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2021 DIGILAW 1091 (GUJ)

SUSHMABEN PRAKASHCHANDRA PUNJABI v. STATE OF GUJARAT

2021-11-29

BIREN VAISHNAV

body2021
JUDGMENT : 1. Draft amendment is granted. To be carried out forthwith. 2. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, when the petition was initially filed, the prayer of the petitioner read as under: “B) Your Lordships may be pleased issue a writ of Certiorari or writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of Certiorari or Mandamus and declare the act of dispossessing the Petitioner, by demolishing rented shop by the Respondents with the help of Vadodara Municipal Corporation on 12/05/2017 is arbitrary, illegal, unconstitutional and violative of Art 19(i)(g) of the Constitution of India.” 3. The case of the petitioner-Sushmaben Prakashchandra Punjabi in the petition was that the father-in-law of the petitioner late Vaishakhimal Punjabi had taken the shop on rent from the respondent no.2-District Panchayat, Vadodara, which was located near Damajirao Dharamshala, opposite railway station, Vadodara. A small restaurant in the name of Shere- Punjab was started. The license was produced. The father in law of the petitioner died on 05.08.1975 and the tenancy rights were transferred in the name of the petitioner’s husband Mr.Prakashchandra Vaishakhimal Punjabi. On the death of the petitioner’s husband on 05.03.2005, the petitioner applied for becoming a tenant of shop vide application dated 01.11.2006. A resolution was passed and by resolution no.65, the petitioner was declared as tenant of the shop. The petitioner had necessary permissions to run the restaurant. The cause of approaching the Court in the year 2017 was the notices issued by the Vadodara Municipal Corporation on 11.05.2017 under Section 264 of the Gujarat Provincial Municipal Corporation Act opining that the rented premises were in dilapidated condition and therefore need to be demolished. The notice also stated that a cost certificate under Section 10D(4) of the Rent Act would be given and permission to repair the same also would be furnished. It is in this context that the petitioner made prayer which is referred to herein above. 4. On 13.10.2021, the petition was amended and the amended prayer of the petition read as under: “7(AA) Your Lordships may be pleased issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or directions quashing and setting aside impugned notice dated 11.05.2017 and 12.05.2017 issued by the respondent-corporation (at ANNEXURE-K (Colly) hereto); 5. Mr.Majmudar learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would draw the attention of the Court to the notice dated 11.05.2017 and submit that it is evident on reading the notice that what was stated therein was that the shop had become dangerous to occupy, was in a dilapidated condition and therefore ought to have been repaired. He submitted that an opportunity ought to have been given to the tenant to undertake repairs. Without such an opportunity being offered, in violation of principles of natural justice, vide a procedure which was unwarranted and illegal, demolition was carried out on 12.05.2015. Mr.Majmudar would invite the attention of the Court to the pleadings particularly para 2.5 thereof to indicate that the demolition was done illegally and was malice and bad in law. Relying on Section 264 of the Act and in support thereof a decision of this Court in case of Baroda Municipal Corporation v. the Heirs of Deceased Shah Kanaiyalal Jain reported in 1994 (1) GCD 916 was cited, Mr.Majmudar would invite the attention of the Court to para 7 thereof, wherein, the Court observed that the procedure under Section 264(1) of the Act has to be exercised in accordance with law and the same is not exercised bona-fide and is an outcome of mala-fide and it is susceptible to be set aside. He would submit that a petitioner was a lawful tenant and could not have been evicted by the landlord District Panchayat without following the provisions of Gujarat Public Premises Eviction Act, 1972. There were resolutions recognizing the tenancy rights of the petitioner and demolition therefore was bad. The shop was never in a dilapidated condition. It is in this context the prayer is made by way of an amendment which is granted today that the petitioner be permitted to carry on her business at the property in question with a further direction to the corporation to reconstruct the shop of the petitioner which has been illegally demolished. 6. Mr.Maulik Nanavati learned counsel appearing for the Municipal Corporation would submit that if the prayers as initially framed in the petition are closely read, it would indicate that the prayer was to declare the act of dispossessing the petitioner and demolition of the rented shop by the Vadodara Municipal Corporation be declared as illegal. At that point of time, the Corporation was never a party respondent. At that point of time, the Corporation was never a party respondent. Subsequently in the year 2021, prayer 7AA was amended, by which, the prayer was made to quash and set aside the impugned notices dated 11.05.2017 and 12.05.2017. The petitioner was knowing fully well when the petition was filed that Vadodara Municipal Corporation was the necessary party and the same was not joined as a party respondent. In addition thereto, he would submit that it is within the powers of the corporation under Section 264 of the Act to pull down any building which has become dangerous or is in a dilapidated condition. The only remedy which the petitioner is having, is by way of a filing of suit against the owner of the land. As far as the decision relied upon by Mr.Majmudar, Mr.Nanavati would submit that this was a decision in a civil proceedings and would not be applicable on the facts of the case. 7. It is in this set of facts, what needs to be considered are the pleadings in the petition. 8. When the petition was filed in August 2017, the pleadings in the petition read as under: “2.5 However, suddenly on 12/05/2017, the Vadodara Municipal Corporation issued another notice vide its letter no.24/22/17-18, wherein it was stated that the construction of the rented shop was done illegally without permission, therefore it is required to be removed immediately. And after one hour of issuance of this second notice, the authorities of Vadodara Municipal Corporation came with various machines and under the instructions and presence of the Municipal Commissioner of Vadodara, has demolished the rented premises of the Petitioner. A copy of the sid notice is annexed herewith and marked as ANNEXURE – J. Thus by such high-handed, illegal, arbitrary and unconstitutional act, the Respondents has removed the Petitioner from its rented premises, with the help of Vadodara Municipal Corporation. …3.1 The action of the Respondents to demolish the rented shop through Vadodara Municipal Corporation, is illegal, arbitrary, unconstitutional and violative of the fundamental right of the Petitioner to do business. …3.1 The action of the Respondents to demolish the rented shop through Vadodara Municipal Corporation, is illegal, arbitrary, unconstitutional and violative of the fundamental right of the Petitioner to do business. Therefore the present petition is required to be allowed.” … 3.6 The Respondents has demolished the shop of only the Petitioner, while all other shops on the same road and adjoining to the shop of the Petitioner, are not touched by the Vadodara Municipal Corporation, therefore the action of demolishing the petitioner’s shop, was arbitrary. Therefore the present petition is required to be allowed.” 9. Being fully aware as is evident from the pleadings that the remedy that was to be availed was against the Vadodara Municipal Corporation, it was only after four years of filing the petition that by way of an amendment the Corporation is joined as a party. 10. Assuming for the sake of argument that the petitioner ought not to be ousted only on the ground of delay in joining the necessary party, reading Section 264 of the Act would make it clear that if at any time it appears to the Commissioner that any structure is in a ruinous condition or likely to fall or in any way dangerous to any person occupying, restoring or passing by such structure or any other structure or any place thereof or neighborhood thereof, the Commissioner may by a written notice require the owner or the occupier of such structure to pull down, secure, remove or repair such structure or thing. To submission of Mr.Majmudar that no option to repair the structure was given, may be it was a perception of the petitioner that the only remedy that the Commissioner had was to ask the occupier to get the structure repaired. By the impugned notice the Commissioner has thought it fit to give a written notice to remove the structure, which, in the perception of the Corporation, was in a dilapidated condition. It is in this context that when the petition was filed, the petitioner has only prayed to set aside the action of the dispossession and demolition of the structure and essentially then it was only the District Panchayat which was in the array of the respondents, the remedy then clearly therefore that was available with the petitioner was by way of a civil proceedings. As far as the contention of Mr.Majmudar relying on Section 5(a) and Section 264 is concerned, it is on an application that such an opinion has to be formed by the Commissioner. On the condition that there has been a violation of principles of natural justice inasmuch as the structure was pulled down immediately on 12.05.2017, and the notice being given only on 11.05.2017, what is evident is that the opportunity was given. 11. The challenge to the notices of quashing are only postfacto decision which clearly is reflected as an afterthought when read in the context of pleadings. Such a prayer was made four years after the petition was filed. The decision in case of Baroda Municipal Corporation v. Heirs of The Deceased Shah Kanaiyalal Jethalal reported in 1994 (1) GCD 916 relied upon by Mr.Majmudar may not be of any assistance in this case though it was canvassed in view of interpretation of Section 264 of the Act, the amended prayer to restore possession and permit the petitioner to carry out his business with a direction to the respondent-Corporation to reconstruct the shop of the petitioner cannot be granted as admittedly, ownership does not vest with the Corporation. 12. As far as the averments made regarding malice, they have been made only after the amendment in the year 2021 whereas when the petition was filed, it was bereft of any details. 13. In view of the above, the petition is dismissed.