(8aa) of the Act are declared unconstitutional and struck down.... The State shall be free to suitably amend Section 3(1) to provide for levy of house tax by adopting a uniform criteria for determination of annual value of similarly situated properties. The State shall also be free to amend Section 3(1) and lay down a uniform criteria for determination of annual value of properties occupied by the tenants as well as the owners in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sachidanand Kishore Prasad Sinha's case [1995]1 SCR 256 and observations made in this order. It is, however, made clear that any such enactment shall not effect the assessments made prior to the amendment of Section 3 by Punjab Act No. 11 of 1994 and the old cases, if any pending shall be decided in accordance with the unamended provision....” (emphasis supplied) In the above judgment, the High Court directs the State Legislature to amend the law relating to determination of annual value by classifying that any such amendment shall not be retrospective. We have serious reservations regarding such a direction. It is not open to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, particularly in the matter of taxation directing it not to amend the law retrospectively. Such a direction is unsustainable, particularly in a taxing statute. It is always open to the State Legislature, particularly in tax matters, to enact validation laws which apply retrospectively. The High Court cannot take away the power of the State Legislature to amend the tax law retrospectively. The basis of the law can always be altered retrospectively. B. Sudershan Reddy, J.(concurring)--While I entirely agree with my esteemed brother Kapadia, J. in the judgment proposed to be delivered by him, I wish to add particularly to supplement what he has said to the topic of separation of powers. 24. The Constitution is filled with provisions that grant Parliament or to State legislatures specific power to legislate in certain areas. These granted powers are of course subject to constitutional limitations that they may not be exercised in a way that violates other specific provisions of the Constitution. Nothing in the text, history or structure of the Constitution remotely suggest the High Courts jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution should differ in this respect -that invocation of such power should magically give High Court a free ride through the rest of Constitutional document. If such magic were available the High Court could structure, restructure legislative enactments. The possibilities are endless. The Constitution makers cannot be charged with having left open a path to such total obliteration of Constitutional enterprise. 25. In Narinder Chand Hem Raj and Ors. v. Lt. Governor, Administrator, Union Territory, Himachal Pradesh and Ors. [1972]1 SCR 940, a writ of mandamus was sought by the petitioners from enforcing levy of sales tax on the sale of liquor. This Court held that the appellants were liable to pay tax imposed under the law. The appellants in reality wanted a mandate from court to the competent authority to delete the certain entry from Schedule A and include the same in Schedule B. The court proceeded to hold: “The power to impose a tax is undoubtedly a legislative power, that power can be exercised by the Legislature directly or subject to certain conditions the Legislature may delegate that power to some other authority. But the exercise of that power, whether by the Legislature by its delegate is an exercise of a legislative power. The fact that the power was delegated to the executive does not convert that power into an executive or administrative power. No court can issue a mandate to a Legislature to enact a particular law. Similarly no court can direct a subordinated legislative body to enact or not to enact a law which it may be competent to enact. The relief as framed by the applicant in his Writ Petition does not bring out the real issue calling for determination. In a reality he wants this Court to direct the Government to delete the entry in question from Schedule A and include the same in Schedule B. Article 265 of the Constitution lays down that no tax can be levied and collect except by authority of law. Hence the levy of a tax can only be done by the authority of law and not by any executive order. Unless the executive is specifically empowered by law to give any exemption, it cannot say that it will not enforce the law as against a particular person. No court can give a direction to a Government to refrain from enforcing a provision of law.” [Emphasis supplied] 26. In T.Venkata Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1985] 3 SCR 509, a Constitution Bench of this Court while considering the question as to whether it is permissible to strike down an Ordinance which has the same force and effect or an Act of Parliament or an. Act of State Legislature on the ground of non-application of mind or malafides or that the prevailing circumstances did not warrant the issue of an Ordinance held that validity of an Ordinance cannot be decided on grounds similar to those on which an executive or judicial action is decided. It is observed: “Any law made by the Legislature, which it is not competent to pass, which is violated of the provisions in Part III of the Constitution or any other constitutional provision is ineffective. It is a settled rule of constitutional law that the question whether a statute is constitutional or not is always a question of power of the Legislature concerned, dependant upon the subject matter of the statute, the manner in which it is accomplished and the mode of enacting it. It is a settled rule of constitutional law that the question whether a statute is constitutional or not is always a question of power of the Legislature concerned, dependant upon the subject matter of the statute, the manner in which it is accomplished and the mode of enacting it. While the courts can declare a statute unconstitutional when it transgresses constitutional limits, they are precluded from inquiring into the propriety of the exercise of the legislative power. It has to be assumed that the legislative discretion is properly exercised. The motive of the Legislature in passing a statute is beyond the scrutiny of courts. Nor can the courts examine whether the legislature had applied its mind to the provisions of a statute before passing it. The propriety, expediency and necessity of a legislative act are for the determination of the legislative authority and are not for determination by the courts.” 27. It is so well settled and needs no restatement at our hands that the legislature is supreme in its own sphere under the Constitution subject to the limitations provided for in the Constitution itself. It is for the legislature to decide as to when and in what respect and of what subject matter the laws are to be made. It is for the legislature to decide as to the nature of operation of the statutes. 28. In State of Himachal Pradesh v. A Parent of a student of Medical College, Simla and Ors. [1985] 3 SCR 676, the High Court of Himachal Pradesh required the State Government to initiate legislation against ragging in educational institutions and for this purpose time of six weeks was granted to the State Government. The decision was challenged before this Court. This court was of the opinion that the direction given by the division bench was nothing short of an attempt to compel the State Government to initiate legislation with a view to curb the evil of ragging. It is held: “...It is entirely a matter for the executive branch of the Government to decide whether or not to introduce any particular legislation. Of course, any member of the legislature can also introduce legislation but the court certainly cannot mandate the executive or any member of the legislature to initiate legislation, howsoever necessary or desirable the court may consider it to be. Of course, any member of the legislature can also introduce legislation but the court certainly cannot mandate the executive or any member of the legislature to initiate legislation, howsoever necessary or desirable the court may consider it to be. That it is not a matter which is within the sphere of the functions and duties allocated to the judiciary under the Constitution. If the executive is not carrying out any duty laid upon it by the Constitution or the law, the court can certainly require the executive to carry out such duty and this is precisely what the court does when it entertains public interest litigation. Where the court find, or being moved by an aggrieved party or by any public spirited individual or social action group, that the executive is remiss in discharging its obligations under the Constitution or the law, so that the poor and the underprivileged continued to be subjected to exploitation and injustice or are deprived of their social and economic entitlements or that social legislation enacted for their benefit is not being implemented thus depriving them of the rights and benefits conferred upon them, the court certainly can and must intervene and compel the executive to carry out its constitutional and legal obligations and ensure that the deprived and vulnerable sections of the community are no longer subjected to exploitation or injustice and they are able to realize their social and economic rights. When the court passes any orders in public interest litigation, the court does so not with a view to mocking at legislative or executive authority or in a spirit of confrontation but with a view to enforcing the constitution and the law, because it is vital for the maintenance of the rule of law that the obligations which are laid upon the executive by the Constitution and the law should be carried out faithfully and no one should go away with a feeling that the Constitution and the law are meant only for the benefit of a fortunate few and have no meaning for the large members of half-clad, half-hungry people of this country. That is a feeling which should never be allowed to grow. That is a feeling which should never be allowed to grow. But at the same time the court cannot usurp the functions assigned to the executive and the legislature under the Constitution and it cannot even indirectly require the executive to introduce a particular legislation or the legislature to pass it or assume to itself a supervisory role over the law making activities of the executive and the legislature.” [Emphasis supplied] 30. The court cannot usurp the functions assigned to the legislative bodies under the Constitution and even indirectly require the legislature to exercise its power of law making in particular manner. The court cannot assume to itself a supervisory role for the law making power of the legislature under the provisions of the Constitution. The High Court must ensure that while exercising its jurisdiction which is supervisory in nature it should not over step the well recognized bounds of its own jurisdiction. 31. In Chandigarh Administrator and Ors. v. Manpreet Singh and Ors. [ AIR 1992 SC 435 ], the High Court while disposing of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution changed the categorization and order of priority specified in the Rule framed by the University for giving admissions to engineering colleges. The Supreme Court while reversing the decision observed: “...if the High Court thought that this categorization was discriminatory and bad it ought to have struck down the categorization to that extent and directed the authority to reframe the rule. It would then have been upon to the rule making authority either to merge these two categories or delete one or both of them, depending upon the opinion they would have formed on a review of the situation. We must make it clear again that we express no opinion on the question of validity or otherwise of the rule. We are only saying that the High court should not have indulged in the exercise of 'switching' the categories -and that too without giving any reasons thereafter. Thereby, it has practicably assumed the role of rule making authority, or, at any rate, assumed the role of an appellate authority. That is clearly not the function of the High Court acting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.” 32. The High Court's directions to make the law in a particular manner are clearly unsustainable.” (iv) In Indian Soaps and Toiletries Makers Association v. Ozair Husain and Ors. That is clearly not the function of the High Court acting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.” 32. The High Court's directions to make the law in a particular manner are clearly unsustainable.” (iv) In Indian Soaps and Toiletries Makers Association v. Ozair Husain and Ors. [ (2013) 3 SCC 641 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: “37. The question arises as to whether in facts and circumstances noted above, the High Court was justified in issuing a writ of mandamus calling upon the Central Government to discharge its duty by amending rules. 38. In A.K. Roy v. Union of India and Ors. [ (1982) 1 SCC 271 ], the Apex Court considered the question whether the Court should issue a mandamus calling upon the Central Government to discharge its duty without any further delay and held thus: “51.......The Parliament having left to the unfettered judgment of the Central Government the question as regards the time for bringing the provisions of the 44th Amendment into force, it is not for the court to compel the government to do that which, according to the mandate of the Parliament, lies in its discretion to do when it considers it opportune to do it. The executive is responsible to the Parliament and if the Parliament considers that the executive has betrayed its trust by not bringing any provision of the Amendment into force, it can censure the executive,....” 39. The aforesaid decision was noticed and reiterated by the Apex Court in Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association v. Union of India and Anr. [ (1989) 4 SCC 187 ], and held thus: “51. There can be no doubt that no court can direct a legislature to enact a particular law. Similarly, when an executive authority exercises a legislative power by way of subordinate legislation pursuant to the delegated authority of a legislature, such executive authority cannot be asked to enact a law which he has been empowered to do under the delegated legislative authority.” 40. In Bal Ram Bali and Anr. v. Union of India [ (2007) 6 SCC 805 ], this Court discussed the separation of powers while dealing with the question of total ban on slaughter of cows, horses, buffaloes and chameleon. In Bal Ram Bali and Anr. v. Union of India [ (2007) 6 SCC 805 ], this Court discussed the separation of powers while dealing with the question of total ban on slaughter of cows, horses, buffaloes and chameleon. This Court held that it is a matter of policy on which decision can be taken by the appropriate Government and the Court cannot issue any direction to Parliament or to the State Legislature to enact a particular kind of law. The writ petition was held to be not maintainable with the following observation: “3. It is not within the domain of the Court to issue a direction for ban on slaughter of cows, buffaloes and horses as it is a matter of policy on which decision has to be taken by the Government. That apart, a complete ban on slaughter of cows, buffaloes and horses, as sought in the present petition, can only be imposed by legislation enacted by the appropriate legislature. Courts cannot issue any direction to the Parliament or to the State legislature to enact a particular kind of law. This question has been considered in Union of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja and Anr. (2003) 6 SCC 195 , wherein in para 30 of the reports it was held as under: “30. Under our constitutional scheme Parliament exercises sovereign power to enact laws and no outside power or authority can issue a direction to enact a particular piece of legislation. In Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Assn. v. Union of India (1989) 4 SCC 187 , it has been held that no court can direct a legislature to enact a particular law. Similarly, when an executive authority exercises a legislative power by way of a subordinate legislation pursuant to the delegated authority of a legislature, such executive authority cannot be asked to enact a law which it has been empowered to do under the delegated legislative authority. This view has been reiterated in State of J and K v. A.R. Zakki (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 548. In A.K. Roy v. Union of India (1982) 1 SCC 271 , it has been held that no mandamus can be issued to enforce an Act which has been passed by the legislature....” 4. This view has been reiterated in State of J and K v. A.R. Zakki (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 548. In A.K. Roy v. Union of India (1982) 1 SCC 271 , it has been held that no mandamus can be issued to enforce an Act which has been passed by the legislature....” 4. In view of the aforesaid legal position, we are of the opinion that this Court cannot grant any relief to the Petitioners, as prayed for, in the writ petition. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.” 41. Learned Counsel for the Respondent-writ Petitioner relied on the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms and Anr. (2002) 5 SCC 294 , and submitted that the "field has remained unoccupied this Court can issue such direction under Article 32 of the Constitution of India", but such submission cannot be accepted as it cannot be said that field has remained unoccupied as under the Drugs and Cosmetic Rules it is the Central Government which in consultation with the Drug Technical Advisory Board is empowered to decide whether any amendment is to be made in the relevant Rules showing the ingredients of vegetarian or non-vegetarian origin or to provide a symbol. In fact the issue in question was deliberated by the Central Government when such matter was referred to the Drug Technical Advisory Board which in its 48th Meeting on 8th July, 1999 rejected such suggestion. 42. In view of the discussions above, we hold that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has no jurisdiction to direct the Executive to exercise power by way of subordinate Legislation pursuant to power delegated by the Legislature to enact a law in a particular manner, as has been done in the present case. For the same reason, it was also not open to the High Court to suggest any interim arrangement as has been given by the impugned judgment. For the same reason, it was also not open to the High Court to suggest any interim arrangement as has been given by the impugned judgment. The writ petition filed by Respondent being not maintainable for issuance of such direction, the High Court ought to have dismissed the writ petition in limine.” (v) In Mangalam Organics Ltd. v. Union of India (UOI) [ (2017) 7 SCC 221 ], the appellant filed an appeal aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court rendered in the writ petition filed by them, wherein they wanted the High Court to exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and issue mandamus to the Central Government directing to issue a notification under Section 11C of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'), to the effect that the duty payable by the appellant on goods manufactured by it shall not be paid. After considering the rival submissions, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under: “35. Issuance of a notification under Section 11C of the Act is in the nature of subordinate legislation. Directing the Government to issue such a notification would amount to take a policy decision in a particular manner, which is impermissible. This Court dealt with this aspect recently in the case of Census Commissioner and Ors. v. R. Krishnamurthy[2015 ALL SCR 83]. Following discussion from the said judgment is useful and worth a quote: “25. Interference with the policy decision and issue of a mandamus to frame a policy in a particular manner are absolutely different. The Act has conferred power on the Central Government to issue Notification regarding the manner in which the census has to be carried out and the Central Government has issued Notifications, and the competent authority has issued directions. It is not within the domain of the Court to legislate. The courts do interpret the law and in such interpretation certain creative process is involved. The courts have the jurisdiction to declare the law as unconstitutional. That too, where it is called for. The court may also fill up the gaps in certain spheres applying the doctrine of constitutional silence or abeyance. But, the courts are not to plunge into policy making by adding something to the policy by way of issuing a writ of mandamus. There the judicial restraint is called for remembering what we have stated in the beginning. The court may also fill up the gaps in certain spheres applying the doctrine of constitutional silence or abeyance. But, the courts are not to plunge into policy making by adding something to the policy by way of issuing a writ of mandamus. There the judicial restraint is called for remembering what we have stated in the beginning. The courts are required to understand the policy decisions framed by the Executive. If a policy decision or a Notification is arbitrary, it may invite the frown of Article 14 of the Constitution. But when the Notification was not under assail and the same is in consonance with the Act, it is really unfathomable how the High Court could issue directions as to the manner in which a census would be carried out by adding certain aspects. It is, in fact, issuance of a direction for framing a policy in a specific manner. 26. In this context, we may refer to a three-Judge Bench decision in Suresh Seth v. Commr., Indore Municipal Corporation: (2005) 13 SCC 287 wherein a prayer was made before this Court to issue directions for appropriate amendment in the M.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 so that a person may be debarred from simultaneously holding two elected offices, namely, that of a Member of the Legislative Assembly and also of a Mayor of a Municipal Corporation. Repelling the said submission, the Court held thus: “In our opinion, this is a matter of policy for the elected representatives of people to decide and no direction in this regard can be issued by the Court. That apart this Court cannot issue any direction to the legislature to make any particular kind of enactment. Under out constitutional scheme Parliament and Legislative Assemblies exercise sovereign power to enact laws and no outside power or authority can issue a direction to enact a particular piece of legislation. In Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Assn. v. Union of India (1989) 4 SCC 187 (SCC para 51) it has been held that no court can direct a legislature to enact a particular law. Similarly, when an executive authority exercises a legislative power by way of a subordinate legislation pursuant to the delegated authority of a legislature, such executive authority cannot be asked to enact a law which it has been empowered to do under the delegated legislative authority. Similarly, when an executive authority exercises a legislative power by way of a subordinate legislation pursuant to the delegated authority of a legislature, such executive authority cannot be asked to enact a law which it has been empowered to do under the delegated legislative authority. This view has been reiterated in State of J & K v. A.R. Zakki 1992 Supp (1) SCC 548. In A.K. Roy v. Union of India (1982) 1 SCC 271 it was held that no mandamus can be issued to enforce an Act which has been passed by the legislature.” 29. In this context, it is fruitful to refer to the authority in Rusom Cavasiee Cooper v. Union of India (1970) 1 SCC 248 , wherein it has been expressed thus: “It is again not for this Court to consider the relative merits of the different political theories or economic policies...” This Court has the power to strike down a law on the ground of want of authority, but the Court will not sit in appeal over the policy of Parliament in enacting a law". 36. As can be seen from the extracted portion of the said judgment, in Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association v. Union of India, it was categorically held that no court can direct a legislature to enact a particular law. Similarly when an executive authority exercises a legislative power by way of subordinate legislation pursuant to the delegated authority of a legislature, such executive authority cannot be asked to enact the law which it has been empowered to do under the delegated legislative authority. 37. We may also refer to the judgment of this Court in the case of Common Cause v. Union of India and Ors..[ AIR 2016 SC 1672 ] In that case, though the legislature had made amendments in the Delhi Rent Act, it was left to the Government to notify the date of coming into force the said amendments. Government did not notify any date. A writ was filed seeking issuance of mandamus to the Government to notify the date, which was dismissed by the High Court. While approving the said decision in the aforesaid judgment, the Court referred to various earlier judgments on the subject. Government did not notify any date. A writ was filed seeking issuance of mandamus to the Government to notify the date, which was dismissed by the High Court. While approving the said decision in the aforesaid judgment, the Court referred to various earlier judgments on the subject. It was held that not only Parliament is empowered to give such a power to the executive to decide when the Act is to be brought into force, but also held that mandamus cannot be issued to the Government to notify the amendments. In the process, the Court also made the following observations which are relevant in the present context: “27. From the facts placed before us it cannot be said that Government is not alive to the problem or is desirous of ignoring the will of the Parliament. When the legislature itself had vested the power in the Central Government to notify the date from which the Act would come into force, then, the Central Government is entitled to take into consideration various facts including the facts set out above while considering when the Act should be brought into force or not. No mandamus can be issued to the Central Government to issue the notification contemplated Under Section 1(3) of the Act to bring the Act into force, keeping in view the facts brought on record and the consistent view of this Court.” 39. The matter can be looked into from another angle as well. When 'power' is given to the Central Government to issue a notification to the effect not to recover duty of excise or recover lesser duty than what is normally payable under the Act, for deciding whether to issue such a Notification or not, there may be various considerations in the mind of the Government. Merely because conditions laid in the said provisions are satisfied, would not be a reason to necessarily issue such a notification. It is purely a policy matter. No doubt, the principle against arbitrariness has been extended to subordinate legislation as well (See: Indian Express Newspapers, Bombay v. Union of India[ (1985) 1 SCC 641 ]). At the same time, the scope of judicial review in such cases is very limited. It is purely a policy matter. No doubt, the principle against arbitrariness has been extended to subordinate legislation as well (See: Indian Express Newspapers, Bombay v. Union of India[ (1985) 1 SCC 641 ]). At the same time, the scope of judicial review in such cases is very limited. Where the statute vests a discretionary power in an administrative authority, the Court would not interfere with the exercise of such discretion unless it is made with oblique end or extraneous purposes or upon extraneous considerations, or arbitrarily, without applying its mind to the relevant considerations, or where it is not guided by any norms which are relevant to the object to be achieved. Taking note of the decisions and accepting the reasons for not issuing a notification under section 11(c) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, the Hon'ble Apex Court dismissed the appeal.” (vi) In State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors. v. Satpal Saini [ (2017) 11 SCC 42 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: “5. The State Government is aggrieved by the mandamus which has been issued by the High Court to amend the provisions of law. The submission of the State is that the above directions trench upon the sovereign legislative power of the state legislature. 6. The grievance, in our view, has a sound constitutional foundation. The High Court has while issuing the above directions acted in a manner contrary to settled limitations on the power of judicial review Under Article 226 of the Constitution. A direction, it is well settled, cannot be issued to the legislature to enact a law. The power to enact legislation is a plenary constitutional power which is vested in Parliament and the state legislatures Under Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution. The legislature as the repository of the sovereign legislative power is vested with the authority to determine whether a law should be enacted. The doctrine of separation of powers entrusts to the court the constitutional function of deciding upon the validity of a law enacted by the legislature, where a challenge is brought before the High Court Under Article 226 (or this Court Under Article 32) on the ground that the law lacks in legislative competence or has been enacted in violation of a constitutional provision. But judicial review cannot encroach upon the basic constitutional function which is entrusted to the legislature to determine whether a law should be enacted. Whether a provision of law as enacted subserves the object of the law or should be amended is a matter of legislative policy. The court cannot direct the legislature either to enact a law or to amend a law which it has enacted for the simple reason that this constitutional function lies in the exclusive domain of the legislature. For the Court to mandate an amendment of a law-as did the Himachal Pradesh High Court-is a plain usurpation of a power entrusted to another arm of the state. There can be no manner of doubt that the High Court has transgressed the limitations imposed upon the power of judicial review Under Article 226 by issuing the above directions to the state legislature to amend the law. The government owes a collective responsibility to the state legislature. The state legislature is comprised of elected representatives. The law enacting body is entrusted with the power to enact such legislation as it considers necessary to deal with the problems faced by society and to resolve issues of concern. The courts do not sit in judgment over legislative expediency or upon legislative policy. This position is well settled. Since the High Court has failed to notice it, we will briefly recapitulate the principles which emerge from the precedent on the subject. 7. In Mallikarjuna Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh ( AIR 1990 SC 1251 ) and in V.K. Sood v. Secretary, Civil Aviation ( AIR 1993 SC 2285 ), this Court held that the court Under Article 226, has no power to direct the executive to exercise its law-making power. 8. In State of Himachal Pradesh v. A Parent of a Student of Medical College, Shimla ( AIR 1985 SC 910 ), this Court deprecated the practice of issuing directions to the legislature to enact a law: “4.....The direction given by the Division Bench was really nothing short of an indirect attempt to compel the State Government to initiate legislation with a view to curbing the evil of ragging...” The same principle was followed in Asif Hameed and Ors. v. State of Jammu & Kashmir ( AIR 1989 SC 1899 ), where this Court observed that: “19....The Constitution does not permit the Court to direct or advice the Executive in matter of policy or to sermonize qua any matter which under the Constitution lies within the sphere of Legislature or Executive”. In Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms ( AIR 2002 SC 2112 ), this Court observed that: “19....it is not possible for this Court to give any direction for amending the Act or the statutory rules. It is for the parliament to amend the Act and the Rules. 9. Similarly, in Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association v. Union of India [ (1989) 4 SCC 187 ], this Court held that a court cannot direct the legislature to enact a particular law. This is because under the constitutional scheme, Parliament exercises a sovereign power to enact law and no other authority can issue directions to frame a particular piece of legislation. This principle was reiterated in State of Jammu & Kashmir v. A.R. Zakki and Ors. ( AIR 1992 SC 1546 ), where this Court observed that: “10...A writ of mandamus cannot be issued to the legislature to enact a particular legislation. Same is true as regards the executive when it exercises the power to make rules, which are in the nature of subordinate legislation. Section 110 of the J & K Constitution, which is on the same lines as Article 234 of the Constitution of India, vests in the Governor, the power to make Rules for appointment of persons other than the District Judges to the Judicial Service of the State of J & K and for framing of such rules, the Governor is required to consult the Commission and the High Court. This power to frame Rules is legislative in nature. A writ of mandamus cannot, therefore, be issued directing the State Government to make the Rules in accordance with the proposal made by the High Court.” In V.K. Naswa v. Union of India [ (2012) 2 SCC 542 ], this Court referred to a large number of decisions and held that: “18. Thus, it is crystal clear that the court has a very limited role and in exercise of that, it is not open to have judicial legislation. Thus, it is crystal clear that the court has a very limited role and in exercise of that, it is not open to have judicial legislation. Neither the court can legislate, nor has it any competence to issue directions to the legislature to enact the law in a particular manner.” 10. A discordant note had been struck by a Bench of two judges in Gainda Ram v. MCD [ (2010) 10 SCC 715 ]. A direction was issued to the legislature to amend legislation before a particular date. The Constitution Bench in Manoj Narula v. Union of India [ (2014) 9 SCC 1 ], held that this direction by a Bench of two judges was contrary to the law laid down earlier by three judges. In that context, the Constitution Bench has conclusively enunciated the legal position thus: “127. The law having been laid down by a larger Bench than in Gainda Ram it is quite clear that the decision, whether or not Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 is to be amended, rests solely with Parliament.” 12. The judiciary is one amongst three branches of the State; the other two being the executive and the legislature. Each of the three branches is co-equal. Each has specified and enumerated constitutional powers. The judiciary is assigned with the function of ensuring that executive actions accord with the law and that laws and executive decisions accord with the Constitution. The courts do not frame policy or mandate that a particular policy should be followed. The duty to formulate policies is entrusted to the executive whose accountability is to the legislature and, through it, to the people. The peril of adopting an incorrect policy lies in democratic accountability to the people. This is the basis and rationale for holding that the court does not have the power or function to direct the executive to adopt a particular policy or the legislature to convert it into enacted law. It is wise to remind us of these limits and wiser still to enforce them without exception. 13. For these reasons, we hold that the directions issued by the High Court for amending the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 and the Rules were manifestly unsustainable. The directions are accordingly set aside. It is wise to remind us of these limits and wiser still to enforce them without exception. 13. For these reasons, we hold that the directions issued by the High Court for amending the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 and the Rules were manifestly unsustainable. The directions are accordingly set aside. The appeal filed by the State shall stand allowed in these terms.” (vii) In Rajesh Sharma and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. [ (2018) 10 SCC 472 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: “16. Function of this Court is not to legislate but only to interpret the law. No doubt in doing so laying down of norms is sometimes unavoidable. Just and fair procedure being part of fundamental right to life, interpretation is required to be placed on a penal provision so that its working is not unjust, unfair or unreasonable. The court has incidental power to quash even a non-compoundable case of private nature, if continuing the proceedings is found to be oppressive5. While stifling a legitimate prosecution is against public policy, if the proceedings in an offence of private nature are found to be oppressive, power of quashing is exercised.” (viii) In Ashwani Kumar v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors [2019 (12) SCALE 125], the applicant therein had filed a Writ Petition (Civil) No. 738 of 2016 under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for an effective and purposive legislative framework/law based upon the 'Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment' ("UN Convention", for short) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and opened for signature, ratification and accession on 10th December 1984. India had signed the UN Convention on 14th October 1997. However, India has not ratified the UN Convention. After considering the rival submissions, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed hereunder; “8. At the outset, we must clarify that by the present order, we would be deciding a very limited controversy, viz. the prayer of the Applicant that this Court should direct Parliament to enact a standalone and comprehensive legislation against custodial torture based on the UN Convention. The prayer made requires the Court to examine and answer the question that whether within the constitutional scheme, this Court can and should issue any direction to the Parliament to enact a new law based on the UN Convention. 9. The prayer made requires the Court to examine and answer the question that whether within the constitutional scheme, this Court can and should issue any direction to the Parliament to enact a new law based on the UN Convention. 9. Classical or pure theory of rigid separation of powers as advocated by Montesquieu which forms the bedrock of the American Constitution is clearly inapplicable to parliamentary form of democracy as it exists in India and Britain, for the executive and legislative wings in terms of the powers and functions they exercise are linked and overlap and the personnel they equip are to an extent common. However, unlike Britain, India has a written Constitution, which is supreme and adumbrates as well as divides powers, roles and functions of the three wings of the State-the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. These divisions are boundaries and limits fixed by the Constitution to check and prevent transgression by any one of the three branches into the powers, functions and tasks that fall within the domain of the other wing. The three branches have to respect the constitutional division and not disturb the allocation of roles and functions between the triad. Adherence to the constitutional scheme dividing the powers and functions is a guard and check against potential abuse of power and the Rule of law is secured when each branch observes the constitutional limitations to their powers, functions and roles. 10. Modern theory of separation of powers does not accept that the three branches perform mutually isolated roles and functions and accepts a need for coordinated institutional effort for good governance, albeit emphasises on benefits of division of power and labour by accepting the three wings do have separate and distinct roles and functions that are defined by the Constitution. All the institutions must act within their own jurisdiction and not trespass into the jurisdiction of the other. Beyond this, each branch must support each other in the general interest of good governance. This separation ensures the Rule of law in at least two ways. It gives constitutional and institutional legitimacy to the decisions by each branch, that is, enactments passed by the legislature, orders and policy decisions taken by the executive and adjudication and judgments pronounced by the judiciary in exercise of the power of judicial review on validity of legislation and governmental action. It gives constitutional and institutional legitimacy to the decisions by each branch, that is, enactments passed by the legislature, orders and policy decisions taken by the executive and adjudication and judgments pronounced by the judiciary in exercise of the power of judicial review on validity of legislation and governmental action. By segregating the powers and functions of the institutions, the Constitution ensures a structure where the institutions function as per their institutional strengths. Secondly, and somewhat paradoxically, it creates a system of checks and balances as the Constitution provides a degree of latitude for interference by each branch into the functions and tasks performed by the other branch. It checks concentration of power in a particular branch or an institution. 11. The legislature as an elected and representative body enacts laws to give effect to and fulfil democratic aspirations of the people. The procedures applied are designed to give careful thought and consideration to wide and divergent interests, voices and all shades of opinion from different social and political groups. Legislature functions as a deliberative and representative body. It is directly accountable and answerable to the electorate and citizens of this country. This representativeness and principle of accountability is what gives legitimacy to the legislations and laws made by Parliament or the state legislatures. Article 245 of the Constitution empowers Parliament and the state legislatures to enact laws for the whole or a part of the territory of India, and for the whole or a part of the State respectively, after due debate and discussion in Parliament/the state assembly. 12. The executive has the primary responsibility of formulating government policies and proposing legislations which when passed by the legislature become laws. By virtue of Articles 73 and 162 of the Constitution, the powers and functions of the executive are wide and expansive, as they cover matters in respect of which Parliament/state legislature can make laws and vests with the executive the authority and jurisdiction exercisable by the Government of India or the State Government, as the case may be. As a delegate of the legislative bodies and subject to the terms of the legislation, the executive makes second stage laws known as 'subordinate or delegated legislation'. In fields where there is no legislation, the executive has the power to frame policies, schemes, etc., which is co-extensive with the power of Parliament or the state legislature to make laws. As a delegate of the legislative bodies and subject to the terms of the legislation, the executive makes second stage laws known as 'subordinate or delegated legislation'. In fields where there is no legislation, the executive has the power to frame policies, schemes, etc., which is co-extensive with the power of Parliament or the state legislature to make laws. At the same time, the political executive is accountable to the legislature and holds office till they enjoy the support and confidence of the legislature. Thus, there is interdependence, interaction and even commonality of personnel/members of the legislature and the executive. The executive, therefore, performs multi-functional role and is not monolithic. Notwithstanding this multifunctional and pervasive role, the constitutional scheme ensures that within this interdependence, there is a degree of separation that acts as a mechanism to check interference and protect the nonpolitical executive. Part XIV of the Constitution relates to "Services under the Union and the States", i.e., recruitment, tenure, terms and conditions of service, etc., of persons serving the Union or a State and accords them a substantial degree of protection. "Office of profit" bar, as applicable to legislators and prescribed vide Articles 102 and 191, is to ensure separation and independence between the legislature and the executive. 13. The most significant impact of the doctrine of separation of powers is seen and felt in terms of the institutional independence of the judiciary from other organs of the State. Judiciary, in terms of personnel, the Judges, is independent. Judges unlike members of the legislature represent no one, strictly speaking not even the citizens. Judges are not accountable and answerable as the political executive is to the legislature and the elected representatives are to the electorate. This independence ensures that the judges perform the constitutional function of safeguarding the supremacy of the Constitution while exercising the power of judicial review in a fair and even-handed manner without pressure and favours. As an interpreter, guardian and protector of the Constitution, the judiciary checks and curbs violation of the Constitution by the Government when they overstep their constitutional limits, violate the basic structure of the Constitution, infringe fundamental rights or act contrary to law. Power of judicial review has expanded taking within its ambit the concept of social and economic justice. As an interpreter, guardian and protector of the Constitution, the judiciary checks and curbs violation of the Constitution by the Government when they overstep their constitutional limits, violate the basic structure of the Constitution, infringe fundamental rights or act contrary to law. Power of judicial review has expanded taking within its ambit the concept of social and economic justice. Yet, while exercising this power of judicial review, the courts do not encroach upon the field marked by the Constitution for the legislature and the executive, as the courts examine legality and validity of the legislation or the governmental action, and not the wisdom behind the legislative measure or relative merits or demerits of the governmental action. Neither does the Constitution permit the courts to direct, advise or sermonize others in the spheres reserved for them by the Constitution, provided the legislature or the executive do not transgress their constitutional limits or statutory conditions. Referring to the phrase "all power is of an encroaching nature", which the judiciary checks while exercising the power of judicial review, it has been observed that the judiciary must be on guard against encroaching beyond its bounds since the only restraint upon it is the self-imposed discipline of self-restraint. Independence and adherence to constitutional accountability and limits while exercising the power of judicial review gives constitutional legitimacy to the court decisions. This is essence of the power and function of judicial review that strengthens and promotes the Rule of law. 14. Constitutional Bench judgments in His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala and Anr. (1973) 4 SCC 225 , State of Rajasthan and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (1977) 3 SCC 592 , I.R. Coelho (Dead) by L.Rs. v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007) 2 SCC 1 and State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala (2014) 12 SCC 696 have uniformly ruled that the doctrine of separation of powers, though not specifically engrafted, is constitutionally entrenched and forms part of the basic structure as its sweep, operation and visibility are apparent. Constitution has made demarcation, without drawing formal lines, amongst the three organs with the duty of the judiciary to scrutinize the limits and whether or not the limits have been transgressed. These judgments refer to the constitutional scheme incorporating checks and balances. Constitution has made demarcation, without drawing formal lines, amongst the three organs with the duty of the judiciary to scrutinize the limits and whether or not the limits have been transgressed. These judgments refer to the constitutional scheme incorporating checks and balances. As a sequitur, the doctrine restrains the legislature from declaring the judgment of a court to be void and of no effect, while the legislature still possesses the legislative competence of enacting a validating law which remedies the defect pointed out in the judgment. However, this does not ordain and permit the legislature to declare a judgment as invalid by enacting a law, but permits the legislature to take away the basis of the judgment by fundamentally altering the basis on which it was pronounced. Therefore, while exercising all important checks and balances function, each wing should be conscious of the enormous responsibility that rests on them to ensure that institutional respect and comity is maintained. 15. In Binoy Viswam v. Union of India and Ors. [ (2017) 7 SCC 59 ], this Court referring to the Constitution had observed that the powers to be exercised by the three wings of the State have an avowed purpose and each branch is constitutionally mandated to act within its sphere and to have mutual institutional respect to realise the constitutional goal and to ensure that there is no constitutional transgression. It is the Constitution which has created the three wings of the State and, thus, each branch must oblige the other by not stepping beyond its territory. 16. In Kalpana Mehta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. [ (2018) 7 SCC 1 ], Mr. Justice Dipak Misra, the then Chief Justice of India, under the headings 'Supremacy of the Constitution', 'Power of judicial review' and 'Doctrine of separation of powers', has held that the Constitution is a supreme fundamental law which requires that all laws, actions and decisions of the three organs should be in consonance and in accord with the constitutional limits, for the legislature, the executive and the judiciary derive their authority and jurisdiction from the Constitution. Legislature stands vested with an exclusive authority to make laws thereby giving it a supremacy in the field of legislation and law-making, yet this power is distinct from and not at par with the supremacy of the Constitution, as: “41. Legislature stands vested with an exclusive authority to make laws thereby giving it a supremacy in the field of legislation and law-making, yet this power is distinct from and not at par with the supremacy of the Constitution, as: “41. This Court has the constitutional power and the authority to interpret the constitutional provisions as well as the statutory provisions. The conferment of the power of judicial review has a great sanctity as the constitutional court has the power to declare any law as unconstitutional if there is lack of competence of the legislature keeping in view the field of legislation as provided in the Constitution or if a provision contravenes or runs counter to any of the fundamental rights or any constitutional provision or if a provision is manifestly arbitrary.” 17. Having said so, Dipak Misra, CJ went on to observe: “42. When we speak about judicial review, it is also necessary to be alive to the concept of judicial restraint. The duty of judicial review which the Constitution has bestowed upon the judiciary is not unfettered; it comes within the conception of judicial restraint. The principle of judicial restraint requires that Judges ought to decide cases while being within their defined limits of power. Judges are expected to interpret any law or any provision of the Constitution as per the limits laid down by the Constitution.” 18. Earlier, Dipak Misra, CJ had observed: “39. From the above authorities, it is quite vivid that the concept of constitutional limitation is a facet of the doctrine of separation of powers. At this stage, we may clearly state that there can really be no straitjacket approach in the sphere of separation of powers when issues involve democracy, the essential morality that flows from the Constitution, interest of the citizens in certain spheres like environment, sustenance of social interest, etc. and empowering the populace with the right to information or right to know in matters relating to candidates contesting election. There can be many an example where this Court has issued directions to the executive and also formulated guidelines for facilitation and in furtherance of fundamental rights and sometimes for the actualisation and fructification of statutory rights.” 19. and empowering the populace with the right to information or right to know in matters relating to candidates contesting election. There can be many an example where this Court has issued directions to the executive and also formulated guidelines for facilitation and in furtherance of fundamental rights and sometimes for the actualisation and fructification of statutory rights.” 19. D.Y. Chandrachud, J., in his separate and concurring judgment for himself and A.K. Sikri, J. in Kalpana Mehta (supra) had referred to the nuanced 'doctrine of functional separation' that finds articulation in the articles/books by Peter A. Gerangelos in his work titled “The Separation of Powers and Legislative Interference in Judicial Process, Constitutional Principles and Limitations”, 23 M.J.C. Vile's book titled 'Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers' 24, Aileen Kavanagh in her work 'The Constitutional Separation of Powers' 25 and Eoin Carolan in his book titled 'The New Separation of Powers-A Theory for the Modern State' 26. These authors in the context of modern administrative State have reconstructed the doctrine as consisting of two components: 'division of labour' and 'checks and balances', instead of isolated compartmentalisation, by highlighting the need of interaction and interdependence amongst the three organs in a way that each branch is in cooperative engagement but at the same time acts, when necessary, to check on the other and that no single group of people are able to control the machinery of the State. Independent judiciary acts as a restraining influence on the arbitrary exercise of power. 20. Referring to the functional doctrine, D.Y. Chandrachud, J., had cited the following judgments: “249. In State of U.P. v. Jeet S. Bisht, the Court held that the doctrine of separation of powers limits the "active jurisdiction" of each branch of Government. However, even when the active jurisdiction of an organ of the State is not challenged, the doctrine allows for methods to be used to prod and communicate to an institution either its shortfalls or excesses in discharging its duty. The Court recognised that fundamentally, the purpose of the doctrine is to act as a scheme of checks and balances over the activities of other organs. The Court recognised that fundamentally, the purpose of the doctrine is to act as a scheme of checks and balances over the activities of other organs. The Court noted that the modern concept of separation of powers subscribes to the understanding that it should not only demarcate the area of functioning of various organs of the State, but should also, to some extent, define the minimum content in that delineated area of functioning. S.B. Sinha, J. addressed the need for the doctrine to evolve, as administrative bodies are involved in the dispensation of socio-economic entitlements: (SCC p. 619, para 83) “83. If we notice the evolution of separation of powers doctrine, traditionally the checks and balances dimension was only associated with governmental excesses and violations. But in today's world of positive rights and justifiable social and economic entitlements, hybrid administrative bodies, private functionaries discharging public functions, we have to perform the oversight function with more urgency and enlarge the field of checks and balances to include governmental inaction. Otherwise we envisage the country getting transformed into a state of repose. Social engineering as well as institutional engineering therefore forms part of this obligation. (emphasis in original)” xx xx xx 251. In Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India, Madan B. Lokur, J. observed that separation of powers does not envisage that each of the three organs of the State-the legislature, executive and judiciary-work in a silo. The learned Judge held: (SCC p. 583, para 678) “678. There is quite clearly an entire host of parliamentary and legislative checks placed on the judiciary whereby its administrative functioning can be and is controlled, but these do not necessarily violate the theory of separation of powers or infringe the independence of the judiciary as far as decision-making is concerned. As has been repeatedly held, the theory of separation of powers is not rigidly implemented in our Constitution, but if there is an overlap in the form of a check with reference to an essential or a basic function or element of one organ of State as against another, a constitutional issue does arise. It is in this context that the 99th Constitution Amendment Act has to be viewed--whether it impacts on a basic or an essential element of the independence of the judiciary, namely, its decisional independence.” 21. Thereafter, D.Y. Chandrachud, J. had observed: “254. It is in this context that the 99th Constitution Amendment Act has to be viewed--whether it impacts on a basic or an essential element of the independence of the judiciary, namely, its decisional independence.” 21. Thereafter, D.Y. Chandrachud, J. had observed: “254. While assessing the impact of the separation of powers upon the present controversy, certain precepts must be formulated. Separation of powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary is a basic feature of the Constitution. As a foundational principle which is comprised within the basic structure, it lies beyond the reach of the constituent power to amend. It cannot be substituted or abrogated. While recognising this position, decided cases indicate that the Indian Constitution does not adopt a separation of powers in the strict sense. Textbook examples of exceptions to the doctrine include the power of the executive to frame subordinate legislation, the power of the legislature to punish for contempt of its privileges and the authority entrusted to the Supreme Court and the High Courts to regulate their own procedures by framing rules. In making subordinate legislation, the executive is entrusted by the legislature to make delegated legislation, subject to its control. The rule-making power of the higher judiciary has trappings of a legislative character. The power of the legislature to punish for contempt of its privileges has a judicial character. These exceptions indicate that the separation doctrine has not been adopted in the strict form in our Constitution. But the importance of the doctrine lies in its postulate that the essential functions entrusted to one organ of the State cannot be exercised by the other. By standing against the usurpation of constitutional powers entrusted to other organs, separation of powers supports the Rule of law and guards against authoritarian excesses. 255. Parliament and the State Legislatures legislate. The executive frames policies and administers the law. The judiciary decides and adjudicates upon disputes in the course of which facts are proved and the law is applied. The distinction between the legislative function and judicial functions is enhanced by the basic structure doctrine. The legislature is constitutionally entrusted with the power to legislate. Courts are not entrusted with the power to enact law. Yet, in a constitutional democracy which is founded on the supremacy of the Constitution, it is an accepted principle of jurisprudence that the judiciary has the authority to test the validity of legislation. The legislature is constitutionally entrusted with the power to legislate. Courts are not entrusted with the power to enact law. Yet, in a constitutional democracy which is founded on the supremacy of the Constitution, it is an accepted principle of jurisprudence that the judiciary has the authority to test the validity of legislation. Legislation can be invalidated where the enacting legislature lacks legislative competence or where there is a violation of fundamental rights. A law which is constitutionally ultra vires can be declared to be so in the exercise of the power of judicial review. Judicial review is indeed also a part of the basic features of the Constitution. Entrustment to the judiciary of the power to test the validity of law is an established constitutional principle which co-exists with the separation of powers. Where a law is held to be ultra vires there is no breach of parliamentary privileges for the simple reason that all institutions created by the Constitution are subject to constitutional limitations. The legislature, it is well settled, cannot simply declare that the judgment of a court is invalid or that it stands nullified. If the legislature were permitted to do so, it would travel beyond the boundaries of constitutional entrustment. While the separation of powers prevents the legislature from issuing a mere declaration that a judgment is erroneous or invalid, the lawmaking body is entitled to enact a law which remedies the defects which have been pointed out by the court. Enactment of a law which takes away the basis of the judgment (as opposed to merely invalidating it) is permissible and does not constitute a violation of the separation doctrine. That indeed is the basis on which validating legislation is permitted. 256. This discussion leads to the conclusion that while the separation of powers, as a principle, constitutes the cornerstone of our democratic Constitution, its application in the actual governance of the polity is nuanced. The nuances of the doctrine recognise that while the essential functions of one organ of the State cannot be taken over by the other and that a sense of institutional comity must guide the work of the legislature, executive and judiciary, the practical problems which arise in the unfolding of democracy can be resolved through robust constitutional cultures and mechanisms. The separation doctrine cannot be reduced to its descriptive content, bereft of its normative features. The separation doctrine cannot be reduced to its descriptive content, bereft of its normative features. Evidently, it has both normative and descriptive features. In applying it to the Indian Constitution, the significant precept to be borne in mind is that no institution of governance lies above the Constitution. No entrustment of power is absolute.” 22. Having elucidated the doctrinal basis of separation of powers and mutual interaction between the three organs of the State in the democratic set-up, it would be important to draw clear distinction between interpretation and adjudication by the courts on one hand and the power to enact legislation by the legislature on the other. Adjudication results in what is often described as judge made law, but the interpretation of the statutes and the rights in accordance with the provisions of Articles 14, 19 and 21 in the course of adjudication is not an attempt or an act of legislation by the judges. Reference in this regard can be made to the opinion expressed by F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, J. in Union of India v. V. Sriharan alias Murugan and Others [ (2016) 7 SCC 1 ], who had, in the context of capital punishment for offences Under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code ("IPC", for short), held that the lawmakers have entrusted the task of weighing and measuring the gravity of the offence with the institution of judiciary by reposing a very high amount of confidence and trust. It requires a judge to apply his judicial mind after weighing the pros and cons of the crime committed in the golden scales to ensure that the justice is delivered. In a way, therefore, the legislature itself entrusts the judiciary to lay down parameters in the form of precedents which is oft-spoken as judge made law. This is true of many a legislations. Such law, even if made by the judiciary, would not infringe the doctrine of separation of powers and is in conformity with the constitutional functions. This distinction between the two has been aptly expressed by Aileen Kavanagh in the following words: “In general, the ability and power of the courts to make new law is generally more limited than that of the legislators, since courts typically make law by filling in gaps in existing legal frameworks, extending existing doctrines incrementally on a case-by-case basis, adjusting them to changing circumstances, etc. Judicial lawmaking powers tend to be piecemeal and incremental and the courts must reason according to law, even when developing it. By contrast, legislators have the power to make radical, broad-ranging changes in the law, which are not based on existing legal norms....” 23. Seven Judges of this Court in P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka (2002) 4 SCC 578 had, while interpreting Articles 21, 32, 141 and 142 of the Constitution, held that prescribing period at which criminal trial would terminate resulting in acquittal or discharge of the Accused, or making such directions applicable to all cases in present or in future, would amount to judicial law-making and cannot be done by judicial directives. It was observed that the courts can declare the law, interpret the law, remove obvious lacuna and fill up the gaps, but they cannot entrench upon the field of legislation. The courts can issue appropriate and binding directions for enforcing the laws, lay down time limits or chalk out a calendar for the proceeding to follow to redeem the injustice and for taking care of the rights violated in the given case or set of cases depending on the facts brought to the notice of the court, but cannot lay down and enact the provisions akin to or on the lines of Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Drawing distinction between legislation as the source of law which consists of declaration of legal Rules by a competent authority and judicial decisions pronounced by the judges laying down principles of general application, reference was made to Salmond on Principles of Jurisprudence (12th Edition) which says: “We must distinguish law-making by legislators from law-making by the courts. Legislators can lay down Rules purely for the future and without reference to any actual dispute; the courts, insofar as they create law, can do so only in application to the cases before them and only insofar as is necessary for their solution. Judicial law-making is incidental to the solving of legal disputes; legislative law-making is the central function of the legislator.” 24. Reference was also made to Professor S.P. Sathe's work on "Judicial Activism in India--Transgressing Borders and Enforcing Limits," evaluating the legitimacy of judicial activism, wherein it was observed: “Directions are either issued to fill in the gaps in the legislation or to provide for matters that have not been provided by any legislation. Reference was also made to Professor S.P. Sathe's work on "Judicial Activism in India--Transgressing Borders and Enforcing Limits," evaluating the legitimacy of judicial activism, wherein it was observed: “Directions are either issued to fill in the gaps in the legislation or to provide for matters that have not been provided by any legislation. The Court has taken over the legislative function not in the traditional interstitial sense but in an overt manner and has justified it as being an essential component of its role as a constitutional court. (p. 242) In a strict sense these are instances of judicial excessivism that fly in the face of the doctrine of separation of powers. The doctrine of separation of powers envisages that the legislature should make law, the executive should execute it, and the judiciary should settle disputes in accordance with the existing law. In reality such watertight separation exists nowhere and is impracticable. Broadly, it means that one organ of the State should not perform a function that essentially belongs to another organ. While law-making through interpretation and expansion of the meanings of open-textured expressions such as 'due process of law', 'equal protection of law', or 'freedom of speech and expression' is a legitimate judicial function, the making of an entirely new law ... through directions ... is not a legitimate judicial function. (p. 250)” 25. From the above, it is apparent that law-making within certain limits is a legitimate element of a judge's role, if not inevitable. A judge has to adjudicate and decide on the basis of legal provisions, which when indeterminate on a particular issue require elucidation and explanation. This requires a judge to interpret the provisions to decide the case and, in this process, he may take recourse and rely upon fundamental rights, including the right to life, but even then he does not legislate a law while interpreting such provisions. Such interpretation is called 'judge made law' but not legislation. This requires a judge to interpret the provisions to decide the case and, in this process, he may take recourse and rely upon fundamental rights, including the right to life, but even then he does not legislate a law while interpreting such provisions. Such interpretation is called 'judge made law' but not legislation. Aileen Kavanagh, in explaining the aforesaid position, had observed: “...If there has not been a case in point and the judge has to decide on the basis of legal provisions which may be indeterminate on the issue, then the judge cannot decide the case without making new law...This is because Parliament has formulated the Act in broad terms, which inevitably require elaboration by the courts in order to apply it to the circumstances of each new case. Second, even in cases where judges apply existing law, they cannot avoid facing the question of whether to change and improve it.... Interpretation has an applicative and creative aspect.” 26. Legislating or law-making involves a choice to prioritize certain political, moral and social values over the others from a wide range of choices that exist before the legislature. It is a balancing and integrating exercise to give expression/meaning to diverse and alternative values and blend it in a manner that it is representative of several viewpoints so that it garners support from other elected representatives to pass institutional muster and acceptance. Legislation, in the form of an enactment or laws, lays down broad and general principles. It is the source of law which the judges are called upon to apply. Judges, when they apply the law, are constrained by the Rules of language and by well identified background presumptions as to the manner in which the legislature intended the law to be read. Application of law by the judges is not synonymous with the enactment of law by the legislature. Judges have the power to spell out how precisely the statute would apply in a particular case. In this manner, they complete the law formulated by the legislature by applying it. This power of interpretation or the power of judicial review is exercised post the enactment of law, which is then made subject matter of interpretation or challenge before the courts. 27. In this manner, they complete the law formulated by the legislature by applying it. This power of interpretation or the power of judicial review is exercised post the enactment of law, which is then made subject matter of interpretation or challenge before the courts. 27. Legislature, as an institution and a wing of the Government, is a microcosm of the bigger social community possessing qualities of a democratic institution in terms of composition, diversity and accountability. Legislature uses inbuilt procedures carefully designed and adopted to bring a plenitude of representations and resources as they have access to information, skills, expertise and knowledge of the people working within the institution and outside in the form of executive. Process and method of legislation and judicial adjudication are entirely distinct. Judicial adjudication involves applying Rules of interpretation and law of precedents and notwithstanding deep understanding, knowledge and wisdom of an individual judge or the bench, it cannot be equated with law making in a democratic society by legislators given their wider and broader diverse polity. The Constitution states that legislature is supreme and has a final say in matters of legislation when it reflects on alternatives and choices with inputs from different quarters, with a check in the form of democratic accountability and a further check by the courts which exercise the power of judicial review. It is not for the judges to seek to develop new all-embracing principles of law in a way that reflects the stance and opinion of the individual judges when the society/legislators as a whole are unclear and substantially divided on the relevant issues[ [1993] AC 789 (p. 879-880)]. In Bhim Singh v. Union of India [ (2010) 5 SCC 538 ], while observing that the Constitution does not strictly prohibit overlapping of functions as this is inevitable in the modern parliamentary democracy, the Constitution prohibits exercise of functions of another branch which results in wresting away of the regime of constitutional accountability. Only when accountability is preserved, there will be no violation of principle of separation of powers. Constitution not only requires and mandates that there should be right decisions that govern us, but equal care has to be taken that the right decisions are made by the right body and the institution. This is what gives legitimacy, be it a legislation, a policy decision or a court adjudication. 28. Constitution not only requires and mandates that there should be right decisions that govern us, but equal care has to be taken that the right decisions are made by the right body and the institution. This is what gives legitimacy, be it a legislation, a policy decision or a court adjudication. 28. It is sometimes contended with force that unpopular and difficult decisions are more easily grasped and taken by the judges rather than by the other two wings. Indeed, such suggestions were indirectly made. This reasoning is predicated on the belief that the judges are not directly accountable to the electorate and, therefore, enjoy the relative freedom from questions of the moment, which enables them to take a detached, fair and just view. The position that judges are not elected and accountable is correct, but this would not justify an order by a court in the nature of judicial legislation for it will run afoul of the constitutional supremacy and invalidate and subvert the democratic process by which legislations are enacted. For the reasons stated above, this reasoning is constitutionally unacceptable and untenable. xx xxx xxxxxx 30. It can be argued that there have been occasions when this Court has 'legislated' beyond what can be strictly construed as pure interpretation or judicial review but this has been in cases where the constitutional courts, on the legitimate path of interpreting fundamental rights, have acted benevolently with an object to infuse and ardently guard the rights of individuals so that no person or citizen is wronged, as has been observed in paragraph 46 of the judgment of Dipak Misra, CJ in Kalpana Mehta's case. Secondly, these directions were given subject to the legislature enacting the law and merely to fill the vacuum until the legislative takes upon it to legislate. These judgments were based upon gross violations of fundamental rights which were noticed and in view of the vacuum or absence of law/guidelines. The directions were interim in nature and had to be applied till Parliament or the state legislature would enact and were a mere stop-gap arrangement. These judgments were based upon gross violations of fundamental rights which were noticed and in view of the vacuum or absence of law/guidelines. The directions were interim in nature and had to be applied till Parliament or the state legislature would enact and were a mere stop-gap arrangement. These guidelines and directions in some cases as in the case of Vishaka (supra) had continued for long till the enactment of 'The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013' because the legislature (it would also include the executive) impliedly and tacitly had accepted the need for the said legislation even if made by the judiciary without enacting the law. Such law when enacted by Parliament or the state legislature, even if assembly contrary to the directions or guidelines issued by the Court, cannot be struck down by reason of the directions/guidelines; it can be struck down only if it violates the fundamental rights or the right to equality Under Article 14 of the Constitution. These are extraordinary cases where notwithstanding the institutional reasons and the division of power, this Court has laid down general rules/guidelines when there has been a clear, substantive and gross human rights violation, which significantly outweighed and dwarfed any legitimising concerns based upon separation of powers, lack of expertise and uncertainty of the consequences. Same is the position in cases of gross environmental degradation and pollution. However, a mere allegation of violation of human rights or a plea raising environmental concerns cannot be the 'bright-line' to hold that self-restraint must give way to judicial legislation. Where and when court directions should be issued are questions and issues involving constitutional dilemmas that mandate a larger debate and discussion (see observations of Frankfurter J. as quoted in Asif Hameed and Ors. v. State of Jammu & Kashmir and Ors. (1989 AIR 1899). 31. Such directions must be issued with great care and circumspection and certainly not when the matter is already pending consideration and debate with the executive or Parliament. This is not a case which requires Court's intervention to give a suggestion for need to frame a law as the matter is already pending active consideration. Any direction at this stage would be interpreted as judicial participation in the enactment of law. This Court in Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association v. Union of India and Anr. This is not a case which requires Court's intervention to give a suggestion for need to frame a law as the matter is already pending active consideration. Any direction at this stage would be interpreted as judicial participation in the enactment of law. This Court in Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association v. Union of India and Anr. [ (1989) 4 SCC 187 ] had directed that no court can direct the legislature to enact a particular law. Similarly, when an executive authority exercises the legislative power by way of subordinate legislation pursuant to delegatory authority of the legislature, such executive authority cannot be asked to enact a law which it has been empowered to do under delegated authority. Again, we would quote from Dipak Misra, CJ in Kalpana Mehta's case, in which it was observed: “44. Recently, in Census Commr. v. R. Krishnamurthy, the Court, after referring to Premium Granites v. State of T.N., M.P. Oil Extraction v. State of M.P., State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan and State of Punjab v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga, held: (R. Krishnamurthy case, SCC p. 809, para 33) “33. From the aforesaid pronouncement of law, it is clear as noonday that it is not within the domain of the courts to embark upon an enquiry as to whether a particular public policy is wise and acceptable or whether a better policy could be evolved. The court can only interfere if the policy framed is absolutely capricious or not informed by reasons or totally arbitrary and founded ipse dixit offending the basic requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution. In certain matters, as often said, there can be opinions and opinions (sic) but the court is not expected to sit as an appellate authority on an opinion. 32. In V.K. Naswa v. Home Secretary, Union of India and Ors. [ (2012) 2 SCC 542 ], this Court in clear and categoric terms had observed that we do not issue directions to the legislature directly or indirectly and any such directions if issued would be improper. It is outside the power of judicial review to issue directions to the legislature to enact a law in a particular manner, for the Constitution does not permit the courts to direct and advice the executive in matters of policy. It is outside the power of judicial review to issue directions to the legislature to enact a law in a particular manner, for the Constitution does not permit the courts to direct and advice the executive in matters of policy. Parliament, as the legislature, exercises this power to enact a law and no outside authority can issue a particular piece of legislation. It is only in exceptional cases where there is a vacuum and non-existing position that the judiciary, in exercise of its constitutional power, steps in and provides a solution till the legislature comes forward to perform its role. 33. In State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors. v. Satpal Saini [ (2017) 11 SCC 42 ], this Court had overturned the directions given by the High Court to amend provisions of the state enactment after what was described as the plight of large population of non-agriculturist himachalis. Reference was made to Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association (supra) that no writ of mandamus can be issued to the legislature to enact a particular legislation nor can such direction be issued to the executive which exercises the powers to make Rules in the nature of subordinate legislation. Reference was also made to V.K. Naswa (supra) wherein several earlier judgments were considered and it was held that the courts have a very limited role and, in its exercise, it is not open to make judicial legislation. Further, the courts do not have competence to issue directions to the legislature to enact a law in a particular manner. Reference was also made to the constitutional bench judgment in Manoj Narula v. Union of India [ (2014) 9 SCC 1 ], in which a discordant note struck by two judges in Gainda Ram and Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Ors. [ (2010) 10 SCC 715 ] was held to be contrary to the Constitution by observing that the decision whether or not Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 should be amended is solely within the domain of Parliament and, therefore, no directions can be issued by this Court. It was observed: “6. The grievance, in our view, has a sound constitutional foundation. The High Court has while issuing the above directions acted in a manner contrary to settled limitations on the power of judicial review Under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was observed: “6. The grievance, in our view, has a sound constitutional foundation. The High Court has while issuing the above directions acted in a manner contrary to settled limitations on the power of judicial review Under Article 226 of the Constitution. A direction, it is well settled, cannot be issued to the legislature to enact a law. The power to enact legislation is a plenary constitutional power which is vested in Parliament and the State Legislatures Under Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution. The legislature as the repository of the sovereign legislative power is vested with the authority to determine whether a law should be enacted. The doctrine of separation of powers entrusts to the court the constitutional function of deciding upon the validity of a law enacted by the legislature, where a challenge is brought before the High Court Under Article 226 (or this Court Under Article 32) on the ground that the law lacks in legislative competence or has been enacted in violation of a constitutional provision. But judicial review cannot encroach upon the basic constitutional function which is entrusted to the legislature to determine whether a law should be enacted. Whether a provision of law as enacted subserves the object of the law or should be amended is a matter of legislative policy. The court cannot direct the legislature either to enact a law or to amend a law which it has enacted for the simple reason that this constitutional function lies in the exclusive domain of the legislature. For the Court to mandate an amendment of a law -- as did the Himachal Pradesh High Court --is a plain usurpation of a power entrusted to another arm of the State. There can be no manner of doubt that the High Court has transgressed the limitations imposed upon the power of judicial review Under Article 226 by issuing the above directions to the State Legislature to amend the law. The Government owes a collective responsibility to the State Legislature. The State Legislature is comprised of elected representatives. The law enacting body is entrusted with the power to enact such legislation as it considers necessary to deal with the problems faced by society and to resolve issues of concern. The courts do not sit in judgment over legislative expediency or upon legislative policy. This position is well settled. The State Legislature is comprised of elected representatives. The law enacting body is entrusted with the power to enact such legislation as it considers necessary to deal with the problems faced by society and to resolve issues of concern. The courts do not sit in judgment over legislative expediency or upon legislative policy. This position is well settled. Since the High Court has failed to notice it, we will briefly recapitulate the principles which emerge from the precedent on the subject.” 7. In Mallikarjuna Rao v. State of A.P. and in V.K. Sood v. Deptt. of Civil Aviation, this Court held that the court Under Article 226 has no power to direct the executive to exercise its law-making power. 8. In State of H.P. v. Parent of a Student of Medical College, this Court deprecated the practice of issuing directions to the legislature to enact a law: (SCC p. 174, para 4) “4. ... The direction given by the Division Bench was really nothing short of an indirect attempt to compel the State Government to initiate legislation with a view to curbing the evil of ragging....” The same principle was followed in Asif Hameed v. State of J&K, where this Court observed that: (SCC p. 374, para 19) “19. ... The Constitution does not permit the court to direct or advise the executive in matter of policy or to sermonise qua any matter which under the Constitution lies within the sphere of the legislature or executive....” In Union of India v. Assn. for Democratic Reforms, this Court observed that: (SCC p. 309, para 19) “19. ... it is not possible for this Court to give any directions for amending the Act or the statutory Rules. It is for Parliament to amend the Act and the Rules.” xx xx xx 12. The judiciary is one amongst the three branches of the State; the other two being the executive and the legislature. Each of the three branches is co-equal. Each has specified and enumerated constitutional powers. The judiciary is assigned with the function of ensuring that executive actions accord with the law and that laws and executive decisions accord with the Constitution. The courts do not frame policy or mandate that a particular policy should be followed. The duty to formulate policies is entrusted to the executive whose accountability is to the legislature and, through it, to the people. The courts do not frame policy or mandate that a particular policy should be followed. The duty to formulate policies is entrusted to the executive whose accountability is to the legislature and, through it, to the people. The peril of adopting an incorrect policy lies in democratic accountability to the people. This is the basis and rationale for holding that the court does not have the power or function to direct the executive to adopt a particular policy or the legislature to convert it into enacted law. It is wise to remind us of these limits and wiser still to enforce them without exception.” 34. Even more direct on the facts of the present case would be judgment by one of us, (Mr. Justice Ranjan Gogoi, the Chief Justice), in Common Cause: A Registered Society v. Union of India [ (2017) 7 SCC 158 ] to the following effect: “18. There can be no manner of doubt that the parliamentary wisdom of seeking changes in an existing law by means of an amendment lies within the exclusive domain of the legislature and it is not the province of the Court to express any opinion on the exercise of the legislative prerogative in this regard. The framing of the Amendment Bill; reference of the same to the Parliamentary Standing Committee; the consideration thereof by the said Committee; the report prepared along with further steps that are required to be taken and the time-frame thereof are essential legislative functions which should not be ordinarily subjected to interference or intervention of the Court. The constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and the demarcation of the respective jurisdiction of the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary under the constitutional framework would lead the Court to the conclusion that the exercise of the amendment of the Act, which is presently underway, must be allowed to be completed without any intervention of the Court. Any other view and any interference, at this juncture, would negate the basic constitutional principle that the legislature is supreme in the sphere of law-making. Reading down a statute to make it workable in a situation where an exercise of amendment of the law is pending, will not be justified either. Any other view and any interference, at this juncture, would negate the basic constitutional principle that the legislature is supreme in the sphere of law-making. Reading down a statute to make it workable in a situation where an exercise of amendment of the law is pending, will not be justified either. A perception, however strong, of the imminent need of the law engrafted in the Act and its beneficial effects on the citizenry of a democratic country, by itself, will not permit the Court to overstep its jurisdiction. Judicial discipline must caution the Court against such an approach.” 35. When the matter is already pending consideration and is being examined for the purpose of legislation, it would not be appropriate for this Court to enforce its opinion, be it in the form of a direction or even a request, for it would clearly undermine and conflict with the role assigned to the judiciary under the Constitution. In this connection, we may refer to the observation of Lord Bingham in Regina (Countryside Alliance) and Ors. v. Attorney General and Anr. [(2008) 1 AC 719], though made in a different context, to the following effect: “...The democratic process is liable to be subverted if, on a question of moral and political judgment, opponents of the Act achieve through the courts what they could not achieve in Parliament.” 36. Confronted with the present situation, Mr. Colin Gonsalves, learned amicus curiae, had submitted that directions can be given to the executive to ratify the UN Convention. We do not think that any such direction can be issued for it would virtually amount to issuing directions to enact laws in conformity with the UN Convention, a power which we do not 'possess', while exercising power of judicial review. 43. We have no hesitation in observing that notwithstanding the aforesaid directions in D.K. Basu (supra) and the principles of law laid down in Prithipal Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr. (2012) 1 SCC 10 and S. Nambi Narayanan (supra), this Court can, in an appropriate matter and on the basis of pleadings and factual matrix before it, issue appropriate guidelines/directions to elucidate, add and improve upon the directions issued in D.K. Basu (supra) and other cases when conditions stated in paragraph 27 supra are satisfied. However, this is not what is urged and prayed by the applicant. However, this is not what is urged and prayed by the applicant. The contention of the Applicant is that this Court must direct the legislature, that is, Parliament, to enact a suitable standalone comprehensive legislation based on the UN Convention and this direction, if issued, would be in consonance with the Constitution of India. This prayer must be rejected in light of the aforesaid discussion.” For the reasons stated above, this writ petition is dismissed.