ORDER : Petitioner is the defacto complainant in crime 661/2014 of Ettumanoor police station. That crime was registered alleging offence under Sections 452 and 395 read with 120B of the IPC and also under certain provisions of the Money Lenders Act. On conclusion of investigation, final report was filed referring the crime. The grievance of the petitioner is that he was not served with the refer notice. In this connection reliance was placed on the copy of order sheet of the Judicial First Class Magistrate-I, Ettumanoor, where it is shown that on 29.08.2019 notice was ordered to be repeated on the respondent/the defacto complainant through registered post returnable by 16.11.2019. On 16.11.2019, there was no sitting and the case was adjourned to 06.02.2020 by notification. On 06.02.2020, when the case was taken up, since there was no representation for the defacto complainant, assuming that notice to the defacto complainant was “deemed to be sent”, the refer report was accepted and the case was closed. Challenging the said order, the defacto complainant has moved this revision. 2. After hearing the learned counsel on both sides, I have no doubt that the procedure adopted by the learned Magistrate is illegal and in violation of the standing instructions and also authoritative pronouncements of the Apex Court and this Court in accepting a final report. The directives issued by the Apex Court in the oft quoted decision in Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police and another [ AIR 1985 SC 1285 ] cannot be ignored by the Court. It is apposite to extract the following observations of the Apex Court which are very relevant in the present context: “4. …......... But if the Magistrate decides that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding further and drops the proceeding or takes the view that though there is sufficient ground for proceeding against some, there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against others mentioned in the First Information Report, the informant would certainly be prejudiced because the First Information Report lodged by him would have failed of its purpose, wholly or in part. Moreover, when the interest of the informant in prompt and effective action being taken on the First Information Report lodged by him is clearly recognised by the provisions contained in sub-sec. (2) of S. 154, sub-sec. ( 2) of S. 157 and sub-sec. Moreover, when the interest of the informant in prompt and effective action being taken on the First Information Report lodged by him is clearly recognised by the provisions contained in sub-sec. (2) of S. 154, sub-sec. ( 2) of S. 157 and sub-sec. (2)(ii) of S. 173, it must be presumed that the informant would equally be interested in seeing that the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence and issues process, because that would be culmination of the First Information Report lodged by him. There can, therefore, be no doubt that when, on a consideration of the report made by the officer in charge of a police station under sub-sec.(2)(i) of S.173, the Magistrate is not inclined to take cognizance of the offence and issue process, the informant must be given an opportunity of being heard so that he can make his submissions to persuade the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence and issue process. We are accordingly of the view that in a case where the Magistrate to whom a report is forwarded under sub-sec. (2)(i) of S. 173 decides not to take cognizance of the offence and to drop the proceeding or takes the view that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against some of the persons mentioned in the First Information Report, the Magistrate must give notice to the informant and provide him an opportunity to be heard at the time of consideration of the report. It was urged before us on behalf of the respondents that if in such a case notice is required to be given to the informant, it might result in unnecessary delay on account of the difficulty of effecting service of notice on the informant. But we do not think this can be regarded as a valid objection against the view we are taking, because in any case the action taken by the police on the first information report has to be communicated to the informant and a copy of the report has to be supplied to him under sub-sec.(2)(i) of S.173 and if that be so, we do not see any reason why it should be difficult to serve notice of the consideration of the report on the informant. Moreover, in any event, the difficulty of service of notice on the informant cannot possibly provide any justification for depriving the informant of the opportunity of being heard at the time when the report is considered by the Magistrate.” This has been reiterated by the Apex Court in Union Public Service Commission v. S. Papaiah and others ( AIR 1997 SC 3876 ) and Sanjay Bansal and another v. Jawajarla Vats and others ( AIR 2008 SC 207 ). 3. It is not known as to what the learned Magistrate meant when the final report was accepted taking notice as 'deemed to be sent'. If the learned Magistrate was in mind that the notice that might have been served by the investigating agency under Section 173(2)(h)(ii), there also the Court has failed to follow the procedure. This aspect has been considered specifically by the Apex Court in Union Public Service Commission's case, quoted supra, where the Court was adverting to sufficiency of the notice issued by the CBI, the investigating agency in that case, to the defacto complainant. The Court held that as per the law laid down in Bhagwant Singh's case, quoted supra, the issuance of a notice by the Magistrate to the informant at the time of consideration of the final report is a “must”. The Court further held that issuance of notice by the CBI to the party was not a substitute for the notice which was required to be given by the Magistrate in terms of the judgment in Bhagwant Singh's case. According to the Apex Court, the learned Magistrate could not in any event 'delegate' to the investigating agency its function for issuing notice. Moreover, when law requires a particular thing to be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner and in no other manner. 4. To put it in other words, the learned Magistrate went wrong in accepting the final report without serving notice on the defacto complainant and affording opportunity to give expression to his version. Resultantly, the order dated 06.02.2020 accepting the final report is quashed. The case is remitted to the trial court for fresh consideration, after giving opportunity to the revision petitioner/the defacto complainant to raise his objections in accepting the report. The learned counsel agreed that the petitioner/counsel will appear before the trial court on 20.12.2021. Resultantly, the order dated 06.02.2020 accepting the final report is quashed. The case is remitted to the trial court for fresh consideration, after giving opportunity to the revision petitioner/the defacto complainant to raise his objections in accepting the report. The learned counsel agreed that the petitioner/counsel will appear before the trial court on 20.12.2021. The Criminal Revision Petition is disposed of as above.