Research › Search › Judgment

Bombay High Court · body

2021 DIGILAW 1129 (BOM)

Maroti v. Ramkrushna

2021-08-13

MANISH PITALE

body2021
JUDGMENT Manish Pitale, J. - By this application, the applicants (original complainants), have challenged order dated 12/06/2017 passed by the Court of 17th Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.9, Nagpur (hereinafter referred to as "Magistrate"), whereby complaint filed by the applicants against the non-applicants for offences punishable under sections 499, 500 and 501 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as "IPC"), has been dismissed under section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "Cr.P.C.") 2. In brief the grievance of the applicants is that the non-applicants herein made certain defamatory statements against them in a proceeding before the Sub-Divisional Officer, concerning a dispute between the parties as regards boundaries of their agricultural fields. The applicants contended that specific statements quoted in the complaint demonstrated that the non-applicants had committed offences punishable under sections 499, 500 and 501 of the IPC. 3. The Magistrate called for a report under section 202 of the Cr.P.C. 4. Thereafter, the Magistrate took up the complaint for consideration. In the impugned order, the Magistrate came to a conclusion that even if the statements made in the complaint were to be accepted, it was obvious that the alleged defamatory statements were made by the non-applicants before the Sub-Divisional officer in a proceeding where the non-applicants were seeking to assert their rights and that therefore, Eighth Exception to section 499 of the IPC was squarely attracted. On this basis, the complaint was dismissed. 5. The impugned order was made subject matter of challenge in the present application, wherein notice was issued. The respondent appeared through counsel and the application was directed to be listed for final disposal at the admission stage. 6. Mr. V. G. Bhamburkar, learned counsel appearing for the applicants, submitted that the Magistrate had committed an error in concluding that the non-applicants were entitled to the benefit of Eighth Exception to section 499 of the IPC. It is submitted that as per settled law, the said Exception could be applied only if the accused ( non-applicants in the present case), established that the statements that they made before the Sub-Divisional Officer were made in good faith. It was submitted that such a finding was necessarily a finding on facts, which could be arrived at only after trial and that therefore, the impugned order deserved to be set aside. It was submitted that such a finding was necessarily a finding on facts, which could be arrived at only after trial and that therefore, the impugned order deserved to be set aside. Reliance placed on judgment of the Lahore High Court passed in the case of Chanan Singh v. Tarak Singh, 43 CriLJ 1942, pg.572 and judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chaman Lal v. The State of Punjab, (1970) 1 SCC 590 . 7. On the other hand, Ms Ghatode, the learned counsel appearing for the non-applicants, submitted that the said non-applicants were entitled for the benefit of Eighth Exception to section 499 of the IPC. It was an admitted position that the statements attributed to the non-applicants were made in a proceeding before the Sub-Divisional Officer in the process of the non-applicants asserting their rights in respect of the agricultural land. On this basis, it was submitted that Eighth Exception to section 499 of the IPC squarely applied in favour of the non-applicants. Reliance was placed on judgments of the Madras High Court in the case of Balamurugan v. State Rep. by the Inspector of Police,2021 SCCOnLineMad 2086 and in the case of Dr. R. Krishnamurthy, Editor and Printer v. City Public Prosecutor,2021 SCCOnLineMad 2676. 8. Heard the learned counsel for the rival parties and perused the material on record. The relevant finding of the Magistrate in the impugned order is found in paragraphs-5 and 6. After recording that the statements of the non-applicants to which the applicants have taken exception were made in proceedings before the Sub-Divisional Officer pertaining to a boundary dispute of agricultural land, the Magistrate directly came to the conclusion that Eighth Exception to section 499 of the IPC, was clearly attracted in the present case in favour of the non-applicants. 9. The relevant portion of section 499 of the IPC reads as follows: "Sec. 499. Defamation.- Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter excepted, to defame that person. Defamation.- Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter excepted, to defame that person. Eighth Exception - Accusation preferred in good faith to authorised person.- It is not defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject matter of accusation. Illustration If A in good faith accuses Z before a Magistrate; if A in good faith complains of the conduct of Z, a servant, to Z's master; if A in good faith complains of the conduct of Z, a child, to Z's father - A is within this exception." 10. A perusal of the above quoted Eighth Exception to section 499 of the IPC and the illustration appended thereto shows that the emphasis is on the words "good faith". It is specified that when a person makes a statement in 'good faith' before a lawful authority, such a person cannot be hauled up for the offence of defamation. In the case of Chaman Lal v. State of Punjab (supra), specifically in the context of Eighth Exception to section 499 of the IPC, in paragraph-8 it has been specifically held that 'good faith' has also to be established as a fact. In paragraph-16 of the said judgment, it was held that in the facts of the said case, the Court found that there was utter lack of 'good faith' in the accusation. 11. The two judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents in the case of Balamurugan v. State Rep. by the Inspector of Police and Dr. R. Krishnamurthy, Editor and Printer v. City Public Prosecutor, (supra) are not relevant for the point in issue before this Court because in those cases, the Court found on facts that the accusations could not be said to be defamatory. 12. In the case of Chanan Singh v. Tarak Singh (supra), the Lahore High Court specifically dealt with a question pertaining to Eighth Exception to section 499 of the IPC. 12. In the case of Chanan Singh v. Tarak Singh (supra), the Lahore High Court specifically dealt with a question pertaining to Eighth Exception to section 499 of the IPC. It was held that a complaint for defamation would be maintainable in respect of allegations made before a public servant and that the burden of proof would lie on the accused person to show that his case fell within Eighth Exception to section 499 of the IPC. It was specifically held that when an accused claims benefit of Eighth Exception to section 499 of the IPC, it has to be proved as a fact. 13. The moment the said position of law is appreciated, it becomes clear that the matter has to go to the next stage of evidence and trial. The Magistrate completely failed to appreciate this aspect of the matter and erroneously held in favour the non-applicants, merely because the alleged defamatory statements were made before the Sub-Divisional Officer in a proceeding pending between the parties. The approach adopted by the Magistrate was obviously not in tune with the aforesaid position of law and therefore, the dismissal of the complaint cannot be upheld. 14. In view of the above, the present application is allowed. The impugned order is quashed and set aside and the complaint filed by the applicants is restored before the Magistrate, to be proceeded with in accordance with law.