JUDGMENT M S Sonak, J. - Heard Mr.Nitin Sardessai, the learned Senior Advocate who appears along with Mr. Gaurang Panandikar for the Petitioners, Ms.Ankita Kamat, learned Addl. Govt. Advocate for Respondents No.1 and 2 and Mr. Vithal Naik for Respondent No.4. 2. Rule. The rule is made returnable forthwith with the consent of and at the request of the learned Counsel for the parties. 3. The Petitioners challenge the Judgment and Order dated 30/4/2021, made by the Co-operative Tribunal, Goa in Co-operative Appeal No.5/2020, holding that the Returning Officer's order dated 13/6/2019, rejecting the nomination papers of Respondent No.4 seeking election to the Board of Directors of the Sahakar Urban Credit Cooperative Society Ltd. (Society), was improper and setting aside the same. As a consequence, the Cooperative Tribunal (Tribunal) set aside the elections of the Petitioners herein, who are declared elected unopposed and directed Respondent No.1 herein to hold fresh elections in accord with the law, as expeditiously as possible. 4. The Registrar of Cooperative Societies, vide notice dated 30/5/2019, published the program to elect the Board of directors of the Society. The Petitioners and Respondent No.4 filed their nominations within the prescribed period. One Vijay Kudalkar objected to the acceptance of nomination of Respondent No.4 herein on the ground that the said Respondent had failed to attend 3 annual general meetings of the Society during 5 years preceding the election. The objector pointed out that this was a disqualification for being chosen as a director under Section 60(3)(b) of the Goa Cooperative Societies Act, 2001 (said Act). Based on such objection, Respondent No.2-Returning Officer, rejected the nomination papers of Respondent No.4 vide order dated 13/6/2019. The Petitioners were then declared elected unopposed and such result was published vide notice dated 1/7/2019. 5. Respondent No.4 herein, thereupon filed Cooperative Appeal No.5/2020 before the Tribunal, questioning rejection of his nomination papers and the consequent declaration of the Petitioners as elected, unopposed. The Petitioners filed their written submissions to oppose the dispute raised by Respondent No.4. Significantly, in the written submissions filed before the Tribunal, the Petitioners never urged that Respondent No.4 was disqualified for being chosen as a director on another ground i.e. being a voting member of the Society for at least 3 years immediately preceding the year of the election, in terms of Section 60(3)(a) of the said Act. Significantly, in the written submissions filed before the Tribunal, the Petitioners never urged that Respondent No.4 was disqualified for being chosen as a director on another ground i.e. being a voting member of the Society for at least 3 years immediately preceding the year of the election, in terms of Section 60(3)(a) of the said Act. The Petitioners only pointed out how Respondent No.4 was disqualified in terms of Section 60(3) (b) and, therefore, the rejection of nomination papers by the Returning Officer, was legal and valid. 6. Though, no plea based on Section 60(3)(a) of the said Act was ever raised by the Petitioners in their submissions filed before the Tribunal, at the stage of arguments such a plea was orally canvassed. The Tribunal has considered such a plea, but rejected the same, on merits. The Tribunal has also held that the disqualification under Section 60(3)(b) was not attracted and, therefore, the rejection of the nomination papers of Respondent No.4 by the Returning Officer, was illegal and void. Based on this, the Tribunal made the impugned Judgment and Order dated 30/4/2021. Hence, the present Petition. 7. Mr. Sardessai, the learned Senior Advocate for the Petitioners submits that even though Respondent No.4 may have attended 3 annual general body meetings of the Society, the attendance of Respondent No.4 at the 25th Annual General Body meeting held on 18/9/2016 and the subsequent adjourned meeting held on 9/10/2016, could not have been regarded as valid attendance of such an annual general body meeting. He submitted that as per record, the Petitioners had not subscribed to the shareholding of the Society up to 31/3/2016. He submitted that since the meeting, in question, was in respect of the year 2015-16, the attendance of Respondent No.4 at such a meeting was neither valid nor could be considered for Section 60(3)(b) of the said Act. Mr. Sardessai pointed out the communication dated 13/10/2016, addressed to Respondent No.5 by the then Secretary of the Society making this position clear. Mr. Sardessai submitted that Respondent No.4 never reacted to the communication dated 13/10/2016 and, therefore, it is quite apparent that Respondent No.4 stood disqualified in terms of Section 60(3)(b) of the said Act. Mr. Sardessai submits that since this crucial aspect has not been appreciated by the Tribunal, the impugned Judgment and Order is vitiated and is required to be set aside. 8. Mr. Mr. Sardessai submits that since this crucial aspect has not been appreciated by the Tribunal, the impugned Judgment and Order is vitiated and is required to be set aside. 8. Mr. Sardessai submitted that the Petitioners were entitled to object to the eligibility of Respondent No.4 under Section 60(3)(a) in the course of arguments before the Tribunal because this was a pure question of law. Mr. Sardessai relied on J.H. Patel vs. Subhan Khan, 1996 SCC 312 and N.T. Veluswami Thevar vs. G. Raja Nainar and others, (1959) AIR SC 422 in support of this proposition. He submitted that the provisions of Section 60(3)(a) are to be read in conjunction with Section 21(4) of the said Act and bye-law 9(e) of the Society. He submits that from this, it is apparent that for the year 2016 when Respondent No.4 was enrolled as a member, he was not a 'voting member'. Mr. Sardessai submits that from this, it is quite clear that Respondent No.4 was not a voting member of the Society for at least 3 years immediately preceding the year of election i.e. 2019, and, therefore, Respondent No.4 was ineligible to be chosen as a director of the Society. Mr. Sardessai submits that though, the Tribunal permitted the Petitioners to raise this contention, the same was incorrectly decided against the Petitioners and, therefore, the impugned Judgment and Order of the Tribunal warrants interference. 9. For all the aforesaid reasons, Mr. Sardessai submits that the impugned Judgment and Order made by the Tribunal is liable to be set aside and the Cooperative Appeal No.5/2020, dismissed. 10. Mr. Vithal Naik, the learned Counsel for Respondent No.4 defends the impugned Judgment and Order made by the Tribunal based on the reasoning reflected therein. He submits that the objection based on Section 60(3)(a) of the said Act, was neither raised before the Returning Officer nor raised in the written submissions filed before the Tribunal. He submits that the objection is not some pure question of law as alleged but, at the highest, a mixed question of law and fact. He submits that such an objection could not have been addressed by the Tribunal when it was raised only towards the conclusion of the oral arguments on behalf of the Petitioners herein. 11. Mr. He submits that the objection is not some pure question of law as alleged but, at the highest, a mixed question of law and fact. He submits that such an objection could not have been addressed by the Tribunal when it was raised only towards the conclusion of the oral arguments on behalf of the Petitioners herein. 11. Mr. Naik submits that in any case, the objection based under Section 60(3)(a) was quite frivolous particularly, since, there was no dispute about the enrollment of Respondent No.4 to the full membership of the Society or, about the fact that Respondent No.4 was a shareholder of the Society and, thereby entitled to vote from 2016 onwards. 12. Mr. Naik submits that factually there is no dispute about Respondent No.4 attending the annual general body meeting held on 18/9/2016 and the adjourned meeting dated 9/10/2016. He submits that based on self-serving communication dated 13/10/2016 addressed by Petitioner No.1 herein and allegedly served upon Respondent No.4, there was no question of Respondent No.4 being declared ineligible to be chosen as director. The so-called distinction that the 25th Annual General Body Meeting pertained to the year 2015-16, is quite frivolous and, based thereon, no disqualification was ever attached to Respondent No.4. He submits that the Tribunal has quite correctly appreciated the scope of Section 60(3)(b) and ruled in favor of Respondent No.4. 13. Mr. Naik points out that in this case, the Returning Officer has acted in a quite highhanded manner. His order rejecting the nomination papers of Respondent No.4, contained no reasons whatsoever, but only a bald conclusion. He submits that the Returning Officer, in this case, breached Rule 69 and failed to hold even a summary inquiry, and with the utmost haste, rejected the nomination papers. 14. Mr. Naik submits that even inquiry proceedings have been ordered against the Returning Officer for such highhanded actions by this Court. He submits that based on such arbitrary and highhanded rejection of the nomination papers, the Petitioners managed to get themselves elected, unopposed. He submits that the Tribunal, in this case, has quite correctly relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary vs. Gujarat Co-operative Milk Marketing Federation Limited and ors., (2015) 8 SCC 1 where it is held that democratic principles must prevail in matters of elections to cooperative societies. He submits that the Tribunal, in this case, has quite correctly relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary vs. Gujarat Co-operative Milk Marketing Federation Limited and ors., (2015) 8 SCC 1 where it is held that democratic principles must prevail in matters of elections to cooperative societies. He submits that the Petitioners wish to continue as Board of Directors even without facing the electorate and based on the arbitrary and highhanded rejection of nomination papers by the Returning Officer. He, therefore, submits that this Petition may be dismissed. 15. The rival contentions now fall for my determination. 16. At the outset, the record bears out that the objection to the acceptance of the nomination papers of Respondent No.4 on the ground that Respondent No.4 was ineligible in terms of Section 60(3)(a) of the said Act, was neither raised before the Returning Officer nor was the same raised in the written submissions filed before the Tribunal. This objection was orally canvassed only in the course of the arguments made on behalf of the Petitioners herein since the Petitioners herewith were the Respondents before the Tribunal in Cooperative Appeal No.5/2020. Mr. Naik is quite right in his submission that the objection raised was not some pure question of law, but rather, this was a mixed question of law and fact. Adjudication of this question required scrutiny of the factual position. Therefore, the Tribunal might have been justified in not even allowing the Petitioners to canvass such a contention during oral arguments, without laying any factual basis, which could have been contested by Respondent No.4 fairly and properly. 17. J.H. Patel (supra), relied upon by Mr. Sardessai, does not assist the proposition now sought to be advanced by Mr. Sardessai. In that case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the plea not taken before the Returning Officer at the time of scrutiny of nomination papers, can be raised in an election petition before the Election Tribunal (High Court). However, even in such a case, the Tribunal should keep in mind the possibility of mischief being played by the person raising a new plea while deciding whether or not to entertain such a plea. However, even in such a case, the Tribunal should keep in mind the possibility of mischief being played by the person raising a new plea while deciding whether or not to entertain such a plea. The Hon'ble Apex Court observed that a person who by deliberately withholding relevant facts and material himself becomes instrumental in rejection of his nomination, cannot be allowed to raise a fresh ground regarding the improper rejection of his nomination which would adversely affect the opposite party. Therefore, J.H. Patel (supra) is not an authority for the proposition now advanced by Mr. Sardessai. This judgment is not an authority for the proposition that a mixed question of fact and law can simply be orally canvassed to seek disqualification of a member. 18. In N.T. Veluswami Thevar (supra), also it was held that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is not confined to the grounds before the Returning Officer, provided fresh grounds are properly raised before the Tribunal. Simply canvassing a fresh ground involving a mixed question of law and fact before the Tribunal at the conclusion of arguments, does not amount to properly raising the fresh ground particularly, since, the Petitioners seek to disqualify Respondent No.4 on such ground. 19. Even, now the position on facts concerning the ground of ineligibility contemplated by Section 60(3)(a) of the said Act, is not clear. The Petitioners, except for stating that Respondent No.4 was admitted as a member on 17/9/2016, have not produced any other material in support of the ground of disqualification under Section 60(3)(b) of the said Act. Respondent No.4, in his affidavit-in-reply filed before this Court, has contended that he was already a shareholder and a voting member for three cooperative years i.e. April 2016 - March 2017, April 2017 - March 2018, and April 2018 - March 2019, respectively. 20. The election, in this case, took place sometime in June 2019. Bye-law 9(e), no doubt refers to no right of membership being exercisable until the expiry of one year from the date of admission as a member for the purpose of voting for the election to the member of the Board of the Society. One of the interpretations of this bye-law is that a member will not be allowed to vote for the election to the member of the Board of the Society until he completes one year of membership. One of the interpretations of this bye-law is that a member will not be allowed to vote for the election to the member of the Board of the Society until he completes one year of membership. But, this bye-law, by itself, does not disqualify Respondent No.4 from being chosen as a director of the Society. In the absence of such a ground being raised either before the Returning Officer or before the Tribunal in the detailed written submissions filed by the Petitioners, prejudice is bound to occasion to the Respondent No.4, if such a ground is to be considered and adjudicated upon by the Tribunal, based on oral submissions made towards the conclusion of the arguments on behalf of the Petitioners. 21. Therefore, without going into the issue of whether the Tribunal was right in its reasoning on the interpretation of Section 60(3)(a), read with bye-law 9(e), it is sufficient to hold that there is no jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal in not sustaining the rejection of the nomination papers of Respondent No.4 on the ground contemplated by Section 60(3) (a) of the said Act, mainly for the reason that such a ground was neither raised before the Returning Officer nor was such a ground raised in the written submissions filed before the Tribunal, along with factual material to sustain such a ground. Mr. Vithal Naik is quite right in his submission that prejudice would occasion to Respondent No.4 were this ground to be considered in the absence of any factual basis and only relying upon the oral submissions made towards the conclusion of the oral arguments on behalf of the Petitioners. Mr. Naik submitted that consideration of such ground at that stage by the Tribunal would amount to gross violation of the principles of natural justice and denial of a fair opportunity to Respondent No.4. 22. Now coming to the primary ground urged before the returning officer and reiterated before the Tribunal and this Court, reference is necessary to Section 60(3)(b), which provides that to be eligible for being chosen as a director of a society which has been in existence for more than three years, a member "shall have attended three annual general meetings of the society during the period of five years preceding the election". 23. 23. There is no dispute whatsoever that Respondent No.4 attended 25th Annual General Body Meeting held on 18/9/2019 at Ravindra Bhavan (Mini Hall), Baina Vasco, Goa, and the subsequent adjourned meeting held on 9/10/2019 at Janata Vachanalaya, Municipality Building, Vasco da Gama, Goa. There is also no dispute that Respondent No.4 attended the two Annual General Body Meetings held in the year 2017 and 2018. Therefore, on facts, it is established that Respondent No.4 had attended three Annual General Body Meetings of the Society during the period of 5 years, preceding the elections held in June 2019. There are records like minute books etc. confirming the attendance of Respondent No.4 at such 3 meetings. 24. The Petitioners, however, rely on a communication dated 13/10/2016, allegedly addressed by the Secretary of the Society Shri Ankush Bagkar, to Respondent No.4, stating that since Respondent No.4 has not subscribed as a shareholder of the Society up to 31/3/2016, he "will not be considered as present" for the Annual General Body Meetings held on 18/9/2016 and 9/10/2016. Now, this is some unilateral declaration by the Secretary, who is incidentally the first Petitioner in this Petition. Based upon such a self-serving document, the admitted and factual attendance of Respondent No.4 at the 25th Annual General Body Meeting can neither be ignored nor wished away. 25. The Returning Officer, in a summary manner, without making any inquiry whatsoever and relying entirely on the objections raised and without recording any reasons, could not have rejected the nomination papers of Respondent No.4 on the ground contemplated by Section 60(3)(b) of the said Act. The Tribunal has quite correctly dealt with this issue and there is no perversity either in factual findings or in the reasoning, to warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 26. In this matter, it is necessary to take cognizance of the submission of Mr. Naik concerning the conduct of the Returning Officer in rejecting the nomination papers of several candidates, so that there should be no elections to the Board of Directors and the Petitioners should be declared elected unopposed. The record indicates that even after rejection, the Returning Officer failed to issue copies of his orders of rejection for almost 4 months, despite the knowledge that a dispute is required to be raised within 30 days from the date of such rejection. The record indicates that even after rejection, the Returning Officer failed to issue copies of his orders of rejection for almost 4 months, despite the knowledge that a dispute is required to be raised within 30 days from the date of such rejection. As a result, the Division Bench of this Court had to intervene in Writ Petition No.1068/2019, instituted by the members of the Society including Respondent No. 4 whose nomination papers came to be rejected in a summary manner. The Judgment and Order dated 10/12/2019 in the said Petition records how the Returning Officer delayed the holding of elections for a considerable time and, thereafter how he went about rejecting the nomination papers disregarding the provisions of Rule 69 of the Goa Cooperative Societies Rules, 2003 (said Rules). 27. In paragraphs 24, 25, and 26, this is what was observed by the Division Bench about the conduct of the Returning Officer, who rejected, inter alia, several nomination papers including the nomination papers of Respondent No.4 herein : "24. However, we agree with Mr. Rodrigues that some orders are necessary in the context of the conduct of Respondent No.6 in furnishing the certified copies of orders on rejection of the Petitioners nomination papers after 4 months from the date of receipt of application for certified copy. As noted earlier, the parties whose nomination papers are rejected have a remedy before the Cooperative Tribunal by way of raising a dispute. Such dispute is required to be ordinarily raised within 30 days from the date of declaration of the election. Proviso to Section 83(1) of the said Act no doubt empowers the Cooperative Tribunal to extent or condone the delay. 25. In the present case, however, the conduct of Respondent No.6 at least, prima facie, rendered extremely difficult for the Petitioners to effectively exercise their right to raise their dispute under Section 83 of the said Act. In order to effectively exercise such right, the Petitioners were entitled to know the reasons for which their nomination papers came to be rejected. Apart from all this, Rule 69 of the said Rules is quite clear, in that where the Returning Officer rejects the nomination papers, he is obliged to record, in writing, brief statement of his reasons for such rejection and further copy of such statement has to be immediately supplied on demand to the candidate or to the proposer concerned. 26. Apart from all this, Rule 69 of the said Rules is quite clear, in that where the Returning Officer rejects the nomination papers, he is obliged to record, in writing, brief statement of his reasons for such rejection and further copy of such statement has to be immediately supplied on demand to the candidate or to the proposer concerned. 26. In the present case, the supply of copies four months after demand, does not amount to complying with the provisions of sub-Rule (6) of Rule 69 of the said Rules. Respondent No.6 may have his own justification. However, it will not be appropriate for us to go into such justification, at this stage since we propose to direct Respondent No.2 who, we are informed, is the Disciplinary Authority qua respondent No.6 to initiate disciplinary proceedings against Respondent No.6, within a period of two months from the date of this order. We make it clear that full and reasonable opportunity should be afforded to Respondent No.6 in the course of these disciplinary proceedings. The observations made by us in this Judgment are only prima facie and the same need not influence the Disciplinary Authority. Such observations are made only in the context of prayer clause (b) of this Petition in which the Petitioners have applied for a writ of mandamus to Respondent No.2 to conduct an inquiry and initiate appropriate disciplinary proceedings against Respondent No.6 herein. The disciplinary proceedings should be concluded within six months from the date of initiation thereof." 28. Having regard to all the aforesaid circumstances, according to me, this is not a fit case for interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. This Petition is, therefore, liable to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. Interim relief, if any, is vacated.