JUDGMENT : C.S. Sudha, J. The present appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter, 'the Act') is directed against the order dated 15th of March 2019 passed by the Additional District Judge-IV, Thiruvananthapuram. By the said order, the District Court had rejected the application filed by the appellants herein under Section 34 of the Act. The appellants allege that Annexure A9 award is in violation of Section 34(2)(a) (iv), 2(b)(ii) and Section 34(2-A) of the Act; that it is in conflict with the fundamental policy of Indian law; that there is patent illegality appearing on the face of the award, and that it is against the basic notions of morality and justice, apart from being perverse. 2. The facts germane for deciding the present appeal are as follows - The parties herein entered into three separate agreements dated 26.10.2011, viz., Exts. C5, C6 and C7, whereby the respondent/claimant was awarded the contract for putting up advertisements in Kollam, Ernakulam and Thrissur railway stations for a period of 5 years. As per the agreement, the respondent was to remit Rs.64,00,000/- to the appellants/Railways by way of four quarterly instalments towards annual license fee. However, the respondent failed to pay the instalments as agreed and the appellants terminated the contract on 15.06.2012. The respondent thereafter challenged the termination of the contract by way of W.P.(C)No.14877/2012 filed before this Court and a Single Judge of this Court dismissed the same vide judgment dated 05.07.2012, pursuant to which, the respondent preferred W.A.No.1293/2012 wherein a Division Bench of this Court, while declining to interfere with the termination of the contract, directed the Railways to consider the issue and pass orders on the representation filed by the respondent. Subsequently, the respondent’s representation was considered and the contract was re-awarded to the respondent on 09.08.2012. The revised terms of the contract were accepted by the respondent. Even thereafter the respondent was unable to make timely payments of the license fee. This resulted in another round of litigation before this Court wherein the respondent undertook to clear all outstanding dues to the tune of Rs.105.6 Lakhs by 26.04.2013. The respondent did not honour his promise which prompted the appellants to terminate the contract on 27.04.2013. 3. Soon thereafter, an Arbitrator was appointed to settle the dispute between the parties, by this Court on 27.01.2014, on an application preferred by the respondent herein. The respondent did not honour his promise which prompted the appellants to terminate the contract on 27.04.2013. 3. Soon thereafter, an Arbitrator was appointed to settle the dispute between the parties, by this Court on 27.01.2014, on an application preferred by the respondent herein. The Arbitrator vide award dated 24.09.2016 held that the termination of the contract is illegal and awarded a compensation of Rs.2,11,20,000/- for such illegal termination along with interest at the rate of 12% p.a. from 27.01.2014 (the date of the order on arbitration request), till the date of the award and thereafter at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of realization with costs of Rs.3,00,000/-. It was also held that the appellants herein are entitled to realise a sum of Rs.64,00,000/- with future interest at 12% per annum from the date of the arbitration request and the same was deducted from the compensation awarded to the respondent/claimant. Effectively, the respondent/claimant was held entitled to realise a sum of Rs.1,47,20,000/- along with interest. 4. The respondent challenged the award under Section 34 of the Act. The District Court set aside the award on the ground that the award has been passed in violation of Annexures A6 and A8 judgments of this Court and that the Arbitrator did not have the jurisdiction to nullify the judgments passed by this Court. On appeal, this Court allowed the same and remanded the matter to the District Court for fresh consideration in the light of the Arbitration and Conciliation Amendment Act, 2015. On remand, the District Court dismissed the application under section 34 vide Annexure A11 order. 5. Heard Sri. Dinesh Rao A., learned counsel for the appellants and Sri. K.C. Eldho, learned counsel for the respondent. 6. While the learned counsel for the respondent defended the award and the judgment of the court below, the appellants argue that the award is in conflict with the fundamental policy of Indian law; that patent illegality appears on the face of the award; that it is against the basic notions of morality or justice and is perverse as explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in PSA SICAL Terminals Pvt. Ltd. vs. the Board of Trustees of V.O. Chidambranar Port Trust Tuticorin [2021 SCC ONLINE SC 508]. The learned counsel for the appellants argued that the termination of the contract was as per the clauses in the agreement dated 26.10.2011 entered into between the parties. It is also argued that the award calculated as Rs.2,11,20,000/- is perverse, unreasonable and defies logic. 7. From the award, it is seen that the Arbitrator had awarded a sum of Rs.2,11,20,000/- for wrongful termination of the contract by the appellants herein. It is not clear as to how he arrived at the said figure. It is also relevant to note that the respondent/claimant has not proved the loss that has been caused to him. Furthermore, it is not in dispute that the agreements dated 26.10.2011 reserve the right of the appellants to terminate the contract if the license fee is not remitted in time or if the respondent/claimant is in breach of any other condition in the contract. The task before us in this appeal is to ascertain whether the aforementioned anomalies as pointed out by the appellants, warranted an interference under Section 34 of the Act, and if so, whether the District Court ought to have set aside the award. 8. The relevant clauses in the agreement with regard to termination of the contract are reproduced below- “3. The contractor shall pay the annual license fee. Four equal installments on or before the commencement of each quarter. The first year license fee is Rs.64,00,000/- (Rupees Sixty four lakhs only)” which shall be increased by 10%, 15%, 20% and 25% respectively over the rate of previous years. Any failure in this regard will be reckoned as breach of contract on the part of the contractor and Railway Administration shall have the right to take action deemed fit including imposition of fine, termination of contract duly forfeiting the SD without prejudice to its rights to claim ascertained liquidated damages. Apart from the rentals and electric energy etc, any such amount as may be due to the electrical/concerned Branch/Trivandrum division should also be paid. xxxxxxx 9. The Railway Administration reserves the right to terminate the agreement without assigning any reason/ reasons at any time by giving notice of not less than 30 days and the contractor shall not be entitled for any compensation for damages caused by reasons of such terminations other than proportionate abatement of display charges for the periods of non-display. xxxxxxxxx 15. All advertisements material etc. xxxxxxxxx 15. All advertisements material etc. should be removed by the contractor from Railway premises immediately after the contract period is over or if the contract is terminated or if the contract is terminated due to breach of any of its conditions. 15.A. The contractor is free to decide the tariff to be charged from his clients. Change in tariff structure may be carried out by the contractor as and when required. 16. In the event of the contractor not complying with any of the conditions stipulated to the satisfaction of the Railway Administration, the Railway Administration shall have the right to terminate the contract and take any action deemed fit including forfeiture of all amount paid in advance and confiscation of the materials without prejudice to its right to claim damages from the successful contractor.” 9. Admittedly, the respondent herein has committed default in the deposit of license fee and the appellants terminated the contract invoking clause 3. Therefore, it is the case of the appellants that, in the light of the above provisions of the contract, the appellants were well within the authority to terminate the contract. However, the Arbitrator was of the opinion that the appellants, while re-awarding the contract and incorporating new terms therein, have diluted clause 3 and therefore, have waived their right to terminate the contract. The new terms that were incorporated when the contract was re-awarded are as follows - “(1) The 3rd quarter amount Rs.48 lakhs due from you should be remitted on 14.08.2012 (2) 4th quarter amount Rs.48 lakhs should be remitted on or before 07.09.2012. (3) You should remit the penal interest for the delay payment @4.5% above SBI base rate. (4) The existing bank guarantee is increased to 25% of the annual licence fee instead of 10% as at present. The same should be submitted immediately. (5) Rider agreement should be executed duly adding these two conditions (Nos.4 and 5) at the earliest.” 10. According to the Arbitrator, the aforesaid conditions would show that while re-awarding the contract, the appellants had made a departure from Clause 3 of the contract. Different dates were given for remitting the license fee; and for belated payment, penal interest above the SBI base rate was fixed. According to the Arbitrator, the aforesaid conditions would show that while re-awarding the contract, the appellants had made a departure from Clause 3 of the contract. Different dates were given for remitting the license fee; and for belated payment, penal interest above the SBI base rate was fixed. This according to the Arbitrator is indication of the fact that the appellants were not serious in terminating the contract for failure to remit the license fee in time by invoking Clause 3 and option was given to the respondent/claimant to remit the defaulted instalments on a later date with penal interest. The Arbitrator also opined that the appellants had gone beyond the initial agreements regarding bank guarantee, which was enhanced from 10% in the original agreements to 15%. These aspects according to the Arbitrator indicate the intention of the parties that the date of payment of the license fee mentioned in the agreements was for information and knowledge of the parties only and that in the event of delay in remitting the license fee, the respondent/claimant could remit it at a later date with penal interest and to ensure the payment, sufficient bank guarantee was obtained. 11. Furthermore, the Arbitrator has also pointed out that the contract was terminated in a hurry and that too on a Saturday, which is a nonworking day for the appellants/Railways. Also, the termination was effected by an officer below the rank of an officer who had awarded the contract. The Arbitrator found that the appellants/Railways had remained silent with regard to the allegation of demand of illegal gratification levelled against a senior officer. The Arbitrator, after analysing the evidence let in by the respondent/claimant held that the allegation that a senior officer in the railways had demanded Rs.25,00,000/- as bribe from the respondent herein is probable and that the refusal of the respondent/claimant to heed to this unlawful demand was also a factor leading to the unlawful termination of the contract. According to the Arbitrator, these factors are sufficient indicators to show that the appellants/Railways had taken a hostile attitude towards the respondent/claimant and was just waiting for an opportunity to terminate the contract. 12. Before we arrive at a decision as to whether the Arbitrator was right or justified in concluding so, the law on the point needs to be referred to. 12. Before we arrive at a decision as to whether the Arbitrator was right or justified in concluding so, the law on the point needs to be referred to. It is well settled that the Court while exercising jurisdiction under S.34 of the Act does not sit as the Court of appeal. The scope of S.34 is very limited. It is also settled law that the Arbitral Tribunal is the final adjudicator of facts and evidence adduced before it. When a case involves interpretation of a clause or some clauses of an agreement and the Arbitral Tribunal gives an interpretation which is plausible, the Court should not substitute that interpretation for its own interpretation only because the Court takes a different view or feels that the other interpretation is a better interpretation. (State of Rajasthan v. Nav Bharat Construction Co. 2010 (2) SCC 182 ). 13. If the view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal is a plausible one and just because the Court may have a different view, the arbitral award should not be interfered with under S.34 of the Act. When two commercial parties agree to have their disputes resolved through arbitration reference, they should be bound by the award of the Arbitral Tribunal unless, of course, rules of natural justice have been breached or there is something so shocking in the award staring at the face of the court that would prompt the Court to interfere. (see Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. vs. M/s.Dewan Chand Ram Saran [2012 KHC 4240]). 14. It has been laid down in M/s Sudarsan Trading Co. v. Govt. of Kerala reported in 1989 (2) SCC 38 , that even if one is of the view that the interpretation rendered by the Arbitrator is erroneous, one is not expected to interfere therein if two views are possible. The court is not expected to substitute its evaluation of the conclusion of law or fact arrived at by the Arbitrator. The court has no jurisdiction to substitute its own evaluation of the conclusion of law or fact to come to a conclusion that the Arbitrator had acted contrary to the bargain between the parties. It is not permissible for the Court to interfere with the Arbitrator's view merely because another view of the matter is possible. 15. The court has no jurisdiction to substitute its own evaluation of the conclusion of law or fact to come to a conclusion that the Arbitrator had acted contrary to the bargain between the parties. It is not permissible for the Court to interfere with the Arbitrator's view merely because another view of the matter is possible. 15. Therefore, the Court under S. 34 is not permitted to re-appreciate the evidence placed before the Arbitrator as he is the best Judge of the quality as well as quantity of evidence and it will not be for the Court to take upon itself the task of being a Judge of the evidence before the Arbitrator. 16. In the instant case, the wisdom of the Arbitrator does not shock the conscience of the Court because the Arbitrator arrived at the aforesaid conclusion after appreciating both the oral and documentary evidence on record. Therefore, neither this Court nor the court below would be right in re-appreciating the evidence and arriving at a different finding. Also, as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Associate Builders v. DDA ( AIR 2015 SC 620 ), construction of the terms of a contract is the exclusive domain of the Arbitrator and the courts can intervene only if the construction is one which no reasonable man would endorse. In such circumstances, the argument of the appellants that the Arbitrator while holding that the termination of contract was illegal has re-written the contract, cannot be accepted. 17. Now that the Arbitrator’s finding as regards the illegality of the termination of contract is not interfered with, this Court needs to ascertain whether the compensation of Rs.2,11,20,000/- awarded to the respondent/ claimant is sustainable. While considering the said issue, this Court needs to keep in mind that the aforesaid amount arrived at by the Arbitrator is not based on any evidence. Furthermore, the claimant/respondent has not proved any loss of profit as a result of the termination of contract. Here S.73 of the Contract Act needs to be referred to, which says that when a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive from the party who has broken the contract, compensation for any loss or damage caused to him by such breach. However, such compensation cannot be given for any remote and indirect loss or damage sustained by such breach. However, such compensation cannot be given for any remote and indirect loss or damage sustained by such breach. Application of S.73 would come into play only when there is no penalty stipulated for or no genuine pre-estimate of damages (liquidated damages) was arrived at by mutual agreement in the contract. In the instant case also neither has any penalty been stipulated nor has any liquidated damages been arrived at between the parties while entering into the agreements. S.73 imposes on the party complaining of breach to prove the actual damages or loss caused to him thereby, including loss which would naturally arise in the usual course of things from such breach. So, S.73 demands proof regarding the loss or damage sustained by the breach of the other party. [Micheal v. Sebastian, 2017 (4) KHC 52 ]. 18. In the case on hand, the Arbitrator has awarded as compensation, an amount of Rs.2,11,20,000/- even though the claimant/respondent herein has neither proved any loss nor has he shown any loss of profit. Even the Arbitrator, while awarding the aforesaid amount has not discussed the basis for arriving at the said figure. Though both oral and documentary evidence was adduced by the respondent in support of his claim for compensation, the said evidence was found wanting by the Arbitrator to establish the respondent’s claim. That being the position, the amount of compensation arrived at by the Arbitrator is based on no evidence, which he could not have done in the light of the mandate contained in S.73 of the Contract Act. 19. Further, it is well settled that the ground of patent illegality under the Act would be attracted if the finding of the Arbitrator is based on no evidence at all or on irrelevant considerations or if the same ignores vital evidence, as such an award would be perverse [see PSA SICAL Terminals Pvt. Ltd. (supra), Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI (2019 KHC 6554) and Associate Builders (supra)]. The position has been most succinctly stated in Associate Builders (supra) in the following words- “40. … The third juristic principle is that a decision which is perverse or so irrational that no reasonable person would have arrived at the same is important and requires some degree of explanation. It is settled law that where - 1. a finding is based on no evidence, or 2. … The third juristic principle is that a decision which is perverse or so irrational that no reasonable person would have arrived at the same is important and requires some degree of explanation. It is settled law that where - 1. a finding is based on no evidence, or 2. an arbitral tribunal takes into account something irrelevant to the decision which it arrives at; or 3. ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision, such decision would necessarily be perverse. A good working test of perversity is contained in two judgments. In H.B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer cum - Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312 at p. 317, it was held: "7. …................It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law." In Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police, 1999 (2) SCC 10 at para 10, it was held: "10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with." It must clearly be understood that when a court is applying the "public policy" test to an arbitration award, it does not act as a court of appeal and consequently errors of fact cannot be corrected. A possible view by the arbitrator on facts has necessarily to pass muster as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and quality of evidence to be relied upon when he delivers his arbitral award. Thus an award based on little evidence or on evidence which does not measure up in quality to a trained legal mind would not be held to be invalid on this score …” 20. Thus an award based on little evidence or on evidence which does not measure up in quality to a trained legal mind would not be held to be invalid on this score …” 20. In the aforesaid circumstance, we have no hesitation in holding that the amount arrived at by the Arbitrator is based on no evidence and as such, it is perverse. 21. Having found so, what remains to be ascertained is whether the portion of the award that is found to be perverse is separable from the other parts of the award so as to be set aside. If an award deals with and decides several claims separately and distinctly, even if the Court finds that the award in regard to some items is bad, the Court will segregate the award on items which did not suffer from any infirmity and uphold the award to that extent. (J. G. Engineers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2011 KHC 4418 : AIR 2011 SC 2477 ) 22. As stated earlier, there is no nexus between the amount awarded and the claims put forth by the respondent/claimant under various heads, or the evidence adduced by him. The Arbitrator has rejected all the evidence that the respondent/claimant offered to show that he had suffered loss and has also gone to the extent of observing that the claims put forth are tall claims. Therefore, we fail to understand as to how the Arbitrator had arrived at the figure. We are constrained to say that the amount awarded, that is, Rs.2,11,20,000/- was arrived at arbitrarily and is not based on any evidence. Hence, the question posed whether the portion of the award that is found to be perverse is separable from the other parts of the award so as to be set aside, has to be answered in the affirmative. So, we hold that the portion of the award which allows Rs.2,11,20,000/- to the respondent/claimant as being perverse and the same is liable to be set aside and we do so. To hold otherwise or to conclude that the court has no power to set aside that part of the award granting compensation would mean that this Court endorses the finding arrived at by the Arbitrator sans evidence. To hold otherwise or to conclude that the court has no power to set aside that part of the award granting compensation would mean that this Court endorses the finding arrived at by the Arbitrator sans evidence. Any amount – be it high or low, awarded for loss not proved, is against the principle enshrined in S.73 of the Contract Act and would also be an award which qualifies as perverse. In such circumstances, interference is warranted. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the award is set aside in so far as it grants compensation of Rs.2,11,20,000/- to the respondent/claimant. The parties are left to bear their respective costs. Pending applications if any, shall stand disposed of.