JUDGMENT : (Prayer in W.P.11376/2012 : Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for a Writ of Certiorari calling for the records relating to the impugned charge memo dated 7.8.2007 in PR No.19/B1/2007- C.No.8726/812/B1/2004- PR.No.125/H1/2007 and quash the same. Prayer in W.P.11377/2012 : Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for a Writ of Certiorari calling for the records relating to the impugned charge memo dated 7.8.2007 in PR No.10/B1/2007- C.No.8726/812/B1/2004- PR.No.116/H1/2007 and quash the same. Prayer in W.P.12266/2012 : Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for a Writ of Certiorari Calling for the records relating to the impugned charge memo dt 7.8.2007 in PR. No. 13/B1/2007- C.No.8726/812/B1/2004 - PR. No.119/H1/2007 and quash the same. Prayer in W.P.12267/2012 : Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for a Writ of Certiorari calling for the records relating to the impugned charge memo dt 7.8.2007 in PR. No. 17/B1/2007- C.No.8726/812/B1/2004 - PR. No. 123/H1/2007 and quash the same. Prayer in W.P.12268/2012 : Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for a Writ of Certiorari Calling for the records relating to the impugned charge memo dt 7.8.2007 in PR. No. 14/B1/2007- C.No.8726/812/B1/2004 - PR. No. 120/H1/2007 and quash the same. Prayer in W.P.12269/2012 : Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for a Writ of Certiorari Calling for the records relating to the impugned charge memo dt 7.8.2007 in PR. No. 22/B1/2007- C.No.8726/812/B1/2004 - PR. No.128/H1/2007 and quash the same. Prayer in W.P.12271/2012 : Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for a Writ of Certiorari Calling for the records relating to the impugned charge memo dt 7.8.2007 in PR. No. 27/B1/2007- C.No.8726/812/B1/2004 - PR. No. 133/H1/2007 and quash the same. Prayer in W.P.12627/2012 : Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for a Writ of Certiorari calling for the records relating to the impugned charge memo dt 7.8.2007 in PR. No. 21/B1/2007 - C. No. 8726/812/B1/2004 - PR. No. 127/H1/2007 and quash the same. Prayer in W.P.12630/2012 : Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for a Writ of Certiorari Calling for the records relating to the impugned charge memo dt 7.8.2007 in PR. No.15/B1/2007 - C. No. 8726/812/B1/2004 - PR. No. 21/B1/2007 - C. No. 8726/812/B1/2004 - PR. No. 127/H1/2007 and quash the same. Prayer in W.P.12630/2012 : Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for a Writ of Certiorari Calling for the records relating to the impugned charge memo dt 7.8.2007 in PR. No.15/B1/2007 - C. No. 8726/812/B1/2004 - PR. No.121/H1/2007 and quash the same. 1. Since the issue raised in all these writ petitions are one and the same, these writ petitions were grouped together and accordingly are being disposed of by this common order. 2. These petitioners were working as Special Sub Inspector of Police in Prohibition and Excise Wing of the respondent Department. While so, in or about the year 2000, for an alleged occurrence of misuse of official position by allegedly receiving mamool, after seven years a charge memo had been issued in respect of all these petitioners as well as some other similarly placed Special Sub Inspectors of Police, totalling about 21. 3. Simultaneously, criminal proceedings also were initiated against them. Initially the criminal case was of the year 2004, subsequently the same were transferred to Special Judge, Salem and renumbered as C.C.No.19 of 2014 and accordingly it was tried by the said Court. 4. As against the said charge memo, these petitioners and others had approached this Court by filing a batch of writ petitions in W.P.Nos.28311 of 2007 etc., batch, seeking a prayer from this Court to defer the departmental proceedings, mainly on the ground that on the same set of charges already criminal proceedings were initiated, which were pending trial and therefore, if the departmental proceedings is continued, that will prejudice the interest of the petitioners and others, who were accused in the criminal proceedings on the same set of charges. 5. In those writ petitions, though initially interim stay was granted against the Department not to proceed further against the petitioners, subsequently the said batch of writ petitions came to be disposed of by a learned Judge of this Court by an order dated 14.09.2011. 6. In that order, the plea raised by the petitioners and others to defer the departmental proceedings on the ground alleged, was not accepted. Resultantly, the following orders were passed by the learned Judge in that batch of writ petitions. 5. 6. In that order, the plea raised by the petitioners and others to defer the departmental proceedings on the ground alleged, was not accepted. Resultantly, the following orders were passed by the learned Judge in that batch of writ petitions. 5. In W.P.No.33152 of 2004, this Court disposed of a similar writ petition and in paragraphs 3 to 5, it is held thus :- 3. It is a settled proposition of law that there is no bar for the department to conduct its disciplinary proceedings and that it need not await the verdict of the criminal court and the verdict of the criminal court would not, in any manner, bind the enquiry proceedings. 4. It has been the frequent experience that criminal proceedings are kept pending endlessly for several years and therefore, there is no justification in expecting that the departmental proceedings should be kept pending till then. Therefore, I am not inclined to entertain the writ petition. However, in the interest of justice, the respondent may be restrained from finalising the proceedings before six months from today. 5. With the result, the writ petition is disposed of with the following direction: The respondent is permitted to proceed with the departmental proceedings. However, final orders shall not be passed before the completion of six months from today. The department is free to pass final orders after the completion of six months.” 6. In view of the earlier order made in W.P.No.33152 of 2004 rendered by this Court on 18.11.2004 and the order of the Supreme Court and the Division Bench judgements, these writ petitions are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.” 7. Therefore, the department was free to proceed against these petitioners and others in the departmental proceedings, which was initiated by issuing the charge memo. However, as per the orders of this Court, final orders after completing the disciplinary proceedings should not be passed for six months period. 8. However, it seems that the respondent Department did not immediately proceed against the petitioners and others and in this regard, though some attempt had been made against some of the delinquents, not the petitioners before this court, to issue summons, but according to the petitioners, no attempt has been made even to issue notices or summons to these petitioners for conducting the enquiry in the departmental proceedings. 9. 9. According to the petitioners, first time the summons were issued only in April 2012, i.e., beyond the six months period moratorium that has been given to the respondents not to pass final orders, but to proceed with the departmental proceedings. Therefore, according to the petitioners, the same is delayed proceedings and on that ground itself the respondent is precluded from proceeding further in the departmental proceedings. 10. Apart from the said prime ground, on other grounds also, the petitioners had moved these writ petitions before this Court, with the aforesaid respective prayers. 11. In this context, it is to be noted that, initially several writ petitions were filed ie., by all delinquents and during the pendency of these writ petitions the criminal case in C.C.No.19 of 2014 as referred to above came to be concluded, where the criminal Court by a judgment dated 23.05.2017, convicted some of the delinquents and acquitted some of them. 12. In this regard, it is to be further noted that, all the nine petitioners herein are acquitted by the orders passed by the learned Special Judge, Salem in C.C.No.19 of 2014 dated 23.05.2017. It is also to be noted that, the criminal Court had conducted the trial on the basis of the charges framed against those delinquents including these petitioners only on the same set of charges that is being now faced by these petitioners in the departmental proceedings also. 13. With this background, Mr.L.Chandrakumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has canvassed two points or two grounds for this Court-s consideration. One is that, the learned Judge, while passing the order on 14.09.2011 in the earlier round of litigation, has permitted the Department to proceed further in the departmental proceedings without any delay, however, only final orders shall not be passed within six months period beyond which even final orders can also be passed. 14. In this context, he very much emphasized the words used by the learned Judge in the said order to the extent “the respondent is permitted to proceed with the departmental proceedings, however final orders shall not be passed before completion of six months period from today, the department is free to pass final orders after the completion of six months.” 15. By relying upon these directions given by the learned Judge, Mr.L.Chandrakumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would contend that, the six months period was specifically directed to be commenced from the date of the order ie., 14.09.2011. Therefore, whatever be the effect of the order of the learned Judge, both sides have to abide as if it is a time bound order, that the time of the clock would start from the date of the order itself. 16. On this pretext, the learned counsel would contend that, it is the specific case of the respondent in the first round of litigation that, the departmental proceedings cannot be deferred merely because on the same set of charges criminal case was pending. Therefore, the intention of the respondent is to proceed departmentally as quick as possible to conclude the departmental proceedings unmindful of the pendency of the criminal case. 17. Considering the plea raised by the Department, the learned Judge has, of course, permitted the Department to proceed against these petitioners and others in the departmental proceedings immediately i.e., from the date of the order itself and only restriction that was imposed by the learned Judge on the Department is that, they shall not pass final orders within six months from the date of the order i.e., 14.09.2011. 18. By making these contentions, the learned counsel would canvass the point that, though such a premium has been given and liberty was given by this Court to the Department to proceed against the petitioners and others in the departmental proceedings, except passing final orders for six months, the Department, though claimed to have made an attempt to issue summons to others, who are not petitioners before this Court, no steps have been taken to conduct enquiry and in this regard, no summons had been issued by the Department to all these petitioners fixing the date of enquiry immediately to complete the same either within six months or at least within a reasonable period. 19. 19. The very import of the order of the learned Judge, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, is to see that, the Department shall proceed with the departmental proceedings immediately and if that spirit of the order is to be understood, it shall be understood that, the Department is not precluded from conducting the departmental proceedings immediately without waiting for the order to be passed in the criminal proceedings that was pending at that time. 20. Therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioners would contend that, there has been a delay in proceeding departmentally against the petitioners despite the orders passed by this Court and therefore, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the said order of the learned Judge in the first round of litigation dated 14.09.2011 has not been mandatorily followed by the Department and therefore on that ground itself the Department will loose its sanctity to proceed further in the departmental proceedings which were against the petitioners. 21. Apart from the ground as referred to above, the learned counsel for the petitioners would contend that, insofar as these nine petitioners are concerned, when they face the criminal trial, which were jointly tried in C.C.No.19 of 2014 as referred to above, all these nine petitioners had been acquitted by the judgment of the Criminal Court i.e., Special Judge, Salem on 23.05.2017, 22. By relying upon the said judgment of acquittal made in favour of the petitioners, the learned counsel would canvass the point that, in view of the said acquittal having been made, whether the Department still can proceed against these petitioners in the departmental proceedings, that too after this delay, as the occurrence allegedly taken place in the year 2000, charge memo was issued in 2007 and the Court has passed order on 14.09.2011 to proceed against these petitioners departmentally by conducting departmental proceedings already initiated and to pass final orders after six months and therefore, after the long passing of 21 years or more, that too, after clear acquittal earned by the petitioners, whether still the respondent Department can proceed against the petitioners, is a question. Therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that, the departmental proceedings which is still pending cannot be proceeded further and it is liable to be dropped. 23. Therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that, the departmental proceedings which is still pending cannot be proceeded further and it is liable to be dropped. 23. He also submitted that, three out of the nine petitioners before this court alone are still working and the remaining six people have already reached superannuation, however they have not been permitted to retire because of the pendency of the departmental proceedings and also the pendency of criminal case, in respect of some of them who retired prior to 2017. 24. Per contra, Mrs.K.Bhuvaneswari, learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the respondents has heavily relied upon the following averments made in the counter affidavit. As regards the averments made in para 8. It is submitted that the contention of petitioner is incorrect that the oral enquiry date was fixed on 27.01.2012. On receipt of the High Court Order, summons were sent to petitioner Head Constable and the witnesses to attend the oral enquiry, but the enquiry was postponed on 16.2.2012 since the petitioner and the witnesses were not turned up. The delinquent entered on medical leave and the enquiry was also not conducted on 16.2.2012 due to non-appearance of prosecution witnesses. Finally a common enquiry date 10.04.2012 was fixed for conducting enquiry. The oral enquiry was commenced as per the directions of Honourable High Court as per rule 3(b) of Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Services (D&A) Rules, 1955. The delinquents including the petitioner have objected the oral enquiry due to non receipt the original documents relating to the enquiry from the case file to defend the charge. The petitioner instructed to get the copies of the documents. The minutes of the enquiry was recorded and the delinquents including the petitioner were also signed in the relevant documents during that day. The oral enquiry posted on 28.04.2012 for examining the witnesses. The delinquent officers and two prosecution witnesses namely TVL.Selvam and Uthaman were present during that day. Both the witnesses were examined and necessary prosecution Exhibits were filed during the enquiry the delinquents were refused to sign in the enquiry documents for the reason known to them only. The fact has been recorded during that day itself. The delinquent officers and two prosecution witnesses namely TVL.Selvam and Uthaman were present during that day. Both the witnesses were examined and necessary prosecution Exhibits were filed during the enquiry the delinquents were refused to sign in the enquiry documents for the reason known to them only. The fact has been recorded during that day itself. The counsels appeared on behalf of the delinquent have objected to conduct the oral enquiry since, the Honourable High Court ordered as follows in W.P.Nos.12266 to 12271 of 2012, 11373 to 11377 of 2012, 12625 to 12630/2012 and MP Nos.2 to 2 of 2012.” 25. By relying upon the above averments, the learned Additional Government Pleader would contend that, pursuant to the order passed by this Court dated 14.09.2011 immediately the Department has taken steps to conduct the departmental proceedings ie., enquiry and in this regard, fixing the enquiry on 27.01.2012, summons were issued. Subsequently, the enquiry was postponed on the request of the delinquents on 16.02.2012 and thereafter enquiry was fixed on 06.03.2012 and in all those occasions, notices / summons were served on the delinquents including the petitioners. Learned Additional Government Pleader would further contend that, though notices / summons were served on them, either they have not turned up or they might have requested the Enquiry Officer to defer it for alleged personal reasons. Therefore, common enquiry date of 10.04.2012 was fixed for conducting enquiry. Accordingly, summons were issued and ultimately on 28.04.2012 ie., on the date of enquiry, some of the delinquents appeared and in order to establish that, they signed in the Register before the Enquiry Officer. 26. By making the above submissions, the learned Additional Government Pleader would submit that, first of all there is no mandatory element attached with the said order of the learned Judge dated 14.09.2011 to complete the enquiry within six months. Assuming that, it should be at least started or should begin immediately after the order passed by the learned Judge, steps had been taken. Summons / notices were served and ultimately the common enquiry date was fixed as 28.04.2012 and on that date, only some of them appeared, remaining did not appear and thereafter immediately they rushed to this Court by filing this batch of writ petitions and obtained interim order of stay. Therefore, the Department could not proceed further, she contended. 27. Summons / notices were served and ultimately the common enquiry date was fixed as 28.04.2012 and on that date, only some of them appeared, remaining did not appear and thereafter immediately they rushed to this Court by filing this batch of writ petitions and obtained interim order of stay. Therefore, the Department could not proceed further, she contended. 27. Insofar as the acquittal registered in respect of these petitioners by orders of the criminal Court dated 23.05.2017 is concerned, the learned Additional Government Pleader would submit that, merely because some of the delinquents have been acquitted by the criminal Court, it does not mean that the departmental proceedings shall not be proceeded against them. 28. She would also submit that, law is well settled in this regard that, despite the acquittal is recorded in the criminal Court proceedings, as against the very same delinquents, departmental proceedings, if at all was already initiated and was pending, the same can very well be proceeded. 29. Learned Additional Government Pleader would also submit that, insofar these petitioners are concerned, though they got acquittal, it is not an honourable acquittal and merely because they have been acquitted by the Criminal Court, it does not mean that, the charge memo issued against them does not have any bearing to be proceeded against them departmentally. By making all these submissions, the learned Additional Government Pleader would seek the indulgence of this Court to reject these writ petitions and to permit the respondent Department to proceed against the petitioners to conclude the enquiry ie., departmental proceedings and based on the outcome of that enquiry, let the disciplinary authority decide the further course of action including inflicting of any punishment, if the charges framed against them are proved. 30. I have considered the rival submissions made on behalf of the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as the learned Additional Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the respondent Department. 31. The first ground raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that, as per the order dated 14.09.2011, the Department should have proceeded against the petitioners and others immediately from the date of the order, as the six months period fixed by the Court not to pass final orders and to complete the enquiry or conduct the enquiry started from the date of the order i.e., 14.09.2011. 32. 32. Though the language used by the learned Judge is that, “the respondent is permitted to proceed with the departmental proceedings”, in view of the subsequent sentence where the learned Judge has used the following words “the Department is free to pass final orders after the completion of six months” and also the words “final orders shall not be passed before completion of six months from today”, if these three sentences are read conjointly, there could be two meanings conveyed. One is that, the Department has been permitted to proceed against the delinquents but shall not pass final orders within six months from the date of the order. Another meaning is that, the Department since wants to proceed against them immediately, unmindful of the pendency of the criminal case, they can do so and they may do it immediately starting from the date of the order and even if they have completed the departmental proceedings, they shall wait to pass final orders upto six months. 33. Therefore, what has been passed on in the mind of the learned Judge, who passed the order, cannot be culled out or interpreted or construed in a different way. 34. In order to have a purposive interpretation, though it may not be even possible to interpret the language used by the Courts in judicial orders, since there has been a specific ground raised before this Court stating that, there has been a delay, as within six months no attempt has been made by the respondent to proceed against the petitioners, this kind of interpretative answer has to be given as to whether the delay on the part of the respondent in not proceeding against the petitioners within six months period from the date i.e., 14.09.2011 can be a valid ground to agitate the issue. 35. In order to delve into those questions, this Court feels that, if at all the Department wanted to proceed against the petitioners and others, for which they approached this Court, where the learned Judge has permitted the Department to proceed immediately, of course with rider that, not to pass final orders for six months and thereafter they can pass orders after six months, this Court feels that, the Department could have act upon strictly to issue summons to all the delinquents including the petitioners. 36. 36. In this context, even though there has been averments made in the counter affidavit as quoted herein above that, in January 2012, February 2012 as well as March 2012 summons were issued and enquiry date has been fixed, when the relevant documents were called for by this Court, the learned Additional Government Pleader has produced the photocopy of the relevant documents, wherein the crucial document is the list of delinquents who were present on 28.04.2012 for oral enquiry, where some of the delinquents including some of the petitioners herein did attend the enquiry on 28.04.2012 and in order to establish the proof, they signed in the Register and a photocopy of the said Register has been filed before this Court. 37. However, it is to be noted that, this was only on 28.04.2012 and not before that date. 38. If at all any notices were served on 27.01.2012, 16.02.2012 and 06.03.2012 or any other date upto 13.03.2012, the date on which the six months period was over, as per the order of this Court referred to above, those documents could have been filed before this Court. 39. In this regard, it is the submission of the learned Additional Government Pleader that, they started from the first accused one Sekar, against whom notices were served in January / February and in respect of these petitioners, admittedly no notices have been served and no attempts have been made to conduct the enquiry. 40. Only after April 2012, they wanted to fix the combined enquiry of all the delinquents including the petitioners and when that date was fixed, notices were given to these petitioners. 41. Therefore, it has become clear that within six months from 14.09.2011 ie., the date of the order of the learned Judge, the Department has not proceeded against these petitioners at least. 42. Therefore, the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners that, despite the order passed by this Court on 14.09.2011, there has been a delay in proceeding against the petitioners by issuing summons to conduct the enquiry for six months period, is appealing to this Court. 43. 42. Therefore, the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners that, despite the order passed by this Court on 14.09.2011, there has been a delay in proceeding against the petitioners by issuing summons to conduct the enquiry for six months period, is appealing to this Court. 43. Apart from the aforesaid, with regard to the merits of the case, the learned counsel for the petitioners very much canvassed the order of acquittal by the order of the Criminal Court dated 23.05.2017, since that happened during the pendency of the writ petition, that ground could not have been taken at the time of filing the writ petition. However, when the arguments were advanced, the learned counsel for the petitioners very much relied on the acquittal registered by the petitioners. 44. The other fact that has to be noted is that, out of the nine petitioners, in the present batch of writ petitions, six have already reached superannuation, however, they were not permitted to retire because of the pendency of the departmental proceedings, and the remaining three are still in service. 45. Though initially these petitioners and others were suspended from service, subsequently the suspension was revoked in respect of these petitioners and they were reinstated in the same post i.e., Special Sub Inspector of Police. 46. It is also brought to the notice of this Court by the learned counsel for the petitioners that, all these years the petitioners had been continuously working in the same post i.e., Special Sub Inspector of Police, that means, no service benefits including promotion and other consequential benefits had been conferred on them because of the pendency of the departmental proceedings as well as the criminal case. 47. Now the decks have been cleared insofar as the criminal case, where acquittal had been given on 23.05.2017 in respect of at least these nine petitioners. 48. Some of the delinquents since have been convicted by the Criminal Court, against which, it is stated that appeals have been filed, unless and until they get the reversal of the order of the Trial Court with regard to the conviction, the question of reconsidering the departmental proceedings does not arise. 49. However, insofar as these nine petitioners are concerned, in respect of the same set of charges, the Criminal Court has acquitted them. 50. 49. However, insofar as these nine petitioners are concerned, in respect of the same set of charges, the Criminal Court has acquitted them. 50. No doubt, merely because acquittal has been registered against the same set of charges, it cannot be said that the departmental action cannot be proceeded if initiated already against these delinquents. If we see the nature of the case, the alleged occurrence had taken place in the year 2000, for which no immediate action has been taken by the respondents, as admittedly the charge memo was issued in the year 2007 ie., after seven years. 51. Thereafter, because of the interim stay granted by this Court or otherwise, the Department could not proceed further till the year 2011. On 14.09.2011, the Court has already permitted the respondent to proceed against the petitioners and others in the departmental proceedings, however for six months there was no move from the respondents. 52. Thereafter also, because of the delayed action, these writ petitions were filed, where interim orders were granted and subsequently the criminal case also ended in acquittal and altogether the issue has travelled for more than two decades, ie., we are at the 21st year after the alleged occurrence had taken place in the year 2000. 53. Therefore, at this length of time, whether the Department can subsequently proceed against these petitioners to establish the charges made against them on the alleged occurrence that had taken place in the year 2000, as most of the witnesses cited by the Department would not be readily available to depose, therefore it is very difficult for the Department to proceed against these petitioners. 54. Assuming that if the Department is permitted to proceed at this length of time, that would be an empty formality only. Moreover, six out of the nine employees ie., the petitioners have already superannuated long back i.e., seven or eight years ago, but they have not been permitted to retire and consequently no retirement benefits have been conferred to them. 55. Therefore, visualizing all these facts and taking into account the totality of the circumstances, this Court feels that, the Department may not be permitted to proceed further at this length of time especially in the context that, all these nine petitioners have been acquitted in the criminal case, as same set of charges have been tried by the criminal court. 56. 56. Accordingly, this Court feels that the petitioners can succeed in these writ petitions and in the result, the following orders are passed:- i. That the impugned orders in these writ petitions are hereby quashed. Consequently, the respondents shall pass necessary orders with regard to the service benefits due to these petitioners. However, it is made clear that, insofar as the service benefits to be conferred on the petitioners, all those benefits shall only be given as notional benefits. Such benefits shall be considered as continuity of service or length of service for the purpose of consequential relief and based of which, in respect of all the six petitioners, who have superannuated, they shall be permitted to retire from service on the date of superannuation and consequently, their retiral and pensionary benefits shall be calculated and disbursed. In respect of the other three petitioners, who are still in service, the necessary continuity of service shall be conferred on them and after conferring the same, if at all the petitioners are eligible to get any promotional avenues, that also shall be explored and conferred on them, if those petitioners are otherwise qualified to get the same. ii. Even in that case, if at all any promotional avenue is conferred on the remaining three petitioners, who are in service, those promotional benefits shall also be on notional basis except the remaining years of service, wherein if the remaining three petitioners are posted in the promoted post and they work, they shall be entitled to get all the benefits as if they have been working from the date of promotion. It is made clear that, by virtue of the orders passed by the judicial forum or otherwise, since these petitioners have been reinstated and had been working as Special Sub Inspector of Police till date, the said services for which whatever emoluments they have been entitled and already received by them, shall not be disturbed. 57. With the above directions and observations, these writ petitions are disposed of. No costs.