JUDGMENT : G. A. SANAP, J. 1. In this Letters Patent Appeal, challenge is to the Judgment and order dated 11/12/2009 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.2796/2005, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition and thereby, confirmed the order dated 18/05/2005 passed by the respondent No.2. The respondent No.2 vide order dated 18/05/2005 had confirmed the order of respondent No.3 whereby the respondent No.3 cancelled the FL-III license issued in favour of the appellant vide order dated 16/03/2005. The facts leading to the filing this Letters Patent Appeal are as follows :- 2. The appellant runs a business of Eating House under the license and of Selling Important Foreign Liquor (potable) and Indian make Foreign Liquor under the License Form FL-III issued as per the Bombay Foreign Liquor Rules, 1953 (for short, "Rules 1953"). On 09/04/2002, the officials of the respondent No.4 - Superintendent visited the appellant's business place. At the time of inspection, they found certain breaches under the provisions of Bombay Foreign Liquor Rules 1953, The Bombay Foreign Liquor (Sale on Cash, Register of Sales, etc.) Rules, 1969 and violation of the Condition Nos.8 to 10 of the license. The respondent No.4 after completing necessary enquiry, made report to the respondent No.3 - Collector, State Excise, Amravati. The respondent No.3 on the basis of material collected during the course of enquiry, issued Show Cause Notice dated 30/01/2004 to the appellant and called upon him to show cause as to why his license should not be cancelled. The illegalities, breaches and violations of the law, rules and Condition Nos.8 to 10 attributed to the appellant are (i) Alterations in the licensed premises without approval of the licensing authority. (ii) There was a vast difference in the stock and IMFL resulting shortages and (iii) The stock of 1680 X 180 mm bottles of 50 U.P. rum and 12 x 750 mm bottles of Diplomat Whisky found without transport permit. The appellant filed his reply dated 20/02/2004 and tried to explain his bonafides and placed on record his assurance that in near future, he would take care. The respondent No.3 on the basis of material placed on record and the seriousness of the breaches, came to the conclusion that the appellant does not deserve any leniency and ultimately cancelled the license vide order dated 16/03/2005. 3. The respondent No.3 on the basis of material placed on record and the seriousness of the breaches, came to the conclusion that the appellant does not deserve any leniency and ultimately cancelled the license vide order dated 16/03/2005. 3. The appellant filed the Statutory Appeal against the order of cancellation of the license by the respondent No.3 to the respondent No.2. The respondent No.2 on appreciation of the material, did not find any reason to disagree with the conclusion reached by the respondent No.3 and ultimately dismissed the appeal vide order dated 18/05/2005. 4. The appellant preferred the writ petition mentioned above and challenged the order passed by the respondent No.2 dated 18/05/2005 and prayed for setting aside both the orders dated 16/03/2005 passed by the respondent No.3 and dated 18/05/2005 passed by the respondent No.2. The learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that the material placed on record is sufficient to maintain both the orders. The learned Single Judge on the basis of proved facts and by applying the law, confirmed the aforementioned two orders and dismissed the writ petition. 5. Being aggrieved by the order of dismissal of the writ petition, the appellant has filed this Letters Patent Appeal. The grounds of challenge to the impugned order have been set out in the memo of appeal. It is mainly assailed on the ground that the learned Single Judge has failed to apply the law laid down in the case of K.V. Acharya and another Vrs. State of Maharashtra and others, reported in 2000 CRI.L.J. 2038 and came to the wrong conclusion. 6. We have heard Shri S. G. Jagtap, learned counsel for the appellant and Ms. S. S. Jachak, learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondent Nos.1 to 4. We have gone through the record and proceedings of the appeal as well as record of the proceeding conducted before the respondent No.3. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned Single Judge has not correctly considered the law laid down in the case of K.V. Acharya and another Vrs. State of Maharashtra and others, reported in 2000 CRI. L.J. 2038 and as such, came to the wrong conclusion. Learned counsel submitted that the license issued in favour of the appellant was renewed for the years 2003-2004 and 2004-2005, despite alleged illegalities, violations and breaches of the same attributed to the appellant. State of Maharashtra and others, reported in 2000 CRI. L.J. 2038 and as such, came to the wrong conclusion. Learned counsel submitted that the license issued in favour of the appellant was renewed for the years 2003-2004 and 2004-2005, despite alleged illegalities, violations and breaches of the same attributed to the appellant. Learned counsel submitted that the renewal of the license for subsequent two years would clearly indicate that the illegalities, violations and breaches were not found sufficient for refusal of the renewal of the license. Learned counsel submitted that the facts in the case of K.V. Acharya (supra) and the facts in the present case are identical and therefore, the law laid down in the case of K.V. Acharya is applicable to the facts of this case. Learned counsel submitted that in view of the provisions of law and the law laid down in the case of K.V. Acharya (supra), the learned Single Judge ought to have accepted the case of the appellant. Learned counsel submitted that the reasons recorded by the learned Single Judge to distinguish the decision are not acceptable in the backdrop of the facts and law. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that the subsequent renewal of the license for two years for the alleged illegalities, violations and breaches committed in 2002 would amount to waiver of the right by the authorities to cancel the license issued in favour of the appellant. 9. Learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondent Nos.1 to 4 submitted that the learned Single Judge has not committed any mistake while dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant. Learned AGP submitted that the learned Single Judge has recorded the concrete and cogent reasons in support of conclusion arrived at by him. Learned AGP submitted that in the backdrop of the peculiar facts of this case and the material difference between the provisions of the Bombay Prohibition Act and the Bombay Police Act and the Rules framed thereunder, the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on the decision in the case of K.V. Acharya (supra) is totally misplaced. Learned AGP submitted that the learned Single Judge has minutely considered the facts and law and arrived at a just and reasonable conclusion. Learned AGP submitted that the learned Single Judge has minutely considered the facts and law and arrived at a just and reasonable conclusion. In the submission of learned AGP, the proposition of law laid down in the case of K.V. Acharya (supra) is not applicable to the facts of this case. As far as the submission touching the plea of waiver raised by the learned counsel for the appellant are concerned, in the submission of learned AGP, the plea of waiver is not available to the appellant. Learned AGP submitted that the enquiry initiated after the inspection of the premises of the appellant took time due to peculiar facts of the case and ultimately, had culminated in passing of the order of cancellation. Learned AGP, in short, supported the Judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge. 10. We have given thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant and learned AGP for the respondent Nos.1 to 4. 11. In order to appreciate the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned AGP for the respondent Nos.1 to 4 on the point of applicability of law laid down in the case of K.V. Acharya (supra) and to consider the plea of waiver raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, it would be necessary to go through the record and proceedings minutely. In order to appreciate the submission on the point of law and deal with the plea of the waiver, proved and admitted facts need due consideration. The officials of the Excise Department, Amravati visited the establishment of the appellant on 09/04/2002. The officials found grave illegalities, violations and breaches of law, rules and the conditions of the license issued to the appellant. The Inspector who was heading the team drew panchnama and noted down the facts found at the time of inspection. The panchnama is dated 09/04/2002. The samples from the liquor bottles found in the premises were drawn. The record would show that the appellant was present on the spot. His statement was recorded on 09/04/2002. Perusal of his statement, which is part of record and proceeding, would show that he had admitted the illegalities, violations and breaches found by the Inspector at the time of inspection. The record would show that the appellant was present on the spot. His statement was recorded on 09/04/2002. Perusal of his statement, which is part of record and proceeding, would show that he had admitted the illegalities, violations and breaches found by the Inspector at the time of inspection. The Inspector during the course of enquiry, wrote a letter to M/s. Jamner Taluka Co-operative Distillery Ltd., Jamner, District Jalgaon to obtain its report inasmuch as the liquor was shown to have been manufactured by it. The letter is dated 15/01/2003. The second letter was written to the manufacture on 30/04/2003. The reply of the manufacturer is dated 22/06/2003. It was received by the Inspector, Excise Department, Amravati on 15/10/2003. Along with this reply, the manufacture annexed photocopy of reply dated 30/01/2003 which according to it was earlier forwarded to the Inspector, Excise, Amravati. This fact would show that during enquiry, the officer received confirmation from Jamner Taluka Co-operative Distillery, Dist. Jalgaon that the liquor was not manufactured by it. 12. During the course of enquiry, the Excise Inspector forwarded the samples to Chemical Analyzer, Nagpur on 31/12/2002. He received the report of Chemical Analyzer, Nagpur dated 22/12/2003 on 23/12/2003. Perusal of the report would show that the Chemical Analyzer had analyzed the sample on 17/10/2003. The Chemical Analyzer's Report is undisputedly against the appellant. The Chemical Analyzer's Report proves that the liquor in the bottles purportedly manufactured by Jamner Taluka Co-operative Distillery, Dist. Jalgaon contained in 35 boxes was duplicate, spurious and the duty on the same was evaded. The aforesaid chronology of the events would prove beyond doubt that from the date of visit and inspection i.e. from 09/04/2002 to 23/12/2003, the enquiry was in process. After completion of the initial enquiry, the respondent No.3 issued a show cause notice to the appellant on 30/01/2004. The appellant gave reply to the same on 20/02/2004. 13. In our opinion, the abovestated undisputed and proved facts are relevant to decide the plea of waiver as well as distinguishable features of this case. 14. Before proceeding to consider the law laid down in the case of K.V. Acharya (supra), it would not be out of place to mention that the appellant throughout the enquiry admitted the illegalities, violations and breaches attributed to him. 14. Before proceeding to consider the law laid down in the case of K.V. Acharya (supra), it would not be out of place to mention that the appellant throughout the enquiry admitted the illegalities, violations and breaches attributed to him. The grievance has been made in the memo of appeal that during the course of enquiry, the copy of Chemical Analyzer's Report was not provided to the appellant. In our view, this grievance is ill-founded for two reasons. Firstly, learned counsel for the appellant categorically stated that the licensee has not disputed the facts. Secondly, the appellant had participated in the enquiry proceedings and exhausted the right to deal with the case and documents. The Chemical Analyzer's Report is part of record and proceeding. The record and proceeding of the enquiry called by this Court would show that time and again, the notices were issued to the appellant to appear before the respondent No.3 for the purposes of enquiry. The appellant participated in the enquiry conducted by respondent No.3. During the course of enquiry on 22/03/2004, the appellant had categorically admitted his guilt. He appeared and participated in the enquiry proceeding, as can be seen from the record and proceedings, on 28/05/2004 and 08/06/2004. A perusal of the record would show that the reasonable opportunity had been granted to the appellant to meet the case of the respondents. He availed the opportunity. Despite availing the opportunity of hearing and in the teeth of the concrete evidence against appellant on record, a plea has been raised that the cancellation of the license vide order dated 16/03/2005, due to the renewal of the license for two years would amount to waiver of right by the respondent No.3 to pass the order. In our opinion, the abovestated admitted and proved facts cannot be brushed aside while dealing with this plea raised by the appellant. Similarly, the abovestated undisputed and proved facts would also facilitate the task to highlight the distinguishing features of this case and the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant. 15. In this background, it would be necessary to appreciate the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant relying upon the decision in the case of K.V. Acharya (supra). We have minutely perused the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge. 15. In this background, it would be necessary to appreciate the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant relying upon the decision in the case of K.V. Acharya (supra). We have minutely perused the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge has made threadbare analysis of facts and relevant provisions of law and on doing so, recorded the finding that on facts and in view of the provisions of Section 54 of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 and the provisions of Rule 45 Sub-Rule (4) of the Bombay Foreign Liquor Rules, 1953, the proposition of the law in the case of K.V. Acharya (supra) is not applicable to the facts of this case. Learned counsel vehemently argued that the learned Single Judge has not considered the law laid down in the decision as well as the provisions of Rule 45 Sub-Rule(4) of Rules, 1953 in proper perspective. In order to appreciate the submissions, we have gone through the provisions of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 and the Rules. We have also gone through the provisions of Section 33 of Bombay Police Act, 1951 and Rule 13-A framed thereunder. In the case of K.V. Acharya (supra), Section 33 of the Bombay Police Act and the Rule 13(A) governing the issuance of license or controlling places of public amusement or entertainment fell for consideration. Chapter IV of the Bombay Police Act and more particularly, Section 33 deals with the Police Regulations. The heading of Section 33 is "Power to make rules for regulations of traffic and for preservation of order in public place, etc." Sub- Section (7) which is relevant for our purpose provides for the powers of the Competent Authority to refuse a license for, or to prohibit the keeping of any place of public amusement or entertainment by a person of notoriously bad character. Sub- Section (7) begins with non-obstante clause and as such would obviously prevail over earlier sub-sections of that Section as well as Rules made thereunder. A perusal of the Judgment would show that Rule 13(A) of the Rules has been reproduced in the text of the reported Judgment. For our purpose, Sub-rule (4) would be relevant. Sub- Section (7) begins with non-obstante clause and as such would obviously prevail over earlier sub-sections of that Section as well as Rules made thereunder. A perusal of the Judgment would show that Rule 13(A) of the Rules has been reproduced in the text of the reported Judgment. For our purpose, Sub-rule (4) would be relevant. It states that the Commissioner of Police may refuse to renew the license if he is satisfied after such enquiry, as he thinks fit that the licensee is not a suitable person for continuing to hold license. A perusal of the Judgment would show that the petitioner therein was served with show cause notice dated 15/11/1995 and after enquiry, the order was passed on 02/04/1996 whereby his license was suspended for 15 days. The said order was maintained in appeal on 17/06/1996. It is seen that the instances in the show cause notice relate to all 19 illegalities, violations and breaches that had been mentioned for the suspension of the license. The instances are from 17/04/1992 onwards till 24/03/1995. It is, therefore, apparent that after 1992 till the issuance of show cause notice on 15/11/1995, there were renewals and admittedly those breaches or incidents were available when those renewals were considered. 16. Perusal of Section 33 Sub-section (7) of the Bombay Police Act would show that it gives a blanket and overriding power to the Competent Authority to refuse a license or to prohibit keeping of any place of public entertainment to a person of notoriously bad character. Similarly, Rule 13(A)(4) enables the Commissioner of Police to refuse to renew license to a person found not suitable for continuing to hold it. Perusal of the Judgment in the case of K.V. Acharya (supra) would show that in view of this express provision, this Court has found that when the license is being renewed from time to time, suspension for a period of 15 days for repeatedly committing breaches of law and creating law and order problem was not legal. It was also found that when the illegalities, violations and breaches were not found sufficient by the Competent Authority either to deny a license or to deny its renewal, the same could not furnish a ground for cancellation or suspension of license which was renewed after initiation of proceeding for alleged breaches. It was also found that when the illegalities, violations and breaches were not found sufficient by the Competent Authority either to deny a license or to deny its renewal, the same could not furnish a ground for cancellation or suspension of license which was renewed after initiation of proceeding for alleged breaches. In the case of K.V. Acharya, powers are available with the authority and the corelation with their purpose. It was not a case of cancellation of license like a case before us but a case of suspension of the license for 15 days only. 17. In the backdrop of these facts, it was held in K.V. Acharya's case that the license cannot be suspended when such offences, incidents of breaches were not found sufficient for refusal of renewal of the license. 18. It would be necessary to highlight the distinguishable facts and relevant provisions of law in the case before us. In this case, the cancellation of license has been ordered relaying upon the provisions of Section 54 of the Bombay Prohibition Act and the Rule 45 of Rules, 1953. Section 54 of the Bombay Prohibition Act provides for the power to cancel or suspend the license and permits. Sub-section (1) permits and empowers the authority granting license under the Bombay Prohibition Act to suspend or to cancel it for the reasons to be recorded. Clauses (a), (b) and (c) postulate the grounds and the contingencies for such suspension or cancellation of license by the Competent Authority. Clause (c) would show that if there is any breach by the holder of any license, action for suspension or cancellation can be taken. It provides for suspension or cancellation for previous breaches by the holder as well. The provisions of Rule 45 of the Rules, 1953 deals with the procedure and the powers of the authority to grant the license. As per Sub- Rules (1) and 1(A), the license can be granted after consideration of the application of the applicant by the committee. Sub-Rule (3) provides for renewal of the license. It provides that the person desirous of renewal of such license has to apply 30 days before the date of expiry of that license to renew it. In our opinion, Sub-Rule (4) of Rules 1953 would be relevant for deciding the case before us. Sub-Rule (3) provides for renewal of the license. It provides that the person desirous of renewal of such license has to apply 30 days before the date of expiry of that license to renew it. In our opinion, Sub-Rule (4) of Rules 1953 would be relevant for deciding the case before us. Sub-Rule (4) states that any license granted under Sub-Rule (1) can be renewed by the Collector for a period not exceeding one year at a time. Sub-Rule (4) does not mandate the placing of renewal application before the committee as is required under Sub-Rule (1) at the time of initial grant of license. It, therefore, goes without saying that the renewal of license appears to be as a matter of course. It seems that such power to refuse renewal has not been provided to take care of the situation obtained on record in this case. It is with purpose. Such provision could have empowered the Competent Authority to refuse renewal during enquiry, which in the given case could take its own time and result of the enquiry could be in favour of the licensee. This, in our view, is the distinguishing feature in this case. The provisions similar to Section 33(7) of the Bombay Police Act and Rule 13(A) (4) framed thereunder does not find place in the Bombay Prohibition Act or the Rules framed under the Prohibition Act. It, therefore, goes without saying that in absence of power to refuse the renewal of the license on the application made by the appellant by relying upon the provisions of Rule 4, the license in this case was renewed pending the enquiry. Therefore, the submission that the power to renew license under sub-rule (4) includes power to refuse renewal of license cannot be accepted. 19. It is not out of place to mention that the order of suspension or cancellation of license under the provisions of the Bombay Police Act is intended to prevent the breach of public peace and tranquility. It has no direct relation with the general public health. Section 54 of the Bombay Prohibition Act and the Rules framed under it, are intended to control and regulate the issuance of liquor license and as such has a direct bearing and relation with the general public health. It has no direct relation with the general public health. Section 54 of the Bombay Prohibition Act and the Rules framed under it, are intended to control and regulate the issuance of liquor license and as such has a direct bearing and relation with the general public health. The comparative analysis of the provisions would show that more serious public health related object & situation is sought to be redressed by the provisions of Section 54 of the Bombay Prohibition Act and the Rules thereunder. 20. In our view, the aforestated paramount difference would also be one more consideration to record agreement with the view taken by the learned Single Judge. We have already noted down the admitted and proved facts. The appellant has categorically admitted the illegalities, violations and breaches committed by him. The appellant is now estopped from making statement contrary to the one made by him during the course of enquiry. During the course of enquiry, the appellant has admitted the illegalities, violations and breaches attributed to him in the notice. A perusal of the record would show that the enquiry was conducted by strictly adhering to the procedure prescribed under the law and the principles of natural justice, as well. In our view, the learned Single Judge has properly considered the facts and law and came to the conclusion that the decision in the case of K.V. Acharya (supra) is distinguishable and is not applicable to the facts of this case. On re-appreciation of the admitted and proved facts and application of the same to the provisions of law, we are of the considered opinion that the law laid down in the case of K.V. Acharya (supra) would not be applicable to the facts of this case. We are in full agreement with the view taken by the learned Single Judge. On undertaking the exercise of re-appreciation of the undisputed and proved facts and the provisions of law involved in this case and in the case of K.V. Acharya (supra), in our opinion, the view taken by the learned Single Judge is the only possible view in this case. On re-appreciation of the evidence, we are not persuaded to take a different view. We fully agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge. On re-appreciation of the evidence, we are not persuaded to take a different view. We fully agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we conclude that the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant on the basis of law laid down in K.V. Acharya's case, cannot be accepted. The learned AGP on the basis of material placed on record has fully justified in making submissions. The submissions deserve acceptance. 21. In view of this, we conclude that there is no substance in the appeal. The appeal deserves to be dismissed. Hence, the following order : ORDER I] The Letters Patent Appeal stands dismissed. II] In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs. Learned advocate for the appellant submits that the interim relief granted in the appeal may be continued for some time. We have heard Ms. S. S. Jachak, learned AGP for respondent Nos.1 to 4. In the interest of justice, the interim relief granted in the LPA to continue for a period of six weeks. After six weeks, it shall cease to operate automatically.