JUDGMENT : S.N. PATHAK, J. 1. Heard the parties. 2. Petitioner has approached this Court for quashing the order dated 31.01.2018 and 03.07.2018 (Annexure-6 and 6/1 respectively), passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Gumla (respondent No. 5), by which he has cancelled the selection made by the Gram Sabha on 10.01.1997, wherein petitioner was appointed as Dalpati and further refused to pay the honorarium to the petitioner for the work discharged by him as Dalpati. Petitioner has also prayed for quashing the order dated 20.10.2018 (Annexure-8) issued by the Deputy Commissioner-cum-District Magistrate, Gumla by which he has refused to give arrears of honorarium to the petitioner and also refused to promote the petitioner as Panchayat Sachiv. Petitioner has further prayed for payment of honorarium from January, 1997 to April, 2004 and from April, 2015 till date, as he has been working as Dalpati against sanction post in Atakora Mahadev Chengari Panchayat since 10.01.1997. Petitioner has further prayed for his promotion to the post of Panchayat Sachiv, on the ground that other appointees of the year 1997 have already been promoted to the said post. 3. The facts of the case lies in a narrow compass. The petitioner was initially appointed to the post of Dalpati by the Gram Sabha in the meeting held on 10.01.1997 in Gram Panchayat Atakora. Thereafter, his period of work was extended on 24.05.2004 and the same was communicated by the Chairman, Gram Sabha to the Deputy Commissioner through Block Development Officer. In furtherance thereof the Block Development Officer forwarded the matter to the District Panchayat Raj officer vide letter No. 445 dated 10.07.2004 but no action has been taken. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred several representations before the concerned authorities and after a long gap on 03.03.2015, the Block Development Officer sent a reminder to the District Panchayati Raj Officer. Thereafter, on 10.03.2015 approval of appointment of the petitioner was refused by the District Panchayat Officer after lapse of 10 years of recommendation, though on 29.05.2015, similarly situated persons have been promoted to the post of Panchayat Sachiv. 4. Thereafter, on 10.03.2015 approval of appointment of the petitioner was refused by the District Panchayat Officer after lapse of 10 years of recommendation, though on 29.05.2015, similarly situated persons have been promoted to the post of Panchayat Sachiv. 4. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner moved before this Hon'ble Court against the aforesaid decisions and for payment of honorarium by filing writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 3364 of 2017, which was disposed of on 30.08.2017 with a direction to reconsider the case of the petitioner and for payment of honorarium for the work discharged by the petitioner as Dalpati. However, when nothing was done by the respondents, the petitioner filed contempt case being Cont. Case No. 928 of 2017 and during the pendency of the said case, the respondents passed several orders refusing to redress the grievances of the petitioner. However, subsequently part payment of honorarium was made to the petitioner by passing order dated 04.09.2018 and hence, the said contempt case was dropped on 07.09.2018. After receiving the part payment made by the respondents, petitioner again submitted representation before the respondents praying therein for payment of rest of honorarium as well as for grant of promotion to the post of Panchayat Sachiv on the ground that he was working on the post of Dalpati for last 21 years and similarly situated persons have already been promoted on 20.10.2018 but respondents are sitting tight over the matter. 5. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner has knocked the door of this Court for redressal of his grievances. 6. Ms. Sunita Kumari, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner assiduously argues that respondents without following the due procedure and ignoring the real facts, in most arbitrary manner have passed the impugned order, which also finds strength from the application made by the Mukhiya of the said village before the respondent No. 5 on 08.09.18. Learned counsel further argues that non-payment of honorarium of the petitioner and cancellation of selection of the petitioner vide impugned order dated 31.01.2018 is illegal, arbitrary and against the cardinal principle of law. Learned counsel further argues that though similarly situated persons have been promoted to the post Panchayat Sachiv but the petitioner has been debarred from enjoying the fruits of promotion. Learned counsel further argues that though similarly situated persons have been promoted to the post Panchayat Sachiv but the petitioner has been debarred from enjoying the fruits of promotion. Learned counsel further argues that the government resolution dated 02.06.1997 and 01.06.2012 are not at all applicable in the case of petitioner, as because petitioner was appointment on 10.01.1997 i.e. prior to issuance of the said resolutions. Learned counsel further argues that though the petitioner has discharged his duties on the post of Dalpati without any complaints from any corner but he has been denied his legally admitted dues towards honorarium for the period he had worked. Learned counsel further argues that the grounds of respondents that they are not maintaining any register for marking the attendance of the Dalpati is also not sustainable since they are maintaining the register for entering the work discharged by the Dalpatis. 7. Per contra, counter-affidavit has been filed. Learned counsel for the respondent-State submits that the selection of the petitioner was not as per the rules, since on the date of Aam Sabha i.e. 10.01.1997 the petitioner had not even completed the age of 18 years, whereas the required age for appointment to the post of Dalpati was 21 years and as such, extension granted by the Aam Sabha cannot be called appropriate as his initial selection itself was violative of the existing rules. Learned counsel further argues that as per the provisions of Jharkhand Gram Rakshadal Rule, 2001, for selection to the post of Dalpati, Gram Karyakarini had to invite applications from eligible candidates and after securitizing the applications received from the desirous candidates, the same has to be forwarded to the District Panchayati Raj Officer of the concerned District for his approval and only after getting the approval, the appointment of Dalpatis could be made. However, in the present case, the appointment of the petitioner was never approved by the District Panchayati Raj Officer, Gumla, which is mandatory for appointment to the post of Dalpatis. Learned counsel further submits that in compliance of the Court's order dated 30.08.2017, passed in W.P. (S) No. 3364 of 2017, payment to the petitioner has already been made and hence, now no dues is remaining. Learned counsel accordingly submits that for the aforesaid facts and reasons, the writ petition is fit be dismissed. 8. Learned counsel further submits that in compliance of the Court's order dated 30.08.2017, passed in W.P. (S) No. 3364 of 2017, payment to the petitioner has already been made and hence, now no dues is remaining. Learned counsel accordingly submits that for the aforesaid facts and reasons, the writ petition is fit be dismissed. 8. Be that as it may, having heard the rival submissions of the parties and upon perusal of the documents brought on record, this Court is of the considered view that the case of the petitioner needs consideration. 9. Admittedly, the petitioner was appointed as a Dalpati in the month of January, 1997 and continued to work on the said post till cancellation of his appointment on 31.01.2018 by the respondents but the petitioner was allowed to work further on the direction of the Deputy Commissioner, however, the said letter was later on withdrawn. From perusal of the letter No. 1127 (II) dated 05.10.2018 (Annexure-10), it appears that two persons namely one Bande Oraon and the present petitioner were working as Dalpatis, so admittedly, the petitioner had worked till 05.10.2018 and allowed to continue thereafter. A list was also prepared for promotion to the post of Panchayat Sachiv (Panchayat Sevak) on 16.05.2015 by the Deputy Commissioner of the concerned District. Though the petitioner fulfils the requisite qualification for promotion to the post of Panchayat Sachiv but his name was not recommended and considered. Earlier the petitioner approached this Court for payment of honorarium and this Court was pleased to direct the respondents for payment of honorarium to the petitioner from 24.05.2004 to 09.03.2015 to the tune of Rs. 71,007/-. It was not a case of the respondents before this Court that petitioner’s appointment was illegal. The petitioner continued to work for more than 20 years and when honorarium was refused, he rushed to this Court. In the 2nd round of litigation, the respondents chose not to make any payment and have come-out with a case that petitioner’s services were put to an end on 31.01.2018. From perusal of the documents brought on record, it appears that the Block Development Officer, Bharno had written letter to the District Panchayati Raj Officer, Gumla regarding working of the Dalpatis where name of the petitioner is reflected at S. No. 2. From perusal of the documents brought on record, it appears that the Block Development Officer, Bharno had written letter to the District Panchayati Raj Officer, Gumla regarding working of the Dalpatis where name of the petitioner is reflected at S. No. 2. However, it was only after filing of the writ petition and passing of the order for payment of honorarium, the Block Development Officer withdrew the letter dated 05.10.2018. It was open for the respondents to cancel the appointment of the petitioner on cogent grounds by giving opportunity of hearing and following the procedures of law but the same was not done. It appears that the respondent-authorities have acted like a Roman Czar by passing orders after 20 years that initial appointment of the petitioner was not in accordance with law. The reasoning given by the respondents vide order dated 31.01.2018 for cancellation/ rejection of the case of petitioner is not at all acceptable to this Court. The respondents have tried to justify that since petitioner was not having the minimum age of 18 years for appointment, the appointment itself is illegal cannot be affirmed further. This issue fell for consideration before the Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court in case of Ganesh Ram vs. State of Jharkhand, 2006 (2) JCR 489 , wherein the Hon’ble has observed that: 6. Initially no minimum age for entry in the Government service was prescribed. Persons were used to be appointed in service, irrespective of age, major or minor. The only rider, that was put by the State Government, was that the services rendered prior to attaining the age of 16 years were not to be counted as pensionable service. This is evident from Rule 57 of the Bihar Pension Rules, 1950, as quoted hereunder: 57. If a Government servant in inferior service, qualifying service, shall not being only the Government servant concerned has attained the age of 16 years. 7. No common minimum age of 18 years has been laid down by the State Government (Bihar and Jharkhand). It varies from job to job and service to service. For example: Minimum age of 22 years has been prescribed for appointment in the Bihar Civil Services (Executive Branch), as evident from the Bihar Civil Services (Executive Branch) and Bihar Junior Civil Services (Recruitment) Rules, 1951. It varies from job to job and service to service. For example: Minimum age of 22 years has been prescribed for appointment in the Bihar Civil Services (Executive Branch), as evident from the Bihar Civil Services (Executive Branch) and Bihar Junior Civil Services (Recruitment) Rules, 1951. On the other hand, minimum age of 25 years has been prescribed for appointment in the Bihar Civil Services (Judicial Branch) under Bihar Civil Services (Judicial Branch) Rules 1955. For appointment of the officers in the Bihar Police Radio, minimum age of 19 years has been prescribed whereas for appointment in the Jharkhand Judicial Services (commonly known as Sub-ordinate Judicial Services) and Jharkhand Superior Judicial Services, minimum age of 25 years and 35 years respectively have been prescribed. Appointments of minors even below 18 years of age are still permissible on one or other post, reference of some of them are given hereunder: Employments by the State Government/Central Government for construction or maintenance of Roads, Runways, Dam, Irrigation Work etc. are guided by the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. The definition of employee, as laid down under Section 2(i) of the Act, means any person, who is employed for hire or reward or to do any work, skilled or unskilled, etc. and also includes an employee, employed by the appropriate Government i.e. State Government or Central Government. Clause (a) to Section 2 defines “adolescent” means a person, who has completed his fourteenth year of age but has been completed his eighteenth year. “Adult” has been defined under Clause (aa) of Section 2, which means a person, who has completed his eighteenth year of age and “child” as defined under Clause (bb) of Section 2, means a person, who has not completed his fourteenth year of age. Section 3 of Minimum Wages Act, 1948 while prescribes the manner in which the appropriate Government will fix the minimum rates of wages, under sub-section (3) appropriate Government is empowered to fix different minimum rates of wages for “adults” and “adolescent” and “children” and “apprentices”. This simply shows that even in the Government employment, an “adolescent”, though minor, can be appointed for whom different wages may be fixed. 8. The State of Bihar has issued Police Order No. 209-82, circulated vide Memo No. 6568/P2/43-271-88, dated 11th August, 1988. This simply shows that even in the Government employment, an “adolescent”, though minor, can be appointed for whom different wages may be fixed. 8. The State of Bihar has issued Police Order No. 209-82, circulated vide Memo No. 6568/P2/43-271-88, dated 11th August, 1988. This Police Order is also applicable in the State of Jharkhand, in view of Section 84 of the Bihar Reorganization Act, 2000. As per this Order, in every distinct, out of the sanctioned strength of police force, two posts can be reserved in which dependent children of police force, below 18 years of age, can be appointed on compassionate ground, if the police personnel dies while on duty. Those children, so appointed, are commonly known “as Bal-Arakshi” and are paid minimum of the scale of pay of the post, without annual increment, till they attain majority. It is only on attaining majority, if the “Bal-Arakshi” so wishes and is qualified, they are appointed as Constable against such posts. The children, on appointment, are provided with two half-pants, two shirts two-sets of socks, one pair of shoes etc. This simply goes to show that there is no bar on appointment of a minor in the services of the State. 9. However, there is a prohibition of employment of child in certain occupation and processes under Section 3 of The Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986. As per Section 2(iii) of the Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986 “child” means a person, who has not completed his fourteenth year of age, From the statement of objects and reasons, it will be evident that the Bill was intended to ban the employment of children i.e. those, who have not completed their fourteenth year, in specified occupations and processes. Even under the said Act, there is no prohibition of employment of “adolescent” i.e. those who have completed their fourteenth year but are below eighteenth year of age. The Indian Majority Act, 1875 does not impose any prohibition of employment of a minor in the services of the State, Civil Body/Government Institution, Public Sector Undertaking or in any Government Organization. The said Act relates to marriage, dower divorce, adoption etc. The same view as taken into consideration by the Full Bench of this Hon’ble Court in case of State of Jharkhand and Others vs. Arun Kumar Dhar, 2017 (2) JLJR 530 . The said Act relates to marriage, dower divorce, adoption etc. The same view as taken into consideration by the Full Bench of this Hon’ble Court in case of State of Jharkhand and Others vs. Arun Kumar Dhar, 2017 (2) JLJR 530 . The relevant Para of the said judgment is quoted herein below: 17. We also find that Jharkhand Service Code is a complete Code in itself, prescribing the service conditions of Government servants. This being a complete Code, there appears to be no reason to take any help from other rules or law to draw any inference that the intention of the Legislature was to allow only 40 years (now 42 years) of service to be the maximum period of service, to which a Government servant could be employed in a Government service. No help can be taken even from the Rule 57 of the Bihar Pension Rules, as the Pension Rules is applicable only for purposes of payment of pension and retirement dues. In absence of any provision in the Jharkhand Service Code, prohibiting the appointment of a Government servant prior to attaining the age of 18 years, it cannot be said that the appointment of the writ petitioner prior to attaining the age of 18 years, was in any way either irregular or illegal. Indeed, admittedly the petitioner-respondent was appointed upon attaining the age of about 15 years and 2½ months and not prior to the age of 14 years, when there is a Constitutional bar upon appointment of children under Article 24 of the Constitution of India. 18. This apart, Part-XIV of the Constitution of India, deals with the Services under the Union and the States. Article 309 therein stipulates that the appropriate Legislature may regulate the recruitment, and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with affairs of the Union or of any State. Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India empowers the President, in connection with the affairs of the Union, and the Governor of a State, in connection with the affairs of the State, to make rules regulating the recruitment, and the conditions of service of persons to be so appointed. Article 311 of the Constitution of India, ensures protection to a member of civil service from dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, without following the due process of law. 21. Article 311 of the Constitution of India, ensures protection to a member of civil service from dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, without following the due process of law. 21. For the foregoing discussions, we answer the questions of reference, as follows: (ii) In absence of any provision in the Jharkhand Service Code, 2001, prohibiting the appointment of a Government servant prior to the age of 18 years, the appointment of a person prior to attaining the age of 18 years, cannot be said to be against Section 11 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 read with Section 3 of the Majority Act, 1875. The view of the Full Bench of this Hon’ble Court was affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in SLP No. 10975 of 2018 in the case of State of Jharkhand and Others vs. Arun Kumar Dhar and the said SLP preferred by the State of Jharkhand stood dismissed. 10. It is also admitted that petitioner was appointed as Dalpati by Gram Sabha on 10.01.1997 and his work was extended by the Gram Sabha till 24.05.2004 and further recommended for approval. Reminder was also sent on 03.03.2015. This Court on 30.08.2017 directed the respondents in W.P. (S) No. 3364 of 2017 for payment of honorarium and the respondents paid the same to the petitioner, which shows that petitioner worked for that period. It was never the case of the respondents that appointment of the petitioner was either illegal or irregular. It was only after filing of the present writ petition, the respondents have tried to make out a case of illegal appointment. The resolution of the government dated 02.06.1997 and 01.06.2012 is not at all applicable in the case of the petitioner as petitioner was admittedly appointed on 10.01.1997 and the aforesaid resolutions were issued after February, 1997 which was already taken into consideration by this Court in the earlier round of litigation. The respondents in order to save their skin, have passed the order for recalling the letter dated 05.10.2018, issued by the respondents, which shows that petitioner was working on 05.10.2018 and even thereafter. This act itself shows the callous approach of the respondent-authorities and to misguide the Court such steps have been taken. This Court condemn the act of the respondents, who have tried to dupe the Court by making false statements. This act itself shows the callous approach of the respondent-authorities and to misguide the Court such steps have been taken. This Court condemn the act of the respondents, who have tried to dupe the Court by making false statements. In view of the orders and directions/ observations of the Single Bench of this Court affirmed by the Full Bench of this Hon’ble Court and also by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the act of the respondents is not at all tenable in the eyes of law. 11. As sequitur to the aforesaid observations, rules, guidelines, legal propositions and judicial pronouncements, the impugned order dated 31.01.2018 is hereby quashed and set aside. The consequential orders dated 03.07.2018 and 20.10.2018 are also quashed and set aside. 12. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner with all consequential benefits and pay the honorarium due to the petitioner from 2015 till the date of removal. The entire exercise shall be completed within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt/ production of a copy of this order. Since the respondents have harassed a 4th grade employee, who was forced to knock the door of this Court of justice time and again, a cost of litigation amounting to Rs. 10,000/- shall be paid to the petitioner additionally. 13. Resultantly, the instant writ application stands allowed.