ORDER : P. Naveen Rao, J. 1. Heard learned Counsel for the petitioners, learned Assistant Government Pleader for Revenue and learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 5 in WP No. 3456 of 2021. 2. Since the issue in these writ petitions and the prayer sought are same, both the writ petitions are disposed of by a common order. 3. According to petitioners, each of them have purchased land to an extent of Acs. 2.20 guntas in Survey Nos. 83UU and 83U respectively of Toopranpet Village, Choutuppal Mandal, Yadadri Bhongiri District, through registered sale deeds dated 14.5.1979. Their names were entered in the revenue records and were issued pattadar passbooks and title deeds. Again on 19.7.2000, they were issued pattadar passbooks and title deeds. Petitioners allege that in the year 1999-2000, the Tahsildar, Choutuppal Mandal, erroneously deleted their names from the revenue records from the above extent of land and inspite of several requests made, the same was not rectified. On 21.8.2020, they made representations to the District Collector, Revenue Divisional Officer and the Tahsildar to rectify the erroneous corrections made and to restore their names. Alleging that inspite of representations made on 21.8.2020, authorities have not acted on the request to delete wrong entries made in the revenue records against survey numbers mentioned above, these writ petition's are filed. Petitioners pray to declare the action of respondent authorities, particularly the Tahsildar, Choutuppal Mandal, respondent No. 4, in deleting their names by way of Amendment Register for the year 1999-2000 from pahani column basing on joint document (General Power of Attorney) dated 20.8.1988 to an extent of Acs. 5.00 of land without any reason, as illegal, arbitrary and unjust. 4. The averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petitions and the prayers in the writ petitions, on the face of them, look very innocuous, genuine and simple prayer sought is not acting on the representations submitted by the petitioners as amounting to illegal exercise of power by the Tahsildar. It appears as an innocent projection of illegal deletion of names of petitioners behind their back, without following due process affecting their valuable right to property. As projected in the writ petitions, except the issue of delay, everything appears bona fide. It appears as an innocent projection of illegal deletion of names of petitioners behind their back, without following due process affecting their valuable right to property. As projected in the writ petitions, except the issue of delay, everything appears bona fide. However, as the facts unravel from the averments in the affidavit filed in support of the application for impleadment as respondent No. 5 and the documents placed on record in IA No. 2 of 2021, it is astonishing to note as to how the petitioners sought to mislead this Court on facts and law with vicious intent to obtain orders behind the back of persons in whose favour the right vested long ago. 5. The documents placed on record by 5th respondent demystifies the claim of petitioners. The facts as now revealed are as under. 6. One Venkat Laxama Reddy was the Jagirdar of agricultural land in Survey No. 83 of Toopranpet Village to an extent of Acs. 20.05 guntas. Y. Lingaiah claimed that he and Chenchala Muthaiah became shikmi pattadar by way of cultivation from 1945. Lingaiah was cultivating land to an extent of Acs. 10.02 guntas and Chenchala Muthaiah and Mallaiah family were cultivating land to an extent of Acs. 10.03 guntas. Ijardar offered to sell the land occupied by Y Lingaiah. But, Y. Lingaiah did not have means to accept the offer to purchase the said land; he left the village and was out of village for 10 to 15 years. During that period, Busani Bixapathi purchased land to an extent of Acs. 5.02 guntas out of Acs. 10.02 guntas of land earlier offered to Y. Lingaiah. Remaining Acs. 5.00 of land was occupied by Komerisetti Venkataiah. However, after returning to the village, Y. Lingaiah regained the possession on land to an extend of Acs. 5.00 and was in occupation and enjoyment of the land. In other words, there were two different parcels of land in Sy. No. 83; (1) Acs. 5.02 and (2) Acs. 5.00. 7. Lingaiah executed two sale deeds on 14.5.1979 selling the land to petitioners in these two writ petitions, each with an extent of Acs. 2.21 guntas. Strangely, both contain same boundaries. On 18.6.1983, again two sale deeds were executed by Lingaiah in favour of petitioners. This time, selling land to an extent of Acs. 2.20 each with different boundaries. However, the earlier two sale deeds were not cancelled. 2.21 guntas. Strangely, both contain same boundaries. On 18.6.1983, again two sale deeds were executed by Lingaiah in favour of petitioners. This time, selling land to an extent of Acs. 2.20 each with different boundaries. However, the earlier two sale deeds were not cancelled. In other words, though Lingaiah had only land to an extent of Acs. 5.00 in his possession and enjoyment, he has sold Acs. 10.02 guntas of land to petitioners. Petitioners executed irrevocable Power of Attorney to K. Yadagiri Reddy on land to an extent of Acs. 5.00 in Survey No. 83 authorising him to deal with all transactions concerning the above extent of land. The Power of Attorney holder executed sale deed on 29.5.1986 in favour of Balaji Re-rolling Mills Private Limited. Balaji Re-rolling Mills Private Limited executed General Power of Attorney in favour of Smt. I. Anuradha on 20.6.1988, who has developed the above extent of land by obtaining permissions, forming a layout and sold individuals house plots. The purchasers of house plots have formed into an association named as 'Udayarka Homes Owners Welfare Association', respondent No. 5 in WP No. 3456 of 2021. 8. Busani Mallesha and two others filed appeal before the Revenue Divisional Officer under the Act 26 of 1971 challenging the memo issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer on 14.7.2005 making wrongful entries in the revenue records on land to an extent of Acs. 5.02. guntas in Survey No. 83 of Toopranpet Mandal. They claim that the lands belong to them and petitioners and Lingaiah has no manner of right to claim the said land. In the counter-affidavit filed by Lingaiah in ROR Appeal No. D/2165/2005, he has admitted that he owns only Acs. 5.00 of land and that he has no concern with reference to other land to an extent of Acs. 5.02 guntas. Petitioners herein are respondents 2 and 3. They mainly placed reliance on execution of sale deeds by Lingaiah to support their claim that they own land to an extent of Acs. 10.02 guntas having purchased from Lingaiah. 9. The Revenue Divisional Officer commented heavily on the manner in which the Mandal Revenue Officer exercised his powers and erroneously mutated the name of Lingaiah without verifying the records and also erred in giving sub-division numbers. 10.02 guntas having purchased from Lingaiah. 9. The Revenue Divisional Officer commented heavily on the manner in which the Mandal Revenue Officer exercised his powers and erroneously mutated the name of Lingaiah without verifying the records and also erred in giving sub-division numbers. The Revenue Divisional Officer allowed the appeal, declared the amendments carried out by the Tahsildar as illegal and ordered for restoration of the entries. The Tahsildar passed orders on 11.4.2008 deleting the names of Kavuri Jagan Mohan Rao on land to an extent of Acs. 2.35 guntas and M/s. City Lubicants Private Limited on land to an extent of Acs. 2.05 guntas in Survey No. 83, cancelled the pattadar passbooks issued in their favour and entered the name of Busani Mallesha, Mysaiah and Satyanarayana. 10. The decisions of the revenue authorities i.e., the Revenue Divisional Officer and the Tahsildar, sets right the controversy and vests land to an extent of Acs. 5.02 guntas in the legal heirs of late Busani Bixapathi leaving only Acs. 5.00 of land to the vendors of the petitioners. This Acs. 5.00 of land was sold through Power of Attorney Holder appointed by the petitioners and on the said land, layout was formed and after converting the same for non-agricultural purpose, house plots were made and they were sold. 11. Petitioners instituted OS No. 17 of 2000 praying to grant decree of declaration of title and perpetual injunction on land to an extent of Acs. 5.00 in Survey No. 83. On 13.9.2000, learned Senior Civil Judge, Bhongiri, granted ex parte ad interim injunction. This was contested and in CMA No. 545 of 2001, this Court considered the issue at length. The plea taken by them was though they executed General Power of Attorney in favour of K. Yadagiri Reddy, the same was cancelled just before filing of the suit and that K. Yadagiri Reddy died in the year 1991 and therefore the sale deeds executed by him are not valid in law. In CMA No. 545 of 2001 arising out of interlocutory orders in OS No. 17 of 2000, learned Single Judge of this Court observed as under: "... Under these circumstances, the fact remains that there was a Power of Attorney by the respondents-plaintiffs in favour of K. Yadagiri Reddy on 29.1.1986 and he on behalf of the plaintiffs executed the sale deed in Ex. Under these circumstances, the fact remains that there was a Power of Attorney by the respondents-plaintiffs in favour of K. Yadagiri Reddy on 29.1.1986 and he on behalf of the plaintiffs executed the sale deed in Ex. R2 on 29.5.1986 in favour of the defendants. Subsequently, of course, there are some alienations of plots and the respective plot owners are in possession. Except asserting the cancellation of the Power of Attorney and that too just prior to the filing of the suit, there is no explanation forthcoming as to the sale executed by the said agent K. Yadagiri Reddy in favour of the defendants as long back as on 29.5.1986. Even though a comprehensive declaratory relief is sought for, there is no challenge made to the correctness, validity or otherwise nature of Ex. R2 in any manner whatsoever. The title, thus, has validly stood passed in favour of the appellants herein under the said sale deed in Ex. R2. Therefore, the claim of title or interest of whatsoever nature by the respondents-plaintiffs is wholly unsustainable." (Emphasis supplied) 12. This Court observed that the agent to the petitioners has sold land to an extent of Acs. 5.00 much before cancellation of alleged General Power of Attorney and held that claim of title or interest is wholly unsustainable and vacated the injunction granted by the Trial Court. For the reasons best known, petitioners withdrew OS No. 17 of 2000 on 7.4.2005, though with liberty to institute a fresh suit, but as informed to this Court, so far no suit is filed. Thus, petitioners lost their claim on two different parcels of land by these two proceedings, one before Revenue authorities and another before Civil Court. Therefore, no land is left in Sy. No. 83 in the names of petitioners. 13. In retrospect, two aspects are to be noticed. Firstly, though initially Lingaiah claimed ownership of land to an extent of Acs. 10.02 guntas in Sy. No. 83, he gave up his claim on land to an extent of Acs. 5.02 guntas and confined his ownership to Acs. 5.00 of land. Petitioners purchased Acs. 5.00 of land and later sold the same through their agent. Simultaneously, petitioners claimed to have purchased Acs. 5.02 guntas of land from Lingaiah by a sham transaction. 10.02 guntas in Sy. No. 83, he gave up his claim on land to an extent of Acs. 5.02 guntas and confined his ownership to Acs. 5.00 of land. Petitioners purchased Acs. 5.00 of land and later sold the same through their agent. Simultaneously, petitioners claimed to have purchased Acs. 5.02 guntas of land from Lingaiah by a sham transaction. The question of passing on title to petitioners on this extent of land does not arise, when the vendor did not have valid title and the revenue Courts have confirmed title claim of Busani Bixapathi and revenue records were mutated accordingly. 14. From the documents placed on record, following aspects are noticed: 1. On land to an extent of Acs. 5.00 in Sy. No. 83, Pahanis for various years reflect names of Smt. I. Anuradha and status of land as house plots. 2. Disturbed by the manner in which frequently petitioners were, trying to encroach into the land of respondent No. 5 and creating problems to them and also attempts made to sell land by dubious means, the 5th respondent lodged several complaints with the police and also issued public notices through daily newspapers cautioning the individuals from entering into any such sale transactions. 3. On 22.12.2009, petitioners gave an undertaking before the Sub-Inspector of Police, Choutuppal Police Station, stating that they will not trespass into the land unless any order is secured by them in legal proceedings. However, it appears, their attempts to encroach and illegal activities did not stop and therefore complaints were lodged with the police time and again. 4. Again on 11.9.2018, petitioners gave an undertaking to the Inspector of Police, Choutuppal Police Station stating that they will not interfere with the land possessed by respondent No. 5 and they will not undertake any transaction by relying on pattadar passbooks in their possession. 5. Even though petitioners' names are not shown in the revenue records and revenue records consistently reflect the status of the land as house plots, petitioners sought to place reliance on old pattadar passbooks, which were issued erroneously, to make a claim for mutation of their names in the revenue records. 6. Though Lingaiah had only Acs. 5.00 of land, as he gave-up his claim on another parcel of land to an extent of Acs. 6. Though Lingaiah had only Acs. 5.00 of land, as he gave-up his claim on another parcel of land to an extent of Acs. 5.02 guntas, which was purchased by Busani Bixapathi, taking advantage of erroneous entries made in the revenue records reflecting Lingaiah name on both parcels of land, Lingaiah and petitioners entered into dubious sale transactions covering Acs. 10.02 guntas. 15. Coming back to the averments and the material placed on record in the writ petitions, it is seen that none of these facts are stated in the affidavits nor relevant documents are filed. In the pattadar passbooks filed by petitioners the extent of land shown is Acs. 2.20 guntas each. While so, Documents bearing Nos. 763 of 1979 and 764 of 1979 placed on record by petitioners in the writ petition paper book would show that petitioners purchased Acs. 2.21 each. This variation on extent is not explained. However, as noticed in previous paragraphs they relate to two different transactions, one was legal and another extra-legal. These pattadar pass books are old and do not reflect subsequent alienation. Inspite of loosing the battles in the revenue Courts and in the civil litigation and knowing fully well that petitioners do not have any land in Sy. No. 83, they continue to claim the land by resorting to dubious methods. 16. Having regard to the history of litigation and the manner in which the petitioners vendor and petitioners were prosecuting the issue, it cannot be said that the petitioners were not aware of these developments. They were parties in the proceedings before the revenue authorities. They filed undertakings before the Police and filed OS No. 17 of 2000. Even assuming there is some semblance of right in them, there is stoic silence in the affidavits filed in support of the writ petitions as to why they kept quiet from the year 2000, when; their names were deleted and some other persons names were reflected in the revenue records, and only on 21.8.2020, they made representations and soon thereafter filed these writ petitions alleging that the revenue authorities are not acting upon their representations. 17. 17. Though, unexplained delay more so when the delay is too long is staring at petitioners but more serious aspect is with regard to the manner in which petitioners resorted to abuse the process of the Court and mislead the Court in believing their claim as genuine and bona fide. Those aspects over shadow the issue of delay and latches. 18. On removing the mask of innocence and piercing the layer of innocuous relief, it bares the sinister design to grab the land already vested in third parties and create legal logjam to bona fide house plot owners by using the writ jurisdiction platform. This Court is loath to such practices and it is necessary to nip such litigation in the bud. 19. Remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution is an extraordinary remedy available to every aggrieved person. In exercise of this power, writ Court stretches its hand to reach out wherever injustice is caused and in whatever manner injustice is meted out. The remedy under Article 226 is equitable and discretionary. The writ Court has no bounds in issuing prerogative writs except self-imposed restraint. To exercise such extraordinary remedy, the Court expects the person coming before it to be fair and frank in stating the facts which constitute cause of action to ventilate his grievance, leaving it to Court to decide whether relief can be granted and if so, what relief. Thus, the minimum that is required by petitioner, knocking the doors of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, is to state the true and correct facts and project the grievance. 20. Court will be disinclined to lien in favour of a petitioner to grant equitable relief who is not truthful, do not disclose the true facts, tries to mislead the Court or suppresses true facts deliberately in order to gain undue advantage while invoking the writ Court to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 21. In K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Limited and others, (2008) 12 SCC 481, the Supreme Court observed that the party invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of writ Court is supposed to be truthful, frank and open. He must disclose all material facts without any reservation even if they are against him. 21. In K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Limited and others, (2008) 12 SCC 481, the Supreme Court observed that the party invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of writ Court is supposed to be truthful, frank and open. He must disclose all material facts without any reservation even if they are against him. He cannot be allowed to play "hide and seek" or to "pick and choose" the facts he likes to disclose and to suppress (keep back) or not to disclose (conceal) other facts" (Paragraph 38). 21A. It is apt to reproduce Paragraphs 34 to 39 K.D. Sharma's case (supra), which read thus: 34. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary. Prerogative writs mentioned therein are issued for doing substantial justice. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that the petitioner approaching the writ Court must come with clean hands, put forward all the facts before the Court without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an appropriate relief. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of misleading the Court, his petition may be dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim. 35. The underlying object has been succinctly stated by Scrutton, L.J., in the leading case of R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commrs., (1917) 1 KB 486, in the following words: (KB P. 514) "... It has been for many years the rule of the Court, and one which it is of the greatest importance to maintain, that when an applicant comes to the Court to obtain relief on an ex-parte statement he should make a full and fair disclosure of all the material facts--it says facts, not law. He must not misstate the law if he can help it--the Court is supposed to know the law. But it knows nothing about the facts, and the applicant must state fully and fairly the facts; and the penalty by which the Court enforces that obligation is that if it finds out that the facts have not been fully and fairly stated to it, the Court will set aside any action which it has taken on the faith of the imperfect statement." (Emphasis supplied) 36. A prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. A prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. While exercising extraordinary power a writ Court would certainly bear in mind the conduct of the party who invokes the jurisdiction of the Court. If the applicant makes a false statement or suppresses material fact or attempts to mislead the Court, the Court may dismiss the action on that ground alone and may refuse to enter into the merits of the case by stating, "We will not listen to your application because of what you have done." The rule has been evolved in the larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of Court by deceiving it. 37. In Kensington Income Tax Commrs.'s case (supra), Viscount Reading, C.J., observed: (KB Pp. 495-96) "... Where an ex parte application has been made to this Court for a rule nisi or other process, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the affidavit in support of the application was not candid and did not fairly state the facts, but stated them in such a way as to mislead the Court as to the true facts, the Court ought, for its own protection and to prevent an abuse of its process, to refuse to proceed any further with the examination of the merits. This is a power inherent in the Court, but one which should only be used in cases which bring conviction to the mind of the Court that it has been deceived. Before coming to this conclusion a careful examination will be made of the facts as they are and as they have been stated in the applicant's affidavit and everything will be heard that can be urged to influence the view of the Court when it reads the affidavit, and knows the true facts. But if the result of this examination and hearing is to leave no doubt that the Court has been deceived, then it will refuse to hear anything further from the applicant in a proceeding which has only been set in motion by means of a misleading affidavit." (Emphasis supplied) 38. The above principles have been accepted in our legal system also. As per settled law, the party who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 or of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is supposed to be truthful, frank and open. The above principles have been accepted in our legal system also. As per settled law, the party who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 or of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is supposed to be truthful, frank and open. He must disclose all material facts without any reservation even if they are against him. He cannot be allowed to play "hide and seek" or to "pick and choose" the facts he likes to disclose and to suppress (keep back) or not to disclose (conceal) other facts. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true and complete (correct) facts. If material facts are suppressed or distorted, the very functioning of writ Courts and exercise would become impossible. The petitioner must disclose all the facts having a bearing on the relief sought without any qualification. This is because "the Court knows law but not facts". 39. If the primary object as highlighted in Kensington Income Tea Commrs's case (supra), is kept in mind, an applicant who does not come with candid facts and "clean breast" cannot hold a writ of the Court with "soiled hands". Suppression or concealment of material facts is not an advocacy. It is a jugglery, manipulation, manoeuvring or misrepresentation, which has no place in equitable and prerogative jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose all the material facts fairly and truly but states them in a distorted manner and misleads the Court, the Court has inherent power in order to protect itself and to prevent an abuse of its process to discharge the rule nisi and refuse to proceed further with the examination of the case on merits. If the Court does not reject the petition on that ground, the Court would be failing in its duty. In fact, such an applicant requires to be dealt with for contempt of Court for abusing the process of the Court. (Emphasis supplied) 22. In Prestige Lights Limited v. SBI, (2007) 8 SCC 449 , the Supreme Court observed that "in exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the High Court is not just a 'Court of Appeal', but it is also a 'Court of Equity' and a person who invokes the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is duty-bound to place all the facts before the Court without any reservation. The High Court would be fully justified in refusing to entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution if there is suppression of material facts or if the facts are twisted." 23. In Dalip Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (2010) 2 SCC 114 , the Supreme Court observed: "1. For many centuries Indian society cherished two basic values of life i.e., "satya" (truth and "ahimsa" (non-violence)), Mahavir, Gautam Buddha and Mahatma Gandhi guided the people to ingrain these values in their daily life. Truth constituted an integral part of the justice-delivery system which was in vogue in the pre-Independence era and the people used to feel proud to tell truth in the Courts irrespective of the consequences. However, post-Independence period has seen drastic changes in our value system. The materialism has overshadowed the old ethos and the quest for personal gain has become so intense that I those involved in litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood, misrepresentation and suppression of facts in the Court proceedings. 2. In the last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped up. Those who belong to this creed do not have any respect for truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical means for achieving their goals. In order to meet the challenge posed by this new creed of litigants, the Courts have, from time to time, evolved new rules and it is now well established that a litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or final." (Emphasis supplied) 24. It is apt to consider the further observations made in the decision of the King's Bench Division in The King v. The General Commissioners for the purposes of the Income Tax Acts for the District of Kensington. Ex parte Princess Edmond DE Polignac, (1917) 1 K.B. 486, which decision is treated in India as an authority for the proposition on good faith required by a person applying for a writ. "55.2. Ex parte Princess Edmond DE Polignac, (1917) 1 K.B. 486, which decision is treated in India as an authority for the proposition on good faith required by a person applying for a writ. "55.2. Warrington, L.J., observed, "It is perfectly well settled that a person who makes an ex parte application to the Court-that is to say, in the absence of the person who will be affected by that which the Court is asked to do--is under an obligation to the Court to make the fullest possible disclosure of all material facts within his knowledge, and if he does not make that fullest possible disclosure, then he cannot obtain any advantage from the proceedings, and he will be deprived of any advantage he may have already obtained by means of the order which has thus wrongly been obtained by him." (Emphasis supplied) 25. In Paragraph 13 of S.J.S. Business Enterprises's case (supra), the Supreme Court observed that "as a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a litigant disqualifies such litigant from obtaining any relief". 26. The above enunciation of law makes it apparent that the party who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is supposed to be truthful, frank and open. He must disclose all material facts without any reservation, even if they are against him. The petitioner cannot be allowed to play "hide and seek" or to "pick and choose" the facts he likes to disclose and to suppress or not to disclose other material facts. A litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or final. [Dalip Singh's case (supra)]. These writ petitions answer all the negative ingredients noted above earning disqualification to maintain writ petitions. 27. The writ petitions are dismissed with costs of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten thousand only) in each of the writ petitions payable to the Secretary, High Court Legal Services Committee. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.