ORDER : 1. The petitioner is owner of 28 buffaloes, which were seized pursuant to FIR No. 241/2020, registered at Police Outpost-Manora, District Jashpur against him and co-accused persons for offences under Sections 4, 6 and 10 of the Chhattisgarh Agricultural Cattle Preservation Act, 2004 (hereinafter called as ‘the Act of 2004’) and Section 11 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960. 2. As per FIR, truck bearing Registration No. HR-55Q-5980, which was plying from the State of Chhattisgarh to Jharkhand Slaughter house carrying 23 male buffaloes and 5 female buffaloes were seized and abovestated offences were registered. The petitioner made an application under Section 457 of the Cr.P.C. for grant of interim custody of said cattles, which was rejected by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jashpur on 8.12.2020 in the light of Section 7 of the Act of 2004, which has been affirmed by the revisional Court and custody has been directed to be given to the registered Goshala in the light of Section 7 of the Act of 2004 and decision of this Court in the matter of Jalil Ansari and Others vs. State of C.G. and Others, 2012 (1) CGLJ 176 against which, this petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. has been filed. 3. Mr. A.K. Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioner, would submit that the petitioner being owner of the cattle is entitled to have interim custody of seized cattle as there is no express statutory bar contained in the Act of 2004 and Section 7 of the Act of 2004 is only enabling provision for keeping the seized cattle till the conclusion of prosecution, if application for interim custody is not made or it is rejected, but it will certainly not bar the application for interim custody under Section 451 and 457 of the Cr.P.C. He would further submit that decision rendered by this Court in Jalil Ansari (supra) requires reconsideration. 4. Mr. Prasoon Agrawal, learned counsel appearing as Amicus Curiae, would submit that since there is no express statutory bar in the Act of 2004 in granting interim custody, therefore, the principle of implied prohibition would not be applicable in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru vs. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 . 5. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 6. In Jalil Ansari (supra) this Court (coordinate Bench) held as under: “11. The Act of 2004 is therefore, special enactment prohibiting slaughter, prohibition of possession and transport or sale of Agriculture cattle. The Act is applicable in respect of the Agriculture cattle being animal specified under the schedule appended to the Act. The Act contains special provision with regard to interim custody/possession of seized Agriculture cattle. It clearly mandates that till the conclusion of prosecution, seized Agricultural cattle will be under the custody of nearest registered Goshala, Gosadan, Gorakshan sansthan or other registered Sansthan. Therefore, till the conclusion of prosecution, interim custody of seized Agriculture cattle could only be given to specified institutions. The provision contained in Section 7 of the Act of 2004 therefore, impliedly prohibits interim custody of Agriculture cattle to any person or institution other than those specified in Section 7 of the Act. In view of the provisions contained in Section 18 of the Act, provisions of Section 7 will have overriding effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force. 18. Learned counsel for the respective petitioners however submitted that even though, the interim custody of the Agriculture cattle could not be given to the petitioners, it could not be given to the private individuals/villagers. In this regard, it is suffice to say that the provisions contained in Section 7 are unambiguous and interim custody of Agriculture cattle could be granted only to those institutions, which have been specified in Section 7 and to none other. The petitioners in the aforesaid case shall be at liberty to move application before the Court below, if in any case, interim custody of the cattle has been granted to any person other than those specified in Section 7 of the Act of 2004. On such applications being filed, the trial Court shall pass necessary order ensuring that interim custody of Agriculture cattle is granted only to the persons/institutions specified in Section 7 of the Act of 2004, subject to the aforesaid observations, all the aforesaid petitions (Cr. M.P. No. 270, 391, 433, 471, 472 and 473 of 2011) are without any basis and are hereby dismissed.” 7. Section 7 of the Act of 2004 provides as under: “7. M.P. No. 270, 391, 433, 471, 472 and 473 of 2011) are without any basis and are hereby dismissed.” 7. Section 7 of the Act of 2004 provides as under: “7. Possession of seized agriculture cattle and Monthly reports - Till the conclusion of prosecution, seized Agricultural cattle will be under custody of nearest registered Goshala, Gosadan, Gorakshan sansthan or other registered Sansthan and they are required to provide monthly report to concerned court in prescribed proforma.” 8. A careful perusal of the aforesaid provisions would show that it provides the procedure for keeping the said animals which has to be followed by the authorities once the seizure of agricultural cattle is made pursuant to lodgment of FIR and consequent investigation. It nowhere touches upon the fact that interim custody of the agricultural cattle is not permitted or grant of interim custody is specifically/expressly barred. It is an enabling provision directing that cattle so seized has to be kept in such named institutions in Section 7 of the Act of 2004 till the conclusion of the trial. A careful perusal of Section 7 of the Act of 2004 would show that it nowhere expressly bars release of articles/cattle under Section 7 of the Act of 2004. Had it been the intention of the legislature that the seized cattle is not to be released a specific/express provision in this regard would have been incorporated in the Act of 2004 like Section 6E of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and Section 47D of the Chhattisgarh Excise Act, 1915. 9. “Expressum facit cessare tacitum” the maxim means “when there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded.” This well known maxim is a principle of logic and common sense and not merely a technical rule of construction. The said rule will be applicable while construing Section 7 of the Act of 2004. 10. The Supreme Court in the matter of Competition Commission of India vs. Still Authority of India, (2010) 10 SCC 744 has held as under: “60. Expressum facit cessare tacitum express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of other. (Expression precludes implication). This doctrine has been applied by this Court in various cases to enunciate the principle that expression precludes implication. [Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398 ]. It is always safer to apply plain and primary rule of construction. Expressum facit cessare tacitum express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of other. (Expression precludes implication). This doctrine has been applied by this Court in various cases to enunciate the principle that expression precludes implication. [Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398 ]. It is always safer to apply plain and primary rule of construction. The first and primary rule of construction is that intention of the legislature is to be found in the words used by the legislature itself. The true or legal meaning of an enactment is derived by construing the meaning of the word in the light of the discernible purpose or object which comprehends the mischief and its remedy to which an enactment is directed. [State of H.P. vs. Kailash Chand Mahajan, 1992 Supp. (2) SCC 351 and Padma Sundara Rao vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2002) 3 SCC 533 ].” 11. The Supreme Court in the matter of Kesavananda Bharati (supra) has considered the doctrine of implied prohibition by holding as under: “2087. In considering the petitioner's argument on inherent limitations, it is well to bear in mind some of the basic principles of interpretation. Absence of an express prohibition still leaves scope for the argument that there are implied or inherent limitations on a power, but absence of an express prohibition is highly relevant for inferring that there is no implied prohibition. This is clear from the decision of the Privy Council in The Queen vs. Burah, 5 IA 178, 195. This decision was followed by this Court in State of Bombay vs. Narotham Das Jaitha Bai, AIR 1951 SC 89 and in Sardar Inder Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1957 SC 510 . In saying this, I am not unmindful of the fact that Burah's case (supra) and the two cases which followed it, bear primarily on conditional legislation.” 12. In principles of statutory interpretation (14th Edition Page 809) by Justice G.P. Singh, it has been held that bar of jurisdiction has to be strictly construed and unless it is expressly barred, bar cannot be inferred or implied and this principle is also applicable to criminal Court. 13. In principles of statutory interpretation (14th Edition Page 809) by Justice G.P. Singh, it has been held that bar of jurisdiction has to be strictly construed and unless it is expressly barred, bar cannot be inferred or implied and this principle is also applicable to criminal Court. 13. In the matter of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation vs. Mohar Singh, (2008) 5 SCC 542 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court relying upon the abovestated celebrated text (principles of statutory interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh) held as under: “21. We may in this behalf profitably notice the following excerpts from the Principles of Statutory Interpretation (11th Edn.) by Justice G.P. Singh: “It is a principle by no means to be whittled down and has been referred to as a “fundamental rule.” As a necessary corollary of this rule provisions excluding jurisdiction of civil courts and provisions conferring jurisdiction on authorities and tribunals other than civil courts are strictly construed. The existence of jurisdiction in civil courts to decide questions of civil nature being the general rule and exclusion being an exception, the burden of proof to show that jurisdiction is excluded in any particular case is on the party raising such a contention. The rule that the exclusion of jurisdiction of civil court is not to be readily inferred is based on the theory that civil courts are courts of general jurisdiction and the people have a right, unless expressly or impliedly debarred to insist for free access to the courts of general jurisdiction of the State. Indeed, the principle is not limited to civil courts alone, but applies to all courts of general jurisdiction including criminal courts. The rule as stated above relating to strict construction of provisions excluding jurisdiction of courts of general jurisdiction was recently expressly approved by the Supreme Court.” 14. Following the principle of law laid down in the abovestated judgment (supra), reverting to the facts of the case, in the considered opinion of this Court, the Act of 2004 nowhere expressly bars the applicability of Sections 451 and 457 of the Cr.P.C. for grant of interim custody of seized cattle till the conclusion of trial. Following the principle of law laid down in the abovestated judgment (supra), reverting to the facts of the case, in the considered opinion of this Court, the Act of 2004 nowhere expressly bars the applicability of Sections 451 and 457 of the Cr.P.C. for grant of interim custody of seized cattle till the conclusion of trial. Section 7 of the Act of 2004 is only enabling provision and procedure prescribed in Section 7 of the Act of 2004 and that has to be followed after seizure of cattle pursuant to commission of offence, that does not mean that there is implied prohibition to exercise jurisdiction under Section 451 and 457 of the Cr.P.C. for grant of interim custody. Furthermore denying the custody of cattle till the conclusion of trial to the petitioner would be violative of his legal right to have interim custody of cattles which he own and he is likely to suffer financial loss, if cattles are not kept properly by the institution to whom custody is given under Section 7 of the Act of 2004. 15. In the considered opinion of this Court, the decision rendered by a coordinate Bench of this Court in Jalil Ansari (supra) requires reconsideration. The matter be placed for consideration to Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting larger Bench on the following stated question: “Whether Section 7 of the Act of 2004 impliedly bars the jurisdiction of criminal Court under Sections 451 and 457 of the Cr.P.C. for grant of interim custody of the cattle seized in the FIR registered for commission of offences under the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Agricultural Cattle Preservation Act, 2004?” 16. At this stage, Mr. A.K. Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that during the pendency of reference, interim custody of seized cattle till the matter is decided be given to the petitioner. In the opinion of this Court, no such direction can be given for interim custody at this stage. However, the petitioner is at liberty to make an appropriate application before the larger Bench, if so advised, making this prayer.