JUDGMENT : C. JAYACHANDRAN, J. 1. A challenge to a non-speaking order (Ext.P7) is dismissed by the judgment impugned of the learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 27134/2018 dated 9.4.2021. The aggrieved petitioner is the appellant. 2. Ext.P7 order issued by the first respondent Corporation directed the appellant/petitioner to remove the unauthorized constructions, allegedly made trespassing into the public stream vested with it, within seven days from the date of receipt thereof. It is the petitioner’s case that Ext.P7 order is violative of Ext.P1 judgment of the Munsiff’s Court, Kochi in O.S. No. 478/2009, which attained finality by virtue of Ext.P2 decree of the Sub Court, Kochi in A.S. No. 4/2013. The petitioner apprehended demolition of his septic tank, which is allegedly constructed in the purambokku land, wherefore, the writ petition was filed. 3. O.S. No. 478/2009 is a suit instituted by the petitioner/appellant against four persons, who hold properties adjoining to the plaint schedule property having an extent of two cents. The first respondent Corporation and its Executive Engineer were impleaded as additional 5th and 6th defendants respectively, in the said suit. The plaintiff (petitioner herein) sought for a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from trespassing into the plaint schedule property, as also, from cutting, opening or extending any pathway through any portion of the same. 4. The said suit was decreed as per Ext.P1 judgment dated 31.10.12 in the lines indicated above. The party defendants carried an appeal from Ext.P1 judgment, which was dismissed, as evidenced from Ext.P2 decree dated 18.6.2014 of the Sub Court, Kochi. 5. In the year 2018, the first respondent Corporation issued Ext.P3 notice directing the appellant/petitioner to demolish the alleged unauthorized construction made after trespassing into the public stream. The appellant/petitioner gave Ext.P4 reply denying encroachment and specifically propounding Ext.P1 judgment in his favour. However, by virtue of Ext.P5 provisional order, the first respondent Corporation reiterated the allegation of encroachment and directed the petitioner to remove the unauthorised construction within 15 days. This was followed by Ext.P7 final order directing removal of unauthorized construction within seven days, which was the subject matter of challenge in the writ petition. 6. The first respondent Corporation filed counter affidavit contending that Ext.P1 judgment is applicable to land comprised in Survey No. 359/3 of Rameswaram Village only. This was followed by Ext.P7 final order directing removal of unauthorized construction within seven days, which was the subject matter of challenge in the writ petition. 6. The first respondent Corporation filed counter affidavit contending that Ext.P1 judgment is applicable to land comprised in Survey No. 359/3 of Rameswaram Village only. As per Ext.R1(a) report, along with the sketch appended to it, it could be seen that the appellant/petitioner had trespassed into the purambokku road to the extent of 0.29 ares and made illegal constructions therein. The encroached portion is shown in Ext.R1(a) sketch. A portion of the encroachment made has already been evicted and when the Corporation was about to demolish the remaining portion of the illegal construction, the petitioner obstructed on the strength of Ext.P1 judgment. Accordingly, demolition was stopped, contended the first respondent. 7. The third respondent filed a counter affidavit contending that Ext.P1 judgment has been passed in a suit for injunction simplicitor, where the question of possession alone was considered. The same will not clothe the petitioner with any title over the disputed land. It was also contended that the first respondent Corporation wanted to construct a road through the purambokku land, for which demolition of the illegal construction made by the petitioner is essential. Thus, the fourth respondent contended that larger interests of the people of the locality is to be served by demolishing the illegal construction made by the petitioner. 8. By the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition finding that the factual circumstances involved in the case, can be considered only by a fact finding body and that statutory requirements in terms of Section 406 of the Kerala Municipalities Act have been complied with. The learned Single Judge also referred to an interim order passed in the writ petition, which reads as follows: “Having perused the pleadings and documents on record and hearing the counsel appearing for the respondents, respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are given the liberty to carry out demolition of any unauthorised constructions made by the petitioner in the writ petition protruding to any public property.” 9. The petitioner was found fault with for not resorting to the statutory remedy against Ext.P7 order. 1 and 2 are given the liberty to carry out demolition of any unauthorised constructions made by the petitioner in the writ petition protruding to any public property.” 9. The petitioner was found fault with for not resorting to the statutory remedy against Ext.P7 order. The writ petition was dismissed holding that the petitioner cannot secure any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, since the findings are rendered on factual aspects, which cannot be subjected to judicial scrutiny by the High Court under the writ jurisdiction. 10. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant/petitioner and the learned counsel for the first respondent Corporation. 11. At the outset, we find that the measurement culminating in Ext.R1(a) sketch is not one made after issuing notice to the appellant/petitioner. The possessory rights of the petitioner is seen recognised in Ext.P1 judgment. We are not oblivious of the limited legal consequences of Ext.P1 judgment, inasmuch as the same is rendered in a suit for injunction simplicitor. As rightly contended by the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent Corporation, the issue involved in a suit for injunction simplicitor is possession . By virtue of the relief granted vide Ext.P1, all what is seen restrained is ‘trespass’ into the petitioner's property having an extent of two cents, as also, from cutting open a pathway through the same. We endorse that a proceeding for eviction, in terms of the statute, after issuing notice vide Ext.P3, followed by Ext.P5 provisional order and Ext.P7 final order, can, by no stretch of imagination, tantamount to trespass. However, we are of the definite view that the proceedings which culminated in Ext.R1(a) sketch, through which the first respondent Corporation had concluded encroachment, should have been done with prior notice issued to the appellant/petitioner, in whose favour there exists a judgment recognising his possessory rights. This is all the more so, since the extent of the petitioner's property shown in Ext.R1(a) sketch is only 1.500 cents, as against his title to property having an extent of two cents. 12. That apart, we also find that Ext.P7 order is smeared with a fundamental legal infirmity. No reason, whatsoever, is seen stated in Ext.P7 order in support of the conclusion arrived at therein. The appellant/petitioner propounded Ext.P1 judgment by virtue of Ext.P4 reply to Ext.P3 notice. 12. That apart, we also find that Ext.P7 order is smeared with a fundamental legal infirmity. No reason, whatsoever, is seen stated in Ext.P7 order in support of the conclusion arrived at therein. The appellant/petitioner propounded Ext.P1 judgment by virtue of Ext.P4 reply to Ext.P3 notice. There is no reference about Ext.P1 judgment, or for that matter Ext.R1(a) sketch, either in Ext.P5 provisional order, or in Ext.P7 final order, notwithstanding the fact that the first respondent Corporation is very much a party to O.S. No. 478/2009. Further, we see total non-application of mind in Ext.P7 order, which is in a printed form, wherein the first respondent Corporation had not even cared to strike off the irrelevant clauses. The following contents of Ext.P7 order would demonstrate the same: The first sentence extracted above would indicate that no reply has been submitted by the petitioner, whereas, the second sentence suggests that the reply submitted is not satisfactory. No reason is forthcoming as to why Ext.P4 reply is not satisfactory. All what is seen inserted in Ext.P7, the printed form, is the name of the petitioner in three different places, coupled with a broad, general allegation that he had trespassed into the stream, which belongs to the Municipality, without specifying the extent and nature of trespass. 13. In R. vs. Civil Service Appeal Board, Ex p Cunningham, (1991) 4 All ER 310 (CA), Lord Donaldson, Master of Rolls, opined emphatically in favour of disclosing reasons in the following lines: “.......it is a corollary of the discretion conferred upon the Board that it is their duty to set out their reasoning in sufficient form to show the principles on which they have proceeded. Adopting Lord Lane, C.J. observations [in R. vs. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, Ex p Khan (Mahmud), 1983 (2) All ER 420 (CA) All ER at p. 423, QB at pp. 794-795], the reasons for the lower amount is not obvious. Mr. Cunningham is entitled to know, either expressly or inferentially stated, what it was to which the Board were addressing their mind in arriving at their conclusion. It must be obvious to the Board that Mr. Cunningham is left with a burning sense of grievance. 794-795], the reasons for the lower amount is not obvious. Mr. Cunningham is entitled to know, either expressly or inferentially stated, what it was to which the Board were addressing their mind in arriving at their conclusion. It must be obvious to the Board that Mr. Cunningham is left with a burning sense of grievance. They should be sensitive to the fact that he is left with a real feeling of injustice, that having been found to have been unfairly dismissed, he has been deprived of his just desserts (as he sees them).” 14. In M/s. Steel Authority of India Ltd. vs. STO, Rourkela-I Circle and Others, 2008 (5) Supreme 281 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus: “10. Reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion. It introduces clarity in an order and without the same it becomes lifeless.” 15. As regards the necessity of giving reasons in support of a decision, the law once recognised a demarcation between administrative orders and quasi judicial orders. This demarcation was reduced to a vanishing point as per the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in A.K. Kraipak vs. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262 . Recording reasons in support of a decision on a disputed claim ensures that the decision is not a result of caprice, whim or fancy, but was arrived at after considering the relevant law and that the decision was just. [See: Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar vs. State of U.P. (1970) 1 SCC 764 ]. The latin maxim “Cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex” [‘reason is the soul of the law and when the reason of any particular law ceases, so does the law itself’] was pressed into service by a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in H.H. Shri Swamiji vs. Commissioner, HR&CE Department, (1979) 4 SCC 642 . In State of Orissa vs. Binapani Dei and Others, AIR 1967 SC 1269 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that even an administrative order or decision in matters involving civil consequences, has to be made consistent with the rules of natural justice. [See: Raj Restaurant and Another vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (1982) 3 SCC 338 also]. 16. It is trite that the reasons behind the decision should be spelt out in the order/decision itself and the same cannot be supplemented in a counter affidavit filed, pursuant to a challenge. 17. [See: Raj Restaurant and Another vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (1982) 3 SCC 338 also]. 16. It is trite that the reasons behind the decision should be spelt out in the order/decision itself and the same cannot be supplemented in a counter affidavit filed, pursuant to a challenge. 17. We find that no reason, whatsoever, is stated in Ext.P7 order, or for that matter, Ext.P5 provisional order. Important is the requirement to refer to Ext.R1(a) sketch in Ext.P5 provisional order, as also, in Ext.P7 final order, inasmuch as the Corporation pins down encroachment on the strength of the measurement claimed to have been done, resulting in Ext.R1(a) sketch. Nor is Ext.P1 judgment and its legal impact referred to in Ext.P7 order. Coupled with the same, there is complete non-application of mind in Ext.P7 order, as could be seen from the portion which has been extracted in vernacular above. 18. We have no option, but to set aside Ext.P7 order. 19. The Writ Appeal is allowed and the judgment impugned is set aside. Ext.P7 order is quashed. We direct the first respondent Corporation to measure the petitioner's property, with due notice to the petitioner, to ascertain specifically whether there is any encroachment or not. Documents, if any, produced by the petitioner and his claim under Ext.P1 judgment shall also be taken into consideration. The first respondent shall thereafter pass final orders in terms of Section 406 of the Kerala Municipalities Act, after affording an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner. The first respondent shall not carry out demolition of the petitioner's structures until such orders, as directed above, are passed, in accordance with law.