ORDER : 1. Hearing of the matter has been done through video conferencing and there is no complaint whatsoever regarding audio and/or visual quality. I.A. No. 6590 of 2021 2. This interlocutory application has been preferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay of 23 days in preferring this Letters Patent Appeal. 3. Heard learned counsel for the appellant. 4. No reply to the aforesaid interlocutory application has been filed. 5. Having regard to the averments made in the application and submissions made on behalf of the appellant, we are of the view that the appellant was prevented from sufficient cause in filing the appeal within the period of limitation. As such, the delay of 23 days in preferring the appeal is hereby condoned. 6. I.A. No. 6590 of 2021 stands allowed. L.P.A. No. 655 of 2019 7. The instant appeal, preferred under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, is directed against the order/judgment dated 16.07.2019 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. (L) No. 4540 of 2008 whereby and whereunder the learned Single Judge has refused to interfere with the Award dated 12.12.2007 passed by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur in reference Case No. 34 of 2000 in which the reference has been answered in favour of the workman. 8. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleadings made in the writ petition, which are require to be enumerated herein, read as under: It is the case of the respondent-workman that he being a regular employee of the appellant-employer, has been terminated from service with effect from 01.04.1999 without assigning any reason or without any departmental proceeding or provision contained under Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The workman raised dispute, conciliation fails, the appropriate Government made reference being Reference No. 34 of 2000 to the effect that “Whether the termination of service of workman K.L. Bannerji by the management M/s. D.P. Bodhanwala Transport and Handling Contractor, Patel Building, Bistupur, Jamshedpur is justified? If not, what relief workman is entitled to?” The Labour court has framed two issues which are as under: (I) Whether Shri K.L. Bannerji employee of M/s. D.P. Bodhanwala Transport and Handling Contractor, Patel Building, Bistupur, Jamshedpur (Management), was workman within the definition of section 2(s) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. (II) Whether termination of Mr. If not, what relief workman is entitled to?” The Labour court has framed two issues which are as under: (I) Whether Shri K.L. Bannerji employee of M/s. D.P. Bodhanwala Transport and Handling Contractor, Patel Building, Bistupur, Jamshedpur (Management), was workman within the definition of section 2(s) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. (II) Whether termination of Mr. K.L. Bannerji with effect from 1.4.1999 was legal and valid and in consonance with the principle of natural justice and to what relief he is entitled to? The Award has been passed in favour of the workman by which termination of the workman from service has been held to the illegal as also workman has been held entitled to reinstatement in service with 50% back wages and shall be deemed to be in continuous service. The learned Single Judge has refused to interfere with the same which is the subject matter of the present intra-court appeal. 9. We have heard the learned counsel for the writ petitioner/appellant, perused the documents available on record as also the discussion made by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. 10. Mr. Shankar Lal Agarwal, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner/appellant, has submitted that the learned Single Judge has not appreciated the fact in its right perspective since it is the admitted case of the workman that his performance in the service was not up to the mark. According to him, since there is an admission, therefore, if on that ground the workman has been terminated, the same cannot be said to be unjust. 11. The facts which are not in dispute in this case are that the workman namely Sri K.L. Bannerji, who was working under the Management-appellant, was terminated from service with effect from 1st April, 1999. The matter finally culminated into reference being Reference Case No. 34 of 2000 and referred before the appropriate adjudicator i.e. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur. The Labour Court summoned the appellant for answering the reference, which has been quoted and referred hereinabove. The Labour Court formulated two issues as quoted and referred hereinabove. It appears from the Award that list of documents was produced by the workman i.e. termination letter dated 12.02.1999, postal envelope, another letter dated 11.02.1999 and registered legal notice dated 08.02.1999. It further appears from the record that the Management did not file any document in support of its case. It appears from the Award that list of documents was produced by the workman i.e. termination letter dated 12.02.1999, postal envelope, another letter dated 11.02.1999 and registered legal notice dated 08.02.1999. It further appears from the record that the Management did not file any document in support of its case. The oral testimony was also recorded by the Labour Court i.e. of workman and on Management’s behalf one Ramesh Patel was examined. The specific case of the workman before the Labour Court was that he was terminated with mala-fide intention because one legal notice was issued on 08.02.1999 on behalf of the workman asking from the Management the outstanding wages which annoyed the Management and in consequence thereof, the workman was terminated that too, without issuing any notice and without resorting to the condition stipulated under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Further, the termination was made without holding any enquiry. 12. While on the other hand, the plea of the Management as per the testimony is that due to non-payment of wages and bonus, the workman was incapable to do his work satisfactorily, as such, as per the provision of Section 57 of the Evidence Act, facts admitted by one party are not needed to be proved. Further ground has been taken that since the workman was holding the post which was supervisory in nature, which will not come under the definition of workman as per Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Tribunal has examined the testimony and the documents as also considered the ground of Management wherein it has been admitted that the workman has not been paid the bonus and other available allowances because his work was not found to be satisfactory. The fact about giving legal notice claiming the amount of bonus and other allowances has not been disputed by the Management. The Labour court has decided first issue about the status of the person concerned which is claiming to be workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Act, 1947. The fact about giving legal notice claiming the amount of bonus and other allowances has not been disputed by the Management. The Labour court has decided first issue about the status of the person concerned which is claiming to be workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Act, 1947. It would be evident from the Award that the Labour Court has considered this aspect of the matter after taking into consideration the various judicial pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court wherein the nature of work is required to be seen for coming to the conclusion as to whether a particular employee is coming under the definition of workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act, 1947 or not as also the terms of appointment in the job performed has been found relevant for its consideration. The Labour Court has come to the conclusion after appreciating the factual aspect that the workman was given a duty to look after the work of 20 workmen of the concerned establishment and from the evidence it was found by the Labour Court that he was not authorized to initiate any departmental proceeding against its sub-ordinate/other workmen and as such, the contention was raised on behalf of the Management regarding supervisory jurisdiction of the workman has been negated and accordingly, the issue pertaining to the status of the person concerned, has been held to be workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act, 1947. So far as the second issue is concerned which pertains to the legality and propriety of the order of termination which admittedly was issued without following the principle of natural justice, the Labour Court has considered after appreciating the documentary evidence especially the Ext.-W which is the termination letter dated 12.02.1999 by which the workman was intimated that his services shall be terminated with effect from 01.04.1999 and he was informed to collect admissible dues from the office. The Labour Court has further considered the provision of Section 25F of the Act, 1947 wherein it has been provided that no workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice. The Labour Court has further considered the provision of sub-section (b) of Section 25F of the Act, 1947 wherein it has been stated that the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months. It has further been considered that the workman was employed under the Management since 1996 and the provision of Section 25F of the Act, 1947 has not been complied with and, therefore, the conclusion has been arrived by holding the order of termination to be unjust and improper. In the aforesaid finding the Labour Court has answered the reference by holding the termination of the workman to be unjustified since it was issued without following the principle of natural justice as also held the workman entitled for reinstatement in service with 50% back wages and shall be deemed to be in continuous service. The aforesaid Award has been challenged by the Management invoking the jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India but the learned Single Judge has refused to interfere with the same against which the instant appeal has been filed. 13. It would be evident from the order passed by the learned Single Judge that the writ petition was only against the finding arrived at by the Labour Court so far as it relates to issue No. 1 i.e. whether Shri K.L. Bannerji employee of M/s. D.P. Bodhanwala Transport and Handling Contractor, Bistupur, Jamshedpur (management), was workman within the definition of section 2(s) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The second issue i.e. whether termination of Mr. The second issue i.e. whether termination of Mr. K.L. Bannerji with effect from 01.04.99 was legal and valid and in consonance with the principle of natural justice and to what relief he is entitled to, has not been questioned, as would appear from the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order which reads as under: “So far present writ petition is concerned, only issue no. 1 has been assailed before this Court, taking plea by the counsel for the petitioner-employer that the alleged employee is not covered under the definition of workman.” The point has been agitated before the learned Single Judge that the writ petitioner was working in the supervisory capacity and was getting salary of Rs. 2000/- while statutory limit is Rs. 1600/- and as such, ousted from the definition of workman. Mr. Agarwal, learned counsel appearing for the Management, reiterated the said ground by making further submission that the learned Single Judge has not appreciated the said fact and, therefore, the impugned order is not sustainable in the eyes of law. 14. This Court, in order to scrutinize the legality and propriety of the finding pertaining to issue No. (I), deems it fit and proper to consider the discussion made in this regard by the Labour Court and from its perusal it is evident that the Labour Court has considered the document i.e. Ext. W/3 wherein it was written that the workman, namely, K.L. Bannerji, was working as Supervisor and earning basic wages including other allowances i.e. Rs. 2020/- per month. The Management witness, namely, Ramesh Patel, deposed, by supporting the version, that the workman used to work in the company on the post of Supervisor and his work was to allot work to the labourers, train them and also allow them to work overtime and his duty was also to look after loading and unloading of the goods. It has further been stated at paragraph 2 of the examination-in-chief that Rs. 1600/- per month was being given to the workman. This witness has further deposed that the service of the workman was terminated on the ground of unsatisfactory work and paragraph-5 of the examination it was deposed that termination letter was issued to the workman and in paragraph-8 of the cross-examination it has been deposed that the termination notice was issued to the workman without holding any domestic enquiry. This witness has further deposed that the service of the workman was terminated on the ground of unsatisfactory work and paragraph-5 of the examination it was deposed that termination letter was issued to the workman and in paragraph-8 of the cross-examination it has been deposed that the termination notice was issued to the workman without holding any domestic enquiry. Further, at paragraph 10 of the cross-examination it was admitted that the workman used to do the duty of Supervisor and also performed his allotted work and in paragraph-11 it has also been deposed that before termination written explanation was not called for from the workman. 15. It is settled position of law that merely by making reference of the nomenclature of the post in the order of appointment, there cannot be an inference that the person concerned is under the supervisory category rather, the nature of work is required to be seen while giving a declaration about the status of a person as to whether he is under the fold of workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act, 1947 or not. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ved Prakash Gupta vs. M/s Delton Cable India (P) Ltd. (1984) LIC 658 (SC) wherein it has been held that in absence of any written direction, specifying the duty of employee including other work and the work of the workman was to work with other workman and he was not authorized with the power to appoint or dismiss any workman or order to conduct enquiry against them. In the aforesaid fact, the requirement is to see the substantial duty of the concerned workman in order to come to the conclusion as to whether the nature of work is managerial or supervisory in nature or not. In the case of Anand Regional Coop. In the aforesaid fact, the requirement is to see the substantial duty of the concerned workman in order to come to the conclusion as to whether the nature of work is managerial or supervisory in nature or not. In the case of Anand Regional Coop. Oil Seeds Growers’ Union Ltd. vs. Shaileshkumar Harshadbhai Shah, 2006 (3) FLR 581 (SC) wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that where the employee was Head of the Department but he was not authorized to initiate any departmental proceeding against his subordinate, he will not be excluded from the definition of workman and further, it was held that for determining the question as to whether the person employed in an industry is a workman or not; not only the nature of work performed by him but also terms of the appointment in the job performed are relevant considerations. 16. This Court, on the basis of the aforesaid proposition of law as has been settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court, has examined the factual aspect in order to judge as to whether the workman can be treated to be workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act, 1947. It appears from the Award that the workman was given the duty to look after the work of 20 workmen of the concerned establishment and from the evidence it appears that he was not authorize to initiate departmental proceeding against his subordinate/workmen. In view of such factual undisputed fact and considering the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court as referred hereinabove, the Labour Court, if has come to the conclusion by holding the person concerned to be workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act, 1947, which according to our considered view, cannot be said to suffer from an error. The learned Single Judge, after considering the aforesaid fact has also come to the finding by refusing to interfere with the finding recorded by the Labour Court in the Award. 17. This Court deems it fit and proper to discuss about the jurisdiction conferred to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in making interference with the Award, as has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court in Syed Yakoob vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and Others, AIR 1964 SC 477 , wherein at paragraph 7, it has been held as follows: “7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or properly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity, be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.” In another judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the Case of Sawarn Singh and Another vs. State of Punjab and Others, (1976) 2 SCC 868 it has been held at paragraph nos.12 and 13 which read as under: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra). 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” Thus, it is evident that the ratio has been propounded by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgments referred hereinabove that the fact finding recorded by the Labour Court is least to be interfered with and if there is erroneous finding available on the face of record, then certainly the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can interfere with the Award by issuing writ of certiorari but no such ground has been found by this Court. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the order passed by learned Single Judge refusing to interfere with the part of the finding recorded by the Labour Court in the Award is not a perverse/erroneous finding, rather the finding recorded by the Labour Court is based upon cogent reason which has been derived from the evidence (oral/documentary) produced before the Labour Court. Therefore, it will not be proper for this Court to intervene into the fact finding recorded by the Labour Court which has been confirmed by the learned Single Judge. 18. In the result, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed.