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2021 DIGILAW 1108 (KER)

Santhosh C. S/o Babu C. v. State of Kerala

2021-12-03

P.B.SURESH KUMAR

body2021
JUDGMENT : P.B. SURESH KUMAR, J. 1. Petitioners seek in this writ petition, among others, a declaration that sub-section (1) of Section 76 of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 (the Court Fees Act) as amended in terms of the Kerala Finance Act, 2016 does not apply to applications for compensation before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (the Tribunal). They also seek alternatively, a declaration that insistence of additional court fee in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 76 of the Court Fees Act for instituting applications for compensation before the Tribunal is illegal and unconstitutional. 2. The brief facts leading to the writ petition as narrated by the petitioners are the following: The first petitioner is stated to be a victim of a motor accident that took place on 21.5.2016. It is stated that though a crime was registered by the Payyannur police in connection with the said accident, the Accident Information Report in respect of the said occurrence has not been forwarded by the officer in charge of the concerned police Station to the jurisdictional Tribunal, as required under Section 159 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (the Motor Vehicles Act). The second petitioner is stated to be the father of a person who died in a motor accident that took place on 08.08.2016. It is stated that Accident Information Report in respect of the said accident was also not forwarded by the officer in charge of the concerned police Station to the jurisdictional Tribunal. It is stated that, in the circumstances, proceedings have not been initiated by the Tribunal in terms of sub-section (4) of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act for providing compensation to the petitioners for the loss caused to them in the motor accidents. It is also stated that in the circumstances, though the first petitioner instituted an application for compensation before the second respondent Tribunal, the same is not being entertained since the first petitioner has not remitted the additional court fee payable in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 76 of the Court Fees Act. Similarly, it is stated that though the second petitioner has instituted an original petition before the said Tribunal claiming a sum of Rs. Similarly, it is stated that though the second petitioner has instituted an original petition before the said Tribunal claiming a sum of Rs. 60 lakhs towards compensation as O.P. (MV) No. 1219 of 2016 by remitting 10% of the additional court fee payable in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 76 of the Act, he is unable to pursue the application on account of his inability to pay the balance additional court fee. The petitioners are seeking the reliefs aforesaid in the above background. They also seek in the writ petition, directions to the State Government to take appropriate action against the police officers who fail to forward Accident Information Reports to the Tribunals on the premise that it is the said failure on the part of the police officers that compels the petitioners and other similarly placed persons to institute applications claiming compensation before the Tribunal by remitting fee in terms of sub-rule (1) of Rule 397 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (the Motor Vehicles Rules) and additional court fee in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 76 of the Court Fees Act. 3. The case set out by the petitioners in the writ petition is that the Court Fees Act does not apply to applications for compensation before the Tribunals; that even if the Court Fees Act applies to applications before the Tribunals, sub-section (1) of Section 76 of the said Act is unconstitutional inasmuch as it is arbitrary and that even if the Court Fees Act applies to applications before the Tribunals and sub-section (1) of Section 76 of the Court Fees Act is valid, insofar as the victims of motor accidents are compelled to remit the fee in terms of Rule 397 of the Motor Vehicles Rules and additional court fee in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 76 of the Court Fees Act on account of the failure on the part of the police officers concerned in forwarding Accident Information Reports to the jurisdictional Tribunals, action shall be taken against the erring police officers. 4. A counter affidavit has been filed by the State in the writ petition stating, among others, that the Court Fees Act applies to the applications for compensation before the Tribunals and sub-section (1) of Section 76 of the Court Fees Act as amended by the Kerala Finance Act, 2016, is valid and enforceable. 4. A counter affidavit has been filed by the State in the writ petition stating, among others, that the Court Fees Act applies to the applications for compensation before the Tribunals and sub-section (1) of Section 76 of the Court Fees Act as amended by the Kerala Finance Act, 2016, is valid and enforceable. It is also stated in the counter affidavit that the additional fee payable in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 76 is to be paid even for the applications registered by the Tribunals in terms of sub-section (4) of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 5. Heard Sri. M.V. Amaresan, the learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri. P. Santhosh Kumar, the learned Senior Government Pleader as also Sri. Rajesh R. Kormath, the learned amicus curiae appointed in the matter. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that fee is remitted on applications for compensation before the Tribunals in terms of sub-rule (1) of Rule 397 of the Motor Vehicles Rules and the said fee is not court fee, but only a fee in the form of court fee. According to the learned counsel, insofar as there is no requirement under the Court Fees Act to pay any fee on applications for compensation before the Tribunal, the additional court fee provided for under sub-section (1) of Section 76 of the Court Fees Act does not apply to applications for compensation before the Tribunals. The learned counsel has also argued that even if it is found that there could be a levy of additional court fee in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 76 in respect of applications for compensation before the Tribunals, the provision is unconstitutional in as much as the same is arbitrary and unreasonable insofar as it fastens on the victims of motor accidents a burden to pay fee in order to claim their entitlement in terms of a beneficial legislation. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the provision is discriminatory too, insofar as it provides that it does not apply to the proceedings before the Family Courts, for if the proceedings before the Family Courts could be exempted from the purview of sub-section (1) of Section 76 of the Court Fees Act, there is no reason why the applications before the Tribunals shall not be exempted from the purview of the said provision. Alternatively, it was also submitted by the learned counsel that applications had to be instituted before the Tribunal by the victims of motor accidents claiming compensation by remitting the fee in terms of Rule 397 of the Motor Vehicles Rules and sub-section (1) of Section 76 of the Court Fees Act on account of the failure on the part of the police officers in forwarding Accident Information Reports and directions shall, therefore, be issued to ensure compliance of the requirements in the Motor Vehicles Act concerning forwarding of Accident Information Reports to the Tribunals, so that the victims of motor accidents would be relieved from the obligation to institute applications for compensation by remitting fee and additional court fee in terms of the statutory provisions referred to above. 7. Per contra, the learned Senior Government Pleader submitted that ‘court’ as defined in the Court Fees Act includes Tribunals as well and it cannot, therefore, be contended that the said Act does not apply to applications before the Tribunals. It was also submitted by the learned Senior Government Pleader that the challenge against the un-amended sub-section (1) of Section 76 of the Court Fees Act and the notification issued thereunder has been repelled by this Court, and the decision of this court has been affirmed by the Apex Court in Cardamom Marketing Corporation vs. State of Kerala and Others, AIR 2016 SC 4480 . It was also contended by the learned Senior Government Pleader that financial difficulty, if any, of a litigant cannot be a reason for challenging a provision under the Court Fees Act. 8. Sri. Rajesh R. Kormath, the learned amicus curiae submitted that levy of an additional court fee for constituting a Legal Benefit Fund cannot be said to be unconstitutional on any ground whatsoever and this question has already been answered by the Apex Court in favour of the State. The learned amicus curiae has also endorsed the submission made by the learned Senior Government Pleader that the petitioners cannot be heard to contend that sub-section (1) of Section 76 of the Court Fees Act does not apply to applications for compensation before the Tribunals. The learned amicus curiae has also endorsed the submission made by the learned Senior Government Pleader that the petitioners cannot be heard to contend that sub-section (1) of Section 76 of the Court Fees Act does not apply to applications for compensation before the Tribunals. The learned amicus curiae, however, pointed out that in terms of Section 159 of the Motor Vehicles Act, it is obligatory on the part of the police officers to forward Accident Information Reports to the Tribunals concerned and it is obligatory on the part of the Tribunals to treat the same as applications for compensation. It was also pointed out by the learned amicus curiae that despite various directions issued by the Apex Court and this Court, the aforesaid provisions continues to be dead letters. The learned amicus curiae, in the circumstances, suggested that appropriate directions may be issued for enforcing the said statutory provisions so that hardships caused to the victims of motor accidents could be substantially reduced. The learned amicus curiae has also pointed out that it is categorically provided in sub-section (1) of Section 76 of the Court Fees Act that the said provision is subject to sub-rule (1) of Rule 397 of Motor Vehicles Rules which prescribes the fee payable on applications for compensation before the Tribunals and if the said provision is subject to sub-rule (1) of Rule 397, naturally it has to be understood that the same is subject to sub-rule (2) of Rule 397 also, which confers jurisdiction on the Tribunals to exempt a party from payment of fees under sub-rule (1). According to the learned amicus curiae, if sub-section (1) of Section 76 of the Court Fees Act is subject to sub-rule (2) of Rule 397 of the Motor Vehicles Rules, it cannot be contended that the same would cause any hardship to the victims of motor accidents. 9. I have examined the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties on either side as also the learned amicus curiae. 10. Before proceeding to deal with the arguments advanced by the petitioners to sustain the declarations sought for by them as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this judgment, it is necessary to indicate that it is on a wrong factual premise that the petitioners seek the aforesaid declarations. 10. Before proceeding to deal with the arguments advanced by the petitioners to sustain the declarations sought for by them as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this judgment, it is necessary to indicate that it is on a wrong factual premise that the petitioners seek the aforesaid declarations. As noted, the case set out by the petitioners in the writ petition is that on account of the failure on the part of the police officers in forwarding Accident Information Reports in respect of the accidents in which the first petitioner sustained injuries and the son of the second petitioner died, to the Tribunal, the petitioners were constrained to institute applications for compensation before the Tribunal taking upon themselves the burden to pay not only the fee provided for in terms of sub-rule (1) of Rule 397 of the Motor Vehicles Rules, but also the additional court fee provided for in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 76 of the Court Fees Act. It is the specific case of the petitioners that had the concerned police officers forwarded the Accident Information Reports in respect of the accidents to the Tribunal, they would not have been burdened with the liability to pay the fee and additional court fee in terms of the statutory provisions aforesaid. Rule 397 of the Motor Vehicles Rules reads thus: 397. Fees - (1) Every application under sub-section (1) of Section 166 of the Act, for payment of compensation shall be accompanied by a fee of rupee one in the form of Court Fee Stamp, if the claim in a case of accident is confined to special damages and if any further general damages, are claimed, an ad-valorem fee shall be charged on the aggregate of the special and general damages claimed on the following scales, namely: Amount Claims Amount of Court Fee (i) Upto Rs. 5,000 Rs. 10 (ii) Rs. 5,001 to Rs. 50,000 Rs. 10 plus 1/4% of the amount by which the claim exceeds Rs. 5,000 (iii) Rs. 50,001 to 1,00,000 Rs. 122.50 plus 1/2% of the amount by which the claim exceeds Rs. 50,000 (iv) Over Rs. 1,00,000 Rs. 372.50 plus 1% of the amount by which the amount of claim exceeds Rs. 1,00,000 (2) The Claims Tribunal may, in its discretion, exempt a party from the payment of the fee prescribed under sub-rule (1). 50,001 to 1,00,000 Rs. 122.50 plus 1/2% of the amount by which the claim exceeds Rs. 50,000 (iv) Over Rs. 1,00,000 Rs. 372.50 plus 1% of the amount by which the amount of claim exceeds Rs. 1,00,000 (2) The Claims Tribunal may, in its discretion, exempt a party from the payment of the fee prescribed under sub-rule (1). Provided that when the claimant succeeds and an award is made in his favour, the party ordered by the award to pay the compensation shall deposit the amount of compensation before the Claims Tribunal and the claimant shall be paid only such amount available after deducting the Court Fee which would have been paid by the claimant had he not been exempted under sub-rule (2) of this rule. (3) The fee for an appeal shall be 2% of the excess amount claimed with a minimum amount of rupees one thousand: Provided that if the appeal is filed for reducing the claim amount or to strike down the order of the Claims Tribunal the appeal fees shall be Rs. 1,000 (Rupees one thousand only) As evident from the extracted provision, the fee prescribed therein is for applications preferred under sub-section (1) of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, which enables persons who are entitled to compensation for the loss caused to them in motor accidents to prefer applications for compensation before the Tribunal. As evident from sub-rule (2) of Rule 397 of the Motor Vehicles Rules, the Tribunal is empowered to exempt a person in its discretion from payment of fee prescribed under sub-rule (1). Though it is not stated in sub-rule (2) of Rule 397 as to the grounds on which the said discretion could be exercised by the Tribunal, insofar as the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act conferring right on the victims of the motor accidents to claim compensation is a beneficial legislation, sub-rule (2) of Rule 397 could be understood as a provision conferring power on the Tribunal to ensure that compensation is not denied to anyone on account of their inability to pay the fee prescribed under sub-rule (1) of Rule 397. As evident from the proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 397, the exemption provided for therein is not an absolute exemption. As evident from the proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 397, the exemption provided for therein is not an absolute exemption. The scheme of the Rule is that if the claimant succeeds in the proceedings and if an award is made in his favour, the fee payable is liable to be deducted from the compensation granted to him. In this context, it is relevant to note that although the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules made thereunder do not provide for payment of cost to the applicants for compensation before the Tribunal, by virtue of the law declared by this Court in Jeena vs. Satheesh Babu, 2011 (3) KLT 943 , the Tribunal has jurisdiction to order proportionate cost also in favour of the claimants who are succeeding in the applications for compensation. When proportionate cost is ordered in applications for compensation, the fee paid on applications for compensation before the Tribunal could be recovered back by the claimants. In the light of the said practice, the fee payable on the applications by the claimants covered by sub-rule (2) of Rule 397 is recovered from the proportionate cost ordered by the Tribunal and not from the compensation granted to the party. In other words, the position as far as the fee payable in terms of Rule 397 of the Motor Vehicles Rules is that those claimants who are unable to pay the fee in terms of sub-rule (1) of Rule 397 need not have to pay the fee for the purpose of instituting and prosecuting applications for compensation and the fee payable by others on applications are now being recovered from the proportionate cost ordered by the Tribunal. The requirement in terms of Rule 397 is therefore not an impediment for the victim of a motor accident to claim compensation which is legitimately due to him. Of course, insofar as the Tribunals are ordering only proportionate cost, if there is an exorbitant claim, the fee payable on the claims disallowed by the Tribunal will have to be borne by the claimant and in case the claimant is exempted from payment of fee in terms of sub-rule (2) of Rule 397 of the Rules, the fee payable on the claims disallowed by the Tribunal is to be borne by the claimant and the same is liable to be recovered from the compensation directed to be paid. 11. 11. Section 76 of the Court Fees Act reads thus: 76. Legal Benefit fund: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force and subject to section 4A of the Act and sub-rule (1) of rule 397 of the Kerala Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989 it shall be competent for the Government to levy an additional court fee by notification in the Gazette, in respect of original petitions, original applications, appeals or revisions to tribunals, appellate authorities and original suits in Civil Courts other than in Family Court at a rate not exceeding one percent of the amount involved in the dispute and in other cases at a rate not exceeding one hundred rupees for each original suit, original petition, original application, appeal or revision. Explanation: The term “amount involved in the dispute” as specified in sub-section (1), where it is capable of valuation, does not include the amount of valuation for the purpose of court fee, in suits for recovery of possession, partition and suits of similar nature and where fixed court fee is specified under this Act. (2) There shall be constituted a legal benefit fund to which shall be credited: (i) the proceeds of the additional court-fee levied and collected under sub-section (1). (ii) fifty per cent of the court-fees levied and collected on mukhtarnama or vakalathnama under Article 16 of Schedule II of this Act. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, an amount equal to seventy percent of the Legal Benefit Fund collected under sub-section (2) shall be set apart every year towards the Fund constituted under Section 3 of the Kerala Advocates' Welfare Fund Act, 1980 and an amount equal to thirty percent of the Legal Benefit Fund collected shall be set apart towards the Fund constituted under Section 3 of the Kerala Advocates' Clerks Welfare Fund Act, 2003: Provided that the amount so set apart shall be transferred to such Funds after retaining an amount equal to ten percent each from the amount set apart to the Funds specified in sub-section (3) for providing infrastructure to the litigants. (4) The mode and manner in which legal service to the people may be made more efficient and social security measures for legal profession may be provided, shall be as prescribed by rules made by Government. (4) The mode and manner in which legal service to the people may be made more efficient and social security measures for legal profession may be provided, shall be as prescribed by rules made by Government. Going by the plain meaning of the words used in the extracted provision, the additional court fee prescribed therein is one to be paid over and above the court fee prescribed for the various proceedings. Needless to say, insofar as the additional court fee payable in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 76 of the Court Fees Act on applications for compensation preferred before the Tribunals is one to be paid in addition to the fee prescribed in terms of Rule 397 of the Motor Vehicles Rules, the scheme of Rule 397 being that the prescription therein shall not be an impediment for a person who is unable to pay the said fee in the matter of claiming compensation that is legitimately due to him, the provisions in sub-rule (2) of Rule 397 shall apply to the additional court fee payable under sub-section (1) of Section 76 of the Court Fees Act as well. 12. True, there is no provision in the Motor Vehicles Rules or Court Fees Act for payment of any fee in respect of applications registered by the Tribunal on the basis of Accident Information Reports. Insofar as an intention to exempt payment of fee in respect of such applications cannot be inferred from the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Rules made thereunder as also from the Court Fees Act, and insofar as sub-section (4) of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act only provides that the Accident Information Reports shall be treated as applications for compensation, it cannot be contended that fee is not payable on such applications. Going by the scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act and the Motor Vehicles Rules, according to me, the fee payable on such applications are liable to be recovered as provided for in the proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 397 of the Motor Vehicles Rules, especially when proportionate cost is ordered in such cases as well. Going by the scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act and the Motor Vehicles Rules, according to me, the fee payable on such applications are liable to be recovered as provided for in the proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 397 of the Motor Vehicles Rules, especially when proportionate cost is ordered in such cases as well. The petitioners are therefore not right in their stand that fee in terms of sub-rule (1) of Rule 397 of the Motor Vehicles Rules and the additional court fee in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 76 of the Court Fees Act is not payable in respect of the applications registered on the basis of Accident Information Reports. It is, therefore, unnecessary for this Court to consider the prayer of the petitioners to ensure compliance of the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act concerning forwarding of Accident Information Reports and registration of applications for compensation on the basis of the same by the Tribunals, for such actions will not absolve the victims of motor accidents from their obligation to pay fee and additional court fee. 13. Now I shall deal with the sustainability of the case put forward by the petitioners for seeking the declaration sought for in the writ petition as set out in the opening paragraph of this judgment. The Court Fees Act is a legislation traceable to Entry 11A of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution relating to the fees payable in respect of suits and other proceedings before the various forums having jurisdiction under any special or local law to decide questions affecting rights of parties. Clause (ii) of Section 3 of the Court Fees Act defines ‘court’ thus: (ii) “Court” means any Civil, Revenue, or Criminal Court and includes a Tribunal or other authority having jurisdiction under any special or local law to decide questions affecting the rights of parties. In the light of the aforesaid definition in the Court Fees Act, it cannot be contended that the Tribunal would not fall within the scope of the Court Fees Act. If that be so, the additional court fee prescribed under the Court Fees Act becomes payable in respect of proceedings before the Tribunals as well. In the light of the aforesaid definition in the Court Fees Act, it cannot be contended that the Tribunal would not fall within the scope of the Court Fees Act. If that be so, the additional court fee prescribed under the Court Fees Act becomes payable in respect of proceedings before the Tribunals as well. True, no fee is prescribed under the Court Fees Act for applications for compensation before the Tribunals and fee on applications for compensation before the Tribunals is prescribed in terms of Rule 397 of the Motor Vehicles Rules. It is also true that what is prescribed under Rule 397 is not court fee, but only a fee in the form of court fee. That does not mean that an additional fee in the form of court fee cannot be levied on applications before the Tribunals, when it is found that the applications for compensation before the Tribunals would also fall under the scope of the Court Fees Act. The contention of the petitioners that the provisions of the Court Fees Act do not apply to applications for compensation before the Tribunals is therefore unsustainable. 14. As evident from the Court Fees Act, the additional court fee levied in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 76 is for the constitution of a legal benefit fund. It is seen that sub-section (1) of Section 76, prior to its amendment in terms of the Finance Act, 2016, providing for additional court fee on various matters including appeals before the statutory authorities under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 was challenged by registered dealers under the said statute before this Court on grounds mainly that it does not have any nexus to the object of the Court Fees Act and that it does not have the character of fee, for no services are provided to the litigants in return, inasmuch as it is for constitution of the legal benefit fund for the benefit of the legal fraternity. The challenge was repelled by this Court referring to Article 39A of the Constitution. The said decision of this Court was affirmed by the Apex Court in Cardamom Marketing Corporation Paragraphs 8 to 12 of the said judgment read thus: “8. The challenge was repelled by this Court referring to Article 39A of the Constitution. The said decision of this Court was affirmed by the Apex Court in Cardamom Marketing Corporation Paragraphs 8 to 12 of the said judgment read thus: “8. From the reading of the aforesaid provisions it becomes clear that Section 76 authorises the State Government to issue such a notification and notification has been issued in exercise of powers contained therein. This power extends to levy additional court fee by tribunals and other appellate authorities constituted by or under any special law. The impugned notification, therefore, is intra-vires the provision of Section 76 of the CF Act. Even the rate which is prescribed in the notification is within the outer limit prescribed under Section 76(2) of the Act. To this extent, therefore, there cannot be any quarrel. 9. However, the main argument of the appellants is that the additional court fee which is to be paid on the appeals etc. which are to be filed either under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act or the Kerala Value Added Tax Act by virtue of the aforesaid notification, have no nexus with the object and, therefore, it does not have any character of ‘fee’ as no services are provided to the litigants in return. To put it otherwise, it is submitted that since such additional court fee collected from the assessees like the appellants is used for the benefit of the advocates and no benefit thereof accrues to the litigants, charging of such additional court fee is clearly impermissible as it amounts to compulsory exaction of the money from the appellants in the name of court fee, without giving any corresponding benefit to the appellants. It is moreso when such an additional fee has to be paid at each and every subsequent level of statutory appeal and revision as well. 10. The aforesaid arguments of the appellants is devoid of any merit. Insofar as the argument predicated on fee vis-a-vis tax is concerned, i.e. the submission that the imposition in question is in the nature of tax inasmuch as this imposition has no nexus to any object sought to be achieved in relation to the service available to the appellants and there is no quid pro quo, the same is dealt with by the High Court elaborately. The High Court has referred to Entry 3 in List II (State List) of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution as it stood in the year 1960 when the CF Act was enacted on receiving the assent of the President of India. This Entry reads as under: “3. Administration of justice, constitution and organization of all courts except the Supreme Court and the High Court; officers and servants of the High Court; procedure in Rent and Revenue Courts; fees taken in all courts except to the Supreme Court.” By the Forty-Second Amendment to the Constitution in the year 1976, administration of justice became a Concurrent Subject, having been included as Entry 11A in List III which resulted in requisite modification to Entry 3 in List II as well. At the same time, by the very same amendment, Article 39-A was also inserted in Part IV of the Constitution which relates to the Directive Principles of State Policy. This Article exhorts the State to provide equal justice and free legal aid and reads as under: “39A. Equal justice and free legal aid. The State shall secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice, on a basis of equal opportunity, and shall, in particular, provide free legal aid, by suitable legislation or schemes or in any other way, to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities.” As per the High Court, the administration of justice, thus, becomes a distinct topic and Article 39A calls upon the State to ensure establishment of such legal system which promotes justice and provides free legal aid. 11. We agree with the aforesaid approach of the High Court. First of all, the argument of the appellants ignores that as per Section 76(3) of the CF Act, one of the purposes for which the Fund is to be utilised is for providing efficient legal services for the people of the State. It clearly amounts to quid pro quo. Other purpose is also for the benefit of the public at large. When we talk of sound and stable system of administration of justice, all the stakeholders in the said legal system need to be taken care of. Legal community and advocates are inseparable and important part of robust legal system and they not only aid in seeking access to justice but also promote justice. When we talk of sound and stable system of administration of justice, all the stakeholders in the said legal system need to be taken care of. Legal community and advocates are inseparable and important part of robust legal system and they not only aid in seeking access to justice but also promote justice. Judges cannot perform their task of dispensing justice effectively without the able support of advocates. In that sense, advocates play an important role in the administration of justice. It is wisely said that for any society governed by Rule of Law, effective judicial system is a necessary concomitant. The Rule of Law reflects man's sense of order and justice. There can be no Government without order; there can be no order without law and there can be no administration of law without lawyers. It is no small service to be called upon to prosecute and enforce the rights of a litigant through the court of law and in that sense the legal profession is treated as service to the justice seekers. It is, therefore, by contributing an essential aid to the process of the administration of justice that the advocate discharges a public duty of the highest utility. 12. When the subject-matter of the instant cases is examined in the aforesaid hue, it becomes apparent that providing social security to the legal profession becomes an essential part of any legal system which has to be effective, efficient and robust to enable it to provide necessary service to the consumers of justice. Section 76 of the CF Act and the impugned notification vide which additional court fee is imposed have a direct nexus to the objective sought to be achieved in relation to the service available to the appellants or others who approached the courts/tribunals for redressal of their grievances.” In the light of the aforesaid judgment, the petitioners cannot be heard to contend that sub-section (1) of Section 76 of the Court Fees Act as amended in terms of Finance Act, 2016 containing pari materia provisions and the notification issued in terms of the said provision for levying additional court fee in respect of various proceedings referred to therein including the applications for compensation before the Tribunal are invalid in any manner. 15. 15. One of the grounds urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners to substantiate the case that sub-section (1) of Section 76 of the Court Fees Act is unconstitutional is that the same is arbitrary and unreasonable insofar as it fastens on the victims of motor accidents a burden to pay fee in order to claim their entitlement in terms of a beneficial legislation. As noted, sub-rule (2) of Rule 397 of the Motor Vehicles Rules confers power on Tribunals to exempt in its discretion, any person from payment of fee in terms of sub-rule (1) of Rule 397. I have found that if the fee in terms of sub-rule (1) of Rule 397 could be exempted, the fee in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 76 of the Court Fees Act also could be exempted, for the same is only an addition to the fee prescribed under sub-rule (1) of Rule 397. No doubt, the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act conferring right on the victims of motor accidents to claim compensation for the loss caused to them is a piece of beneficial legislation, but as noted and as found, the requirements in terms of sub-rule (1) of Rule 397 of the Motor Vehicles Rules and sub-section (1) of Section 76 of the Court Fees Act do not create any impediment for those victims of motor accidents who cannot afford to make the said payments in the matter of claiming the compensation legitimately due to them. Of course, if cost is not ordered, the fee and additional court fee are liable to be recovered from the compensation. That position by itself cannot be a reason to hold that the requirement in terms of the aforesaid statutory position is an impediment for the victims of motor accidents to claim the compensation. The challenge to the statutory provision on the ground that it operates as a burden to victims of motor accidents in the matter of claiming the compensation which they are legitimately entitled to is therefore, only to be rejected. 16. There is also no merit in the challenge to sub-section (1) of Section 76 of the Court Fees Act on the ground that it is discriminatory inasmuch as the litigants before the Family Courts are exempted from the purview of the said provision. 16. There is also no merit in the challenge to sub-section (1) of Section 76 of the Court Fees Act on the ground that it is discriminatory inasmuch as the litigants before the Family Courts are exempted from the purview of the said provision. It is trite that a question of discrimination in the context of a challenge against a statutory provision arises only when persons are differently classified without there being an intelligible basis which has a nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the statute. There is no case for the petitioners that the litigants before the Family Court and the Tribunal are similarly placed. As such, merely for the reason that a category of litigants are exempted from the purview of sub-section (1) of Section 76 of the Court Fees Act, the petitioners cannot be heard to contend that the provision is discriminatory. 17. The writ petition in the circumstances, is without merits and the same is, accordingly, dismissed. Registry is directed to forward a copy of this judgment to the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals in the State.