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2021 DIGILAW 1130 (GUJ)

UJESHBHAI ISHWARBHAI PATEL v. COMMISSIONER OF MUNICIPALITIES GUJARAT STATE

2021-12-03

ASHUTOSH J.SHASTRI

body2021
ORDER : 1. By way of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have prayed for quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 25.03.2021 passed by the respondent - authority removing the petitioners from the posts of councilors of Valsad Municipality. 2. The brief facts giving rise to the petition are that petitioner no. 1 is affiliated with Bhartiya Janta Party and was also elected as a councilor of Valsad Municipality in the year 2012 upto 2017. Again in the year 2017, petitioner no. 1 was elected as a councilor of Valsad Municipality. So far as petitioner no. 2 is concerned, he is also affiliated with Bhartiya Janta Party and having 6th term as a councilor in the said Municipality. So far as petitioner no. 3 is concerned, he was also a councilor right from the year 2002 and having successive 3rd term as a councilor. He came to be elected as an independent candidate. So far as petitioner no. 4 is concerned, he is also an independent candidate and elected as a councilor in the Municipality. It is the case of the petitioners that a show cause notice came to be issued on 29.07.2019 in exercise of powers conferred by virtue of sub-section (1) of Section 37 of the Act, inter alia, calling upon the petitioners to show cause as to why the petitioners should not be removed as a councilors of the Valsad Municipality in view of disgraceful conduct shown in the meeting held on 29.01.2019 of the said Municipality. It was alleged in the show cause notice that at 11:30 am, the meeting was held in the meeting hall of Valsad Municipality, wherein, petitioners were raising their voice and were making their representation and it is alleged that despite they being informed to maintain decorum, they continued to misbehave, abuse the office and has disrupted the Valsad Municipality. These petitioners frequently left their chairs and in an infuriated state of mind, rush down in the meeting towards the chair to obstruct the proceedings and were abusing the officers, who are present in the meeting. It was further alleged that the works proposed by the Chairman of the Executive Committee were accepted and stopped by misbehaving in such an abusive manner and to that effect videography of the meeting is also undertaken. It was further alleged that the works proposed by the Chairman of the Executive Committee were accepted and stopped by misbehaving in such an abusive manner and to that effect videography of the meeting is also undertaken. After getting opinion from the Regional Commissioner of the Municipality, Surat Zone, the Commissioner of the Municipality, Surat Zone, opined to take steps under Section 37 of the Act against the petitioners and along with the show cause notice, a report for Regional Commissioner of Municipality, Surat Zone was also served to the petitioners. A copy of the said report was dated 18.07.2019. 2.1. It is the case of the petitioners that on 13.08.2019, an application was submitted to provide the documents relied upon by the authorities for issuance of show cause notice under Section 37 of the Act, but the same were not provided, which has affected their right of making effective reply and representation. Pursuant to the said application, some of the documents were provided to the petitioners and as such, another application was given on 17.03.2020 to provide further documents which were left out and without those relevant documents, it was not possible for the petitioners to prepare an affidavit-in-reply. Since all other documents were not provided, yet another application was given on 29.10.2020 in which one page report was supplied to the petitioners. Though other relevant material was relied upon after the aforesaid third application i.e. 29.10.2020, by a forwarding letter dated 12.09.2019, some of the documents were provided and as such, for left out documents, then the petitioners were present with their advocate along with the application and compact disc which was not provided and for such compact disc by way of notice dated 02.11.2020, the next date of hearing was fixed on 12.11.2020 which was communicated by the Mamlatdar, Municipality (Administration) Gujarat State, Gandhinagar. 2.2. It is further the case of the petitioners that on 10.12.2020, reply to the show cause notice was submitted and along with the same, the petitioners have also produced an affidavit of Mr. 2.2. It is further the case of the petitioners that on 10.12.2020, reply to the show cause notice was submitted and along with the same, the petitioners have also produced an affidavit of Mr. Bharatbhai Patel, one of the councilor, who himself is a complainant alleged to have made a complaint against the petitioners regarding unruly behaviour, but the said affidavit in which the Chief Officer was also alleged to have not acted in proper manner and as such, the petitioners cannot be said to have committed any disgraceful or misconduct of any nature. This affidavit dated 06.08.2019, sworn by the complainant, i.e. Mr. Bharatbhai Patel is also forwarded to everybody, indicating that he signed the document without looking at it, and in good faith, in fact, he submitted that no misconduct is committed by any of the councilors and the said affirmed affidavit was produced dated 06.08.2019. Ultimately, during the course of hearing, few decisions have also been produced with a view to indicate that no steps can be taken under Section 37 of the Act when none of the ingredients are satisfied. Prima facie simply raising voice cannot be said to be disgraceful conduct to attract Section 37 of the Act and raising of voice was on account of serious issues which were deliberated during the course of meeting and as such, in view of the facts which are stated that there are serious conduct of Chief Officer as well as few of the councilors, during the course of meeting that points were raised by the petitioners by indicating few irregularities which are mentioned in the petition. A contention is raised that the respondents recorded the impugned order dated 25.03.2021 without granting any adequate opportunity and when serious action of removal is to be affected principle of fair play in action in close conformity of principles of natural justice are essential and having not observed, the impugned order is not sustainable in the eye of law. 3. Based upon the aforesaid facts, the present petition was brought before this Court in which, on 24.04.2021 notices have been issued upon the respondent authorities and after completion of pleadings the same came up for consideration before this Court and after extensive hearing, the petition was reserved for orders. 4. Learned advocate Mr. 3. Based upon the aforesaid facts, the present petition was brought before this Court in which, on 24.04.2021 notices have been issued upon the respondent authorities and after completion of pleadings the same came up for consideration before this Court and after extensive hearing, the petition was reserved for orders. 4. Learned advocate Mr. B.M. Mangukiya appearing for the petitioners has vehemently contended that the order impugned is a non speaking order and is perverse to the record. On the contrary, the issues which are narrated in the show cause notice, but then the manner in which the action is concluded against the petitioners, it appears that the same is pre-determined and politically motivated. It has been contended that high volume speech or agitated voice during the meeting proceedings ipso facto cannot constitute disgraceful conduct. In a democratic setup, voice of the councilors cannot be sub-merged by taking such kind of drastic action against the petitioners otherwise, for a pretty long period, these petitioners have remained as councilors in the Municipality. The elected representatives were raising voice against the alleged irregularities, cannot shut down or pressurize under the guise of such kind of initiation of steps of removal and if this be allowed, the very basis of raising grievance against the irregularities would be demoralized. By referring to provisions of Section 37 of the Act, read with another provisions, precisely, Section 51 of the Act, a contention is raised that the ingredients are not reflecting at all to attract the provisions of Section 37 of the Act and as such, the order impugned suffers from vice of non application of mind. By referring to certain irregularities, for which, a voice was raised, during the course of meeting, are pointed out by the learned advocate for the petitioners by referring to para 13 onward and has submitted that the conduct of some of the councilors was such in which the petitioners were left with no other alternate but to raise voice to have their representations effectively in the meeting. A reference is made to para 16, 17 and 18 to contend that action is too harsh against the petitioners and almost impermissible at least to remove the petitioners from the position of councilors. A reference is made to para 16, 17 and 18 to contend that action is too harsh against the petitioners and almost impermissible at least to remove the petitioners from the position of councilors. It has been pointed out that the decision making process must be in close conformity with the principles of natural justice and the brief report which has been relied upon of the Regional Commissioner cannot be said to be an inquiry on the basis of the drastic action of removal can be affected. By referring to the contents and the observations made by the authority in the impugned order, it has been submitted that the order is not sustainable in the eye of law. Thus, the authority while passing the order has not considered and given due weightage to the affidavit which has been produced by one of the councilor Mr. Bharatbhai Patel who in turn has stated that the conduct of the petitioners were not such which may attract this action of removal against them and as such, also the impugned order is absolutely unjust, arbitrary and perverse to the record. That being so, the reliefs prayed for in the petition deserves to be considered. 5. As against this, Mr. Hardik Mehta, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the respondent authorities to defend the order has submitted that Section 37 of the Act is sufficiently envisaging power in the authority to maintain disciple in regularization of meetings and no councilor can show any disgraceful conduct in the meeting proceedings and here is a case in which they have found such kind of conduct of the petitioners based upon the report of the Regional Commissioner as well videography, it transpires to the authority that the conduct is such where action is justifiable. Even report and the videography is sufficiently indicating the manner in which the petitioners have misbehaved in the meeting and this is not simply because of raising voice in the meeting on the contrary, in addition to the disgraceful conduct even derogatory words were also used in the presence of lady councilors in the meeting and as such, when such material has been gone into and critically analyzed by the authority while passing the order, the decision making process cannot be said to be violative of the principles of natural justice or suffers from the vice of any perversity. When that be so, the peculiar background of the fact would not permit the petitioners to agitate against the satisfaction arrived at by the authority. The learned Assistant Government Pleader has submitted that before taking decision impugned in the petition, more than enough opportunities have been given to the petitioners not only to supply every material which has been available with the authority, including supply of relevant documents and CD and as many as 22 dates have been given to represent the case and as such, in no circumstance, the decision making process can be said to be violative of principles of natural justice. By giving chronology of events, learned Assistant Government Pleader has submitted that since the findings are clear enough and the conduct is such where the powers can be exercised under Section 37 of the Act, the petitioners have been rightly dealt with by the authority and further the grievance which has been raised about the Resolution which has been passed in the meeting, precisely Resolution No. 96 dated 09.11.2020 would not bind the State authorities simply because after some passage of time, the Resolution is being passed. When the State authorities found that the circumstance warrant exercise of jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Act, Resolution or affidavits are insignificant. 6. So far as non speaking order as alleged by the petitioners, the authorities are not expected to pass the orders at such a great length, but if substance is to be looked into, it clearly reflects application of mind, dealing with the material on record and close conformity of the principles of natural justice. When these elements are very much reflecting from the order, lack of reasons cannot be that factual to dislodge a specific finding which has been arrived at. As a result of this, no case is made out by the petitioners to call for any interference. 7. In addition to this, learned advocate Mr. Mitual Shelat has submitted that the contents of the complaint are sufficient enough to indicate that proper steps have been taken. A perusal of the minutes of meeting at page 140 of the petition compilation is sufficient enough to justify the action against the petitioners. It has been contended specifically that several dates have been given to make an effective representations and the same are as many as 22 and only thereafter, the order is passed. A perusal of the minutes of meeting at page 140 of the petition compilation is sufficient enough to justify the action against the petitioners. It has been contended specifically that several dates have been given to make an effective representations and the same are as many as 22 and only thereafter, the order is passed. Further, there is a conscious suppression of material fact by the petitioners which conduct itself is sufficient enough to dismiss the petition and for that purpose, learned advocate Mr. Shelat has drawn attention to the decision which is reported in the case of General Motors, Haryana Roadways v. Jai Bhagwan & Anr., reported in (2008) 4 SCC 127 . A close perusal of the relevant provisions namely Section 37 as well as Section 51(1) of the Act which clearly suggest that the order passed by the authority is not possible to be construed as invalid in any nature and when that be so, there is hardly any reason for the petitioners to invoke extra ordinary jurisdiction. When every fact is considered, namely the report of the authority, detailed representation of the petitioners as well as videography, and when all these things have been considered by the authority, the order which has been passed in due discharge of statutory function it is well within the scope of authority. Simply because it may prove to be harsh upon the petitioners, would not be a ground to exercise extra ordinary jurisdiction as invoked by the petitioners. Hence, by referring to few decisions from the stand of the respondents, learned advocate Mr. Shelat has requested to dismiss the petition as no case is made out. 8. As a part of rejoinder, learned advocate Mr. Mangukiya has agitated that there is no independent conclusion arrived at by the authority, nor any cogent reasons are supported and so far as alleged filthy language is concerned, there is hardly any material available to justify such act of the petitioners. The complaints which are tried to be relied upon in the proceedings were never part of the record before the Commissioner who passed the impugned order and as such, the same cannot be relied upon at this stage. On the contrary, learned advocate Mr. The complaints which are tried to be relied upon in the proceedings were never part of the record before the Commissioner who passed the impugned order and as such, the same cannot be relied upon at this stage. On the contrary, learned advocate Mr. Mangukiya has reiterated that raising voice as pointed out in the meeting would not constitute the act of disgraceful conduct and as such, for supporting this submission, learned advocate Mr. Mangukiya has referred to the decision delivered by the Apex Court reported in AIR 1952 SC 16 . Hence, the order passed by the1 authority, according to learned advocate Mr. Mangukiya is required to be quashed. For the purpose of strengthening the submissions, learned advocate Mr. Mangukiya has referred to and relied upon the following decisions :- “(1) In the case of Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab & Ors., reported in (2001) 6 SCC 260 . (2) In the case of Sharda Kailash Mittal v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., reported in (2010) 2 SCC 319 . (3) In the case of Baldev Singh Gandhi v. State of Punjab & Ors., reported in (2002) 3 SCC 667 . (4) In the case of Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. District Collector, Raigad & Ors., reported in (2012) 4 SCC 407 (5) In the case of Kamlaben Rohitbhai Patel v. Additional Development Commissioner rendered in Special Civil Application No. 234 of 1990 dated 07.03.2000. (6) In the case of Virbalaben Girishbhai Trivedi & Ors., v. State of Gujarat & Ors., rendered in Special Civil Application No. 7894 and 7850 of 2009 dated 17.12.2009. (7) In the case of Vasantiben Vashrambhai Galchar v. Commissioner of Municipalities Administration, Gujarat State rendered in Special Civil Application No. 9277 of 2021 dated 09.08.20201.” 9. As against this at this stage after the completion of the submissions, learned advocate Mr. Mitual Shelat has referred to and relied upon the following decisions for consideration of the Court and summed up the submissions. “(1) In the case of G.M. Haryana Roadways v. Jai Bhagwan reported in 2008 (4) SCC 127 . (2) In the case of Mushtaq Ahmed Hasanbhai Mansuri v. V.C. Trivedi & Anr., reported in 2003 (1) GLR 745 . (3) In the case of Yashinbhai Ismail Mandli v. State of Gujarat reported in 2020 SCC Online Guj 2414.” 10. “(1) In the case of G.M. Haryana Roadways v. Jai Bhagwan reported in 2008 (4) SCC 127 . (2) In the case of Mushtaq Ahmed Hasanbhai Mansuri v. V.C. Trivedi & Anr., reported in 2003 (1) GLR 745 . (3) In the case of Yashinbhai Ismail Mandli v. State of Gujarat reported in 2020 SCC Online Guj 2414.” 10. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and having gone through the material placed before the Court in this present petition and having considered the proposition laid down by the aforementioned decisions, few circumstances, before arriving at the conclusion are not possible to be ignored by the Court. 11. At the outset, it appears that the petitioners have raised several contentions which are even mentioned in the impugned order as well. It was categorically contended that certain material has not been provided which has affected his right of making effective representation and in addition thereto, the specific contentions have been raised by indicating that relevant statutory provisions are also narrated in the impugned orders. Further, certain decisions have also been pointed out relevant to the controversy involved in the petition and thereby, has requested to set aside the impugned action against the petitioners. Now, in light of the aforesaid situation which was projected by the petitioners before the authority concerned, the conclusion which is reflecting on page 122 in the impugned order it appears that there is no detailed discussion with regard to any of the contentions as to why the same are not of any assistance to the petitioners. Even the discussion with regard to binding decisions and proposition contained therein have also not been discussed and just by one line it has been observed that such decisions are not applicable. This being a quasi judicial authority, it was expected on the part of the authority to at least deal with the contentions which have been raised before it and ought to have arrived at a specific conclusion by assigning proper reasons and if judgments are not applicable, at least some brief discussion ought to have been reflected in the conclusion arrived at by the authority. The same is apparently quite missing looking at the brief reasons which are assigned and in the considered opinion of this Court is not sufficient enough. The same is apparently quite missing looking at the brief reasons which are assigned and in the considered opinion of this Court is not sufficient enough. Substantial reliance which has been placed is on the report prepared by the Chief Officer in substance against whom there was a serious grievance voiced out in the meeting itself and, therefore, the authority ought to have independently examined the issue rather relying upon the report and brushed aside all the contentions without dealing with it. Such exercise of discretion appears to be irregular and not in consonance with the proposition of law laid down on the issue of exercise of jurisdiction. Since the Court is prima facie of the opinion, at the first instance itself that the reasons which are not properly assigned and non dealing of the contentions has also vitiated the very exercise of discretion vested by the statue in authority and, therefore, without discussing much on rival contentions on merit, the Court is of the considered opinion that re-look by the authority deserves in the background of the present facts and circumstances. 12. At this stage, the Court is reminded of the proposition on the issue laid down by several decisions of Hon’ble Apex Court last in line is the decision in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax-1 v. Rashtradoot (HUF) reported in (2019) 5 SCC 149 , in which the Court would like to quote the relevant observations hereunder :- “13.This Court has consistently laid emphasis that every order/judgment, which decides the lis between the parties, must contain the reason(s)/ground(s) for arriving at a particular conclusion. Indeed, what is decisive for deciding the case is not the conclusion alone but the reason(s)/ground(s) assigned in support of such conclusion, which results in reaching to such conclusion. 14. In order to decide as to whether the impugned order is legally sustainable or not, the appellate court is entitled to know as to what impelled the court below to pass such order in favour of one party and against the aggrieved party. We find that this requirement is missing in the impugned order of this case and hence the interference is called for. (See State of Maharashtra v. Vitahla Rao Pritirao Chawan, Jawahar Lal Singh v. Naresh Singh, State of U.P. v. Battan, Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar and State of Orissa v. Dhaniram Luhar.) 15. We find that this requirement is missing in the impugned order of this case and hence the interference is called for. (See State of Maharashtra v. Vitahla Rao Pritirao Chawan, Jawahar Lal Singh v. Naresh Singh, State of U.P. v. Battan, Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar and State of Orissa v. Dhaniram Luhar.) 15. In view of the foregoing discussion, we allow the appeal, set aside the impugned order and remand the case to the High Court with a request to decide the appeal filed by the Revenue (Commissioner of Income Tax) afresh on merits in accordance with law. 12.1. The next decision is in the case of Kushuma Devi v. Sheopati Devi (Dead) & Anr., reported in (2019) 5 SCC 744 , the relevant observations contained in para 7 and 8 since considered, the Court deems it proper to reproduce the same hereunder: “7. The need to remand the case to the High Court has occasioned because from the perusal of the impugned order dated 27.07.2012, quoted above, we find that it is an unreasoned order. In other words, the High Court neither discussed the issues arising in the case, nor dealt with any of the submissions urged by the parties and nor assigned any reason as to why it has dismissed the writ petition. 8. This Court has consistently laid down that every judicial or/and quasi-judicial order passed by the court/tribunal/authority concerned, which decides the lis between the parties, must be supported with reasons in support of its conclusion. The parties to the lis and also the appellate/revisionary court while examining the correctness of the order are entitled to know as to on which basis, a particular conclusion is arrived at in the order. In the absence of any discussion, the reasons and the findings on the submissions urged, it is not possible to know as to what led the court/tribunal/authority for reaching to such conclusion. (See State of Maharashtra v. Vitahla Rao Pritirao Chawan, Jawahar Lal Singh v. Naresh Singh, State of U.P. v. Battan, Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar and State of Orissa v. Dhaniram Luhar.)” 13. Yet another decision which is delivered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa & Ors. (See State of Maharashtra v. Vitahla Rao Pritirao Chawan, Jawahar Lal Singh v. Naresh Singh, State of U.P. v. Battan, Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar and State of Orissa v. Dhaniram Luhar.)” 13. Yet another decision which is delivered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa & Ors. v. Chandra Nandi reported in (2019) 4 SCC 357 wherein also, emphasis has been made by the Hon’ble Apex Court to pass a reasoned order and unreasoned order is not sustainable. “9. The need to remand the case to the High Court has occasioned because from the perusal of the impugned order, we find that it is an unreasoned order. In other words, the High Court neither discussed the issues arising in the case, nor dealt with any of the submissions urged by the parties and nor assigned any reason as to why it has allowed the writ petition and granted the reliefs to the writ petitioner which were declined by the Tribunal. 10. This Court has consistently laid down that every judicial or/and quasi-judicial order passed by the court/tribunal/authority concerned, which decides the lis between the parties, must be supported with the reasons in support of its conclusion. The parties to the lis and so also the appellate/revisionary court while examining the correctness of the order are entitled to know as to on which basis, a particular conclusion is arrived at in the order. In the absence of any discussion, the reasons and the findings on the submissions urged, it is not possible to know as to what led the court/tribunal/authority for reaching to such conclusion.(See State of Maharashtra v. Vitahla Rao Pritirao Chawan, Jawahar Lal Singh v. Naresh Singh, State of U.P. v. Battan, Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar and State of Orissa v. Dhaniram Luhar.)” 14. In view of the aforesaid proposition of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court and in view of the conclusion which is reflecting in the impugned order, this Court is of the clear opinion that on this count alone, the order having been passed without assigning any cogent reasons and without dealing with specific issues and contentions raised by the petitioners, the same deserves to be quashed and set aside with a consequential direction to reconsider. Even the provisions relevant to the issue have also not been examined as it is clearly visible from the order and as such, the Court is left with no other alternative, but to set aside the impugned order. Hence, the following order is passed which would meet the ends of justice, in the opinion of this Court. (1) The impugned order dated 25.03.2021 passed by respondent no. 1 – The Commissioner of Municipalities is hereby quashed and set aside with a consequential direction to reconsider the grievance of the petitioners and take a fresh decision after extending appropriate opportunity to the concerned petitioners. (2) Since the impugned order dated 25.03.2021 is set aside hereby with a consequential direction to take a fresh decision in view of the background of present facts, it is further directed that the said exercise of taking a fresh decision be concluded at the earliest, preferably within a period of four weeks from the date of the receipt of this Court. (3) It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on merit with regard to any of the contentions raised in the petition and it is independently left it open for the concerned authority to take appropriate decision in accordance with law on the basis of the material and the submissions which may be available on record. 15. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the present petition stands allowed. Direct Service is permitted. FURTHER ORDER At this stage, learned advocate Mr. Mitual Shelat appearing for the respondent has requested for suspension of present order for some time. However, considering the background of facts, the Court deems it proper not to consider the said request. Accordingly, rejected.