JUDGMENT : Heard the parties. 2. The petitioner has challenged the order contained in Order No. 558 dated 30.5.2020 (Annexure-14 to the writ petition) passed by respondent no. 4, whereby the appointment of the petitioner has been cancelled. The petitioner has further prayed for reinstatement with all consequential benefits. 3. The facts as delineated in the writ petition are that the respondent Central University of Jharkhand published an advertisement on 15.4.2011 for appointment on different posts including the post of Executive Engineer. The last date of submission of the application was 20.5.2011. The petitioner applied for appointment on the post of Executive Engineer and after he was found fit and eligible, he was appointed on 18.11.2011 in the pay scale of 15600-39100 with Grade Pay of Rs. 6600. Pursuant thereto, he joined on 3.2.2012. After serving for a considerable period, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 22.5.2020, which he duly replied on 27.5.2020 and thereafter, by the impugned order, the service of the petitioner was terminated. The specific case of the petitioner is that he possessed the degree of Bachelor in Civil Engineering with 10 years of experience, as stipulated in the advertisement and therefore, he was rightly appointed. It is further case of the petitioner that there was a general information under Clause (xvi) of the advertisement dated 15.4.2011 itself to the effect inter alia that the University may relax the qualification/experience and age limit at its discretion at any stage in case of candidates with exceptional merit. 4. The respondent University has filed its counter affidavit stating inter alia that the petitioner did not possess the requisite experience of ten years and hence, his appointment was ab initio void. Further it was detected that the petitioner did not possess the essential qualification of experience as per the advertisement. Therefore, the petitioner was issued a show cause notice on 22.5.2020 which was duly served upon him. The show cause duly stipulates that the petitioner lacked the essential qualification of experience of ten years as stipulated in the advertisement. This show cause was duly replied by the petitioner on 27.5.2020 and after considering the show cause reply, the impugned order of termination was passed in terms of the Rules / Statutes applicable in the facts of the present case. 5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel assisted by Mr. This show cause was duly replied by the petitioner on 27.5.2020 and after considering the show cause reply, the impugned order of termination was passed in terms of the Rules / Statutes applicable in the facts of the present case. 5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel assisted by Mr. Kaushik Sharkhel, submits that the order passed by the respondent University is absolutely illegal and arbitrary. The petitioner was appointed on 18.11.2011 and he was terminated on 30.5.2020. Therefore, the petitioner had worked almost for nine years. Learned counsel submits that after working for a considerable period in the respondent University, the petitioner cannot be terminated from service without holding a regular departmental proceeding. On merit also, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner had the requisite qualification as stipulated in the advertisement, which was calculated by the earlier Executive Council at the time of filling up the application form by the petitioner. Later on, the respondents have tried to question the interpretation arrived by the earlier Executive Council regarding the calculation of experience. Learned counsel also submits that it is not the case of the respondents that the petitioner has obtained appointment by forging any document or by giving any misrepresentation, rather, the case of the respondents is that in case of any inadvertent mistake in the process of selection which may be detected, the University reserves the right to cancel any communication made to the candidate, which is evident from last paragraph of the impugned order itself. Moreover, the advertisement itself stipulated that the University may relax the qualification / experience and age limit at its discretion at any stage in case of candidates with exceptional merit. Learned counsel submits that for no fault on the part of the petitioner, the respondent University appointed him and now he has been terminated from service. To buttress his argument, learned counsel places heavy reliance upon the judgment delivered in the cases of Uptron India Ltd. Vs. Shammi Bhan & Another, reported in (1998) 6 SCC 538 ; Buddhi Nath Chaudhary & Ors. Vs. Abahi Kumar & Ors, reported in (2001) 3 SCC 328 ; Anmol Kumar Tiwari & Ors. Vs. State of Jhakhand & Ors, reported in (2021) 5 SCC 424 ; Rakesh Kumar Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors, reported in Manu/SCOR/41560/2018 and Godrej and Boyce Manufacturing Ltd Vs. Vs. Abahi Kumar & Ors, reported in (2001) 3 SCC 328 ; Anmol Kumar Tiwari & Ors. Vs. State of Jhakhand & Ors, reported in (2021) 5 SCC 424 ; Rakesh Kumar Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors, reported in Manu/SCOR/41560/2018 and Godrej and Boyce Manufacturing Ltd Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2014) 3 SCC 430 . On the strength of these judgments, Mr. Indrajit Sinha submits that the writ petition deserves to be allowed by setting aside the termination order and reinstating the petitioner with all consequential benefits. 6. Mr. Manoj Tandon, learned counsel appearing for the respondents University while taking note to the counter affidavit filed by the University submits that it is true that the petitioner was appointed by appointment letter dated 18.11.2011 and he joined on 3.12.2012. However, after it was detected that the petitioner lacked the essential qualification stipulated in the advertisement, a show cause notice was served upon the petitioner, which duly stipulates in clause 6 thereof that on the last date of submission of application form i.e. 20.5.2011, the petitioner (Kumar Pankaj Anand) had 9 years and 9 months experience whereas the requirement was of 10 years. Therefore, show cause notice was issued to the petitioner with a direction to explain as to why the appointment of the petitioner, pursuant to appointment letter dated 18.11.2011, may be treated as one obtained by fraud or / and as ab initio illegal and void and be cancelled accordingly. This show cause was replied by the petitioner on 27.5.2020 stating inter alia that the petitioner had the requisite qualification; and that the advertisement itself stipulated that the University has the power and jurisdiction to relax the same. However, the show cause was not found satisfactory, as the petitioner lacked the essential qualification on the date of submission of his application pursuant to advertisement. Mr. Tandon further submits that when the petitioner lacked the essential qualification on the date of submission of application form, there was no requirement of holding a regular departmental proceeding. Learned counsel also submits that earlier the respondent University uses to follow Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965, but in the case of Central University of Jharkhand Vs. Dr. Learned counsel also submits that earlier the respondent University uses to follow Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965, but in the case of Central University of Jharkhand Vs. Dr. Ishwar Chanda Bidyasagar (L.P.A. No. 171 of 2020), the Division Bench of this Court held that this Rule may not apply in the matter of appointment in Central University of Jharkhand. However, it was held in this case that the University has power and jurisdiction under Statute 25 of the University read with Section 11 of the Central University Act, 2009 and to proceed and pass order after providing reasonable opportunity of hearing. Learned counsel accordingly submits that in this view of the matter, the University after following the Statute 25 of the University, passed the impugned order by providing adequate opportunity to the petitioner. In support of his argument, Mr. Tandon relies upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Punjab Urban Planning and Development Authority and Anr. Vs. Karamjit Singh, reported in (2019) SCC 782, wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that if the initial appointment itself is void, he cannot be treated as an employee and hence holding disciplinary proceedings did not arise at all. Further, learned counsel places heavy reliance upon the judgment dated 29.8.2018 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 58 of 2018 (State of Jharkhand & Ors. Vs. Kanchan Tirkey), which was affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court by order dated 13.7.2019 passed in S.L.P. (Civil) Diary No. 18032 of 2019 (Kanchan Tirkey Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors.), as also the judgment dated 28.1.2021 passed by Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 412 of 2018 (Mithilesh Prasad Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors.). Relying on the aforesaid judgments, Mr. Tandon, submits that the petitioner has not been able to make out any case for interference by this Court and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 7. Be that as it may, having gone through the rival submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the considered view that the case of the petitioner needs consideration. 7. Be that as it may, having gone through the rival submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the considered view that the case of the petitioner needs consideration. It is an admitted fact that an advertisement was issued on 15.4.2011 by the respondent University and the petitioner was appointed to the post of Executive Engineer by Selection / Expert Committee after verification of all educational and experience certificates and thereafter a letter to that effect was issued on 18.11.2021. Even at the time of joining on 3.2.2012, all documents of the petitioner were reverified by the respondents in terms of the advertisement. Since the petitioner continued for more than nine years without any break, it can be very conveniently said that he has acquired the status of an employee and as such, he ought not have been removed without following the procedure prescribed under clauses 2 to 5 of the Statute 25 of the University. As per Statute 25 read with Section 26 (f) of the Act, the service of the employee can only be terminated in the manner prescribed in clauses 2 to 5. The contention of respondent University that Statute 25 is not applicable in present case of removal of the petitioner is not tenable in the eyes of law. 8. The aforesaid contention strengthened from the celebrated judgment of the Constitutional Bench in the case of Delhi Transport Copriraiton Vs. D.T.C. Mazdor Congress & Ors, reported in (1991) Supp 1 SCC 600 in para-271, which reads as under:- “The distinguishing feature of public employment is status. In Roshanlal Tandon v. Union of India, (1969) 1 SCR 185 at pp. 195-196: ( AIR 1967 SC 1889 at pp. 1894-95), the Constitution Bench hold that the legal position of a Government servant is more one of status than of contract. The hall-mark of status is the attachment to a legal relationship of rights and duties imposed by the law and not by mere agreement of the parties. The employment of the Statute or Statutory rules once he is appointed to the post or the Government Servant acquires a status and his rights and obligations are no longer determined by consent of both the parties but by Statute or Statutory Rules. The relationship between the Government and its servants is not like an ordinary contract of service between a master and servant. The relationship between the Government and its servants is not like an ordinary contract of service between a master and servant. The legal relationship is in the nature of status. The duties of statute are fixed by the law and in enforcement of the duties society has an interest. Status is a condition of membership of a group of which powers and duties are exclusively determined by law and not by agreement between the parties concerned. In Calcutta Dock Labour Board v Jaffar Imam, (1965) 3 SCR 453 (463) ( AIR 1966 SC 282 ), it was held that the statutory scheme of employment confers on the worker a status. An unlawful act is an interference with status. This view was followed in Sirsi Municipality V. Cecelia Kom Francis Tellis, (1973) 3 SCR 348 ( AIR 1973 SC 855 ), Bog J. (as he then was) held that the principles applicable to the relation of a Private Master and servant unregulated by statue, could not apply to the cases of a public statutory body exercising powers of punishment fettered or limited by statute and relevant rules of procedure This Court in a recent decision extended all the benefits of pay scales to all the Central Government Corporate Sector employees. It is, thus, I hold that the employees of the corporations, statutory authority or instrumentality under Art. 12 have statutory status as a member of its employees. The rights and obligations are governed by the relevant statutory provisions and the employer and employee are equally bound by that statutory provisions.” 9. Similar issue fell for consideration before the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Jangali Singh Vs. The Sub-Divisional Officer and another, reported in 1977 SCC OnLine All 181, wherein, by referring law laid down by Privy Council and the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Constitution Benches, which are as follows:- “5. In High Commissioner for India v. I.M. Lall, AIR 1948 PC 121 the scope and the requirement of the expression “has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken as occurring in Section 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 was considered in detail. In High Commissioner for India v. I.M. Lall, AIR 1948 PC 121 the scope and the requirement of the expression “has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken as occurring in Section 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 was considered in detail. The Privy Council held that no action is proposed within the meaning of the sub-section until a definite conclusion is reached an the charges and the actual punishment to follow is provisionally determined, prior to that stage the charges are unproved and the suggested punishments are merely hypothetical The Privy Council opined that the reasonable opportunity required that the civil servant must be given an opportunity to show cause against the action proposed, namely, at the stage after the findings are recorded by the authorities concerned and the punishment is proposed. The Privy Council emphasised that the concept of reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed requires that a civil servant should be given an opportunity of showing cause at two different stages, one during the enquiry and the other at the stage when the findings are recorded and provisional punishment is proposed. If any of these two opportunities are not given the reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed could not be fulfilled. 6. In Khem Chand v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 300 the Supreme Court while considering the scope of Article 311(2) prior to the Fifteenth Amendment Act and the extent of opportunity required to be given to a Government Servant interpreted the expression “has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken against him.” The Supreme Court reaffirmed the principles laid down by the Privy Council in IM. Lall’s case and held that reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed envisages two opportunities, one at the stage of enquiry and the other after the findings are recorded and a provisional punishment is proposed against the Government servant if either of the two opportunities are not given the requirement of reasonable opportunity of showing cause will not be fulfilled. In State of Assam v. Bimal Kumar, AIR 1963 SC 1612 , the Supreme Court again emphasised that the reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed requires two opportunities to be given to the Government servant.” 10. In State of Assam v. Bimal Kumar, AIR 1963 SC 1612 , the Supreme Court again emphasised that the reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed requires two opportunities to be given to the Government servant.” 10. Further Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Oryx Fisheries Private Limited Vs. Union of India, reported in (2010) 13 SCC 427 , has held as under:- “It is no doubt true that at the stage of show cause, the person proceeded against must be told the charges against him so that he can take his defence and prove his innocence. It is obvious that at that stage the authority issuing the charge-sheet, cannot, instead of telling him the charges, confront him with definite conclusions of his alleged guilt. If that is done, as has been done in this instant case, the entire proceeding initiated by the show cause notice gets vitiated by unfairness and bias and the subsequent proceeding become an idle ceremony.” 11. From perusal of the records, it is apparent that respondents acted in whimsical manner since beginning in order to victimize the petitioner by hook or by crook. Even initiation of departmental proceeding was merely an idle ceremony, full of unfairness and bias, as the respondents have realized that the detailed procedure of full-fledged departmental proceeding shall take time and they don’t have the documents to prove the same, which were requested by the petitioner to provide in his reply vide letters dated 11.10.2019, 04.12.2019. 17.01.2019, 19.01.2019 and 23.01.2019 (Annexure-17 Series). As such the respondents adopted a short cut method. Even if the delinquent could not have replied against the charge memo issued to him, as per settled law, Disciplinary Authority/Executive Council was duty-bound to conduct a full-fledged Inquiry by itself or by appointing Inquiry Officer to prove the charges. In the same manner, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. Vs. Shtrughan Lal, reported in (1998) 6 SCC 651 has held as under:- “4. Now, one of the principles of natural justice is that a person against whom an action is proposed lobe taken has to be given an opportunity of hearing. This opportunity has to be an effective opportunity and not a mere presence. Shtrughan Lal, reported in (1998) 6 SCC 651 has held as under:- “4. Now, one of the principles of natural justice is that a person against whom an action is proposed lobe taken has to be given an opportunity of hearing. This opportunity has to be an effective opportunity and not a mere presence. In departmental proceedings where charge-sheet is issued and the documents which are proposed to be utilized against that person are indicated in the chargesheet but copies thereof are not supplied to him in spite of his request, and he is, at the same time, called upon to submit his reply, it cannot be said that an effective opportunity to defend was provided to him.” 12. Admittedly, the petitioner continued to work for more than nine years and as per the respondents, the petitioner lacked the experience by three months, as the requirement was ten years. The issue fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Buddhi Nath Chaudhary & Ors. Vs. Abahi Kumar & Ors., reported in (2001) 3 SCC 328 , which reads in paragraph-6 as under:- “The selected candidates, who have been appointed, are now in employment as Motor Vehicle Inspectors for over a declare. Now that they have worked in such posts for a long time, necessarily they would have acquired the requisite experience. Lack of experience, if any, at the time of recruitment is made good now. Therefore, the new exercise ordered by the High Court will only lead to anomalous results. Since we are disposing of these matters on equitable consideration, the learned counsel for the contesting respondents submitted that their cases for appointment should also be considered. It is not clear whether there is any vacancy for the post of Motor Vehicle Inspectors. If that is so, unless any one or more of the selected candidates are displaced, the cases of the contesting respondents cannot be considered. We think that such adjustment is not feasible for practical reasons. We have extended equitable considerations to such selected candidates who have extended equitable considerations to such selected candidates who have worked in the post for a long period, but the contesting respondents do not come in that class. The effect of our conclusion is that appointments made long back pursuant to a selection need not be disturbed. We have extended equitable considerations to such selected candidates who have extended equitable considerations to such selected candidates who have worked in the post for a long period, but the contesting respondents do not come in that class. The effect of our conclusion is that appointments made long back pursuant to a selection need not be disturbed. Such a view can be derived from several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Ram Sarup Vs. State of Haryana; District Collector & Chairman, Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society Vs. M. Tripura Sundari Devi and H.C. Puttaswamy Vs. Hon’ble Chief Justice of Karnataka High Court, Bangalore. Therefore, we must let the matters lie where they are.” 13. The judgments relied upon by the respondents, as aforesaid, are not applicable in this case, as in those cases, appointments were obtained fraudulently, inasmuch as, by interpolation and also by relying on forged documents and hence, rightly the appointments were cancelled, as being obtained by fraud. In the instant case, it is not the case of the respondents that the petitioner was not having the requisite qualification of engineering, save and except, lacking experience by three months as per the interpretation of the respondents. No forged document was ever produced by the petitioner before the respondents nor any misrepresentation was made regarding experience. The law is also well settled that any appointment made by the Selection Committee cannot be a subject matter of review by another Selection Committee. The documents of the petitioner were examined on several occasions and it was not a case that forged documents were produced before the Selection Committee and appointment was obtained on that basis. The arguments of the respondent are not tenable in the eyes of law. 14. Admittedly there is no allegation on record that any certificate, either of educational qualification or of work experience submitted by the petitioner was found to be forged on verification from the concerned Board/Institution. So, the observation made by the present Executive Council on the Order of termination on the basis of so-called inadvertent error committed by the then Executive Council of the year 2011, that the petitioner has committed fraud in obtaining the appointment is malicious and unlawful and it is clear from facts and circumstances of the case that the Petitioner has been victimized and punished by the respondents. 15. 15. The aforesaid contention and observations find strength from the recent judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Anmol Kumar Tiwari & Ors. Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors., reported in (2021) 5 SCC 424 . Paragraph-11 of the judgment which is reproduced herein below:- “11. Two issues arise for our consideration. The first relates to the correctness of the direction given by the High Court to reinstate the Writ Petitioners. The High Court directed reinstatement of the Writ Petitioners after taking into account the fact that they were beneficiaries of the select list that was prepared in an irregular manner. However, the High Court found that the Writ Petitioners were not responsible for the irregularities committed by the authorities in preparation of the select list. Moreover, the Writ Petitioners were appointed after completion of training and worked for some time. The High Court was of the opinion that the Writ Petitioners ought to be considered for reinstatement without affecting the rights of other candidates who were already selected. A similar situation arose in Vikas Pratap Singh’s case (supra), where this Court considered that the appellants-therein were appointed due to an error committed by the respondents in the matter of valuation of answer scripts. As there was no allegation of fraud or misrepresentation committed by the Appellants therein, the termination of their services was set aside as it would adversely affect their careers. That the Appellants-therein had successfully undergone training and were serving the State for more than 3 years was another reason that was given by this Court for setting aside the orders passed by the High Court. As the Writ Petitioners are similarly situated to the Appellants in Vikas Pratap Singh’s case (supra), we are in agreement with the High Court that the Writ Petitioners are entitled to the relief granted. Moreover, though on pain of contempt, the Writ Petitioners have been reinstated and are working at present.” 16. In similar situation, this Court in the case of Arun Kumar Mishra Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors., reported in 2007 SCC OnLine Jhar 247, by referring different laws settled by Hon’ble Supreme Court, returned the following findings:- “37. In P.S.E.B v. Lila Singh. In similar situation, this Court in the case of Arun Kumar Mishra Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors., reported in 2007 SCC OnLine Jhar 247, by referring different laws settled by Hon’ble Supreme Court, returned the following findings:- “37. In P.S.E.B v. Lila Singh. (2007 (2) AIR Jhar R 885), supra, Hon’ble Supreme Court has clearly held that a charge against an employee of having committed fraud in obtaining the appointment is required to be proved in a duly constituted departmental proceeding and without such enquiry the services of such an employee cannot be terminated. 38 In Sumitra Gope v. State of Jharkhand, this Court while dealing with the case of termination of services on the charge of attaching forged certificate with the application held that the termination order without serving any charge sheet, without holding an enquiry and without giving proper opportunity of defending the delinquent was arbitrary and contrary to Article 311/2) of the Constitution of India. In paragraph 6 of the said decision this Court held as follows:- “6. find much substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Admittedly, no charge-sheet was served. There was no departmental enquiry on the alleged charge of submitting a forged certificate. The petitioner was not given proper opportunity to defend herself. She was only-given a notice informing the allegation which she had denied. Thereafter, without establishing the charge by adducing evidence, the punishment of dismissal has been imposed. The respondents have thus acted contrary to the procedure established by Law as well as contrary to the provision of Article 311 of the Constitution of India and have arbitrarily issued the impugned order of dismissal dated 9-2-2004, causing serious civil consequences to the petitioner.” 39. Further in the case of Kumari Ekka v. State of Jharkhand, (2006 (3) AIR Jhar HCR 841), this Court relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Basudeo Tiwary. SidoKanhu University. 1998 (7) Supreme 361 : (1998) 8 SCC 194 : AIR 1998 SC 3261 ) held that even where the selection/appointment is contrary to Act, statute, rule or regulation, principles of natural justice are required to be observed. 40. Tested on the said established legal norms and Constitutional requirements the respondents failed to justify the impugned order of the termination of the petitioner’s services. 41. The impugned order affects the petitioner’s right of livelihood causing him serious civil consequences. 40. Tested on the said established legal norms and Constitutional requirements the respondents failed to justify the impugned order of the termination of the petitioner’s services. 41. The impugned order affects the petitioner’s right of livelihood causing him serious civil consequences. Right to livelihood is a valuable human right and the same cannot be taken away without following due procedure established by law. 42. The impugned order issued without conducting any enquiry or giving any opportunity to the petitioner to defend himself is wholly arbitrary and violative of the principles of natural justice, and the same offends Articles 14, 21 and 311(2) of the Constitution of India. 48. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order dated 14-10-06 as contained in Annexure-7 is hereby, quashed. This writ petition is allowed. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner forthwith with all consequential benefits including full salary of the intervening period without any break.” 17. The intention of the Respondents is also questionable on their hurriedness in issuing the Show Cause Notice on 22.05.2020 by escaping from regular departmental proceeding and calling two meetings of Executive Council in a week span i.e. on 22.05.2020 and 29.05.2020, when the Executive Council had itself resolved on 23.12.2014 (Annexure-19) vide resolution no EC 2014/18/17 (4) that ‘invitation of EC meeting be conveyed before one month or at least before 21 days in advance. The hard copy of Agenda items should also reach the members before 15 days of the proposed date of meeting, so as to go through the agenda items by the members properly. 18. As a sequitur to the aforesaid observations, rules, guidelines, legal propositions and judicial pronouncements, the impugned order of termination dated 30.5.2020 (Annexure-14) is hereby quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner forthwith with all consequential benefits including full salary of the intervening period without any break. No order as to costs. 19. This writ petition stands allowed.