JUDGMENT : Ashwani Kumar Mishra, J. 1. This petition is by the minority institution challenging an order of the District Inspector of Schools, Ghazipur dated 16.3.2021 disapproving the proposed suspension of private respondent as also the orders dated 28.1.2021 and 22.2.2021, which direct payment of salary to be released to the private respondent. The order disapproving the suspension dated 16.3.2021 records that the Manager of the institution had placed the private respondent under suspension on 31.12.2020, whereas the resolution of the Managing Committee to place him under suspension was passed on 3.1.2021. The Inspector, therefore, has observed that on the date of passing of the order of suspension there was no valid resolution by the Managing Committee and, therefore, the order of Manager was without jurisdiction. 2. The aforesaid order is assailed on various grounds. It is urged that being a minority institution the Inspector has no authority to disapprove the resolution for placing private respondent under suspension as the right of minority institution to manage its affairs are infringed. Reliance is placed upon a judgment of this Court in C/M Clancy Intermediate College vs. State of U.P. and Others (Writ Petition No. 15765 of 2016). Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that after the order of suspension was passed by the Manager a valid resolution was passed by the Managing Committee on 3.1.2021, which has the effect of ratifying the earlier order of Manager. This resolution was also on record before the Inspector. 3. In support of plea of ratification Sri Sankalp Narain, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon a judgment of Supreme Court in National Institute of Technology and Others vs. Pannalal Chaudhary, AIR 2015 SC 2846 , in which Supreme Court has observed as under in Para 34 to 40: ''34. That apart, the issue in question could be examined from yet another angle by applying the law relating to ''Ratification'' which was not taken note of by the High Court. 35. The expression ''Ratification'' means ''the making valid of an act already done''. This principle is derived from the Latin maxim ''ratihabitio mandato aequiparatur'' meaning thereby ''a subsequent ratification of an act is equivalent to a prior authority to perform such act.'' It is for this reason; the ratification assumes an invalid act, which is retrospectively validated. 36. 35. The expression ''Ratification'' means ''the making valid of an act already done''. This principle is derived from the Latin maxim ''ratihabitio mandato aequiparatur'' meaning thereby ''a subsequent ratification of an act is equivalent to a prior authority to perform such act.'' It is for this reason; the ratification assumes an invalid act, which is retrospectively validated. 36. The expression ''ratification'' was succinctly defined by the English Court in one old case, Hartman v. Hornsby, 142 Mo 368 44 SW 242, 244 as under: ''Ratification'' is the approval by act, word, or conduct, of that which was attempted (of accomplishment), but which was improperly or unauthorisedly performed in the first instance.' 37. The law of ratification was applied by this Court in Parmeshwari Prasad Gupta vs. U.O.I. (1973) 2 SCC 543 . In that case, the Chairman of the Board of Directors had terminated the services of the General Manager of a Company pursuant to a resolution taken by the Board at a meeting. It was not in dispute that the meeting had been improperly held and consequently the resolution passed in the said meeting terminating the services of General Manager was invalid. However, the Board of Directors then convened subsequent meeting and in this meeting affirmed the earlier resolution, which had been passed in improper meeting. On these facts, the Court held, Even if it be assumed that the telegram and the letter terminating the services of the appellant by the Chairman was in pursuance of the invalid resolution of the Board of Directors passed on 16-12-1953 to terminate his services, it would not follow that the action of the Chairman could not be ratified in a regularly convened meeting of the Board of Directors. The point is that even assuming that the Chairman was not legally authorised to terminate the services of the appellant, he was acting on behalf of the Company in doing so, because, he purported to act in pursuance of the invalid resolution. Therefore, it was open to a regularly constituted meeting of the Board of Directors to ratify that action which, though unauthorised, was done on behalf of the Company. Ratification would always relate back to the date of the act ratified and so it must be held that the services of the appellant were validly terminated on 17-12-1953. 38. Therefore, it was open to a regularly constituted meeting of the Board of Directors to ratify that action which, though unauthorised, was done on behalf of the Company. Ratification would always relate back to the date of the act ratified and so it must be held that the services of the appellant were validly terminated on 17-12-1953. 38. This view was approved by this Court in High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan vs. P.P. Singh and Another, (2003) 4 SCC 239 . 39. The aforesaid principle of law of ratification was again applied by this Court in Maharashtra State Mining Corporation vs. Sunil, (2006) 5 SCC 96 . In this case, the respondent was an employee of the appellant Corporation. Consequent to a departmental enquiry, he was dismissed by the Managing Director of the appellant. The respondent then filed a writ petition before the High Court. During the pendency of the writ petition, the Board of Directors of the appellant Corporation passed a resolution ratifying the impugned action of the Managing Director and also empowering him to take decision in respect of the officers and staff in the grade of pay the maximum of which did not exceed Rs. 4700 p.m. Earlier, the Managing Director had powers only in respect of those posts where the maximum pay did not exceed Rs. 1900 p.m. The respondent at the relevant time was drawing more than Rs. 1800 p.m. Therefore, at the relevant time, the Managing Director was incompetent to dismiss the respondent. Accordingly, the High Court held the order of dismissal to be invalid. The High Court further held that the said defect could not be rectified subsequently by the resolution of the Board of Directors. The High Court set aside the dismissal order and granted consequential relief. The appellant then filed the appeal in this Court by special leave. Justice Ruma Pal, speaking for three-Judge Bench, while allowing the appeal and setting aside of the Court held as under: The High Court rightly held that an act by a legally incompetent authority is invalid. But it was entirely wrong in holding that such an invalid act could not be subsequently ''rectified'' by ratification of the competent authority. Ratification by definition means the making valid of an act already done. But it was entirely wrong in holding that such an invalid act could not be subsequently ''rectified'' by ratification of the competent authority. Ratification by definition means the making valid of an act already done. The principle is derived from the Latin maxim ratihabitio mandato aequiparatur, namely, ''a subsequent ratification of an act is equivalent to a prior authority to perform such act.'' Therefore, ratification assumes an invalid act which is retrospectively validated. In the present case, the Managing Director's order dismissing the respondent from service was admittedly ratified by the Board of Directors unquestionably had the power to terminate the services of the respondent. Since the order of the Managing Director had been ratified by the Board of Directors such ratification related back to the date of the order and validated it. 40. Applying the aforementioned law of ratification to the facts at hand, even if we assume for the sake of argument that the order of dismissal dated 16.8.1996 was passed by the Principal and Secretary who had neither any authority to pass such order under the Rules nor there was any authorization given by the BOG in his favour to pass such order yet in our considered view when the BOG in their meeting held on 22.8.1996 approved the previous actions of the Principal and Secretary in passing the respondent's dismissal order dated 16.8.1996, all the irregularities complained of by the respondent in the proceedings including the authority exercised by the Principal and Secretary to dismiss him stood ratified by the Competent Authority (Board of Governors) themselves with retrospective effect from 16.8.1996 thereby making an invalid act a lawful one in conformity with the procedure prescribed in Rules.'' 4. Per contra, Sri Kushmondeya Shahi, learned counsel for the respondents in support of his plea that Inspector has jurisdiction to disapprove the suspension has placed reliance upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Ms. G. Vallikumari vs. Andhra Education Society and Others, 2010 (2) SCC 497 . Delhi School Education Act fell for consideration before the Court and is reproduced hereinafter: ''8(4). G. Vallikumari vs. Andhra Education Society and Others, 2010 (2) SCC 497 . Delhi School Education Act fell for consideration before the Court and is reproduced hereinafter: ''8(4). Where the managing committee of a recognised private school intends to suspend any of its employees, such intention shall be communicated to the Director and no such suspension shall be made except with the prior approval of the Director: Provided that the managing committee may suspend an employee with immediate effect and without the prior approval of the Director if it is satisfied that such immediate suspension is necessary by reason of the gross misconduct within the meaning of the Code of Conduct prescribed under Section 9, of the employee: Provided further that no such immediate suspension shall remain in force for more than a period of fifteen days from the date of suspension unless it has been communicated to the Director and approved by him before the expiry of the said period.'' 5. The Supreme Court after consideration all judgments on the point observed as under in Para 12: "12. The prepositions which can be culled out from the above noted two judgments are: (i) Section 8(1), (3), (4) and (5) of the Act do not violate the right of the minorities to establish and administer their educational institutions. However, Section 8(1) interferes with the said right of the minorities and is, therefore, inapplicable to private recognized aided/unaided minority educational institutions. (ii) Section 12 of the Act, which makes the provisions of Chapter IV of the Act inapplicable to unaided private recognized minority educational institutions is discriminatory except to extent of Section 8(2). In other words, Chapter IV of the Act except Section 8(2) is applicable to private recognized aided as well as unaided minority educational institutions and the concerned authorities of the education department are bound to enforce the same against all such institutions.'' 6. I have heard Sri Sankalp Narain, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Kushmondeya Shahi, learned counsel for the respondents and persued the materials placed on records. The first question that falls for determination in the facts of the case is as to whether the order of inspector can be sustained only on the ground that no resolution was passed by the Managing committed for placing the private respondent under suspension when the order of suspension itself was passed by the Manager. 7. The first question that falls for determination in the facts of the case is as to whether the order of inspector can be sustained only on the ground that no resolution was passed by the Managing committed for placing the private respondent under suspension when the order of suspension itself was passed by the Manager. 7. Admittedly the institution herein is recognized under the provisions of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921. Section 16G of the Act regulates the conditions of service of Head of the institution, teacher and other employees. Sub-section 5 to 7 of the aforesaid provision are relevant for the present purposes and are reproduced hereinafter: ''(5) No Head of Institution or teacher shall be suspended by the Management, unless in the opinion of the Management: (a) the charges against him are serious enough to merit his dismissal, removal or reduction in rank; or (b) his continuance in office is likely to hamper or prejudice the conduct of disciplinary proceedings against him; or (c) any criminal case for an offence involving moral turpitude against him is under investigation, inquiry or trial. (6) Where any Head of Institution or teacher is suspended by the Committee of Management, it shall be reported to the Inspector within thirty days from the date of the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, in case the order of suspension was passed before such commencement, and within seven days from the date of the order of suspension in any other case, and the report shall contain such particulars as may be prescribed and be accompanied by all relevant documents. (7) No such order of suspension shall, unless approved in writing by the Inspector, remain in force more than sixty days form the date of commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, or as the case may be, from the date of such order and the order of the Inspector shall be final and shall not be questioned in any Court.'' 8. From the bare provisions quoted above, it is apparent that power to place a Head of institution or teacher under suspension is with the Management and not the Manager. Unless a resolution is passed by the Managing Committee an order of suspension cannot be passed. From the bare provisions quoted above, it is apparent that power to place a Head of institution or teacher under suspension is with the Management and not the Manager. Unless a resolution is passed by the Managing Committee an order of suspension cannot be passed. In the facts of the present case, however, Inspector has admitted that at the time when he considered the question of approval to the order of suspension a resolution dated 3.1.2021 of the Managing Committee had been placed before him. This resolution is not disputed. This resolution will have the effect of ratifying the decision of Manager to place the petitioner under suspension in light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of National Institute of Technology (Supra). Para 40 of the judgment in National Institute of Technology (Supra) effectively demolishes the reasoning assigned by the Inspector for passing his order. Since the Inspector has failed to take into consideration the subsequent ratification of Manager's decision by the Management of the Institution, nor the law relating ratification has been examined as such the finding in the order of Inspector that the suspension order is without jurisdiction cannot be sustained. 9. So far as petitioner's plea of interference in the right of minority institution to manage its affairs is concerned it would be worth noticing that the power under the Act is vested with the Inspector to pass an appropriate order in the matter of approval to suspension. Such exercise of power is not unguided. The exercise of power by the Inspector under Section 16 G (7) is regulated by Regulation 39 contained in Chapter 3 of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921, which is reproduced hereinafter: ''39. Such exercise of power is not unguided. The exercise of power by the Inspector under Section 16 G (7) is regulated by Regulation 39 contained in Chapter 3 of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921, which is reproduced hereinafter: ''39. (a) The report regarding the suspension of the head of institution or of the teacher to be submitted to the Inspector under sub-section (6) of Section 16-G shall contain the following particulars and be accompanied by the following document- (a) the name of the persons suspended alongwith, particulars of the (posts including grades) held by him since the date of his original appointment till the time of suspension including particulars as to the nature of tenure held at the time of suspension, e.g., temporary permanent or officiating : (b) a certified copy of the report on the basis of which such person was last confirmed or allowed to cross efficiency bar, whicheveiy later; (c) details of all the charges on the basis of which such person was suspended; (d) certified copies of the complaints, reports and inquiry report, if any, of the inquiry officer on the basis of which such person was suspended; (e) certified copy of the resolution of the Committee of Management suspending such person; (f) certified copy of the order of suspension issued to such person; (g) in case such person was suspended previously also, details of the charges, on which and the period for which he was suspended on previous occasions accompanied by certified copies of the orders on the basis of which he was re-instated. (2) An employee other than a head of institution or a teacher may be suspended by the appointing authority on any of the grounds specified in Clauses (a) to (c) of sub-section (5) of Section 16-G.'' 10. The above provision does not interfere with the right of minority institution to place a teacher under suspension but merely regulates the exercise of such power in such a manner so as to protect the right of teacher from arbitrary exercise of power by the management. 11. The above provision does not interfere with the right of minority institution to place a teacher under suspension but merely regulates the exercise of such power in such a manner so as to protect the right of teacher from arbitrary exercise of power by the management. 11. Sri Sankalp Narain, learned counsel for the petitioner has fairly placed before the Court the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of All Saints High School, Hyderabad and Others vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, AIR 1980 SC 1042 , wherein the Supreme Court observed as under in paragraph 14 and 15: ''Section 3 (3) (a) provides that no teacher employed in any private educational institution shall be placed under suspension except when an inquiry into the gross misconduct of such teacher is contemplated. Section 3 (3) (b) provides that no such suspension shall remain in force for more than a period of two months and if the inquiry is not completed within that period the teacher shall, without prejudice to the inquiry, be deemed to have been restored as a teacher. The proviso to the sub-section confers upon the competent authority the power, for reasons to be recorded in writing, to extend the period of two months for a further period not exceeding two months if, in its opinion, the inquiry could not be completed within the initial period of two months for reasons directly attributable to the teacher. With respect, I find it difficult to agree with Brother Fazal Ali that these provisions are violative of article 30(1). The question which one has to ask oneself is whether in the normal course of affairs, these provisions are likely to interfere with the freedom of minorities to administer and manage educational institutions of their choice. It is undoubtedly true that no educational institution can function efficiently and effectively unless the teachers observe at least the commonly accepted norms of good behaviour. Indisciplined teachers can hardly be expected to impress upon the students the value of discipline, which is a sine qua non of educational excellence. They can cause incalculable harm not only to the cause of education but to the society at large by generating a wrong sense of values in the minds of young and impressionable students. But discipline is not to be equated with dictatorial methods in the treatment of teachers. They can cause incalculable harm not only to the cause of education but to the society at large by generating a wrong sense of values in the minds of young and impressionable students. But discipline is not to be equated with dictatorial methods in the treatment of teachers. The institutional code of discipline must therefore conform to acceptable norms of fairness and cannot be arbitrary or fanciful. I do not think that in the name of discipline and in the purported exercise of the fundamental right of administration and management, any educational institution can be given the right to 'hire and fire' its teachers. After all, though the management may be left free to evolve administrative policies of an institution, educational instruction has to be imparted through the instrumentality of the teachers; and unless, they have a constant assurance of justice, security and fair play it will be impossible for them to give of their best which alone can enable the institution to attain the ideal of educational excellence. Section 3 (3) (a) contains but an elementary guarantee of freedom from arbitrariness to the teachers. The provision is regulatory in character since it neither denies to the management the right to proceed against an erring teacher nor indeed does it place an unreasonable restraint on its power to do so. It assumes the right of the management to suspend a teacher but regulates that right by directing that a teacher shall not be suspended unless an inquiry into his conduct is contemplated and unless the inquiry is in respect of a charge of gross misconduct. Fortunately, suspension of teachers is not the order of the day, for which reason I do not think that these restraints which bear a reasonable nexus with the attainment of educational excellence can be considered to be violative of the right given by Article 30(1). The limitation of the period of suspension initially to two months, which can in appropriate cases be extended by another two months, partakes of the same character as the provision contained in Section 3 (3) (a). In the generality of cases, a domestic inquiry against a teacher ought to be completed within a period of two months or say, within another two months. In the generality of cases, a domestic inquiry against a teacher ought to be completed within a period of two months or say, within another two months. A provision founded so patently on plain reason is difficult to construe as an invasion of the right to administer an institution, unless that right carried with it the right to malad-minister. I therefore agree with Brother Kailasam that Sections 3 (3) (a) and 3 (3) (b) of the Act do not offend against the provisions of Article 30(1) and are valid.'' (Emphasis Supplied) 12. Similar view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in Frank Anthony Public School Employees' Association vs. Union of India and Others, 1986 (4) SCC 707 and again in Y. Theclamma vs. Union of India and Others, 1987 (2) SCC 516 , wherein the Supreme Court observed as under in Para 12: ''It cannot be doubted that although disciplinary control over the teachers of a minority educational institution is with the management, regulations can be made for ensuring proper conditions of service for the teachers and also for ensuring a fair procedure in the matter of disciplinary action. As the Court laid down in Frank Anthony Public School's case, the provision contained in sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act is designed to afford some measure of protection to the teachers of such institutions without interfering with the managements' right to take disciplinary action. Although the Court in that case had no occasion to deal with the different ramifications arising out of sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act, it struck a note of caution that in a case where the management charged the employee with gross misconduct, the Director is bound to accord his approval to the suspension. It would be seen that the endeavour of the Court in all the cases has been to strike a balance between the constitutional obligation to protect what is secured to the minorities under Article 30(1) with the social necessity to protect the members of the staff against arbitrariness and victimisation.'' 13. It would be seen that the endeavour of the Court in all the cases has been to strike a balance between the constitutional obligation to protect what is secured to the minorities under Article 30(1) with the social necessity to protect the members of the staff against arbitrariness and victimisation.'' 13. In view of the authoritative pronouncement by the Supreme Court that Minority Institution in the name of discipline and fundamental right of administration and management cannot be given right to hire and fire of its teachers and that conferring of regulatory power with the educational authorities for ensuring guarantee of freedom from arbitrariness to teachers would not amount to violating the right of minority institution to manage its institution. The argument that exercise of power by the Inspector violates the constitutional guarantee cannot be accepted. So far as judgment of this Court in Clancy Intermediate College (Supra) is concerned the judgment of the Supreme Court in All Saints High School (Supra) was not considered and the observations made in the context of dismissal were made applicable in a case of suspension also. In view of what has been observed by the Supreme Court in the case of All Saints High School (Supra), Frank Anthony Public School (Supra) and Y. Theclamma (Supra) it is difficult to accept petitioner's argument that the order of Inspector violates right of minority institution to manage its affairs. 14. During the course of hearing it is otherwise brought to the notice of the Court that some of the issues relating to validity of the appointment offered to private respondent, as also the grant of approval by the competent authority were not placed before the management which led to various action having been initiated against the private respondent. This contention however is disputed on behalf of the private respondent on the ground that same Manager had challenge the approval order of the private respondent and, therefore, his argument now that theses records were not available cannot be accepted. These aspects, however, need not engage this Court any further in view of the fact that issue relating to legality of suspension has to be examined by the inspector, afresh. In such circumstances order passed by the Inspector dated 16.3.2021 cannot be sustained and is quashed. These aspects, however, need not engage this Court any further in view of the fact that issue relating to legality of suspension has to be examined by the inspector, afresh. In such circumstances order passed by the Inspector dated 16.3.2021 cannot be sustained and is quashed. The Inspector shall revisit the matter in light of relevant provisions and in accordance with law within a period of two months from the date of presentation of a copy of this order. Both the parties shall appear before the Inspector on 5.10.2021 alongwith their records and the Inspector shall be at liberty to fix early date for hearing in the matter. It is clarified that till a fresh decision is taken in accordance with law the private respondent shall be allowed to continue and shall also be entitled to payment of salary.