JUDGMENT :- (Prayer: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying this Court to issue a writ of certiorarified mandamus calling for the records from the 3rd respondent, the Commissioner, Most Backward Classes and Denotified Communities Welfare relating to the impugned order passed by him in his proceedings Se.Mu.No.C1/1449/2005 dated 25.7.2001 quash the same and direct the respondents to pay the petitioner all the retiral benefits namely, pension, family pension, gratuity, backwages from the date of suspension and all other monetary benefits due and payable to him.) 1. It is the case of the petitioner that he was working as Warden in the Government Backward Class Boys Hostel, Palayamkottai and holding additional charge Warden in Vannikonendal in Tirunelveli District and is residing very much close to the District Most Backward Class and Minorities Welfare Office. It is the case of the petitioner that there are 44 Government Backward Class Boys and Girls Hostel in Tirunelveli District and the respective Wardens of the said Hostel used to write indent in papers relating to purchase of food and cooking essentials and submit the same directly in person to the 3rd respondent and the 3rd respondent, on receipt of the indents, placed the order with the Tirunelveli Cooperative Nellai Super Market (for short 'Super Market'). Since the Super Market cannot supply all the items for which indents are placed, price was fixed for the above items and payment thereof was made to the respective wardens for purchase of the various items from the available purchasers/stores. The payments are made to the respective wardens based on certain well laid procedures, wherein approval was granted by the 3rd respondent on placement of necessary files. 2. It is the further case of the petitioner that since the petitioner's house was in close proximity to the 3rd respondent office, all the wardens, when they were unable to be present personally to receive the payment from the Super Market, request was made to the petitioner to collect the amount on their behalf and in turn, pay to them, which the petitioner has been doing all along, including the disputed period of three months, viz., 12/2002, 01/2003 and 02/2003. It is the further case of the petitioner that he has been collecting and paying the amount to the respective wardens and that no complaint relating to misappropriation or preparation of indent/fake bills has been made against him by any of the wardens. It is the further case of the petitioner that the stock as well as the purchase are subjected to periodical audit and inspection by the concerned authorities and no objection has been raised with regard to misappropriation or preparation of fake bills. 3. It is the further case of the petitioner that the 3rd respondent framed seven charges against the petitioner vide his proceedings dated 17.07.2003 alleging preparation of fake/fictitious indents/purchase bills with the connivance of the Super Market employees and, thereby, misappropriated a sum of Rs. 7,21,509.69. Show cause notice was issued to the petitioner calling for explanation to which the petitioner submitted his explanation. Being not satisfied with the explanation, enquiry was ordered and the enquiry officer was appointed, who proceeded with the enquiry and submitted his report holding the charges proved. On the basis of the said report, the 3rd respondent/disciplinary authority, concurred with the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and while directed recovery of the sum of Rs.7,21,506.69, however, did not impose any punishment. 4. Against the said order of recovery, the petitioner preferred appeal before the 2nd respondent and the 2nd respondent, while issued show cause notice to the petitioner calling upon him as to why punishment should not be imposed on him, as only recovery was ordered. The petitioner submitted his explanation to the above and upon consideration of the same, the 1st respondent passed the impugned order dismissing the petitioner from service holding that the 3rd respondent had ordered only recovery of the misappropriated amount and no punishment was awarded with respect to the delinquency committed by the petitioner. Aggrieved by the said order, the present petition has been filed. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the enquiry has not been conducted in a fair and proper manner and that the petitioner was not provided with opportunity and there is total violation of principles of natural justice. Aggrieved by the said order, the present petition has been filed. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the enquiry has not been conducted in a fair and proper manner and that the petitioner was not provided with opportunity and there is total violation of principles of natural justice. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that though charges have been framed, in all, seven in number, but all the charges converge into a single homogeneous charge, viz., misappropriation of Rs.7,21,509.69 by the petitioner during the months 12/2002, 01/2003 and 02/2003 by producing fake bills and the said charges have not been established through oral and documentary evidence. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that neither oral evidence, nor any documentary evidence has been produced at the time of enquiry and merely holding that the petitioner has not proved his side of the case as to the misappropriation alleged, the enquiry officer has held proved the charges against the petitioner, which is wholly unsustainable. It is the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that even on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities, to point a finger on the petitioner, minimal materials ought to be produced, which prima facie, show the involvement of the petitioner and in the case on hand, no evidence, either oral or documentary has been placed to show that the petitioner has committed the misappropriation. It is further submitted that the fake bills, which have been the driving force in fastening the charge on the petitioner have not been placed and in the absence of any material, the finding recorded by the enquiry officer is based on no evidence and the disciplinary authority, without adverting to the materials available on record, has slavishly accepted the findings recorded by the enquiry officer while imposing the order of recovery, which cannot be sustained. It is further submitted that crowning the unsustainable order of recovery, the 1st respondent has passed the impugned order of dismissal on the basis of no evidence and without hearing the petitioner, which is in utter violation of principles of natural justice and, therefore, the above infirmities hit at the root of the impugned order and, therefore, the impugned order deserves to be set aside. 6. 6. Per contra, learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents submitted that it is not the petitioner alone, who was involved in the misappropriation, but a group of persons had perpetrated the illegal act in siphoning off the money belonging to the exchequer and against those persons employed both under the 3rd respondent as also in the Super Market, action was initiated which resulted in punishments having been inflicted on some of the persons, while in respect of other persons, enquiry is still going on. It is also the submission of the learned Government Advocate that parallely, criminal prosecution has also been initiated. 7. It is the further submission of the learned Government Advocate that the enquiry officer proceeded with the enquiry based on the materials available, as much of the documentary evidence, which was under the control of one Anwar Basha, who was working under the petitioner, had been removed from the office by the petitioner clandestinely, which necessitated initiation of departmental action against the said Anwar Basha leading to imposition of punishment. After removing all the materials, which implicated the petitioner, the petitioner has come before this Court with crocodile tears claiming that no oral or documentary evidence was placed in the enquiry, which renders the enquiry questionable. It is the further submission of the learned Government Advocate that it is not as if no materials have been placed before the enquiry officer relating to the act of the petitioner. In regard to the 7th charge, the Warden of Kootapuli Government Most Backward Class Girls Hostel has stated that an escalated bill to the tune of Rs.15,428.20 was claimed by the petitioner instead of the actual bill amount of Rs.8,453.53. On the basis of the materials that were available, the enquiry officer had held the charges proved and the petitioner has not placed any materials to show that he has not submitted any fake bills and also has not examined any of the wardens to the effect that the indent given by them were the indent for which claim was raised and paid back to them. In the absence of the petitioner absolving himself by placing evidence before the enquiry, the enquiry officer has returned a finding of guilt on the part of the petitioner, which has been rightly accepted by the disciplinary authority while imposing the order of recovery and the 1st respondent, in appeal, finding that no punishment has been imposed for the delinquency committed by the petitioner, but only recovery has been ordered, on the basis of the materials, on independent application of mind, has imposed the punishment of dismissal from service, as the delinquency was so grave in nature. It is submitted by the learned Government Advocate that this Court, sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, shall not interfere with the punishment imposed unless the said punishment is shown to be perverse and on the basis of no evidence and that the punishment is disproportionate and shocks the conscience of the Court. Accordingly, plea is made for dismissal of the present writ petition. 8. This Court bestowed its undivided attention to the contentions advanced by the learned counsel on either side and also perused the materials available on record. 9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in B.C. Chaturvedi – Vs - Union of India, ( 1995 (6) SCC 749 ), while dealing with issue relating to the power of the Court relating to judicial review of the order passed by the disciplinary authority, held as under: “12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [ (1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364 : (1964) 1 LLJ 38 ] this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.” (Emphasis Supplied) 10. The above view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Principal Secy. Govt. of A.P. - Vs - M. Adinarayana, ( 2004 (12) SCC 579 ), wherein, it has been held as under: “23. We have read this charge in the light of allegations in support thereof. In the instant case, it is not disputed that the respondent has neither supplied any prior information on the Government nor did he send any prior intimation to the Government. We have read this charge in the light of allegations in support thereof. In the instant case, it is not disputed that the respondent has neither supplied any prior information on the Government nor did he send any prior intimation to the Government. By not doing this, he has contravened the provisions of Rule 9. The Tribunal has also categorically held that the respondent has not applied for prior information before he purchased the items from the competent authority nor he intimated to the competent authority forthwith soon after the purchase of the several items. Therefore, in our view, the charged officer has violated Rule 9 of the Conduct Rules and thus is guilty of misconduct within Rule 2-H (sic) of the Andhra Pradesh Disciplinary Amendment Act, 1993. In view of the abovesaid finding we hold that respondent is guilty of both the charges framed against him within Rule 2 (b) of the Conduct Rules of 1961 framed under the Amendment Act, 1993. * * * * * * * * 26. In our opinion, judicial review cannot extend to the examination of the correctness of the charges as it is not an appeal but only a review of the manner in which the decision was made. We have, therefore, no hesitation in setting aside the order of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal and the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court for reasons stated (supra). The order passed by the Government removing the respondent from service is in order and, therefore, the appeal filed by the appellant State stands allowed. Further, there will be no order as to costs.” 11. In a recent decision in Director General of Police, RPF & Ors. - Vs – Rajendra Kumar Dubey (C.A. No.3820/2020 dated 25.11.20), the Hon'ble Supreme Court, adverting to the various decisions of the Apex Court relating to the interference by the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction with respect to disciplinary proceedings, including the decision in Chaturvedi's case (supra), held as under: “12.1 ...... It is well settled that the High Court must not act as an appellate authority, and re-appreciate the evidence led before the enquiry officer. We will advert to some of the decisions of this Court with respect to interference by the High Courts with findings in a departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is well settled that the High Court must not act as an appellate authority, and re-appreciate the evidence led before the enquiry officer. We will advert to some of the decisions of this Court with respect to interference by the High Courts with findings in a departmental enquiry against a public servant. In State of Andhra Pradesh v S.Sree Rama Rao, a three judge bench of this Court held that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is not the function of the High Court under its writ jurisdiction to review the evidence, and arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may, however interfere where the departmental authority which has held the proceedings against the delinquent officer are inconsistent with the principles of natural justice, where the findings are based on no evidence, which may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry, or the authorities were actuated by some extraneous considerations and failed to reach a fair decision, or allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations, or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. If however the enquiry is properly held, the departmental authority is the sole judge of facts, and if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a writ petition. These principles were further reiterated in the State of Andhra Pradesh v Chitra Venkata Rao. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The court exercises the power not as an appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal on the appreciation of evidence, are not re-opened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ court, but not an error of fact, however grave it may be. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal on the appreciation of evidence, are not re-opened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ court, but not an error of fact, however grave it may be. A writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the finding of fact, the tribunal has erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence. A finding of fact recorded by the tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the material evidence adduced before the tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point, and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal. In subsequent decisions of this Court, including Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, Director General RPF v. Ch. Sai Babu, Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board v T.T. Murali, Union of India v. Manab Kumar Guha, these principles have been consistently followed. In a recent judgment delivered by this Court in the State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Heem Singh this Court has summed up the law in following words: “33. In exercising judicial review in disciplinary matters, there are two ends of the spectrum. The first embodies a rule of restraint. The second defines when interference is permissible. The rule of restraint constricts the ambit of judicial review. This is for a valid reason. The determination of whether a misconduct has been committed lies primarily within the domain of the disciplinary authority. The judge does not assume the mantle of the disciplinary authority. Nor does the judge wear the hat of an employer. Deference to a finding of fact by the disciplinary authority is a recognition of the idea that it is the employer who is responsible for the efficient conduct of their service. Disciplinary enquiries have to abide by the rules of natural justice. But they are not governed by strict rules of evidence which apply to judicial proceedings. The standard of proof is hence not the strict standard which governs a criminal trial, of proof beyond reasonable doubt, but a civil standard governed by a preponderance of probabilities. Disciplinary enquiries have to abide by the rules of natural justice. But they are not governed by strict rules of evidence which apply to judicial proceedings. The standard of proof is hence not the strict standard which governs a criminal trial, of proof beyond reasonable doubt, but a civil standard governed by a preponderance of probabilities. Within the rule of preponderance, there are varying approaches based on context and subject. The first end of the spectrum is founded on deference and autonomy – deference to the position of the disciplinary authority as a fact finding authority and autonomy of the employer in maintaining discipline and efficiency of the service. At the other end of the spectrum is the principle that the court has the jurisdiction to interfere when the findings in the enquiry are based on no evidence or when they suffer from perversity. A failure to consider vital evidence is an incident of what the law regards as a perverse determination of fact. Proportionality is an entrenched feature of our jurisprudence. Service jurisprudence has recognized it for long years in allowing for the authority of the court to interfere when the finding or the penalty are disproportionate to the weight of the evidence or misconduct. Judicial craft lies in maintaining a steady sail between the banks of these two shores which have been termed as the two ends of the spectrum. Judges do not rest with a mere recitation of the hands-off mantra when they exercise judicial review. To determine whether the finding in a disciplinary enquiry is based on some evidence an initial or threshold level of scrutiny is undertaken. That is to satisfy the conscience of the court that there is some evidence to support the charge of misconduct and to guard against perversity. But this does not allow the court to re-appreciate evidentiary findings in a disciplinary enquiry or to substitute a view which appears to the judge to be more appropriate. To do so would offend the first principle which has been outlined above. The ultimate guide is the exercise of robust common sense without which the judges’ craft is in vain.” In Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, this Court held that the High Court in exercise of its power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The ultimate guide is the exercise of robust common sense without which the judges’ craft is in vain.” In Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, this Court held that the High Court in exercise of its power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court would determine whether : (a) the enquiry is held by the competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations which are extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. In paragraph 13 of the judgment, the Court held that: “13.Under Articles 226 / 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in the case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based; (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” (Emphasis Supplied) 12. From the ratio laid down above, it is implicitly clear that the Courts, in exercise of its power of judicial review, cannot extend the examination to the correctness of the act of the authorities, but only limit itself to the manner in which the decision has been arrived at by the authorities and whether the same is in accordance with law. This Court is to test only the correctness of the decision arrived at by the authorities on the basis of the evidence before it and not proceed with the case as if it is an appeal against the impugned order. 13. The main bone of contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that there were no materials, either oral or documentary, before the enquiry officer based on which a finding has been rendered as to the guilt of the petitioner and the said finding arrived at by the enquiry officer is erroneous and the petitioner having no opportunity of cross-examination, there is blatant violation of principles of natural justice, which vitiates the whole proceedings and, therefore, the impugned orders deserve to be interfered with. 14. To appreciate the contention put forth by the petitioner, it is but necessary to advert to the various materials, which are available in the typed set of papers to arrive at a conclusion as to the allegation of violation of principles of natural justice alleged by the petitioner. 15. A perusal of the materials placed by the parties reveal that action has been initiated against very many persons, of which disciplinary proceedings in respect of few persons have resulted in punishments having been awarded and the said orders having attained finality. Two of the persons, whose names figure in the explanation offered by the petitioner are one Janarthanan and Anwar Basha, the former being the Deputy Collector, who passed the bills submitted by the petitioner and the latter being an Assistant, who had in-charge of all the records implicating the petitioner. 16. The said Janarthanan, who was Deputy Collector and since retired, was charged for dereliction of duty and on the charges being held proved, he was inflicted with punishment of stoppage of pension to the tune of Rs.1,000/- per month for a period of three years and the officer had accepted the said punishment and the proceedings had attained finality. 16. The said Janarthanan, who was Deputy Collector and since retired, was charged for dereliction of duty and on the charges being held proved, he was inflicted with punishment of stoppage of pension to the tune of Rs.1,000/- per month for a period of three years and the officer had accepted the said punishment and the proceedings had attained finality. In respect of Anwar Basha, it is the case of the respondents that he was in charge of the records pertaining to the fake bills and other documents, which directly implicated the petitioner and when the documents were in his custody, the almirah was broken open and the said documents have been taken away and the said Anwar Basha was charged for the offence of dereliction of duty and was imposed with punishment of stoppage of increment for a period of three years. However, the records pertaining to the said punishment have been destroyed as per the orders of the appropriate authority after a period of time, which is evident from the communication of the District Collector to the 3rd respondent. Therefore, the stand of the petitioner that he alone has been targeted and inflicted with punishment and none of the other persons have been brought under the scanner and imposed with any punishment, is against the records. 17. The main thrust of the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that no oral and documentary evidence has been examined during the enquiry proceedings and based on the charges, the enquiry officer held the same as proved, which is in stark violation of principles of natural justice and deserves to be interfered with. 18. A perusal of the enquiry report reveals that the petitioner had bluntly refuted the charges. True it is that in much of the charges, the enquiry officer has proceeded on the footing that the charges relate to misappropriation and preparation of false indent/fake bills, but as stated above, much of the documents, which, according to the respondents, implicated the petitioner, which were in the custody of one Anwar Basha, were stolen by breaking open the almirah, of which accusation has been levelled against the petitioner. The said Anwar Basha, being a subordinate to the petitioner and working in the office of the petitioner, when documents, which stand testimony of misappropriation was stolen, the said individual has been proceeded with and imposed with punishment. The said Anwar Basha, being a subordinate to the petitioner and working in the office of the petitioner, when documents, which stand testimony of misappropriation was stolen, the said individual has been proceeded with and imposed with punishment. However, insofar as charge No.7 is concerned, there is a categorical finding recorded by the enquiry officer that the warden of Kootapuli Government Most Backward Class Girls Hostel on enquiry, has given a statement that she had given the vegetable indent to the petitioner and though the actual cost incurred for the month of 02/2003 was only Rs.8,453.53, which is reflected in the bill, which has been stuck in the register, however, claim was made for a higher amount to the tune of Rs.15,,428.20 and that the indent prepared to arrive at the said amount is not the one given by her. 19. In this regard, a perusal of the affidavit filed by the petitioner reveals that there is a categorical admission on the part of the petitioner, who had stated that he used to collect the indent as also the receipt of the money and give the same to the concerned wardens as he was residing very much near the office of the 3rd respondent. Therefore, receipt of the indent and taking the money and paying it back to the respective wardens has been admitted by the petitioner. Such being the case, when a warden, as pointed out above, in relation to charge No.7, has categorically stated that though the amount given to her is in consonance with the indent given by her, however, the actual amount claimed is for a far higher sum, which is not as per the indent prepared by her and in such backdrop, the affirmative admission of the petitioner that he used to collect the indents as also receive the money and pay the same to the concerned wardens, when holistically considered, it is incumbent on the part of the petitioner to place materials to vindicate his stand that he has not placed any such indents and received any excess money. The petitioner has not thought it fit to call the concerned wardens and elicit information in support of his stand that he had no nexus with the said act of misappropriation. The petitioner has not thought it fit to call the concerned wardens and elicit information in support of his stand that he had no nexus with the said act of misappropriation. The petitioner not having taken any steps to vindicate himself from the said statement made by one of the wardens relating to charge No.7, this Court is left with no other alternative but to draw an adverse inference with regard to the other charges, viz., charge Nos.1 to 6 in which the respondents have categorically stated that the documents have been stolen and the petitioner has been instrumental in the said act as the said documents unerringly point the finger on the petitioner. 20. It is to be pointed out that the respondents have to establish their case in the enquiry, but the quality of the evidence in not akin to a criminal trial as the departmental proceedings proceeds on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. It is to be pointed out that the standard of proof required in a departmental proceeding is not in the same league as the standard of proof required to establish a charge in a criminal case. Disciplinary enquiries have to abide by the rules of natural justice. But they are not governed by strict rules of evidence which apply to judicial proceedings. The standard of proof is hence not the strict standard which governs a criminal trial, of proof beyond reasonable doubt, but a civil standard governed by a preponderance of probabilities. While the standard of proof in a criminal trial would be on the basis of the provisions of the Evidence Act and other statutes, however, in the departmental proceedings, it is only on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities, the evidence is evaluated and, therefore, it is impermissible to equate the way in which the evidence ought to be evaluated. 21. In the case on hand, charge No.7 has been proved on the basis of the statement of one of the warden which clearly establishes the charge of misappropriation against the petitioner. However, the respondents have pleaded that for charge Nos. 1 to 6, the documentary evidence having been stolen from the office, the same was not tabled before the enquiry officer. However, charge No.7 having been proved, an inference has been drawn against the petitioner. However, the respondents have pleaded that for charge Nos. 1 to 6, the documentary evidence having been stolen from the office, the same was not tabled before the enquiry officer. However, charge No.7 having been proved, an inference has been drawn against the petitioner. Though the petitioner lays his defence on the ground that no oral or documentary evidence has been tabled before the enquiry officer, however, the entire enquiry cannot be said to be a case of no evidence, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decisions noted above. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that only in case of no evidence, the enquiry can be held to be defective. However, in the case on hand, when one of the charges stood proved relating to similar case of misappropriation and fabrication of fake bills by the petitioner, on the premise of preponderance of probabilities, the enquiry officer has drawn an inference that the other charges also likewise stood proved. However, except for stating that the respondents have not proved the charge, the petitioner has not taken any effort to establish his innocence by adducing any oral evidence. Had really the petitioner been honest and upright as claimed by him, nothing prevented the petitioner from calling upon the other wardens from whom he had received indents and received the money and handed over to them to come and speak on his behalf to establish his case that he was not instrumental in the act of misappropriation. However, no steps have been taken by the petitioner in this regard, except to point out that the respondents have not placed any evidence. The petitioner cannot absolve himself from the delinquency by merely stating that the respondents have not proved the delinquent act against him, when the respondents have proved misappropriation on the part of the petitioner in some of the charges, while drawing inference of the same for the other charges. Therefore, a heavy duty is cast upon the petitioner to rebut the said evidence by producing oral/documentary evidence to press home his innocence, which the petitioner has miserably failed to do. 22. Further, a bare reading of the explanation submitted by the petitioner to the show cause notice issued by the 2nd respondent categorically reveals the attitude exhibited by the petitioner. 22. Further, a bare reading of the explanation submitted by the petitioner to the show cause notice issued by the 2nd respondent categorically reveals the attitude exhibited by the petitioner. In the said communication, the petitioner has pointed out various persons, viz., Janarthanan, Anwar Basha, etc., by stating that they have wriggled themselves out of the predicament by illegal means by compromising with the higher authorities and the petitioner being a person, who is innocent, he may also be absolved from the charges and permitted to retire. Further, the petitioner, in the explanation to the show cause notice in the appeal for infliction of punishment, has pointed fingers against many individuals against whom action requires to be taken and also sought the details of the action taken and giving detailed explanations to his various acts, in an attempt to show him in the right light before the respondents. Deviating from the main issue, the petitioner has pointed fingers against other individuals. The petitioner, in essence, has stated that only to save the skin of the other individuals, who had acted with malice against him, to clothe their wrong doings, have fastened the charge against the petitioner. Further, the petitioner has questioned about the action taken against the other person, viz., Janarthanan. It is to be pointed out that not only action has been taken against the said Janarthanan, but he has been visited with punishment, which has attained finality. The said documents relating to the action taken against the other persons would not be of any relevance to the case of the petitioner and, therefore, the claim of the petitioner for the documents relating to the other persons would not be a ground to hold that there has been violation of principles of natural justice. 23. Though the petitioner has raised pointed contentions in the respondents not establishing the charges against the petitioner, which falls short of acceptance, as certain charges have been proved, as pointed out above, yet the petitioner has not washed his own linen, by taking earnest efforts to examine the wardens from whom he had received indents and also paid the money received from the Super Market. The fallacy on the part of the petitioner in not placing any evidence to establish his case certainly acts in detriment and the inference drawn by the respondents on the basis of the proven charge cannot be found fault with. 24. As already codified by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Gunasekaran's case (supra), the High Court in exercise of its power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The power of the High Court is only to determine whether (a) the enquiry is held by the competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations which are extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. As already stated above, none of the ingredients pointed out by the Hon'ble Apex Court could be said to have been violated in the case on hand. Though violation is alleged, which have been explained properly by the respondents and in the absence of the petitioner rebutting the evidence by placing any further materials on his behalf, this Court, sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has a very limited scope of reviewing the order impugned herein and this Court cannot place itself into the mantle of the disciplinary authority to determine whether a misconduct has been committed or not. The materials on record clearly reveal the delinquency committed by the petitioner on which action has been taken by the respondents. Therefore, it can be safely concluded that the respondents have acted within the four corners of law and the alleged violations, pointed out by the petitioner, being bereft of any conclusive proof, cannot be the basis to term the disciplinary proceedings as vitiated. 25. Therefore, it can be safely concluded that the respondents have acted within the four corners of law and the alleged violations, pointed out by the petitioner, being bereft of any conclusive proof, cannot be the basis to term the disciplinary proceedings as vitiated. 25. A holistic consideration of all the pleas raised by the petitioner at all stages of the proceedings culminating in the order of termination by the 1st respondent reveals that the authorities below, on independent application of mind to the materials placed before them, have arrived at a finding that the delinquency alleged against the petitioner stood proved and that the petitioner has not placed any materials to the contra to substantiate his case and in the absence of the same, the punishment was imposed on the petitioner. 26. At the risk of repetition, it is to be stressed that the Court in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court. It has been the consistent view of the Courts that the nature of evidence required in a disciplinary proceedings is not in the same level as required in a criminal trial, as in the disciplinary proceedings, the finding is arrived at on the basis of preponderance of probabilities. In such a scenario, it is not the function of the High Court under its writ jurisdiction to review the evidence, and arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. If the enquiry is properly held within the four boundaries of legal necessities, then the departmental authority is the sole judge of facts, and if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a writ petition. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ court, but not an error of fact, however grave it may be. High Court in exercise of its power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence and further the Supreme Court has also codified the circumstances under which re-appreciation of evidence is permissible. Therefore, this Court, sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution is not inclined to interfere with the findings of the disciplinary enquiry. 27. Once this Court has accepted the findings recorded by the authorities for imposing punishment on the delinquent, the next limb of consideration is the quantum of punishment imposed on the petitioner and its just and reasonableness for which this Court would like to advert to the ratio laid down with regard to interference of the Courts in the matter of punishment under Article 226 of the Constitution. 28. It has been the consistent view of the Courts that it is always within the domain of the appointing authority to decide on the punishment to be imposed on the delinquent, which should be proportionate to the delinquency. Only when the punishment is disproportionate and shocking the conscience, should the courts interfere in the same in exercise of powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution. In Prem Nath Bali – Vs - High Court of Delhi ( 2015 (16) SCC 415 ), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: “20. It is a settled principle of law that once the charges levelled against the delinquent employee are proved then it is for the appointing authority to decide as to what punishment should be imposed on the delinquent employee as per the Rules. The appointing authority, keeping in view the nature and gravity of the charges, findings of the inquiry officer, entire service record of the delinquent employee and all relevant factors relating to the delinquent, exercised its discretion and then imposed the punishment as provided in the Rules. 21. Once such discretion is exercised by the appointing authority in inflicting the punishment (whether minor or major) then the courts are slow to interfere in the quantum of punishment and only in rare and appropriate case substitutes the punishment. 21. Once such discretion is exercised by the appointing authority in inflicting the punishment (whether minor or major) then the courts are slow to interfere in the quantum of punishment and only in rare and appropriate case substitutes the punishment. Such power is exercised when the court finds that the delinquent employee is able to prove that the punishment inflicted on him is wholly unreasonable, arbitrary and disproportionate to the gravity of the proved charges thereby shocking the conscience of the court or when it is found to be in contravention of the Rules. The Court may, in such cases, remit the case to the appointing authority for imposing any other punishment as against what was originally awarded to the delinquent employee by the appointing authority as per the Rules or may substitute the punishment by itself instead of remitting to the appointing authority.” (Emphasis Supplied) 29. In the case on hand, a careful perusal of the entire records right from the conduct of the enquiry, to the passing of the order of recovery and the further imposition of punishment of termination in appeal, it clearly evidences that there has been proper and independent application of mind on the part of the concerned authorities, who dealt with the case of the petitioner. It is further to be pointed out that the offence committed by the petitioner is of such a nature, that and the gravity of the offence being of monstrous proportion, the 1st respondent has inflicted the punishment of termination from service on the petitioner and this Court, sitting in judicial review, is not required to go through the entire materials as if the matter is in appeal before this Court, but only to arrive at a subjective finding as to whether the enquiry has been conducted in a fair and proper manner and whereupon, the punishment has been imposed on independent application of mind. This Court is in consensus with the whole process of enquiry resulting in the infliction of punishment on the petitioner passed by the 1st respondent and is of the view that the same does not warrant any interference at the hands of this Court. The punishment imposed on the petitioner is also just and reasonable considering the nature of delinquency and no sympathy can flow from this Court for the act of the petitioner. The punishment imposed on the petitioner is also just and reasonable considering the nature of delinquency and no sympathy can flow from this Court for the act of the petitioner. Therefore, the punishment imposed on the petitioner is in no way shocking the conscience of this Court or disproportionate to the delinquency and, therefore, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the same. 30. For the reasons aforesaid, this writ petition is devoid of merits and, accordingly, the same is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.