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2021 DIGILAW 1087 (KER)

State of Kerala, Represented by Its Chief Secretary v. S. Gopalakrishna Pillai

2021-11-26

C.S.SUDHA, P.B.SURESH KUMAR

body2021
JUDGMENT : C.S. Sudha, J. Has the Arbitrator misconducted himself by travelling beyond his jurisdiction in awarding escalation costs and interest in the absence of an escalation clause in the agreements executed between the parties, is the question that needs to be answered by us in this case. 2. The appellants and the respondent herein are the respondents and claimant respectively in the proceedings before the Arbitrator. The parties shall be referred to as described in the said proceedings. This appeal is against the judgment dated 23.3.2010 in O.P.(Arb.) No.138/1994 on the file of the Principal Sub Judge, Thiruvananthapuram. A brief narration of the facts leading to the judgment and decree of the court below:- 3. The claimant, a registered 'A' class contractor of PWD, in response to a tender notification issued by the second respondent for the work of 'Kallada Irrigation and Tree Crop Development Project -Left Bank canal formation of Poovathoor Distributory', bid in the auction and was awarded the contract, pursuant to which, he entered into an agreement dated 25.4.1986 with the respondents. The entire works as per the agreement was to be completed by 23.1.1987. The Probable Amount of Contract (PAC) was fixed at Rs.10,91,502/-. The respondent/claimant bid the auction for Rs.9,71,900/-. According to the claimant, soon after the execution of the agreement, he took all necessary steps to execute the work by making necessary arrangements for labour and materials so as to complete the work within the stipulated time. However, due to the latches and breaches on the part of the respondents, the work could not be completed in time. The work could be completed only by the end of 1992, i.e., after a delay of about 5 years, resulting in great loss and injury to the claimant. The breaches committed by the respondents are stated to be – there was inordinate delay in handing over the work site. There were electric posts, stay wire, live electric lines etc. which were not removed in time in spite of the several requests made by the claimant. Due to the existence of these obstacles, the excavation of the canal and transportation of cut earth through the site turned out to be an impossibility. When the claimant responded to the tender, he was under the impression that the respondents would be in possession of adequate vacant land near the site for dumping cut earth. Due to the existence of these obstacles, the excavation of the canal and transportation of cut earth through the site turned out to be an impossibility. When the claimant responded to the tender, he was under the impression that the respondents would be in possession of adequate vacant land near the site for dumping cut earth. Thereafter he found that they were in possession of only the minimum land required for excavation of the canal, as a result of which, he had to transport huge quantities of cut earth to far off places which was not only time consuming but also quite expensive. As per the agreement, the claimant was expected to excavate ordinary class of soil. But when the work started, he realised that at many places, after the minimum excavation was done, there was hard-rock which could not be removed with pick-axe or crowbar, as a result of which he had to resort to blasting. As some of the portions were residential areas and cutting across roads, he had to go in for controlled blasting at considerable expense. Further, as per the agreement, the construction materials like cement, M.S. items, pipe specials etc. were to be supplied by the respondents. The delay in supply and the piece meal supply of the materials also affected the progress of the work. Several communications were addressed to the respondents, but to no avail. After the work started, the claimant was compelled to carry out several extra items and excess quantity of work, which was not agreed to between the parties. The claimant was under the impression that he would be paid reasonable rates for these extra items of work. But the rates were unilaterally fixed by the respondents. Labour unrest was another factor which delayed the completion of the work and which also increased the cost of the work. There was inordinate delay in making part payments, due to which the claimant found it difficult to carry on with the work as he had borrowed money at exorbitant rate of interest to execute the agreement. Scarcity of water was another factor which affected the execution of the work. Huge quantities of water required to be transported from far off places. All these factors, for which the respondents alone are responsible, resulted in increased cost and delay in the execution of the work. The period of the original agreement was 8 months. Scarcity of water was another factor which affected the execution of the work. Huge quantities of water required to be transported from far off places. All these factors, for which the respondents alone are responsible, resulted in increased cost and delay in the execution of the work. The period of the original agreement was 8 months. On expiry of the said period, the claimant was pressurized into executing supplemental agreements containing terms unilaterally fixed by respondents. The claimant was compelled to execute the supplemental agreements, as he was told that unless and until he executed the same, the admitted amounts due to him would also not be paid. The claimant immediately after executing the supplemental agreements, conveyed his protest to the respondents. In spite of all these constraints, the claimant completed the work to the satisfaction of the respondents. So he was under the bona fide belief that his reasonable claims would be met by the respondents. But when the proposed final bill came, he realised that the same was prepared on the basis of rates unilaterally fixed by the respondents. As he had completed the work on capital borrowed at exorbitant rates, he was constrained to receive the amount offered by the respondents under protest. 4. As disputes arose between the parties, the arbitration clause was invoked and the Arbitrator came to be appointed. Before the Arbitrator, the claimant put forward six claims, viz., (a) the expenses incurred for transporting cut earth to far off places as the respondents failed to provide suitable dumping ground ; (b) charges for idling wages and extra charges incurred due to the delay caused by the respondents in handing over the entire site for the work ; (c) extra rates for the extra/additional items of work he was made to do ; (d) revised rates at the rate of 100% over and above the agreed rate for the works done beyond the period of the original agreement ; (f) claim of interest, and (g) the cost of arbitration. (claim (e) is relating to the amount finally due and payable to him on full and final settlement of the bills). 5. The respondents filed defence statement repudiating the aforesaid allegations of the claimant. The sanctioned estimate amount for the work was Rs.10,91,502/- and the accepted PAC was Rs.9,71,900/-. According to the respondents, the claimant was very slow in executing the work. 5. The respondents filed defence statement repudiating the aforesaid allegations of the claimant. The sanctioned estimate amount for the work was Rs.10,91,502/- and the accepted PAC was Rs.9,71,900/-. According to the respondents, the claimant was very slow in executing the work. There was no proper planning of the works. The delay was solely due to inefficiency and lack of co-ordination on the part of the claimant. The respondents had extended all necessary assistance required to complete the work in time. As the default is completely on the part of the claimant, the respondents are not liable to meet the claims raised by him. 6. The Arbitrator after considering the oral and documentary evidence adduced by both sides, hearing them and after site inspection, passed the award on 15.10.1994. Claims (a), (d) and (f) were allowed and a total amount of Rs.26,75,199/-, over and above the payments the claimant had already received, together with interest at the rate of 14% from 10.9.1993 till the date of decree or payment whichever was early, was awarded. Claims (b) and (c) were rejected. 7. The claimant moved O.P.(Arb.) No.138/1994 under Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1940 ('the Act') for a decree in terms of the award. The respondents filed application under Section 30 for setting aside the award. The court below passed a decree setting aside claim (a), allowing claim (d) and reducing the rate of interest from 14% to 12%. Aggrieved, the respondents have come up in appeal. 8. Heard Sri. T.K. Vipindas, the learned Senior Government Pleader for the appellants and Sri. K.L. Varghese, the learned counsel for the respondent and also perused the records. 9. It is urged by the learned Senior Government Pleader that the Arbitrator has travelled beyond the terms of the agreement by allowing claims (d) and (f). There is no clause in the original or supplemental agreements executed between the parties providing for payment of any enhanced rate or interest. On the other hand, the supplemental agreements were executed by the claimant agreeing to complete the work during the extended period as per the originally agreed rates. The court below while rejecting claim (a), which was wrongly allowed by the Arbitrator, had rightly found that the supplemental agreements had been executed by the claimant on his own volition and rejected the case of the claimant that he had been pressurized to do so. The court below while rejecting claim (a), which was wrongly allowed by the Arbitrator, had rightly found that the supplemental agreements had been executed by the claimant on his own volition and rejected the case of the claimant that he had been pressurized to do so. Having found the supplemental agreements to be valid and binding on the parties, the court below ought to have found that the Arbitrator misconducted himself by allowing claim (d), which in effect goes beyond the terms of the contract entered into between the parties, which called for an interference by the court below. However, the court below not only failed to do so, but has also contradicted itself by confirming the finding of the Arbitrator under claim (d) after having found while rejecting claim (a) that the supplemental agreements are valid and binding on the parties. It is also pointed out that the court below went wrong in awarding interest at the rate of 12%, as there is no clause in the agreements for payment of interest. At best he could have been allowed interest at the rate of 9% and in support of this argument, reference was made to the case of A.P. State Trading Corporation vs. Malla Reddy (2010 (4) KLT SN 27). 10. Per contra, the learned counsel for the claimant pointed out that the claimant had been forced to execute the supplemental agreements without which he would not have even been paid the admitted amounts due to him. In fact, he had conveyed his protest to the respondents immediately on execution of the agreements. Relying on the dictum in P.M. Paul vs. Union of India (1989 Supp (1) SCC 368) and K.N. Sathyapalan vs. State of Kerala [ (2007)13 SCC 43 ], it was argued that even in the absence of any price escalation clause in the original agreement and despite the prohibitory clause in the supplemental agreements, the claimant is entitled for enhanced cost for the works done beyond the date of expiry of the original agreements. Reference was made to the dictum in Assam State Electricity Board vs. Buildworth Private Ltd. [ (2017) 8 SCC 146 ] justifying the decree of the court below awarding interest at the rate of 12%. 11. Before going into the controversy involved, the scope of interference of the court under Section 30 of the Act needs to be referred to. Reference was made to the dictum in Assam State Electricity Board vs. Buildworth Private Ltd. [ (2017) 8 SCC 146 ] justifying the decree of the court below awarding interest at the rate of 12%. 11. Before going into the controversy involved, the scope of interference of the court under Section 30 of the Act needs to be referred to. Section 30 reads: - “30. Grounds for setting aside award. - An award shall not be set aside except on one or more of the following grounds, namely- (a) that an arbitrator or umpire has misconducted himself or the proceedings; (b) that an award has been made after the issue of an order by the Court superseding the arbitration or after arbitration proceedings have become invalid under Section 35; (c) that an award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid.” 12. Here, the attack on the award by the respondents is under clause (a) of Section 30, that is, the Arbitrator misconducted himself by allowing claims (d) and (f), which according to the respondents, is travelling beyond the terms of the contract. Here, we refer to two cases, viz., T.P. George vs. State of Kerala [ (2001)2 SCC 758 ] and NTPC Ltd. vs. Deconar Services Pvt. Ltd. (2021 SCC ONLINE (SC) 498) submitted by the learned counsel for the claimant wherein the scope of interference by the court under Section 30 of the Act is explained. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the scope of interference by the courts into the award is quite limited. A court considering an application under Section 30 of the Act neither sits in appeal over an award of the Arbitrator nor can it re-assess or re-appreciate the evidence or examine its sufficiency or otherwise. The award of Arbitrator is final and only the grounds mentioned in Section 30 and 33 of the Act are available for challenge. It is also a settled proposition that where the Arbitrator has taken a possible view and though a different view is possible, the court is not supposed to interfere with the award. The court would have the jurisdiction or would be justified in interfering with the award only if there exists a total perversity in the award or that it is based on a wrong proposition of law. The court would have the jurisdiction or would be justified in interfering with the award only if there exists a total perversity in the award or that it is based on a wrong proposition of law. Even where two views are possible on a question of law, the court would not be justified in interfering with the award. Hence, for a party to succeed in his challenge of an Arbitral award, it has to be shown that the award of the Arbitrator suffered from perversity or an error on law or that the Arbitrator has otherwise misconducted himself. Merely showing that another reasonable interpretation is possible on the basis of materials on record, has been held to be insufficient to justify an interference by the court. 13. In the instant case, the Arbitrator, a retired Superintending Engineer, Kerala Irrigation Department, is seen to be an expert in assessing situations in contracts of the nature involved in this case. A very well discussed and reasoned award has been passed by the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator has given detailed and cogent reasons for allowing the claims. The fact that there was delay in handing over the entire site to the claimant, is admitted in the objections submitted by the respondents before the Arbitrator. In paragraph (1) of the defence statement filed by them, it is contended that the site was handed over on 25.4.1986 itself. However, in paragraph 3(a) the existence of a few electric posts in certain parts of the site is admitted. In paragraph 3(e), it is stated that in certain areas, some land owners had objected to the work as they had not received compensation for their land. According to the respondents, this aspect had been brought to the notice of the L.A. Tahsildar and speedy action was taken and compensation awarded to the land owners. The said land was also made available to the claimant on 7.11.1989. It is further stated that the claimant informed them that an area of about 02.2 ares in Survey No.411/23 of Kulakkada village had not been acquired or possession given to him. Pursuant to the same, the said land was acquired and made available to the claimant on 7.11.1989. 14. It is further stated that the claimant informed them that an area of about 02.2 ares in Survey No.411/23 of Kulakkada village had not been acquired or possession given to him. Pursuant to the same, the said land was acquired and made available to the claimant on 7.11.1989. 14. The aforesaid pleadings of the respondents make it clear that there was in fact delay in handing over the entire site to the claimant and that the claim made by the respondents that the entire site had been handed over on 25.4.1986 is apparently incorrect. Admittedly, the original PAC was Rs.10,91,502/-. The accepted PAC is Rs.9,71,900/-. The original agreement dated 25.4.1986 stipulated completion of work by 23.1.1987 i.e., within a period of eight months. However, the work was completed only on 31.8.1992 incurring an expenditure of Rs.44,41,416/-. Admittedly, the original PAC was arrived at, as per the rates fixed by the PWD, in the year 1982. Thereafter rates were revised in 1986, 1990 and 1992. The Arbitrator took note of the inflationary trend existing at the point of time and also the fact that it took five years to complete the work for reasons beyond the control of the claimant. The Arbitrator noticed the fact that the supplemental agreements had been executed extending the period of the contract without imposing any penalty on the claimant. This according to the Arbitrator was indicative of the fact that there had been no default on the part of the claimant in completing the work. The delay and latches in handing over the site; the inflationary trends existing at the time coupled with the admitted revision of rates by the PWD, were made the basis for allowing claim (d). The reasonings given by the Arbitrator are quite sound and cogent and so the court below was right in not interfering with the same. Had the claimant been able to complete the works by 23.1.1987, that is, within the stipulated period, he still would have been entitled to the enhanced revised rates taking into account the fact that the rates had been revised by PWD in the year 1986. The fact that the rates had been revised in the year 1986 is not disputed. The claimant had prayed for enhanced revision of rates at the rate of 100% over and above the approved rates for the works done beyond the original period of the contract. The fact that the rates had been revised in the year 1986 is not disputed. The claimant had prayed for enhanced revision of rates at the rate of 100% over and above the approved rates for the works done beyond the original period of the contract. However, he was not granted the same. The learned counsel for the claimant pointed out that only 72.3% escalation has been granted. This statistic is not disputed by the respondents. As the Arbitrator has given clear, cogent and plausible reasons for allowing claim (d), we find no perversity, illegality or error apparent on the face of the record as urged by the appellants herein. 15. Further, even if the supplemental agreements contain no clause for awarding enhanced rate, the Arbitrator was perfectly right in doing so. This is what has been laid down by the Apex Court in the two decisions cited by the learned counsel for the claimant, namely, K.N. Sathyapalan (supra) and P.M. Paul (supra). In P.M. Paul (supra), the parties therein had entered into a contract for construction of a building. The building could not be completed within time. Disputes arose between the parties pursuant to which an Arbitrator was appointed. It was inter alia contended that in the absence of any escalation clause in the contract, it was not permissible for the Arbitrator to have granted the enhanced rate sought for by the contractor. The Arbitrator took note of the fact that the claim related to the losses caused due to increase in price of materials, cost of labour and transport during the extended period of the contract and finding that there was escalation in the cost, allowed compensation. It was contended that the Arbitrator had misconducted himself by awarding compensation for which, he had no jurisdiction. These contentions were repelled and it was held that once it is found that the Arbitrator had jurisdiction to find that there was delay in execution of the contract due to the conduct of one of the parties, the said party would be liable for the consequences of the delay, namely, increase in prices. Therefore, the award of compensation by the Arbitrator was upheld. Likewise, K.N. Sathyapalan (supra)also involves a similar issue. Therefore, the award of compensation by the Arbitrator was upheld. Likewise, K.N. Sathyapalan (supra)also involves a similar issue. In the said case, the question which the Apex Court was called upon to answer was whether in the absence of a price escalation clause in the original agreement and a specific provision to the contrary in the supplemental agreements, the claimant could have made any claim on account of escalation of costs and whether the Arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction in allowing such claim. It was held that ordinarily the parties are bound by the terms agreed upon in the contract. However, in the event one of the parties to the contract is unable to fulfill its obligations under the contract, which has a direct bearing on the work to be executed by the other party, the Arbitrator is vested with the authority to compensate the second party for the extra costs incurred by him as a result of the failure of the first party to live up its obligations. The claimant in the said case had been prevented by unforeseen circumstances from completing the work within the stipulated period of time. It was found that the delay could have been prevented by the opposite party, had the latter taken necessary effective steps in time. These factors were taken into account by the Arbitrator while granting the claim on account of escalation of costs which was referable to the execution of work during the extended period. The Arbitrator was held to be well within his power to do so taking into account the delay and latches on the part of the opposite party. Similar is the case before us also. It is true that there is no escalation clause in the original agreement or in the supplemental agreements executed between the parties. The fact that the entire site had not been handed over to the claimant soon after the execution of the agreement, is more or less admitted though the respondents have put forward some justifications for the same. The work could be completed only after a considerable delay of five years. The fact that the rates were revised in the year 1986, 1990 and 1992, is also an admitted fact. In such circumstances, the Arbitrator was fully justified and was well within his jurisdiction to have granted claim (d). 16. Now coming to the interest awarded to the claimant. The fact that the rates were revised in the year 1986, 1990 and 1992, is also an admitted fact. In such circumstances, the Arbitrator was fully justified and was well within his jurisdiction to have granted claim (d). 16. Now coming to the interest awarded to the claimant. The Arbitrator taking note of the fact that the claimant had executed the work with borrowed capital availed at exorbitant rate of interest, the inordinate delay caused in completing the work, the volume of extra work that he had to do etc., awarded interest at the rate of 14% per annum. This was modified and reduced by the court below to 12%. In Assam State Electricity Board (supra) relied on by the claimant, interest at the rate of 18% per annum had been claimed. The rate of interest at the rate of 12% per annum was granted which was found to be a reasonable one. In these circumstances, we find no scope for interference under clause (a) of Section 30 of the Act and the court below was justified in passing the impugned judgment and decree. As the appeal is without any merits, the same is liable to be dismissed and hence we do so. The parties shall bear their respective costs. All pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.