JUDGMENT : J.B.PARDIWALA , J. 1. By this writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the writ applicant has prayed for the following reliefs; “(A) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus and/or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing by quashing and setting aside the notice dated 19.02.2019 (Annexure K) issued by the respondent No.2 as same being arbitrary and illegal and further be pleased to direct the respondent No.2 to waive the amount of penalty imposed upon the petitioner arbtrarily. (B) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus and/or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing by quashing and setting aside the proceedings pending before respondent no.3 being case no.ARE/1/ETR/575/2020; (C) Pending hearing, admission and final hearing of the matter, Your Lordships may be pleased to direct the respondent no.3 to stay the proceedings pending before respondent no.3 being case no.ARE/1/ETR/575/2020 (D) Pending hearing, admission and final hearing of the matter, Your Lordships may be pleased to direct the respondent no.3 to stay the implementation and execution of notice dated 19.02.2020 and notice dated 31.07.2020.” 2. The first order that came to be passed in the present matter while issuing notice is dated 27.01.2021. The same reads thus; “Heard Mr. Zubin F. Bharda, learned advocate for Mr. Dhruvik K. Patel for the petitioner and Mr. Tirthraj Pandya, learned Assistant Government Pleader for the State Government authorities on advance copy. On condition that the petitioner shall deposit an amount of Rs.30,00,000/ (Rupees thirty lacs only) with the respondent no.3–District Collector, Ahmedabad within a period of 10 days, NOTICE returnable on 9.2.2021.” 3. Thereafter, this Bench heard this matter at length and passed the following order on 25.11.2021; “1) We have heard Mr.Zubin Bharda, the learned counsel with Mr.Dhruvik K. Patel, the learned advocate for the writ applicant and Mr. Ishan Joshi, the learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for the respondent-State. 2) The State seeks to recover an amount of approximately Rs.1,00,00,000/- (Rupees One Crore) from the writ applicant towards arrears of rent. It appears from the materials on record that the writ applicant entered into a contract with the Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad to run a chemist shop at the premises of Civil Hospital. 2) The State seeks to recover an amount of approximately Rs.1,00,00,000/- (Rupees One Crore) from the writ applicant towards arrears of rent. It appears from the materials on record that the writ applicant entered into a contract with the Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad to run a chemist shop at the premises of Civil Hospital. After running the chemist shop for some time disputes arose between the writ applicant and the State. The contract ultimately came to be terminated. According to the State, since the huge amount had to be recovered towards arrears of rent, it first issued the notice calling upon the writ applicant to make the payment. Failing which, the requisite amount due and payable would be recovered by way of land revenue measures. 3) We also take notice of the fact that the security deposit has also been forfeited. It is also not in dispute that the agreement between the parties provides that under the contract, if any sum of money is recoverable from the Contractor and payable by the Contractor to the Medical Superintendent, Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad, the Officer empowered shall be entitled to recover such sum by appropriating in part or whole, the Security Deposit paid by the Contractor and at the end of it, if a security being insufficient then the balance of the total sum recoverable, as the case may be deducted from the sum due to the contractor under the existing contract or any other contract and the balance amount would be recovered as arrears of “ land revenue dues”. 4) It goes without saying that once the parties enter into a contract and the Contractor accepts the conditions as stipulated in the agreement, the same would be binding to the contract. However, a question of law arises in the present litigation. The question is whether any amount, which is sought to be recovered under a contractual relationship between the parties on the strength of an agreement can be recovered by land revenue measures. In other words, whether it is open for the State to invoke the provisions of the Gujarat Land Revenue Code for the purpose of recovering the requisite amount. There is a fine distinction between “arrears of land revenue” & “dues recoverable as arrears of land revenue.” 5) We make it clear that we are not inclined to look into any other issues except the above question. There is a fine distinction between “arrears of land revenue” & “dues recoverable as arrears of land revenue.” 5) We make it clear that we are not inclined to look into any other issues except the above question. We are not going to enter into any adjudication whether any amount is due and payable or not or what is that exact amount due and payable. 6) Post this matter for further hearing on 02.12.2021.” 4. We have heard Mr. Zubin Bharda, the learned counsel appearing with Mr. Dhruvik Patel, the learned advocate for the writ applicant and Mr. Ishan Joshi, the learned AGP appearing for the State-respondents. 5. Clause (7) of the agreement between the parties reads thus; “7) The Contract shall be terminated and firm will be delisted as an accepted bidder for this tender & rejected for the whole duration of tender by the Medical Superintendent, Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad in the following circumstances; 1) If the firm is debarred for disqualification or ceases to exist or convicted of any offence. 2) If the quality of the item supplies is found not up to the standard and multiple samples are found to be not of standard quality. 3) If under this contract any sum of money is recoverable from the contractor & payable by the contractor to the Medical Superintendent, Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad or an officer empowered by him shall be entitled to recover such sum by appropriating in part of whole the Security Deposit paid by the Contractor, if a security being insufficient then the balance of the total sum recoverable as the case may be deducted from the sum due to the contractor under this or any other contract (with the Medical Superintendent, Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad and remaining balance due will be recovered as arrears of “Land Revenue Dues” 6. Having regard to the question of law which we were called upon to answer, few provisions of the Gujarat Land Revenue Code, 1879 may also be looked into. 7. Section 150 of the Code, 1879 reads thus; “150. Having regard to the question of law which we were called upon to answer, few provisions of the Gujarat Land Revenue Code, 1879 may also be looked into. 7. Section 150 of the Code, 1879 reads thus; “150. Process for recovery of arrears:- An arrear of land revenue may be recovered by the following processes— (a) by serving a written notice of demand on the defaulter under section 152; (b) by forfeiture of the occupancy or alienate holding in respect of which the arrear is due under section 153; (c) by distraint and sale of the defaulter’s movable property under section 154; (d) by sale of the defaulter’s immovable property under section 155; (e) by arrest and imprisonment of the defaulter under sections 157 and 158; (f) in the case of alienated holding consisting of entire villages, or shares of villages, by attachment of the said villages or shares of villages under sections 159 to 163.” 8. Section 151 of the Code is as under; “151. Revenue demands of former years how recoverable:- The said processes may be employed for the recovery of arrears of former years as well as of the current year, but the preferences given by sections 137 and 138 shall apply only to demands for the current year: Provided that any process commenced in the current year shall be entitled to the said preferences, notwithstanding that it may not be fully executed within that year.” 9. Section 152 reads thus; “152. When notice of demand may issue:- A notice of demand may be issued on or after the day following that on which the arrear accrues. The [State Government] may from time to time frame rules for the issue of such notices, and [ * * ] shall fix the costs recoverable from the defaulter as an arrear of revenue, and direct by what officer such notices shall be issued.” 10. Section 153 is as follows; “153. The [State Government] may from time to time frame rules for the issue of such notices, and [ * * ] shall fix the costs recoverable from the defaulter as an arrear of revenue, and direct by what officer such notices shall be issued.” 10. Section 153 is as follows; “153. The occupancy or alienated holding for which arrear is due may be forfieted:- The Collector may declare the occupancy or alienated holding in respect of which an arrear of land revenue is due, to be forfeited to the [State] Government], and sell or otherwise dispose of the same under the provisions of sections 56 and 57, and credit the proceeds, if any, to the defaulter’s accounts: Provided that the Collector shall not declare any such occupancy or alienated holding to be forfeited— (a) unless previously thereto he shall have issued a proclamation and written notices of the intended declaration in the manner prescribed by sections 165 and 166 for sales of immovable property, and (b) until after the expiration of at least fifteen days from the latest date on which any of the said notices shall have been affixed as required by section 166.]” 11. Section 154 of the Code reads thus; “154. Distraint and sale of defaulter’s movable property:- The Collector may also cause the defaulter’s movable property to be distrained and sold. By whom to be made:- Such distraintsshall be made by such officers or class of officers asthe [Collector] under the orders of the [State] Government ] may from time to time direct.” 12. Section 155 is as under: “155. Sale of defaulter’s immovable property:- The Collector may also cause the right, title and interest of the defaulter in any immovable property other than the land on which the arrears is due to be sold.” 13. As back as on 22-2-1946, a Full Bench of the Nagpur High Court in the matter of Maulabax v. Sardarmal and another, AIR 1952 Nagpur 341 held with reference to Section 138 of the C.P. Land Revenue Act, 1917 analogous to Section 138 of the Code that Section 138 of the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1917 applies only to those cases in which land revenue due is itself to be recovered and pointed out the distinction as under: - “(1) No distinction is made in the two expressions. There is thus really no distinction between the phraseology adopted in Sections 157, 197 and 225. Under the rules framed under Section 211 of the Act, if a purchaser of a survey number from Government makes a default in payment of the full price, the land is put to auction; and deficit, if any, is recovered from him "as an arrear of land revenue". These phrases "as arrears of land revenue", "as if it were an arrear of land revenue" and "in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue", whether they are used in connection with recovery of revenue or debts due to the State or debts due to local bodies or other persons, appear to have the same meaning. They indicate the mode of recovery and do not clothe the persons entitled to recover with any of the attributes or privileges of Government conferred by Section 138(1) of the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act or the corresponding provisions in the Revenue Recovery Acts of other provides. (2) To attract Section 138(1) a clear provision was necessary as is fond in Section 7(1)(c) of the Land Improvement Loans Act, 1883. In my view, the expression "proceed to recover as if it were an arrear of land revenue" in Section 157(3) imports that a private debt due by a co-sharer to a lambardar is land revenue merely for the limited purpose of recovery. The debt is not in reality a land revenue. The fiction cannot be extended to clothe the lambardar with all the rights and privileges of Government in recovery of land revenue in the absence of an expression "due in respect of that land" or similar expression in Section 157(3). Such an expression cannot be implied." 14. Thereafter, in the matter of Manoharlal Awal v. The State of M.P. and others, AIR 1978 MP 152 , distinction between arrears of land revenue and dues recoverable as arrears of land revenue came to be considered before a Full Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in which the Full Bench has held clearly that arrears of land revenue is distinct and separate from money recoverable as arrears of land revenue and further held that where money is recoverable as arrears of land revenue, the provisions relating to recovery particularly, Section 150 of the Code would not be applicable. The Full Bench has observed as under: - "10. The Full Bench has observed as under: - "10. From the above analysis, it can be clearly seen that (i) "an arrear of land revenue" is distinct and separate from (ii) "money recoverable as an arrear of land revenue" and this distinction has been studiously maintained through out the chapter. The intention of the Legislature becomes obvious enough. In every section only that expression has been used to which it was meant to apply. There does not appear to be any confusion. Where the expression "an arrear of land revenue" alone is used it does not include "money recoverable as an arrear of land revenue". Bearing in mind this distinction, Section 150 of the Code may now be read carefully. The first sub-section speaks of "an arrear of land revenue" alone. There is no mention of money recoverable as an arrear of land revenue, in the whole of the section. To put it differently it is only the person against whom proceedings are taken for the recovery of an arrear of land revenue, who can pay the amount claimed before the property is knocked down and deliver a protest. As soon as this is done, the proceedings shall be stayed. On an application by that person, the Sub-Divisional Officer shall determine whether anything at all was due from him or any amount was due from him less than the amount for the recovery of which proceedings were taken. The decision of the Sub-Divisional Officer is not appealable but the person concerned may institute a civil suit for the recovery of the amount which he paid under protest or any part thereof. 11. The whole of Section 150 is applicable only to a proceeding for the recovery of an arrear of land revenue but not to a proceeding for the recovery of money recoverable as an arrear of land revenue. Although it is not necessary to enter into wisdom of the law makers, it is apparent enough that the levy and assessment of land revenue is a subject-matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of revenue authorities. The Sub-Divisional Officer can give a decision on the objection raised by the defaulter about his non-liability for the entire arrears of land revenue claimed from him or part thereof. The Sub-Divisional Officer can give a decision on the objection raised by the defaulter about his non-liability for the entire arrears of land revenue claimed from him or part thereof. The Legislature did not intend to empower the Sub- Divisional Officer to give a decision on an objection in respect of any dues other than land revenue, the jurisdiction regarding levy and assessment of which vests in other authorities exercising powers under other enactments. For instance, the Excise Act, the Sales Tax Act, etc. Having provided for a deposit and protest and having conferred jurisdiction on the Sub- Divisional Officer to decide the objection the section provides for the remedy of a civil suit as well. But such a suit can be instituted only after the amount has been deposited and decision has been obtained from the Sub-Divisional Officer. This position would not obtain in case of any dues other than land revenue simipliciter, although they have been made recoverable as an arrear of land revenue. Adverting now to Section 257 of the Code itself clause (h) bars a civil suit on questions which can be determined by Revenue Authorities under the Land Revenue Code. It follows that the question whether the whole or any part of the land revenue claimed as arrears is really due or not, being within the jurisdiction of the Sub- Divisional Officer a civil suit will not lie. Opening words of Section 257 override clause (h) with the result that a civil suit will be competent under subsection (3) provided it satisfies the condition precedent i.e. the compliance of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2)." Their Lordships finally answered the reference holding that Section 150 of the Code is not applicable to proceedings for the recovery of any sum of money which is "recoverable as an arrear of land revenue" within the meaning of Section 155 of the Code, and held as under: - "(1) Section 150 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code applies to recovery of "an arrear of land revenue" but not to proceedings for the recovery of any sum of money which is "recoverable as an arrear of land revenue" within the meaning of Section 155 of that Code. (2) ... ... ... (2) ... ... ... (3) In a proceeding for the recovery of a sum of money "recoverable as an arrear of land revenue", the provisions of Section 150 of the Land Revenue Code are inapplicable. Neither the proceeding under sub-section (2), nor a civil suit under sub-section (3) is available to a defaulter. Thus, in such a case, a civil suit contemplated under Section 150 (3) of the Code is not an alternative remedy. (4) ... ... …" 15. Likewise, in the matter of State Bank of Indore v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Indore and others, AIR 1965 MP 40 , a Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh has held that the amount recoverable under the provisions of the Employees Provident Funds Act, 1952 is the amount recoverable as arrears of land revenue and as such, Sections 137 and 152 of the Code would not be applicable. Relying upon the matter of Maulabax (supra), it has been held as under: - "6. Section 155(c) of the Code only rays down that if under any enactment any sum is declared to be recoverable in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue, then it may be recovered, as far as may be, under the provision of Chapter XI of the Code in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue. Section 137 of the Code is not attracted in the present case as that only makes the land revenue assessed on any land the first charge on that land and on the rents and profits thereof. The amount due from an employer under Section 8 of the Act is clearly not any land revenue on any land and, therefore, Section 137 has no applicability whatsoever. Section 152 of the Code only gives effect to the provisions; contained in Section 137 of the Code when it says that the purchaser of the land sold for arrears of land revenue due in respect thereof shall acquire it free of ail encumbrances imposed on it. The words "the land sold for arrears of land revenue" and the qualifying words "due in respect thereof" unmistakably show that it is only when land is sold for arrears of land revenue assessed on that land that the purchaser of the land acquires it free of all encumbrances imposed on it. The words "the land sold for arrears of land revenue" and the qualifying words "due in respect thereof" unmistakably show that it is only when land is sold for arrears of land revenue assessed on that land that the purchaser of the land acquires it free of all encumbrances imposed on it. This provision has also no applicability here for the simple reason that the property that is intended to be sold is not any land and the arrears of the employers contribution is not any amount of arrears of land revenues. Both the Naib Tahsildar and the Sub-Divisional Officer, therefore, erred in holding that the Chawl mortgaged with the petitioner-Bank by the Company could be sold free of file mortgage encumbrance for the recovery of the amount due from the Company tinder under Section 8 of the Act. The matter is really concluded by the Full Bench decision in ILR (1952) Nag 211 : (AIR 1952 Nag 341) (FB) (supra) where it has been held with reference to Section 138 of the C. P. Land Revenue Act, 1917- analogous to Section 152 of the Code - that the words "due in respect thereof" in Section 138 qualify the words "arrears of land revenue" in the section; that section applies only to those cases in which land revenue due is itself recovered; and that it does not come into play if the land revenue is not being recovered." 16. The view taken by the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Manoharlal Awal (supra), referred to above, did not find favour with the Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka vs. Shree Rameshwara Rice Mills, Thtrthahalli, reported in 1987 (2) SCC 160 . We quote the relevant observations; “3. The State alleged that the respondent had committed a breach of the contract by making short delivery of rice and demanded payment of damages assessed at Rs.7,344.16ps. by the Deputy Commissioner. As the respondent failed to pay the damages the State initiated proceedings under the Revenue Recovery Act to recover the amount as if it were arrears of land revenue. The respondent filed a suit to challenge the recovery proceeding as being illegal and for a permanent injunction to restrain the State from pursuing the recovery proceedings. The trial court dismissed the suit but the Appellate Court decreed the suit. The respondent filed a suit to challenge the recovery proceeding as being illegal and for a permanent injunction to restrain the State from pursuing the recovery proceedings. The trial court dismissed the suit but the Appellate Court decreed the suit. The State preferred a Second Appeal to the High Court. In the Second Appeal a reference was made to the Full Bench for its opinion since there were two conflicting decisions of Division Benches of the High Court on the questions of law raised in the appeal. The Full Bench answered the reference in the following manner:- "Where an agreement between the State and a private person provides that for any breach of any of the conditions of such agreement by such person he shall be liable to pay such damages as may be assessed by the State and that any amount that may become due or payable by such person to the State under any part of that agreement, shall be deemed to be and may be recovered from such person as if they were arrears of land revenue— (i) the State is not competent to adjudicate upon the question whether such a person committed breach of contract and that the State is not competent to assess damages for any breach of the contract which is not admitted by the other side: (ii) damages so assessed cannot be recovered from such person as if they were arrears of land revenue". 4. In accordance with the opinion of the Full Bench the Second Appeal preferred by the State was dismissed. The High Court, however, granted a certificate of leave to the State and that is how this appeal by certificate has come to be filed. 5. The other two appeals relate to two contractors who had entered into agreements with the State of Mysore for constructing certain buildings. As the contractors failed to complete the works their contracts were terminated and in terms of the agreements entered into by them the damages payable by them for breach of contract were assessed and the damages were sought to be recovered as arrears of land revenue. Both the contractors filed writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution and challenged the validity of the assessment of the damages and the recovery proceedings. Both the contractors filed writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution and challenged the validity of the assessment of the damages and the recovery proceedings. Following the ruling of the Full Bench referred to above the High Court allowed both the writ petitions and quashed the proceedings for recovery of damages. Against the judgments of the High Court the State has preferred the other two appeals. 6. Mr. B.R.L. Iyenger, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the terms of clause 12 of the agreement are wide and comprehensive enough to hold that the Deputy Commissioner representing the State has competence and sanction to decide whether any breach of the conditions of the contract had been committed and also to determine the quantum of damages payable for the breach. In other words, the argument was that the Deputy Commissioner, even though a party to the agreement is empowered under Clause 12 to not only assess the damages occasioned by the breach of the conditions but also to adjudicate upon any issue concerning the commission of the breach itself. The learned counsel, therefore, submitted that the opinion rendered by the Full Bench and the judgments rendered in pursuance thereof are unsustainable and hence the appeals by the State should be allowed. 7. On a consideration of the matter we find ourselves unable to accept the contentions of Mr. Iyenger. The terms of Clause 12 do not afford scope for a liberal construction being made regarding the power of the Deputy Commissioner to adjudicate upon a disputed question of breach as well as to assess the damages arising from the breach. The crucial words in clause 12 are "and for any breach of conditions set forth herein before, the first party shall be liable to pay damages to the second party as may be assessed by the second party". On a plain reading of the words it is clear that the right of the second party to assess damages would arise only if the breach of conditions is admitted or if no issue is made of it. If it was the intention of the parties that the officer acting on behalf of the State was also entitled to adjudicate upon a dispute regarding the breach of conditions the wording of Clause 12 would have been entirely different. If it was the intention of the parties that the officer acting on behalf of the State was also entitled to adjudicate upon a dispute regarding the breach of conditions the wording of Clause 12 would have been entirely different. It cannot also be argued that a right to adjudicate upon an issue relating to a breach of conditions of the contract would flow from or is inhered in the right conferred to assess the damages arising from a breach of conditions. The power to assess damages, as pointed out by the Full Bench, is a subsidiary and consequential power and not the primary power. Even assuming for argument's sake that the terms of Clause 12 afford scope for being construed as empowering the officer of the State to decide upon the question of breach as well as assess the quantum of damages, we do not think that adjudication by the Officer regarding the breach of the contract can be sustained under law because a party to the agreement cannot be an arbiter in his own cause. Interests or justice and equity require that where a party to a contract disputes the committing of any breach of conditions the adjudication should be by an independent person or body and not by the other party to the contract. The position will, however, be different where there is no dispute or there is consensus between the contracting parties regarding the breach of conditions. In such a case the Officer of the State, even though a party to the contract will be well within his rights in assessing the damages occasioned by the breach in view of the specific terms of Clause 12. 8. We are, therefore, in agreement with the view of the Full Bench that the powers of the State under an agreement entered into by it with a private person providing for assessment of damages for breach of conditions and recovery of the damages will stand confined only to those cases where the breach of conditions is admitted or it is disputed. 9. The further question requiring consideration is regarding the power of the State to recover damages as arrears of land revenue under the Revenue Recovery Act. 9. The further question requiring consideration is regarding the power of the State to recover damages as arrears of land revenue under the Revenue Recovery Act. The Full Bench has taken the view that the State is not entitled to recover damages as arrears of land revenue because damages for breach of conditions will not amount to "money due under the contract". The Full Bench has relied upon a decision of this Court in Divisional Forest Officer v. Mool Chand, AIR 1971 S.C. 694 in support of its view. This decision cannot be an authority for the view taken by the Full Bench because it has been rendered with reference to facts which are entirely different. What fell for consideration in that case was whether a tender amount could be recovered from a defaulting forest contractor as arrears of land revenue when Section 75 of the Forest Regulation and Rule 10 of the Rules made thereunder did not provide for such realisation. We are, however, concerned with cases where the agreement entered into between the Government and the private persons specifically provides for recovery of damages as arrears of land revenue. What the Full Bench has failed to notice is that even though the damages become payable on account of breach of conditions of the contract, the liability to pay damages does not fall outside the terms of the contract but within the terms of the contract. The words "any amount that may become due or payable by the first party to the second party under any part of this agreement" have to be read in conjunction with the earlier portion of the clause stipulating liability on the party contracting with the State to pay damages for breach of conditions. Therefore, it follows that though damages become payable on account of breach of conditions of the agreement they nevertheless constitute amounts payable under the contract i.e. under one of the terms of the contract imposing liability to pay damages for breach of conditions. To illustrate the position if the agreement provides for a liquidated sum being paid as damages for breach of conditions instead of a sum to be assessed by the Deputy Commissioner, it cannot be said that the specified damages will not be money due under the contract and hence the damages cannot be recovered under the Revenue Recovery Act. To illustrate the position if the agreement provides for a liquidated sum being paid as damages for breach of conditions instead of a sum to be assessed by the Deputy Commissioner, it cannot be said that the specified damages will not be money due under the contract and hence the damages cannot be recovered under the Revenue Recovery Act. What applies to specified damages will likewise apply to damages which are quantified after assessment. We, therefore, hold that the opinion of the Full Bench in so far as the recovery of damages and arrears of land revenue is concerned is not in accordance with law.” 17. Thus, in view of the aforesaid dictum as laid in the decision of the Supreme Court, we are of the view that it is permissible for the State to recover its dues towards the rent from the writ applicant as if the same is towards the arrears of the land revenue. 18. We are not impressed by the submission of Mr. Bharda that the only mode and manner of recovering the amount is by filing a civil suit in the competent civil court. The agreement between the parties, in no uncertain terms, provide that if any sum of money under the contract is recoverable from the contractor (writ applicant), then such amount shall be recovered as arrears of land revenue. 19. If the stipulated amount is to be now recovered from the writ applicant as arrears of the land revenue, then the provisions of the Code, 1879, referred to above, would come into play. First a notice has to be issued under Section 152 of the Code and, thereafter, various other steps can be taken as provided upto section 155 of the Code. 20. In the case on hand, an amount of approximately Rs.1 Crore is sought to be recovered from the writ applicant towards the arrears of rent. The question is once there is a dispute as regards the exact amount due and recoverable or even the liability to pay any amount, is raised, then without the adjudication of the same, the authority concerned cannot straightway proceed to recover the amount as arrears of land revenue by following the procedure prescribed under the Code. The question is once there is a dispute as regards the exact amount due and recoverable or even the liability to pay any amount, is raised, then without the adjudication of the same, the authority concerned cannot straightway proceed to recover the amount as arrears of land revenue by following the procedure prescribed under the Code. First, there has to be an adjudication of the liability to pay, if the liability is fixed, then the exact amount to be paid and, thereafter, the said amount can be recovered as if the same is towards arrears of land revenue. 21. The moot question that now falls for our consideration is who shall determine the liability of the writ applicant to pay the stipulated amount towards the arrears of rent. In view of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, the Medical Superintendent cannot proceed, on his own, to determine the liability and fix the same. The writ applicant has outright disputed his liability to pay anything towards the arrears of rent and, in such circumstances, some independent person or body will have to adjudicate such liability. As observed by the Supreme Court, interests of justice and equity require that where a party to the contract disputes the committing of any breach of conditions, the adjudication should be by an independent person or body and not by the other party to the contract. The position will, however, be different when there is no dispute or there is consensus between the contracting parties regarding the breach of conditions. In such a case, the officer of the State, even though a party to the contract, will be well within his rights in assessing the exact liability in view of the specific terms of clause (7) of the agreement, referred to above between the parties. 22. Mr. Joshi, the learned AGP, would submit that the Gujarat Public Monies (Recovery of Dues), Act, 1979 (for short “the Act, 1979”) provides for the mode of recovery of such dues. According to Mr. Joshi, the Collector is the authority who has been conferred with the powers of performing the functions and exercise powers under the Sales Act, 1979. We are afraid, the provisions of the Act, 1979 are not applicable in the present case in any manner. We are saying so having regard to Section 3 of the Act. Section 3 reads thus; “3. We are afraid, the provisions of the Act, 1979 are not applicable in the present case in any manner. We are saying so having regard to Section 3 of the Act. Section 3 reads thus; “3. Recovery of certain dues as arrears of land revenue:- (1) Where any person is a party- (a) to any agreement relating to a loan, advance or grant given to him or relating to credit in respect of, or relating to hire-purchase of, goods sold to him [by the State Government, the Corporation or, as the case may be, the Government Company] by way of financial assistance, or (b) to any agreement relating to a loan, advance or grant given to him of relating to credit in respect of, or relating to hire-purchase of goods sold to him by a bank or a "Government Company, as the case may be, under a State sponsored scheme ; or (c) to any agreement relating to a guarantee given by the State Government or the Corporation in respect of a loan raised by an industrial concern, or (d) to any agreement providing that any money payable thereunder to the State Government or the Corporation shall be recoverable as arrears of land revenue ; and such person- (i) makes any default in payment of the loan or advance of any installment thereof; or (ii) having become, liable under the conditions of the grant to refund the grant or any portion thereof, makes any default in the refund or such grant or portion or any installment thereof, or (iii) otherwise fails to comply with the terms of the agreement then, in the case of the State Government, such officer as may be authorised in that behalf by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette, in the case of a corporation or a Government Company, the Managing Director thereof or where there is no Managing Director, the Chairman thereof, by whatever name called, and in the case of a bank, the local agent thereof, by whatever name called, may send to the Collector a certificate as early as possible in the prescribed form mentioning the sum due from such person and requesting that such sum may be recovered as if it were an arrear of land revenue. (2) The Collector on receiving the certificate shall after making such inquiries (including giving hearing to the party affected) as he deems fit proceed to recover the amount stated therein as aforesaid as arrears of land revenue. (3) On recovery of any amount under sub-section (2), the same shall be paid over to the State Government, Corporation, Government Company, or as the case may be, bank after deducting, except in the case of amount to be paid to the State Government, such portion of the amount realised, as cost of collection ; as the Collector may deem to be reasonable. (4) No suit for the recovery of any such due as aforesaid shall lie in a civil court against any person referred to in sub-section (1), and no injunction shall be granted by a civil court in respect of any action taken or intended to be taken in pursuance of the right conferred by this section.” 23. Considering the above, the agreement with which we are concerned does not fall in any of the categories as provided under Section 3 of the Act. 24. The only option now is to ask the Collector as an independent person to adjudicate the liability and fix the same if any. Once such adjudication takes place and the liability is fixed, thereafter, the provisions of the Code, 1879 would come into play and the requisite amount may be recovered. 25. We dispose of this writ application with a direction that the Collector shall adjudicate the liability of the writ applicant as sought to be fastened by the State and take an appropriate decision whether any amount is due and recoverable from the writ applicant towards the arrears of rent. It is needless to say that the Collector shall give an opportunity of hearing to all the stakeholders. Once the adjudication is completed, and, ultiamtely, if any liability is fixed, then appropriate further steps shall be taken in accordance with the provisions of the Code, 1879. 26. Before we close this matter, we would like to observe that no notice of recovery under Section 152 of the Code could have been straightway issued and no further steps pursuant thereto could have been undertaken without an appropriate adjudication and passing of a substantive order. 26. Before we close this matter, we would like to observe that no notice of recovery under Section 152 of the Code could have been straightway issued and no further steps pursuant thereto could have been undertaken without an appropriate adjudication and passing of a substantive order. It is only on the basis of a substantive order that may be passed that the provisions of Sections 150 to 155 of the Code would come into play. 27. In taking the aforesaid view, we are fortified by a Full Bench decision of this High Court in the case of Government of Gujarat vs. Amraji Motiji Thakor, reported in 1991 (2) GLH 606 , wherein the issue was whether a notice under Section 202 of the Code could have been issued in the absence of any substantive order being passed under the provisions of Section 61 of the Code. The Full Bench answered the said question as under; “There can be no dispute about the application of the principles of natural justice and giving of opportunity to the person concerned to be heard before reaching a decision or making an order of eviction which is to be executed under Section 202 of the Code. The position at law as regards application of principles of natural justice is quite well-settled. Only a couple of decision of the Supreme Court may be pointed out in this connection. In Government of Mysore v. J. V. Bhatt (1975)1 Supreme Court Cases 110 the Supreme Court pointed out that if there is power to decide and determine to the prejudice of a person duty to act judicially is implicit in the exercise of such power. It also said that the former distinction between administrative power and quasi judicial power is being gradually obliterated. On an earlier occasion in Daud Ahmed v. D.M. Allahabad (1978) 1 Supreme Court Cases 655 a larger bench of the Supreme Court pointed out that the principles of natural justice have been made applicable to administrative enquiries or quasi-judicial enquiries where they affect the right of the person. We may make it clear how- ever that the notice to be given under Section 202 of the Code should be of a reasonable time. We may make it clear how- ever that the notice to be given under Section 202 of the Code should be of a reasonable time. The person on whom such a notice is served may appear within that time and make some representation to the Collector requesting him to grant some time to vacate which the latter may consider. It is also clear that the latter part of Section 202 relating to removal of resistance or obstruction does contemplate a summary enquiry and therefore principles of natural justice would be applicable in that enquiry However the view of D. A. Desai J. in Special Civil Application No 500 of 1 to a decision or order of eviction and that the person in wrongful possession need not be heard at that stage and he will be entitled to be heard because of the latter part of Section 202 which contemplates a summary enquiry is with respect not correct in view of the reasons given by us above. The latter part of Section 202 comes into operation when there is resistance or obstruction in removal of a person from possession of land Speaking with respect again it would not be correct to hold that a person sought to be evicted from the land under Section 202 by a notice in order to be entitled to be heard should offer resistance or obstruction and that right of his to be heard would flow from the resistance or obstruction to the execution of the notice of eviction. In fact in the view that we have taken on the first part of the question re-framed the aforesaid view of D. A. Desai J. does not survive. 12. Our answer to the question reframed is as under (1) A notice under Section 202 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code does not in itself account to a decision or order of eviction of a person wrongfully in possession of land; but is only a mode of enforcement of such decision or order recorded under the substantive provisions of the Code or any other Act for the time being in force conferring power on the Collector to evict such person. (2) In view of the above conclusion the question of application of principles of natural justice at the stage of issuing notice under Section 202 does not arise. (2) In view of the above conclusion the question of application of principles of natural justice at the stage of issuing notice under Section 202 does not arise. It is made clear however that the principles of natural justice would be applicable at the stage of recording the decision or order to evict in case of exercise of power by the Collector under Section 61 or 79A of the Code which are some of the substantive provisions in the Code conferring such power on the Collector. (3) The summary enquiry contemplated by the latter part of Section 202 is not meant for reaching or recording a decision or order of eviction. It applies to the contingency of resistance or obstruction in taking possession of land in the course of enforcement of a decision or order to evict made under some provision of the code such as Section 61 or 79A or any other Act for the time being in force empowering the Collector to evict a person wrongfully in possession of land.” 28. Let the entire exercise be undertaken at the earliest and completed within three months from the date of the receipt of the writ of this order. 29. The impugned notice dated 19.02.2019, Annexure-K is hereby quashed and set aside.